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The landscape of UK higher education has changed significantly in the last five years. A tripling of 
tuition fees, the uncapping of student numbers, and an explosion in the number of ‘alternative 
providers’ typify a more marketised higher education sector (Brown and Carasso, 2013). With 
more providers than ever before competing for students, many with little experience and profit-
driven motives, there is a clear danger that quality will suffer.  
Faced with limited resource and an expanding, fiercely independent sector, the Government 
sought to protect quality by asking the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) to 
adopt a risk-based approach. The 2011 White Paper Student at the Heart of the System directed 
QAA to prioritise their reviews based on “an objective assessment of a basket of data, monitored 
continually but at arm’s length” (BIS, 2011, 3.19). There is, however, an evident dearth of empirical 
evidence to support such an approach . The aim of this thesis is to examine the extent to which 
available data can predict the outcome of quality assurance reviews, and hence prioritise them. 
To fulfill this aim, the outcomes of all QAA reviews comparable with its current inspection methods 
were gathered along with all available data that could feasibly form part of a data-driven risk-
based approach to quality assurance. Using machine learning, this study shows conclusively that 
a risk-based approach to quality assurance, as envisioned in the 2011 White Paper, cannot work. 
There is no connection between the available data and the subsequent outcome of QAA reviews. 
The final part of this thesis therefore examines the reason why there is no connection between 
the available data and the outcome of QAA reivews. Three overarching and non-exclusive 
possibilities are identified. Concerns over the data, the review process, and the definition of 
‘quality’ pose significant barriers to the operation of a successful data-driven, risk-based approach. 
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This introduction briefly explains how this thesis came into being, its aim, and the approach 
adopted to achieve this aim. It begins by detailing the developments in higher education policy 
and regulatory theory that led to the conception of the thesis, the author’s background and 
interest in the topic, and the impact of the findings to date. This is followed by a chapter-by-
chapter overview of the thesis.  
 
1.1. Thesis Development and Aims 
In 2012, the UK higher education landscape was undergoing significant change. New 
undergraduate students would be the first to face fees of up to £9,000 a year, students attending 
new, for-profit ‘alternative providers’ would be allowed access to Government-backed student 
loans, and the restrictions on the use of the protected term ‘university’ were being lessened. A 
sector which had been relatively stable, albeit expanding, for many years faced unprecendented 
change and ‘marketisation’ (Brown and Carasso, 2013). To keep pace with these developments 
and remain fit for purpose, the regulation of higher education also needed to change.  
The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) is “the independent body entrusted 
with monitoring, and advising on, standards and quality in UK higher education” (QAA, 2015a). 
Since 2002, QAA had been operating a largely-unchanged system of sexennial audits of providers’ 
internal quality assurance processes (QAA, 2002). The 2011 White Paper Students at the Heart of 
the System called for the QAA to adopt a new: 
“…genuinely risk-based approach, focusing QAA effort where it will have most impact and 
giving students power to hold universities to account. All providers must continue to be 
part of a single assurance framework. But we would explore options in which the 
frequency – and perhaps need – for a full, scheduled institutional review will depend on 
an objective assessment of a basket of data, monitored continually but at arm’s length.”  
(BIS, 2011, 3.19) 
‘Risk-based’ approaches to regulation became popular at the start of the 21st century and are 
defined by the explicit allocation of regulatory resource in proportion to the risks posed to the 
regulator’s objectives (Black, 2005; Rothstein et al., 2006b). The enthusiasm for risk-based 
approaches resulted in their use becoming a statutory requirement for all regulators in 2008 
(BERR, 2007). Up until 2012, QAA had managed to avoid this statutory requirement by virtue of 
their unique status as a private company contracted by regulators – the national funding councils 
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- to deliver part of their regulatory function (Further and Higher Education Act, 1992; Brown, 
2004). Despite the fact that regulators had been practising ‘risk-based’ approaches for up to ten 
years by this point, there was an evident dearth of empirical evidence to inform such a policy 
(Raban, 2011). 
Conversations between Professor Alison Wolf, Sir Roy Griffiths Chair of Public Sector Management 
at King’s College London, and Anthony McClaren, then Chief Executive of QAA, concerning this 
lack of evidence resulted in this collaborative ESRC and QAA-funded thesis; the idea behind which 
is to provide that missing evidence. More specifically, the aim of this thesis is to examine the 
extent to which available data could predict the outcome of QAA reviews, and hence prioritise 
them, as part of a risk-based approach to quality assurance. 
Since the publication of Students at the Heart of the System, and the subsequent conception of 
this thesis, there has been significant change in higher education oversight. HEFCE have 
redesigned the quality assurance system, divided the work into six separate contracts, and 
awarded four of those contracts to QAA following a competitive tender process (HEFCE, 2016c). 
The Conservative Party won a majority in the 2015 General Election, published green and white 
higher education papers, and are now taking the Higher Education and Research Bill through 
parliament (BIS, 2015b, 2016; Department for Education, 2016). The proposed legislative changes, 
which may lead to further changes to quality assurance and the introduction of a Teaching 
Excellence Framework (TEF), prompted a Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) select committee 
hearing into ‘Assessing Quality in Higher Education’ (BIS Select Committee, 2015, 2016a). BIS has 
since been replaced by the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and responibility 
for higher education has moved to the Department for Education (DfE) following the post EU-
referendum reconfiguration of Whitehall (Leach, 2016). 
This thesis, however, has a specific and stable line of enquiry. Whilst I will allude to the 
aforementioned events and developments at various points during the course of my research, I 
have neither set out to evaluate current proposals for reform, nor track the changing politics of 
higher education regulation. This thesis is about the extent to which available data could predict 
the outcome of QAA reviews, and hence prioritise them. It is not about today’s, or yesterday’s, 
particular item of debate. It’s about whether QAA judgements can be predicted using a basket of 
available data, and what one can conclude about risk-based approaches in higher education as a 
result of the answer to this question. 
At the time I applied for the studentship in July 2013, I had been working for four-and-a-half years 
in the ‘Intelligence’ Directorate of the Care Quality Commission (CQC), England’s health and social 
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care regulator. There, my role was to lead a team of analysts in the development and automation 
of ‘Quality and Risk Profiles’ (QRPs). These automated risk reports could contain in excess of 1,000 
quantitative and qualitative metrics and required a vast amount of resource to maintain. Despite 
this, they appeared to be of little use in prioritsing inspections (see for example Pollard, 2011; 
Francis, 2013). Rather than continue to implement what I saw as a flawed approach, I was keen to 
apply my skills to the challenge of identifying an effective, evidence-based approach in another 
sector. 
This thesis is the result. Somewhat dishearteningly for both QAA and for myself, having spent my 
career to date working with regulatory performance data, this thesis conclusively demonstrates a 
data-driven, risk-based approach to quality assurance in higher education cannot work. There is 
simply no robust relationship between the vast array of UK higher education data and the 
subsequent outcome of QAA reviews. These quantitative findings resulted in the final part of the 
thesis that explores why the available data is not able to predict the outcome of QAA reviews. 
The quantitative results have contributed to a change in quality assurance policy. The findings 
were widely publicised in the quality assurance world in late 2015 following a specially convened 
seminar of the Policy Institute at King’s, the author’s oral and written evidence to the BIS Select 
Committee’s ‘Assessing Quality in Higher Education’ Inquiry, presentation at the 2015 Annual 
Conferences' of the European Quality Assurance Forum (EQAF) and the Society for Research into 
Higher Education (SRHE), and coverage in the Times Higher Education (Griffiths, 2015; EQAF, 2015; 
SRHE, 2015; Havergal, 2015). The use of expert interpretation of metrics is now being advocated 
in the unevidenced hope that it will allow for the successful prioritisation of QAA reviews (Kimber, 
2015; HEFCE, 2016c). 
 
This thesis therefore came about as the result of the 2011 White Paper which called for the QAA 
to adopt a data-led, risk-based approach to scheduling their reviews. The aim of this thesis is to 
examine the extent to which available data could predict the outcome of quality assurance 
reviews, and hence prioritise them. The approach taken to meet this aim is detailed below. 
 
1.2. Thesis Outline 
This thesis is presented in a sequential fashion. The first three chapters introduce the thesis and 
establish the research problem via an examination of the development of quality assurance in 
higher education and risk-based regulation. Chapters four to seven detail the data and methods 
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used for the quantitative analysis, and the subsequent results for each of the three provider types 
in higher education. Finally, chapters eight and nine explore the possible reasons for the results of 
the quantitative analysis, and discuss the implications of the overall findings. The specific chapter 
structure is as follows: 
• Chapter 1: Introduction 
• Chapter 2: The Evolution of Quality Assurance in UK Higher Education. 
This chapter details the development of quality assurance in UK higher education. It covers 
the introduction of formal quality assurance and assessment, the creation of the QAA to 
oversee a single quality system, external factors shaping the QAA’s approach, and the 
introduction of a risk-based approach to quality assurance. 
• Chapter 3: Risk-Based Approaches 
This chapter explores ‘risk-based’ approaches to regulation. It defines ‘risk-based regulation’ 
and examines its evolution, merits, and limitations. This is followed by an examination of the 
different ways in which a risk-based approach can be implemented and a review of the 
literature concerning risk-based approaches to quality assurance in higher education. 
• Chapter 4: Data and Methods 
This chapter defines the research question and details the data available to answer it, how 
that data was prepared, and the modelling and evaluation approaches chosen. 
• Chapter 5: Predicting the Outcome of Higher Education Insititution (HEI) Reviews 
This chapter determines which metrics, if any, could have predicted the outcome of past QAA 
HEI reviews as part of a robust model and how accurately they could have done so. It details 
the specific challenges of the HEI subsector before peforming four analyses using naturally-
complete, imputed, in-year standardised, and benchmarked data.  
• Chapter 6:  Predicting the Outcome of Further Education College (FEC) Reviews 
Similar to chapter five, this chapter determines which metrics, if any, could have predicted the 
outcome of past QAA FEC reviews as part of a robust model and how accurately they could 
have done so. It details the specific challenges of the FEC subsector before performing two 
analyses using naturally-complete and in-year standardised data.  
• Chapter 7: Predicting the Outcome of Alternative Provider Reviews 
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Again, similar to chapters five and six, this chapter determines which metrics, if any, could 
have predicted the outcome of past QAA reviews of alternative providers, and how accurately 
they could have done so. The specific challenges of the alternative provider subsector are 
explored before four analyses are conducted. The greater number and diversity of review 
judgements available for alternative providers allow for question-level analyses to be 
performed in addition to the overall review-level analysis explored in the previous chapters. 
• Chapter 8: Why Can’t the Available Data Predict the Outcome of QAA Reviews? 
Following on from the quantitative chapters that concluded that a data-driven, risk-based 
approach to quality assurance in higher education cannot work, this chapter aims to identify 
the reasons why the available data cannot predict the outcome of QAA reviews. The chapter 
identifies three overarching reasons: issues with the available data, issues with QAA reviews, 
and the subjective, contested nature of quality. 
• Chapter 9. Discussion 
The final chapter discusses the findings of this thesis. It addresses the conclusions that can be 
drawn from the thesis and their potential limitations; the next steps for the quality assurance 
of higher education; and the meaning of the findings in the wider context of data-driven, risk-
based regulation outside of higher education. 
 





2. The Evolution of Quality Assurance in UK Higher Education 
 “The Government, on behalf of tax payers, has a legitimate interest in knowing that the public 
funding which goes into higher education is well spent in supporting the UK economy and 
society.” 
(QAA, 2010, p.2) 
The purpose of this chapter is to detail the development of quality assurance in UK higher 
education. It will cover the introduction of formal quality assurance and assessment, the creation 
of the QAA to oversee a single quality system, external factors shaping the QAA’s approach, and 
the introduction of a risk-based approach to quality assurance. A Timeline of key events is 
available in Appendix A at the end of the chapter. 
 
2.1. The Introduction of Sector-Wide External Quality Assurance 
With the goal of improved economic performance, each UK Government since the publication of 
the Robbins report in 1963 has successfully sought the expansion of the higher education sector. 
From 113,000 students in the system in 1961/2, numbers have grown to 909,300 in 1985/6, 
1,408,800 in 1992/93 and 2,496,645 in 2011/12: a twenty-two fold increase in just over fifty years 
(HESA, 2013). As the number of students has grown however, so too has the amount of public 
resource required to fund them and the need to ensure that such funds are used effectively. 
Following a period of economic decline, the 1980/81 – 1983/84 spending round saw a 15% cut in 
the funding for higher education coupled with a continuing expansion of student numbers. Under 
such financial pressure it was clear that quality could suffer. In 1983 the Society for Research into 
Higher Education reported that higher education institutions: 
“may in the future find themselves under pressure to compromise academic quality in 
attempting to maintain student numbers or earn income from other sources. Some 
coordination of arrangements is desirable to try and ensure, for example, that academic 
standards for similar activities do not diverge too widely between institutions”  
(SRHE, 1983, p.14-15) 
The concern was shared by the Secretary of State, Sir Keith Joseph, who in the same year wrote 
to the University Grants Committee (UGC) asking them to assess how standards were currently 
being maintained and enhanced and, in the context of a more efficient use of resources in 
universities, to explore the possibilities for maintaining and improving academic quality in the 
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future. This led to the establishment of the ‘Reynolds Group’ by The Committee of Vice 
Chancellors and Principals (CVCP, now Universities UK) to “study and report on institutions’ 
methods for maintaining and monitoring academic quality and standards” (CVCP, 1986, p.10). The 
group’s report contained three formal codes of practice in addition to ‘points of reference’ for 
institutions undertaking self-comparisons concerning the maintenance and monitoring of 
standards. Following further encouragement from a new Secretary of State - Kenneth Baker - this 
in turn led to the CVCP’s somewhat reluctant establishment of the self-regulatory Academic Audit 
Unit (AAU), designed to provide a more permanent oversight of universities’ quality control 
systems, which commenced operations in 1990. Notwithstanding institutionally-appointed 
external examiners and certain professional areas, the AAU provided the first ‘external’ oversight 
of UK universities in their history (Brown and Carasso, 2013). 
This contrasted strongly with the more rigorous quality measures for polytechnics and colleges 
(the ‘public sector’) where degrees and diplomas were awarded not by the institutions, but by the 
Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA) and the British Technology Education Council 
(BTEC) respectively. CNAA was established in 1964 to assure the quality of degrees in the public 
sector which originally could only be awarded following close scrutiny of individual courses. 
Scrutiny requirements were relaxed over time, however, with institutions validating their own 
courses once they had earned accreditation from CNAA (Harris, 1990). This oversight was coupled 
with formal inspection at both subject and institution-level by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate (HMI) 
not dissimilar to its inspections of schools (Brown, 2004). 
The 1988 White Paper established the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) and the 
Universities Funding Council (UFC), which would no longer fund institutions through grants but 
rather would operate a system of contracting. Ostensibly formed to drive the sustained expansion 
of higher education and the continued ‘efficiency gains’ necessary to fund it, the PCFC 
‘nationalised’ the polytechnics, removing ownership from local authorities, as the universities 
were similarly being removed from the protected autonomy of the UGC (Jenkins, 1995). The 
Government’s stated intention was to: 
• encourage institutions to be more enterprising in attracting contracts from other 
sources, particularly in the private sector, and thereby to lessen their present degree 
of funding on public funding;   




• strengthen the commitment of institutions to the delivery of the educational services 
which it is agreed with the new planning and funding body they should provide. 
(DES, 1987, paragraph 4.17) 
Such enterprise was encouraged in 1990 by a cost neutral increase in tuition fees and decrease in 
block grant funding, both ultimately paid for by Government for UK nationals. It was now more 
lucrative to attract additional EU students as well as non-EU students who had been full fee paying 
since 1979. The unfettered expansion of higher education was slowed three years later however 
when limits were imposed on the number of funded places available at each institution. 
The 1991 White Paper Higher Education: A New Framework (DES, 1991) detailed the 
Government’s plans for a still larger and more cost-effective higher education sector, responsive 
to the needs of industry, to continue to support the drive for economic growth. The White Paper 
declared that UK higher education was “more efficient and more effective” than ever before and 
that recent growth, seeing one in five of all 18-19 year olds now entering higher education 
compared to one in seven in 1987, had occurred without a decline in quality evidenced by a steady 
increase in the proportion of first and second class degrees awarded (DES, 1991, p.3). The claimed 
maintenance of quality was allegedly possible due to the utilisation of capacity ‘at the margin’, 
mostly in the ‘public sector’ institutions which, at the cost of a drastically reduced unit of funding 
(Watson and Bowden, 1997), now educated more students than the university sector (DES, 1991). 
Others, however, would strongly disagree with that analysis. Stevens (2005) claims there was a 
gradual decline in standards since 1970 that was not slowed until the Blair reforms of 2001. Only 
28% of Vice-chancellors surveyed in 1993 felt that degree standards were being maintained (THE, 
1993a). The reliance on the number of first and second class degrees awarded as a measure of 
quality ignored the possibility of grade inflation incentivised by increased competition, a 
continued pattern which drew the ire of the House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science 
and Skills Committee 18 years later (IUSSC, 2009b). 
Regardless of the contemporary state of higher education, if the expansion was to continue 
without quality suffering, further efficiency gains would be needed. Increasing competition and 
the marketisation of the sector was seen as the best way to deliver this. In keeping with the wider 
Government policy at the time, the White Paper stated that: 
“The Government believes that the real key to achieving cost effective expansion lies in 
greater competition for funds and students. That can be best achieved by breaking down 
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the increasingly artificial and unhelpful barriers between the universities, and the 
polytechnics and colleges.”  
(DES, 1991, p.12)  
There was a two-fold strategy to achieve this end. First, ‘public sector’ institutions were now, 
under certain criteria, able to adopt the title of ‘university’ and award their own degrees in place 
of the CNAA, which was to be disbanded. Second, national funding councils responsible for funding 
all higher education teaching in universities, polytechnics and colleges were to replace the PCFC 
and the UFC (DES, 1991). 
Whilst the goal of an expanded, more cost-effective higher education sector had clear benefits, 
there were also clear risks to quality from increased student numbers, enhanced competition, a 
reduced ‘unit of resource’ cost, and structural changes. Moreover, as the sums of public money 
invested in the sector grew, so too did the demand for accountability. The White Paper continued:  
“The prime responsibility for maintaining and enhancing the quality of teaching and 
learning rests with each individual institution. At the same time, there is a need for proper 
accountability for the substantial public funds invested in higher education. As part of this, 
students and employers need improved information about quality if the full benefit of 
increased competition is to be obtained. 
As demand for higher education expands further, and as competition among institutions 
increases, as a result of the changes outlined in the preceding chapters, the Government 
considers that new arrangements for quality assurance in higher education will be 
required.” 
(DES, 1991, p.24) 
George Walden, a former Higher Education Minister, put the matter more candidly: 
“The danger of overstretching the capability of institutions to absorb extra students was 
not unforeseen when expansion was discussed in the mid-eighties. It would be a simple-
minded Government who thought you could cram in more students indefinitely without 
risk to quality … Only market romantics seriously believed that, by a combination of belt 
tightening, better management, better teaching with modern methods, and attracting 
private money and foreign students, the value of a University degree in a hugely expanded 
system could continue unimpaired”  
(Walden, 1996, p.122)  
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The Government therefore had to determine to what extent the additional assurances provided 
in the ‘public sector’ would be amalgamated with the more laissez-faire approach adopted by 
universities. Both quality audit, defined as “external scrutiny aimed at providing guarantees that 
institutions have suitable quality control mechanisms in place”, and quality assessment, defined 
as “external review of, and judgements about, the quality of teaching and learning in institutions”, 
were deemed necessary to provide stakeholders, including the funding councils, with sufficient 
information concerning quality to ensure the full benefit of enhanced competition was realised 
(DES, 1991, p.24).  
Recognising the importance higher education institutions attached to their academic freedom - in 
no small measure a result of the higher education sector’s lobbying powers - the Government 
proposed the quality audit role should be carried out by a single quality assurance body owned by 
the institutions. However, the Government reserved the powers to establish a body of their own 
should institutions fail to do so satisfactorily. The Government believed any doubts over the 
effectiveness of the self-regulatory body would be offset by the institutions’ self-interest in 
demonstrating the rigour of their internal controls; failure to do so would result in a loss of 
reputation in a competitive national and international higher education market and would lead to 
the statutory regulation of academic standards (DES, 1991). 
More salient would be the work of the ‘quality assessment units’ within each funding council 
whose assessments of what is actually provided would result in the award of an institutional 
quality ranking of ‘excellent’, ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’ and inform the Council’s funding 
decisions. Quality was to be assessed via ‘subject review’ (what was to become known as the 
Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA)) in two ways. First, quantitative performance indicators and 
value-added calculations would provide an overview of institutions and their courses. Second, 
direct observation of teaching and learning, management and organisation, accommodation, and 
equipment by professional staff, predominantly recruited from HMI, would provide a more 
comprehensive view of quality (Brown, 2004).  
Overall reactions to the White Paper from representative bodies were largely positive. In their 
formal response to the White Paper the CVCP also supported the abolition of the distinction 
between universities and polytechnics and colleges and welcomed the Government’s invitation to 
discuss how a new quality assurance regime might best operate. The CVCP, however, was less 
enthusiastic about the quality assessment regime stating that “the prime responsibility for the 
maintenance and enhancement of quality must rest with the institutions, reinforced by the 
constructive criticism of the quality audit unit” (CVCP, 1991, p.2). The CVCP proposed alternative 
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was for assessment units composed in part of academics seconded for “up-to-date knowledge of 
their subject” (CVCP, 1991, p.5). Despite suggestions by a minority of members of the Committee 
of Directors of Polytechnics (CDP) that polytechnics should embrace the new quality regime as a 
means of demonstrating their superiority in teaching over the existing universities, largely 
unsuccessful attempts were made by the CDP to water down the quality assessment proposals 
(Brown, 2004). 
Later in 1991, a working group of institutional heads from the representative bodies (CVCP, CDP 
and Standing Conference of Principals (SCOP)) was formed to determine proposals for the quality 
regime. The results, sent to the Department for Education and Skills (DES) in October, 
acknowledged the institutions’ collective responsibility for adequate systems of quality assurance 
across the sector and the need for a strong quality assurance body to “provide both necessary 
public assurance of institutional quality and act as an additional input to a pluralistic assessment 
of quality in higher education” (CVCP et al., 1991, p.2). Concerns were expressed, however, over 
the duplication between the proposed quality audits and assessments to be conducted by the UK-
wide quality assurance body and national funding councils respectively. The working group felt 
strongly that, whilst there was a clear need for funding councils to have access to quality 
information, this should remain independent from the funding operation. Peter Knight, the vice-
chancellor of the University of Central England, was more forthright in his criticism declaring the 
quality system as “the most fundamental threat to academic freedom that higher education has 
ever effected … The one place judgements about quality should never be is in the hands of the 
funders. It gives them control of body and soul” (THE, 1993b). 
The representative bodies recommended a ‘steering committee’ populated in the majority by 
representatives from institutions to advise on and approve the audit unit’s annual work 
programme. As discussions continued the Further and Higher Education Act (1992) received a 
relatively smooth parliamentary approval. In keeping with the White Paper, the assessment 
councils within each Funding Council were established by section 70 which stated that each 
Funding Council shall: 
(a) Secure that provision is made for assessing the quality of education provided in 
institutions for whose activities they provide, or are considering providing, financial 
support under this part of this Act, and 
(b) Establish a committee, to be known as the “Quality Assessment Committee”, with the 
function of giving them advice on the discharge of their duty under paragraph (a) 
above and such other functions as may be conferred on the committee by the council 
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The need for quality audit was somewhat more opaque, stated in section 82: 
(2) Any two or more councils shall, if directed to do so by the Secretary of State, jointly 
make provision for the assessment by a person appointed by them of matters relating to 
the arrangements made by each institution in Great Britain which is in the higher 
education sector for maintaining academic standards in the institution. 
(Further and Higher Education Act, 1992) 
Only minor objections were raised concerning quality arrangements, most notably Baroness 
Blackstone, at the time Master of Birkbeck College and later the Minister for Education, who felt 
that housing the quality assessment body in the Funding Councils was “deeply flawed” and 
proposed a single, more rigorous, independent, UK-wide body “with duties to undertake [both 
quality assessment and audit] work and report on it, rather than tagging on a responsibility for the 
funding councils to set up committees” (HL Deb, 1991). This was rejected at the time, although 
adopted five years later, on the grounds that the funding councils were best placed to make 
decisions on the allocation of resources if they had first-hand experience of the quality of the 
institutions they were awarding; moreover, the audit was a vital part of academic freedom and 
the HEIs should retain their power to assure themselves of their quality (HL Deb, 1991).  
Following discussions between the representative higher education bodies and DES, the Higher 
Education Quality Council (HEQC) was incorporated in May 1992 as a limited company, owned by 
the representative bodies, as the quality assurance body for higher education in the United 
Kingdom. The Board of Directors constituted of an equal number of university and polytechnic 
heads, two college representatives and two, later increased to four, independent members. 
Membership of the body was a condition of receiving public funds from the Funding Councils and 
subscriptions were to be deducted up front from institution’s allotted funds from their Funding 
Council (Brown, 2004). 
 
In summary, a somewhat confusing, and to many unnecessary, dual quality assurance regime was 
developed comprising both quality audit and quality assessment. Quality audit was to involve peer 
review on institutions’ quality control mechanisms and be run by the UK-wide HEQC. Quality 
assessment was to involve the direct observation of teaching by professional inspectors employed 
by the four national funding councils. For established universities, this would be their first 
significant external assessment. For former ‘public sector’ institutions used to the scrutiny of CNAA 
and HMI, the dual system was much less of a change.  
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2.2. Dissatisfaction with HEQC, Quality Assessment Councils, and the establishment of the 
Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) 
The HEQC’s initial approach to quality audit was a continuation of the Academic Audit Unit’s 
approach; three unaccompanied peer-auditors would visit an institution for three days and use 
‘primary documentation’ to focus on four main areas:  
• the provision and design of course and degree programmes 
• teaching and communication methods 
• academic staff 
• the means of taking account of external examiners’ reports and the views of students’ and 
external bodies’. 
The resulting report, which reviewed quality arrangements not against a national standard but 
rather the institution’s own goals, would remain the property of each university (CVCP, 1992). 
Subsequent incremental changes, including the extension of audits to include universities’ 
collaborative and overseas provision, took place alongside the development of the ‘Graduate 
Standards Programme’ instigated by the Secretary of State’s concerns over academic standards, 
in part raised by visits to Singapore and Malaysia in 1994 where he received a number of 
complaints over the practices of British institutions attempting to recruit international students. 
In conjunction with the CVCP, HEQC would establish a set of threshold, or minimum acceptable, 
standards to ensure ‘broad comparability’ within a diverse sector. The full Graduate Standards 
Programme would never be enacted however following QAA’s succession of HEQC shortly after 
the consultation was completed.  
From 1992-95 the Funding Councils’ approach to assessment saw subject areas within universities 
declare whether their performance against their own aims and objectives (and not a universal 
standard or threshold) was ‘excellent’, ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’. Of the 972 self-
assessments, 553 were followed-up by peers who found 251 instances of ‘excellent’ provision, 290 
instances of ‘satisfactory’ provision, and just 12 instances of ‘unsatisfactory’ provision. The 
remaining 419 cases had their declaration of ‘satisfactory’ accepted without review (HEFCE, 1995). 
Overall, the assessment regime did little to differentiate the quality of provision: 251 subjects 
within providers were deemed ‘excellent’, 709 ‘satisfactory’, and just 12 ‘unsatisfactory’. 
At this stage it was noted that "there is a danger that the costs of the whole exercise to the system, 
both to the Funding Councils and to the universities, will exceed the funds affected by the 
outcome” (Wagner, 1993, 281). However, following the Secretary of State’s concern over 
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standards in 1994, the process was reviewed and, in addition to value for money and quality 
improvement, a third purpose of providing accessible information on the quality of education was 
added. Following an evaluation of the assessment process by the Centre for Higher Education 
Studies (CHES, 1994), visits were extended to cover all institutions and departments and 
judgements of ‘excellent’, ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’ were replaced by a score of 1 (the 
lowest) to 4 (the highest) for each of six core areas leading to a published overall profile of 
judgements containing a score out of 24.  
Almost as soon as HEQC and the Funding Councils began their work however, concerns were being 
raised over the efficacy of, and burden created by, the dual quality audit and assessment regime. 
Later in 1992 Dr Malcom Frazer, Chief Executive of HEQC, stated it would be better “if quality was 
not in the hands of the funding council or the HEQC” and that, when the binary divide between 
universities and polytechnics and colleges ceased, he had hoped “we would have an independent 
accrediting body which would accredit at both institutional level and course level” (Brookman, 
1992). In December the Times Higher Education Supplement started its ‘Quality Debate’ series 
with the article ‘Quality Assurance Arrangements are Going Wrong’ (THE, 1992). Articles such as 
‘VCs Slam Red Tape’ reporting “a rising tide of protests by institutions who say they will be bogged 
down by bureaucracy” (THE, 1993c, p.3) represented the majority view captured in a phone survey 
of Vice-chancellors published later that month, which reported that 82% condemned the existing 
quality arrangements and 71% said there should be a single quality body (THE, 1993a). Assiduous 
criticism was focused at the potential burden resulting from the new dual system, especially from 
the quality assessment work undertaken by the funding councils and the perceived deluge of 
repetitious and overlapping paperwork. The lack of confidence in the system was perhaps best 
illustrated by the admission of the Chief Executive of the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE) that, once they published their first critical quality assessment, he expected the 
council to be taken to judicial review. Condemnation of the system was not universal however: 
58% of Vice-chancellors agreed that quality audit and assessment were useful guides to progress 
whilst some argued that an effective quality assurance regime would promote good practice and 
reassure students and the public whilst imposing a minimal burden (THE, 1993a; Foster, 1993).  
The specific objections to the ‘subject review’ assessment process undertaken by the national 
funding councils were well documented and numerous. It was alleged that the system imposed 
excessive demands on institutions with a substantial proportion of the costs of both audit and 
assessment being transferred from the Government on to providers (Watson, 1995). The burden 
of these exercises was far greater than universities had expected or experienced previously. 
Moreover, it was argued that academic freedom and autonomy were being violated; that a culture 
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of compliance and ‘hard-managerialism’ was developing leading to managerial intrusion into 
academic matters; emphasising  presentational and procedural matters at the potential expense 
of intellectual substance; failure to differentiate enough between outcomes to justify the use of 
scarce resources; and harming Britain’s well-earned reputation for quality (Wagner, 1993; 
Alderman, 1996; NCIHE, 1997; Brennan, 1997). 
The work of the HEQC was seen to exemplify Power’s ‘Audit Society’ (1997) in which quality audits 
were described as ‘rituals of verification’ decoupled from the day-to-day work of institutions. In 
higher education, as in many other sectors, ‘Quality’ is difficult to measure, yet in an era of rising 
accountability, it had to be measured (Pollitt, 1993, 1995). Hence, the object of audit in HEIs was 
not the difficult to assess teaching and learning activities, but the more verifiable systems and 
processes which supposedly control those activities (Watson, 1995; Brown, 2004). The perceived 
impact of performing poorly in an HEQC audit led institutions to establish units responsible for 
ensuring success (Power, 1997, p101-2). Whilst often successful at ensuring a positive audit with 
reams of evidence submitted, checklists completed and performance measured, such centralised 
units within HEIs could further the measurement of what was auditable rather than what was 
originally intended (Power, 1997; Shore and Wright, 1999). 
The overarching criticism of the dual system of quality assurance was that it was not clear who the 
process was assuring about what. Brown (1997) contends that audit in higher education is 
intended to assure institutions that their own procedures are working as intended. Audit assumes 
“quality improvement is most likely to be achieved through the ‘internal’ professional motivation 
to do better rather than ‘extrinsic’ motivators such as money or prestige” (Brown, 1997, p.5). 
Conversely, assessment is intended to reassure external stakeholders over value for money and is 
based on the fundamental assumption that “quality improvement is most likely to be achieved 
through the motivation to compete to win additional students and resources” (Brown, 1997, p.6). 
The parallel audit and assessment processes therefore had contrasting operating assumptions and 
motivations. 
The impact of the quality assurance regime was not perceived entirely negatively. Clark (1994) 
noted that many departments were introducing quality assurance procedures with external 
assessors for the first time. Moreover, a substantial number of academics were exploring other 
departments and experiencing new methods of teaching. Watson (1995) also noted greater 
attention being paid to teaching and learning performance, professional development, and how 
the infrastructure of institutions could best meet the needs of their students. Finally, the quality 
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assurance regime provided a source of ‘reliable’ and independent information for staff and 
students (Gordon, 2002).  
In spite of the quality assurance system’s stated benefits, pressure for change built and in 1994 
the new Secretary of State, Mrs Gillian Shephard, asked the HEFCE Chief Executive, Professor (now 
Sir) Graeme Davies, to work with the representative bodies to determine how audit and 
assessment could be combined to form a single quality system.  
Shortly afterwards, in a speech to the CVCP Committee, Mrs Shephard detailed her requirements 
for the unified system. It must: 
• Provide assurance that standards of degrees are maintained and are broadly 
comparable – which does not mean identical – and that the quality of teaching and 
learning is such that students have the best opportunities of reaching those standards. 
• Be transparent so that it can assist in enabling choices to be made by: universities and 
colleges themselves in deploying their resources in full knowledge of their strengths 
and weaknesses; potential students about university and course; employers in 
recruiting graduates; and the Government and the Funding Council in deploying public 
funds. 
• Respect academic autonomy whilst having an external element. 
• Respect academic diversity and freedom while at the same time addressing value for 
money and public accountability. 
• Encourage the enhancement of quality and dissemination of good practice. 
• Be cost-effective and avoid unreasonable burdens on institutions. 
(Shephard, 1995) reported in (Brown, 2004).  
After separate proposals by HEFCE, CVCP and HEQC for a unified system were unsuccessful, the 
CVCP proposed the establishment of a Joint Planning Group (JPG) with HEFCE to further develop 
their own ideas. Gillian Shephard welcomed the proposals but struck a note of caution: she 
detailed that costs and benefits should be established and compared to the existing regime; the 
timeframe for subject reviews should not exceed two years to allow the Funding Council, potential 
students and employers to make comparisons; and “In respect of assessment at least, I could not 
contemplate a solution which relied mainly on self-regulation” (Shephard, 1995). 
The JPG was convened in September 1995 and, just five months later, the National Committee of 
Inquiry into Higher Education (NCIHE) or the “Dearing Committee” was established by the 
Secretary of State to “make recommendations on how the purposes, shape, structure, size and 
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funding of higher education, including support for students, should develop to meet the needs of 
the United Kingdom over the next 20 years” (NCIHE, 1997, 3). This would necessarily explore how 
to fund the continued expansion of the higher education system whilst maintaining or improving 
academic standards. Running parallel to the Dearing Committee, the JPG published its first report 
in April 1996. The report proposed the creation of a single body, independent of government and 
the funding councils, that would operate a largely unchanged audit and assessment approach 
(JPG, 1996b). The subsequent reaction from institutions was negative; it was felt that the key issue, 
the burden of the quality regime, had not been resolved. Furthermore, there was no substantive 
increase in self-evaluation. 
The following year, after much deliberation between institutional representatives and the 
Department for Education, a plan for a single quality assurance body was agreed (JPG, 1996a). The 
dual audit and assessment approach would continue, however, it would be as part of a six-to-
eight-year institutional quality assurance plan agreed between the agency and each institution. 
This would enable institutions greater control in the planning, timing and number of subject-level 
assessments within a national framework. Representatives from the provider under review would 
be able to observe these assessments, but would not be able to actively participate in them. These 
assessments would then form the main source of evidence for institution-wide peer reviews 
focusing on the management of quality (Brown, 2004, p.115-6).  
The Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) was subsequently incorporated as a company on 27th March 
1997, four months prior to the publication of the Dearing report, with a budget of 80% of the total 
for HEQC and the funding councils’ quality assessment divisions. QAA officially took over the 
HEQC’s staff and functions on 1st August 1997 and began operations, including its delegated 
responsibility for assessment, under contract with the national funding councils (Brown, 2004). 
Subscription to QAA was a requirement of receiving funds from the national funding councils. The 
new agency’s board was made up of four members representing HEIs, four members representing 
the Funding Councils, and six independent members. Whilst owned by the representative bodies, 
the QAA was legally independent with a majority of its board members coming from elsewhere 
(QAA, 1997). 
 
In summary, there were strong concerns over the burden, duplication and efficacy of the dual 
audit and assessment system. These concerns were exacerbated by the expansion of both 
approaches over time. In 1995, the Secretary of State responded and set out her criteria for a new 
unified system of quality assurance: it had to reduce burden, be cost-effective, maintain quality 
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and standards, and respect academic freedom. After two years of negotiation the Quality 
Assurance Agency was formed to take responsibility for both quality audit and assessment and do 
so by conducting cyclical reviews once every six to eight years. 
 
2.3. The Evolution of the QAA 
There have been three key phases in the development of the QAA prior to its current ’risk-based’ 
incarnation. The QAA was established with the aim of reducing the burden on providers by 
combining the quality audit and assessment bodies. Whilst continuing the ‘subject review’ and 
institutional audit work of its predecessor bodies, the QAA sought to find a method that effectively 
combined its assessment and audit roles.  
In July 1997, before the QAA could begin its first consultation, the comprehensive, 1,700 page 
Dearing report was published containing 93 executive recommendations. Beyond the headline 
recommendations of a flat-rate, non-means tested tuition fee and means-tested maintenance 
grants, there were a number of suggestions regarding quality that were well received by the 
Government (Stevens, 2005). The report stated the need for the standards of institutional awards 
to be maintained and recommended that the QAA provide benchmarking information and create 
a ‘National Qualifications Framework’ allowing it to “ensure that diversity is not an excuse for low 
standards or unacceptable quality” (NCIHE, 1997, p.143). The framework would detail what could 
be expected from each level of higher education award, regardless of the provider of the award, 
and a more detailed description of the skills and competencies associated with award holders. The 
QAA should then “work with universities and other degree-awarding institutions to create, within 
three years, a UK-wide pool of academic staff … from which institutions must select external 
examiners” (NCIHE, 1997, p.373) who would validate whether programmes met agreed standards 
for a level of award. Eight months later the QAA published its first consultation paper which 
broadly followed the suggestions of the ‘Dearing Report’: a pool of registered external examiners 
would check against a national standards framework as part of an approach which would allegedly 
have a ‘lighter-touch’ overall, either through less frequent reviews or a reduced review intensity 
when it does occur (QAA, 1998a).  
Two years previously HEQC had consulted on a similar approach where external examiners, 
registered on a national database, would ensure the comparability of standards. The approach 
was abandoned, however, after a significant minority of universities objected on the grounds of 
the resources that would be required (HEQC, 1996). Five months later, following a second negative 
reaction to the suggestion of registered external examiners the idea was withdrawn; however, the 
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idea of benchmarking and programme specifications, equally unpopular with the sector (see, for 
example (Wolf, 1998)), was continued due to the positive reaction of students and employers to 
the consultation (QAA, 1998b).  
A subsequent QAA consultation was launched in October 1998 and, following protracted and 
challenging negotiations between QAA, the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE), 
HEFCE and the representative bodies, an agreement resulting in a system more comprehensive 
than those it had replaced was reached for England. The new approach would entail ‘Programme 
Reviews’ conducted by academics that would result in a threshold judgement concerning 
programme outcome standards, i.e. were intended programme outcomes appropriate, were they 
achieved and if so were they maintainable? Furthermore, the ‘Programme Reviews’ would judge 
aspects of a provider’s learning opportunities to be either ‘commendable’, ‘approved’ or ‘failing’. 
In addition to ‘Programme Reviews', ‘Institutional Review’ would examine the management of 
institutional standards and result in the identification of areas where it was essential, advisable or 
desirable for the institution to take action along with an overall judgement of confidence.  
The new methodology, detailed in the QAA’s Handbook for Academic Review (QAA, 2000), was far 
more comprehensive than those it had replaced. There were to be qualifications frameworks for 
every award, programme specifications for every course, benchmarks for every major subject, and 
codes of practice for each aspect of quality assurance (Brown, 2004). The approach was 
introduced in Scotland in October and was scheduled for implementation 12 months later in 
England; however, the process was to be short-lived and the QAA would soon enter its second 
phase.  
The drive for closer attention to be paid to academic standards was led by the QAA’s first Chief 
Executive, John Randall, who had vast ambitions for the inspection of higher education institutions 
and in 2000 wrote: 
“Subject benchmark information, programme specifications that spell out outcomes to be 
achieved, and a qualifications framework based on clear and explicit descriptors of level 
are the new means of defining standards in higher education. Together, they have a 
function similar to that of a code defining professional standards, in that they tell the 
individual client (the student) and the wider interested public (especially the employer) 
what they can reasonably expect from a professional service. Universities and their 




(Randall, 2000, p.166). 
In 2001, fulfilling a recommendation of the Dearing Report and building on earlier work of HEQC, 
QAA published its ‘Academic Infrastructure’. The set of reference points was developed “to help 
UK higher education providers to set, maintain and assure the academic standards of the higher 
education awards they make and the quality of the learning opportunities they offer” and ensure 
“broad comparability of standards at a threshold level across a diverse and dynamic sector” (QAA, 
2010, p.2). 
In the same year that QAA published its comprehensive ‘Academic Infrastructure’, however, the 
then Secretary of State, David Blunkett announced a 40% reduction in the volume of external 
review activity with departments that had scored highly in their last assessment becoming exempt 
from the next round. There were a number of factors that led to this announcement. In August 
2000, a report commissioned by HEFCE put the annual cost to the sector of subject reviews at £30 
million (PA Consulting Group, 2000). In January 2001, economists from the University of Warwick 
which had scored full marks in their recent subject review bitterly attacked the process (Harrison 
et al., 2001). At the same time, Number 10 was being lobbied by a group of prominent Russell 
Group Vice-chancellors to reduce the quality assurance burden. Finally, the academic board of the 
LSE refused QAA reviewers access to the university and determined to “secede from [its] 
engagements with the QAA” which it believed had “infringed academic freedom, imposed its own 
bureaucratic and pedagogical agenda, neglected students’ intellectual development and used 
incompetent and unprofessional reviewers” (THE, 2001b).  
All these tensions were in evidence in the House of Lords on the evening following the Secretary 
of State’s announcement when a debate was initiated by Lord Norton of Louth, a Professor at the 
University of Hull, and supported by other prominent peers on the complex and bureaucratic 
regulation of higher education (HL Deb, 2001). HEFCE, not the QAA, was subsequently tasked with 
leading the development of a new, less burdensome approach. Facing a reduction in subject-level 
assessment to an amount he considered unacceptable and, more importantly, wishing to take 
quality assurance in a different direction to HEFCE and UUK, John Randall resigned in August 2001 
(Clare, 2001).  
The following year, shortly before the QAA was to publish its revised approach, the Better 
Regulation Task Force, part of the ‘New Labour’ Government’s drive for more targeted, less-
burdensome regulation published Higher Education: Easing the Burden (BRTF, 2002). It too argued 
that higher education institutions were over-regulated, largely due to a lack of co-ordination 
between agencies, and recommended the strengthening of the Funding Council’s HE Forum to 
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provide a “gatekeeper role to prevent unnecessary new burdens being placed on HEIs” (BRTF, 
2002, 11). 
Without universal application, ‘Programme Review’ was no longer an appropriate basis for a 
comprehensive regime. Having some programmes and institutions publicly judged against 
standards whilst the majority weren’t would provide a piecemeal and confusing view of quality. 
The second key phase in the evolution of the QAA therefore began in 2002 with the proposal for 
a new approach of institutional-level review, based on audit, with subject-level assessments only 
undertaken on a highly selective basis where audit revealed concerns. In transitioning to the 
revised approach assessments would continue, covering up to a maximum of 10% of the 
institution’s students. ‘Principal’ judgements were then made on: 
• The level of confidence that can reasonably be placed in the soundness of the 
institution’s management of the quality of its programmes and the academic 
standards of its awards; and, through direct scrutiny of primary evidence, whether the 
institution is securing acceptable academic standards and quality; 
• The level of reliance that can reasonably be placed on the accuracy, integrity, 
completeness and frankness at the information that an institution publishes about the 
quality of its programmes and the standards of its awards. 
(QAA, 2002) 
The quality assurance of UK higher education was now, for all intents and purposes, entirely audit 
based. Every new course had to be validated by the provider, the provider would then monitor 
the course each year to ensure it was on track, and review it every five years or so against 
nationally agreed reference points known as ‘Subject Benchmarks’. In addition, providers would 
continue the established system of appointing external examiners to check the quality and 
standards of each course. On a five-year cyclical basis, QAA were responsible for “checking these 
checks”, i.e. that each provider had in place the necessary processes to ensure the quality and 
standards of their own provision meet expectations (QAA, 2012a). Teaching was not observed and 
quality outcomes were not assessed. 
There was a price to be paid for the reduction in the quality burden however. A greater amount 
of quality information about each institution was now to be published, including external 
examiners’ reports. Following a consultation, the QAA published its Handbook for Institutional 
Audit (2002) and the first of the new audits took place in February 2003. The Scottish took a slightly 
different approach and agreed to institutional audits less the ‘discipline audit trail’ assessments, 
38 
 
an internal subject review process and a separate quality enhancement process (QAA, 2003). 
Following a consultation, the Handbook for Enhancement Led Institutional Review: Scotland was 
published by the QAA in April 2003. The Welsh institutions and funding council also took the 
opportunity to reflect on the quality arrangements in England and opted for a revised, more 
enhancement-based approach without the requirement to publish external examiners’ reports or 
internal reviews.  
The Quality Assurance regime then remained relatively steady up until 2009 whilst publicly 
available information on higher education expanded rapidly. A fairly extensive set of information 
was made available on the ‘Teaching Quality Information’ website, now ‘Unistats’, in late 2004. 
The National Student Survey (NSS) was first run the following year and the results made available 
online. Throughout this time a number of high-profile quality failings occurred both in the UK and 
overseas, many highlighted by the QAA themselves. London Met was discovered to be offering 
modules in curry making and kite flying (THE, 2002). The University of Luton was found to have 
unsupervised recruitment agents in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Nigeria making admission 
decisions including waiving entry criteria (THE, 2005b). The University of Humberside was accused 
of having a branch in an Israeli petrol station and issuing 5,500 bogus degrees (MacKinnon and 
Norfolk, 2004). Leeds Met allowed “practical avoidance of challenging modules” (THE, 2005c). De 
Montfort increased grades in pharmacy by 14 per cent (THE, 2005a). These reports of quality 
failings culminated in a critical report by the House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science 
and Skills Committee in 2009, which expressed concerns over low and declining academic 
standards in some areas of the UK higher education system and challenged the QAA’s existing 
practices (IUSSC, 2009b). 
The ongoing battle between self-regulation and academic freedom and an external agency 
prescribing standards was once again resumed with the committee making strong 
recommendations for change at the QAA. The committee only withheld calls for the replacement 
of the QAA on the grounds that “the inevitable hiatus, disruption and costs caused by the abolition 
of the QAA and establishment of a new body would not serve the best interests of students, 
universities and the taxpayer” (IUSSC, 2009b, p.97). The committee disagreed with the QAA’s Chief 
Executive’s, Peter Williams’, view that process and outcomes “were very strongly linked” (IUSSC, 
2009b, p.94)and stated that “in not judging the standards themselves, the QAA is taking an unduly 
limited view of its potential role” (IUSSC, 2009b, p.97). The committee recommended that the 
QAA should be reformed and re-established as a Quality and Standards Agency which: 
• Had a duty to safeguard, and report on, standards in higher education in England. 
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• Should be half funded through HEFCE and half from levies on HEIs in England to ensure 
its independence. 
• Should review and report on the quality of teaching in universities and, where 
shortcomings are identified, ensure that they are reported publicly and addressed by 
the institutions concerned. 
• Have powers to carry out reviews of the quality of, and standards applied in, the 
assessment for an institution’s courses, including, if necessary, its degree awarding 
powers, in response to external examiners’ or public concerns about the standards in 
an institution or at the direction of the Secretary of State. 
(IUSSC, 2009b) 
The IUSSC, therefore, were calling for the QAA to take a tougher stance on the variation in 
academic standards and focus on direct assessment of teaching quality rather than the processes 
that facilitated it. Were fundamental changes to the operation of the QAA not achieved within 
two years, the IUSSC recommended that the “QAA/Quality and Standards Agency should be 
abolished and an entirely new organisation be established in its place” (IUSSC, 2009b, p.97). 
The demands of the IUSSC heralded the third key phase in the life of the QAA. A number of changes 
were made and in 2011/12, the ‘Institutional Audit’ methodology was replaced by the 
‘Institutional Review’ (QAA, 2011a). Further to academic standards and the quality of teaching 
and learning, the provision of information and enhancement would be scrutinised by reviewers, 
the resulting judgements would fall into four, not three, categories, and students would become 
full members of review teams (Brown and Carasso, 2013). The revised approach necessitated a 
review of QAA’s ‘Academic Infrastructure’ which was renamed the ‘UK Quality Code for Higher 
Education’ (the ‘Quality Code’) and expanded to include additional reference points, or 
‘expectations’, for the expanded review method (QAA, 2011b). 
 
In summary, with the creation of a unified quality assurance system looking set to produce 
something more comprehensive than the dual audit and assessment system it had replaced, the 
Secretary of State intervened and called for a reduction in regulatory burdens. What resulted was 
an almost entirely audit based approach in which institutional-level quality assurance processes 
were checked for every provider on a cyclical basis and outcomes were not assessed. Whilst less 
burdensome, the new approach failed to stem ongoing concerns over falling quality and standards 
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in an expanding sector and ‘institutional audit’ was superseded by the more comprehensive, wide-
ranging ‘institutional review’. 
 
2.4. A Risk-Based Approach to Quality Assurance 
Shortly after the ‘Institutional Review’ method was finalised the Government published the 2011 
White Paper Students at the Heart of the System. Having already legislated to raise the cap for 
undergraduate tuition fees from £3,000 to £9,000 to shift the cost of higher education to the 
‘consumer’ and promote price competition in the sector, the White Paper contained further 
proposals to marketise the sector. Students at new, for-profit ‘alternative providers’ would be 
eligible for funding from the Student Loans Company, whilst the providers themselves required 
fewer students to obtain the ‘university’ title and would find it easier to obtain their own degree-
awarding powers. All providers faced further requirements for the provision of information to 
support ‘consumer’ choice. 
A combination of new, inexperienced providers entering the market – many with profit-driven 
motives – and increased competition amongst existing providers led to a change of emphasis for 
the QAA.  Students at the Heart of the System proposed: 
“…a genuinely risk-based approach, focusing QAA effort where it will have most impact 
and giving students power to hold universities to account. All providers must continue to 
be part of a single assurance framework. But we would explore options in which the 
frequency – and perhaps need – for a full, scheduled institutional review will depend on 
an objective assessment of a basket of data, monitored continually but at arm’s length.”  
(BIS, 2011, 3.19) 
Now, rather than all providers being reviewed at the same frequency regardless of their size, type, 
or performance, data were to be used to direct QAA’s activity, prioritising those providers at which 
the QAA was most likely to identify quality assurance issues. The White Paper asked HEFCE to 
consult on the criteria for assessing risk and the resulting frequency and intensity of reviews “with 
a view to achieving very substantial deregulatory change for institutions that can demonstrate low 
risk” (BIS, 2011, 3.20). Ad hoc triggers which could prompt an otherwise unscheduled review by 
the QAA would also be subject to consultation.  
The subsequent consultation revealed significant concerns over the “scope, validity, availability 
and reliability” of metrics that might form part of a risk-based quality assurance regime. Plans for 
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QAA to regularly monitor a basket of data were not continued (HEFCE, 2012b). Following the 
consultation, Alan Langlands, the Chief Executive of HEFCE, wrote to Anthony McClaren, Chief 
Executive of QAA, inviting the QAA “to implement a more risk-based approach to the quality 
assurance of higher education in England” with a view to implementing the revised approach 
during the 2013/14 academic year (Langlands, 2012, p.1). The result was the revised ‘Higher 
Education Review’ (HER) approach for HEIs and FECs, designed to target the QAA’s efforts where 
they are most needed and tailor external reviews to the individual circumstances of providers 
being reviewed (QAA, 2013a). 
The revised ‘Higher Education Review’ (HER) approach was ‘risk-based’ in only the most limited of 
ways. ‘Risk-based’ approaches are designed to prioritise regulatory resource to areas where the 
risk, defined as the product of the impact and the likelihood of a regulatee not meeting regulatory 
standards, is greatest (Rothstein et al., 2006b). Under the HER approach, institutions whose two 
previous institution-wide reviews were regarded as successful would continue to be reviewed 
every six years. Institutions that were either not successful in their last two reviews, had not yet 
been reviewed twice, had concerns upheld about the quality of their provision following a full 
inquiry under the QAA’s concern scheme, or had undergone significant managerial change would 
be reviewed four years after their previous review (QAA, 2013a). The ‘impact’ of different 
providers not meeting the standards detailed in the Quality Code was not considered. 
The new ‘alternative providers’ could be subject to QAA review for two reasons. First, for 
alternative providers looking for their students to have access to funding from the Student Loan 
Company (SLC), QAA operated the ‘Review for Specific Course Designation’ (RSCD) programme. 
Only once a course has been approved, or ‘designated’, by QAA were students able to use 
government loans to pay for their tuition fees and maintenance (QAA, 2014b).  Second, alternative 
providers seeking to recruit non-EU students directly must undergo a QAA ‘review of educational 
oversight’ (REO) as part of their application for, and continued ownership of, ‘Tier 4 Sponsor 
Status’1 (QAA, 2012c). Both the RSCD and REO processes comprised a Financial Sustainability, 
Management and Governance (FSMG) check conducted by a third party, and a QAA review of all 
higher education provision addressing the same four key areas as at universities and colleges: 
academic standards, the quality of teaching and learning, the provision of information, and 
enhancement. Following a successful RSCD or REO application, alternative providers were 
                                                          
1 Holding ‘Tier 4 Sponsor Status’, previously known as ‘Highly Trusted Status’, allows education providers 
to sponsor international students to come to the UK under Tier 4 of the UK’s points based visas and 
immigration system. That is, education providers are trusted with the responsibility to approve visas for 
their own foreign students coming to study with them. 
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required to complete an annual information return. Should any material changes or concerns be 
identified then a review would take place outside the normal review cycle. 
There were, and continue to be, significant concerns about the quality of a number of new, 
alternative providers. In 2015, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) reported very high drop-out 
and absence rates, poor administration and inappropriate recruitment practices, including 
colleges recruiting on the streets and students being accepted onto courses while lacking 
adequate English language skills (PAC, 2015). The report did not criticise QAA’s approach, but did 
express further concern over the rapid expansion of alternative providers who, unlike universities 
and colleges, initially faced no cap on the number of students they could recruit. For example, by 
the time the Government introduced controls on alternative providers in November 2013, having 
spent far more than it had budgeted for, Regent’s College had expanded from having 10 Higher 
National Diploma (HND) students to over 1,000. Similarly, the intake at St. Patrick’s College 
ballooned from 50 to over 4,000 in one year (McGettigan, 2014). Although the cap on student 
numbers was lifted for universities and colleges for the 2015/16 academic year, the cap remains 
in place for alternative providers (Hillman, 2014; Clark, 2015). 
Meanwhile, in October 2014, to the surprise of many, HEFCE, HEFCW and DELNI (the funding 
bodies for England, Wales and Northern Ireland respectively, though not Scotland) announced 
that they were to “seek views on future approaches to the assessment of quality in higher 
education” and based on the feedback received “design a specification and invite tenders under a 
joint procurement exercise” (Atkins, 2015). The funding councils’ responsibility to ensure the 
quality of the provision they fund established in the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act had, 
up until this point, been contracted out to the QAA without a competitive tender. The review, 
purportedly conducted to “ensure transparency and demonstrate value for money” (Atkins, 2015) 
was seen by many as a power grab by the funding councils whose roles allocating funding had 
been greatly diminished by the changes to tuition fees and lifting of the English student numbers 
cap (see for example: Million+, 2014; WonkHE, 2015). The funding councils were looking to 
develop “innovative approaches that are risk-based, proportionate, affordable, and low burden” 
suitable for the “fast-evolving and increasingly diverse higher education environment” (Atkins, 
2015).  
The Quality Assessment Review Steering Group (QARSG) formed by HEFCE, HEFCW and DELNI held 
a two-part consultation. In January 2015 a ‘discussion document’ was published to “explore the 
deep, critical questions that need to be addressed before the more practical issues surrounding 
the design and implementation of any new quality assessment arrangements can be considered” 
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(QARSG, 2015c). The document laid out the vision of a changing higher education sector: 
expanding, more global, with new ‘alternative’ and online providers, and greater student 
expectations. Amongst other things the QARSG sought agreement on the principle that the future 
quality assessment arrangement should be risk-based and asked “what evidence and/or data 
should be used to identify quality issues in an individual provider?” (QARSG, 2015c). The majority 
of stakeholders felt that a risk-based approach should be adopted, focusing attention on less-
established providers and those whose performance measures suggests they are, or may in the 
future be, a cause for concern. Suggested performance measures included: provider type, mission 
and age, staff turnover, student numbers, retention, satisfaction, and earnings data (MRUK 
Research, 2015).  
The future of the quality assurance of higher education became yet more uncertain in the spring 
of 2015, however, when the Conservatives won an outright majority on a manifesto containing 
promises of a ‘Teaching Excellence Framework’, and the QARSG published phase two of their 
consultation (QARSG, 2015b; Conservative Party, 2015). The QARSG’s plans for a new quality 
assessment regime and the Government’s plans for the TEF appeared to have been developed in 
isolation. How the two would co-exist was not clear.  
QARSG’s phase two consultation again proposed a general risk-based approach along with 
additional changes including: a switch from focusing on processes to outcomes, an enhanced role 
for university’s governing bodies in assuring quality, and the oft proposed and rejected idea of a 
register of external examiners. The results of the consultation were published in November 2015 
and all proposals, except for making governors responsible for quality assurance and the training 
and registration of external examiners, were accepted by the majority of respondees (QARSG, 
2015a).  
Also in November 2015, the Government published its Green Paper Fulfilling Our Potential: 
Teaching Excellence, Social Mobility and Student Choice (2015b) which contained three key 
proposals that would impact quality assurance. First, the ‘regulatory playing field’ was to be 
levelled, again making it easier for new providers to enter the market and to obtain the ‘university’ 
title and degree awarding powers. Second, a Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF), as part of an 
enhanced higher education market, would force providers to improve teaching quality or drive 
them out of the sector. TEF judgements would be made by panels of experts and informed by 
existing, benchmarked metrics of graduate employment, retention rates, and student satisfaction. 
Third, a number of regulators were to be merged to form the ‘Office for Students’ (OfS) bringing 
together access agreements, quality assurance, data collection and processing, award of the 
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‘university’ title, TEF and teaching funding into a single student champion organisation (BIS, 
2015b). 
As the consultation on the Green Paper took place, HEFCE, HEFCW and DELNI published their 
revised operating model for quality assessment (HEFCE, 2016). The operating model confirmed 
that future quality assurance work would be conducted by themselves and the winners of six 
competitive tenders. Four of the six contracts, including the largest contract relating to conducting 
quality assurance reviews, were awarded to QAA (QAA, 2016a). 
Under the revised process established providers are to no longer face cyclical reviews. Instead, 
experts at the national funding councils will conduct a desk-based ‘Annual Provider Review’ 
exercise that will “build on established data analysis and assurance arrangements” to determine 
those providers in need of a quality assurance review (HEFCE, 2016, 92). The ‘Annual Provider 
Review’ will consider metrics on inter alia continuation rates, degree outcomes, student 
satisfaction, and employment outcomes. New providers are to enter a four-year probationary 
period which will include an initial peer review. During the four years of ‘development’, new 
providers will be subject to the same desk-based ‘Annual Provider Review’ as ‘established’ 
providers. After four years, probationary providers will undergo a peer review and either be 
judged ‘established’, or remain in the probationary process until such time as they become 
‘established’ (HEFCE, 2016c). 
How long this system will last is unclear. In May 2016 the Government published its White Paper 
that retained the three key quality assurance measures of the Green Paper: the regulatory 
landscape is to be ‘levelled’ and will move towards a risk-based approach, the TEF is being trialled 
in 2016/17, and a number of regulators are to be merged to form the ‘Office for Students’ (OfS). 
Somewhat pointedly, the White Paper stated: 
“the Secretary of State will have a power to designate sector-owned organisations to carry 
out specific quality assurance and data publication functions, enabling the principle of co-
regulation to continue.” 
(BIS, 2016, p.18) 
leading to suggestions that, at the Government’s wishes, all quality assurance work will be 
returned to QAA (WonkHE, 2016). As of late November 2016, the higher education bill derived 




In summary, the higher education landscape has changed dramatically since 2011. A stable 
collection of established HEIs and FECs have been joined by new ‘alternative providers’. At the 
same time tuition fees have been tripled and a host of measures have been enacted to create 
more of a higher education market with the intention that the market will drive up quality. With 
more providers entering the market the QAA’s approach became ‘risk-based’, albeit to a very 
limited extent with high-risk providers only being reviewed four, rather than six, years after their 
previous review and without the focus on “a basket of data” envisioned in Students at the Heart 
of the System (BIS, 2011, 3.19). A new metric-led, and outcomes focused, risk-based approach is 
now being introduced however following the Quality Assessment Review. This approach may yet 
change again if and when the higher education bill receives full parliamentary approval. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
Quality Assurance agencies have developed over the past 30 years for a number of reasons. First, 
a continuous ‘marketisation’ of higher education, seen as the most efficient means of achieving 
high standards, and an increasing reliance on institutions being able to attract students to survive, 
has introduced increased risks to quality including low standards and grade inflation. Second, the 
number of students has increased dramatically; whilst one in seven further education leavers 
entered higher education in 1987, nearly one in two entered higher education in 2011. With the 
increase in student numbers has come an increase in public expenditure, £15 billion in 2009/10 
(IUSSC, 2009a), and with it the need for increased accountability. Third, since universities were 
brought under central control in the late 1980s, the political fortunes of the party in power have 
become aligned to the performance of the higher education sector. Politicians have a more direct 
incentive to ensure quality is being maintained or improved. 
The QAA itself was deemed necessary as the work of its predecessors, HEQC and the Quality 
Assessment Councils, was perceived as overlapping and too burdensome. The QAA has since been 
through a number of phases itself suffering from the competing demands of ‘low burden’ 
oversight and respecting academic freedom on the one hand, and comprehensive standard-
setting and assessment on the other. Initially it struggled to fulfil its remit of combining audit and 
assessment effectively whilst reducing the burden imposed on higher education institutions. The 
Secretary of State subsequently demanded a 40 per cent reduction in burden. A ‘lighter touch’ 
approach focusing on the institution-level audit of providers’ processes was introduced and 
teaching quality was no longer directly assessed. The pendulum then proceeded to swing back 
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towards more comprehensive oversight following a critical IUSSC report (2009b) which deemed 
the QAA not to be doing enough to define and enforce standards. 
Higher education began a series of significant changes in 2011. Higher education providers were 
no longer the same established collection of HEIs and FECs but were being joined by ‘alternative 
providers’, some with little experience and the goal of shareholder returns. The introduction of 
new providers, along with the additional pressures of increased competition for existing providers, 
resulted in the QAA being asked to adopt a metric-led, risk-based approach to prioritising their 
review activity. Following consultation, the adopted HER, RSCD and REO approaches were very 
limited in terms of being ‘risk-based’ and data driven. As the sector continues to evolve HEFCE has 
recently implemented a new metric-led, risk-based approach to the quality assurance of higher 
education (HEFCE, 2016c). This may yet change again if the higher education bill currently working 
its way through parliament is approved. A more in-depth assessment of what constitutes a ‘risk-
based’ approach, its merits and limitations, and suggested applications to quality assurance in 
higher education are explored in the next chapter.   
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Appendix A – Summary of Major Events 
1983 The Secretary of State, Sir Keith Joseph, writes to the University Grants Committee 
(UGC) asking them assess how standards were currently being maintained and 
enhanced and, in the context of a more efficient use of resources in universities, to 
explore the possibilities for maintaining and improving academic quality in the future. 
1986 The report of the ‘Reynolds Group’, established by the CVCP to study and report on 
institutions’ methods for maintaining and monitoring academic quality and standards 
in response to the 1983 request by the Secretary of State, recommends points of 
reference for the self-assurance of the maintenance and monitoring of standards.  
1988 The 1988 White Paper establishes the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council 
(PCFC) and the Universities Funding Council (UFC) who would no longer fund 
institutions through grants but rather would operate a system of contracting. Greater 
control could now be exerted over higher education institutions. 
1990 The Academic Audit Unit (AAU), designed to provide a more permanent oversight of 
universities’ standards and quality control, commences operations. 
1992 The binary divide ends with ‘public sector’ institutions, under certain circumstances, 
able to adopt the title of ‘university’ and the PCFC and UFC being replaced by national 
funding councils. 
Quality Assessment Councils are established within the funding councils and 
undertake assessments of the performance of subject areas within universities against 
their own declared aims and objectives. 
HEQC is founded and begins its quality audits where three peer auditors visit an 
institution to focus on four main areas: the provision and design of course and degree 
programmes, teaching and communication methods, academic staff, and means of 
taking account of external examiners’ reports and the views of students’ and external 
bodies’.  
1994 The Secretary of State, John Patten MP, gives a speech at the HEFCE annual conference 
stressing the importance the Government placed upon the broad comparability of 
standards. 
Assessment visits are extended to cover all institutions and departments and 
judgements of ‘excellent’, ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’ are replaced by a score of 
1 (the lowest) to 4 (the highest) for each of six core areas leading to a published overall 
profile of judgements containing a score out of 24.  
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The new Secretary of State, Mrs Gillian Shephard, asks the HEFCE Chief Executive, 
Professor (now sir) Graeme Davies, to work with the representative bodies to 
determine how audit and assessment could be combined to form a single quality 
system. 
1995 A Joint Planning Group is established by HEFCE and the CVCP to develop proposals for 
a single quality regime. 
1996 The National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education or the “Dearing Committee” 
is established by the Secretary of State to “make recommendations on how the 
purposes, shape, structure, size and funding of higher education, including support for 
students, should develop to meet the needs of the United Kingdom over the next 20 
years”. This explores how to fund the continued expansion of the higher education 
system whilst maintaining or improving academic standards 
1997 The Quality Assurance Agency is incorporated and takes over the HEQC’s staff and 
functions. The new agency’s board was made up of four members representing HEIs, 
four members representing the Funding Councils, and six independent members. 
Representing a shift away from pure self-regulation and towards a partnership 
between the state and the institutions. 
The comprehensive Dearing report is published containing 93 executive 
recommendations. The report suggests the need for the standards of institutional 
awards to be maintained and recommended and that the QAA should provide 
benchmarking information, create a ‘National Qualifications Framework’ and create a 
UK-wide pool of external examiners. 
1998 The QAA undertakes its first and second consultations and, following negotiations 
between the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE), HEFCE, 
representative bodies and QAA, an agreement resulting in a system more 
comprehensive than those it had replaced was reached for England. 
The new approach entails ‘Programme Reviews’, resulting in threshold judgements 
concerning programme outcome standards and graded judgements for a number of 
aspects of learning opportunities, and ‘Institutional Reviews’ resulting in an overall 
judgement of confidence in an institution’s management of standards. 




2001 LSE’s Academic Board make a stand and threaten to withdraw from the QAA over 
concerns about the new approach’s infringement of academic freedom and the low 
standard of reviewers.  
The Secretary of State, David Blunkett, announces a 40% reduction in the volume of 
external review activity with departments that have scored highly in their last 
assessment becoming exempt from the next round.  
John Randall, Chief Executive of the QAA, resigns. 
2002 The QAA publishes its Handbook for Institutional Audit detailing the revised, lighter-
touch approach following the Secretary of States announcement the previous year.  
2004 A fairly extensive set of information is made available on the Teaching Quality 
Information website, now Unistats. 
2005 The first National Student Survey (NSS) is run. 
2009 A critical report by the House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills 
Committee expresses concerns over low and declining academic standards in some 
areas of the UK higher education system and challenges the QAA’s existing practices 
stating that “in not judging the standards themselves, the QAA is taking an unduly 
limited view of its potential role” (IUSSC, 2009, p.97). The committee recommends 
that the QAA was to be reformed and re-established as a Quality and Standards 
Agency. 
2010 Parliament votes to raise the maximum tuition fees for undergraduate degrees 
provided by centrally-funded institutions to £9,000 per annum. 
2011 The ‘Institutional Audit’ methodology is replaced by the ‘Institutional Review (England 
and Northern Ireland)’ seeing four areas now scrutinised by reviewers instead of two, 
the resulting judgements falling into four, not three, categories, students becoming 
full members of review teams, and there no longer being fixed programme of reviews 
but instead a more responsive rolling programme. 
BIS publishes the White Paper Students at the Heart of the System proposing a risk-
based approach for the QAA, focusing its effort were it will have greatest impact. New 
providers may receive a more regular and in-depth review whilst those providers with 
a demonstrable track record of high-quality provision can expect to see significantly 
less frequent or in-depth reviews. 
2012 A HEFCE consultation reveals significant concerns over the “scope, validity, availability 
and reliability” of metrics which might form part of a risk-based quality assurance 
regime and plans for QAA to regularly monitor a basket of data are not continued. 
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2013 QAA introduces its ‘risk-based’ HER approach for HEIs and FECs. 
2014 HEFCE, HEFCW and DELNI form the Quality Assessment Review Steering Group and 
announce that they are to “seek views on future approaches to the assessment of 
quality in higher education” and based on the feedback received “design a 
specification and invite tenders under a joint procurement exercise”. 
2015 QARSG’s consultation finds support for a risk-based approach to quality assurance 
focusing on processes rather than outcomes. 
The Conservative Party wins an outright majority and a Higher Education Green Paper 
is published proposing a ‘Teaching Excellence Framework’. 
The BIS Select Committee announces an inquiry into ‘Assuring Quality in Higher 
Education’. 
2016 HEFCE puts quality assurance work out to tender with QAA winning four of the six 
available contracts.  
The revised quality assurance regime sees an end to cyclical reviews and the 
introduction of a metric-led, risk-based approach. 
The higher education bill is presented to parliament maintaining the key proposals laid 




Appendix B - The UK Quality Code for Higher Education 
The Quality Code (2011) is made up of three parts. Part A Setting and Maintaining Academic  
Standards contains six of the 19 ‘expectations’. These six expectations are not accompanied by 
any ‘indicators of sound practice’. Part B Assuring and Enhancing Academic Quality contains 11 of 
the 19 ‘expectations’ each accompanied by multiple indicators. Part C Information about Higher 
Education Provision contains a single ‘expectation’ and five accompanying ‘indicators of sound 
practice’. Each ‘expectation’ and its accompanying ‘indicators of sound practice’ is detailed in turn 
below. 
Part A Setting and Maintaining Academic Standards 
Expectation A1 
In order to secure threshold academic standards, degree-awarding bodies: 
a) ensure that the requirements of The framework for higher education qualifications in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland/The framework for qualifications of higher 
education institutions in Scotland are met by: 
• positioning their qualifications at the appropriate level of the relevant framework for 
higher education qualifications 
• ensuring that programme learning outcomes align with the relevant qualification 
descriptor in the relevant framework for higher education qualifications 
• naming qualifications in accordance with the titling conventions specified in the 
frameworks for higher education qualifications 
• awarding qualifications to mark the achievement of positively defined programme 
learning outcomes 
b) consider and take account of QAA's guidance on qualification characteristics 
c) where they award UK credit, assign credit values and design programmes that align with 
the specifications of the relevant national credit framework. 
d) consider and take account of relevant subject benchmark statements. 
Expectation A2.1 
In order to secure their academic standards, degree-awarding bodies establish transparent and 







Degree-awarding bodies maintain a definitive record of each programme and qualification that 
they approve (and of subsequent changes to it) which constitutes the reference point for delivery 
and assessment of the programme, its monitoring and review, and for the provision of records of 
study to students and alumni. 
Expectation A3.1 
Degree-awarding bodies establish and consistently implement processes for the approval of 
taught programmes and research degrees that ensure that academic standards are set at a level 
which meets the UK threshold standard for the qualification and are in accordance with their own 
academic frameworks and regulations. 
Expectation A3.2 
Degree-awarding bodies ensure that credit and qualifications are awarded only where: 
• the achievement of relevant learning outcomes (module learning outcomes in the case of 
credit, and programme outcomes in the case of qualifications) has been demonstrated 
through assessment 
• both the UK threshold standards and the academic standards of the relevant degree-
awarding body have been satisfied. 
Expectation A3.3 
Degree-awarding bodies ensure that processes for the monitoring and review of programmes are 
implemented which explicitly address whether the UK threshold academic standards are achieved 
and whether the academic standards required by the individual degree-awarding body are being 
maintained. 
Expectation A3.4 
In order to be transparent and publicly accountable, degree-awarding bodies use external and 
independent expertise at key stages of setting and maintaining academic standards to advise on 
whether: 
• UK threshold academic standards are set, delivered and achieved 






Part B: Assuring and Enhancing Academic Quality 
Expectation B1 (Programme design, development and approval) 
Higher education providers, in discharging their responsibilities for setting and maintaining 
academic standards and assuring and enhancing the quality of learning opportunities, operate 
effective processes for the design, development and approval of programmes.  
 Indicators 
1. Higher education providers maintain strategic oversight of the processes for, and 
outcomes of, programme design, development and approval, to ensure processes are 
applied systematically and operated consistently. 
2. Higher education providers make clear the criteria against which programme proposals 
are assessed in the programme approval process. 
3. Higher education providers define processes, roles and responsibilities for programme 
design, development and approval and communicate them to those involved. 
4. Higher education providers evaluate their processes for programme design, development 
and approval and take action to improve them where necessary. 
5. Higher education providers make use of reference points and expertise from outside the 
programme in programme design and in their processes for programme development and 
approval. 
6. Higher education providers involve students in programme design and in processes for 
programme development and approval. 
7. Higher education providers enable staff and other participants to contribute effectively to 
programme design, development and approval by putting in place appropriate 
arrangements for their support and development. 
Expectation B2 (Recruitment, selection and admission) 
Recruitment, selection, and admission policies and procedures adhere to the principles of fair 
admission. They are transparent, reliable, valid, inclusive and underpinned by appropriate 
organisational structures and processes. They support higher education providers in the selection 
of students who are able to complete their programme. 
 Indicators 
1. Recruitment, selection, and admission policies are informed by the strategic priorities of 
the higher education provider. Higher education providers promote a shared 




2. Recruitment, selection and admission processes are conducted in a professional manner 
by authorised and competent representatives of the higher education provider. 
3. Higher education providers have procedures for handling appeals and complaints about 
recruitment, selection and admission that are fair and accessible. Appeals and complaints 
procedures are conducted expeditiously and in accordance with a published timescale. 
4. Higher education providers monitor, review and update their recruitment, selection and 
admission policies and procedures, in order to enhance them and to ensure that they 
continue to support the provider's mission and strategic objectives. Higher education 
providers determine the frequency with which monitoring and review are undertaken. 
5. Recruitment activities undertaken by higher education providers assist prospective 
students in making informed decisions about higher education. 
6. Higher education providers make clear to prospective students how the recruitment, 
selection and admission process will be conducted and what prospective students have to 
do. 
7. Selection processes for entry into higher education are underpinned by transparent entry 
requirements, both academic and non-academic, and present no unnecessary barriers to 
prospective students. 
8. Higher education providers determine how decisions and the reasons for those decisions 
are recorded and conveyed to prospective students. 
9. Higher education providers inform prospective students, at the earliest opportunity, of 
any significant changes to a programme to which they have applied. Prospective students 
are advised promptly of the options available in the circumstances. 
10. Higher education providers give successful applicants sufficient information to enable 
them to make the transition from prospective student to current student 
Expectation B3 (Learning and teaching) 
Higher education providers, working with their staff, students and other stakeholders, articulate 
and systematically review and enhance the provision of learning opportunities and teaching 
practices, so that every student is enabled to develop as an independent learner, study their 
chosen subject(s) in depth and enhance their capacity for analytical, critical and creative thinking. 
 Indicators 
1. Higher education providers articulate and implement a strategic approach to learning and 
teaching and promote a shared understanding of this approach among their staff, 
students and other stakeholders. 
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2. Learning and teaching activities and associated resources provide every student with an 
equal and effective opportunity to achieve the intended learning outcomes. 
3. Learning and teaching practices are informed by reflection, evaluation of professional 
practice, and subject-specific and educational scholarship. 
4. Higher education providers assure themselves that everyone involved in teaching or 
supporting student learning is appropriately qualified, supported and developed. 
5. Higher education providers collect and analyse appropriate information to ensure the 
continued effectiveness of their strategic approach to, and the enhancement of, learning 
opportunities and teaching practices. 
6. Higher education providers maintain physical, virtual and social learning environments 
that are safe, accessible and reliable for every student, promoting dignity, courtesy and 
respect in their use.  
7. Every student is provided with clear and current information that specifies the learning 
opportunities and support available to them. 
8. Higher education providers take deliberate steps to assist every student to understand 
their responsibility to engage with the learning opportunities provided and shape their 
learning experience. 
9. Every student is enabled to monitor their progress and further their academic 
development through the provision of regular opportunities to reflect on feedback and 
engage in dialogue with staff. 
Expectation B4 (Enabling student development and achievement) 
Higher education providers have in place, monitor and evaluate arrangements and resources 
which enable students to develop their academic, personal and professional potential. 
 Indicators 
1. Through strategic and operational planning, and quality assurance and enhancement, 
higher education providers determine and evaluate how they enable student 
development and achievement. 
2. Higher education providers define, coordinate, monitor and evaluate roles and 
responsibilities for enabling student development and achievement both internally and in 
cooperation with other organisations. 
3. A commitment to equity guides higher education providers in enabling student 
development and achievement. 
4. Higher education providers inform students before and during their period of study of 
opportunities designed to enable their development and achievement. 
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5. To enable student development and achievement, higher education providers put in place 
policies, practices and systems that facilitate successful transitions and academic 
progression. 
6. Higher education providers ensure all students have opportunities to develop skills that 
enable their academic, personal and professional progression.  
7. Higher education providers ensure staff who enable students to develop and achieve are 
appropriately qualified, competent, up to date and supported. 
8. Higher education providers make available appropriate learning resources and enable 
students to develop the skills to use them. 
Expectation B5 (Student engagement) 
Higher education providers take deliberate steps to engage all students, individually and 
collectively, as partners in the assurance and enhancement of their educational experience. 
 Indicators 
1. Higher education providers, in partnership with their student body, define and promote 
the range of opportunities for any student to engage in educational enhancement and 
quality assurance. 
2. Higher education providers create and maintain an environment within which students 
and staff engage in discussions that aim to bring about demonstrable enhancement of the 
educational experience. 
3. Arrangements exist for the effective representation of the collective student voice at all 
organisational levels, and these arrangements provide opportunities for all students to be 
heard. 
4. Higher education providers ensure that student representatives and staff have access to 
training and ongoing support to equip them to fulfil their roles in educational 
enhancement and quality assurance effectively. 
5. Students and staff engage in evidence-based discussions based on the mutual sharing of 
information. 
6. Staff and students to disseminate and jointly recognise the enhancements made to the 
student educational experience, and the efforts of students in achieving these successes. 
7. The effectiveness of student engagement is monitored and reviewed at least annually, 





Expectation B6 (Assessment and the recognition of prior learning) 
Higher education providers operate equitable, valid and reliable processes of assessment, 
including for the recognition of prior learning, which enable every student to demonstrate the 
extent to which they have achieved the intended learning outcomes for the credit or qualification 
being sought. 
 Indicators 
1. Higher education providers operate effective policies, regulations and processes which 
ensure that the academic standard for each award of credit or a qualification is rigorously 
set and maintained at the appropriate level, and that student performance is equitably 
judged against this standard. 
2. Assessment policies, regulations and processes, including those for the recognition of 
prior learning, are explicit, transparent and accessible to all intended audiences. 
3. Those who might be eligible for the recognition of prior learning are made aware of the 
opportunities available, and are supported throughout the process of application and 
assessment for recognition. 
4. Higher education providers assure themselves that everyone involved in the assessment 
of student work, including prior learning, and associated assessment processes is 
competent to undertake their roles and responsibilities. 
5. Assessment and feedback practices are informed by reflection, consideration of 
professional practice, and subject-specific and educational scholarship. 
6. Staff and students engage in dialogue to promote a shared understanding of the basis on 
which academic judgements are made.  
7. Students are provided with opportunities to develop an understanding of, and the 
necessary skills to demonstrate, good academic practice.  
8. The volume, timing and nature of assessment enable students to demonstrate the extent 
to which they have achieved the intended learning outcomes.  
9. Feedback on assessment is timely, constructive and developmental. 
10. Through inclusive design wherever possible, and through individual reasonable 
adjustments wherever required, assessment tasks provide every student with an equal 
opportunity to demonstrate their achievement. 
11. Assessment is carried out securely. 
12. Degree-awarding bodies assure themselves that the standards of their awards are not 
compromised as a result of conducting assessment in a language other than English. 
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13. Processes for marking assessments and for moderating marks are clearly articulated and 
consistently operated by those involved in the assessment process.  
14. Higher education providers operate processes for preventing, identifying, investigating 
and responding to unacceptable academic practice. 
15. Degree-awarding bodies specify clearly the membership, procedures, powers and 
accountability of examination boards and assessment panels, including those dealing with 
the recognition of prior learning; this information is available to all members of such 
boards. 
16. Boards of examiners/assessment panels apply fairly and consistently regulations for 
progression within, and transfer between, programmes and for the award of credits and 
qualifications. 
17. The decisions of examination boards and assessment panels are recorded accurately, and 
communicated to students promptly and in accordance with stated timescales.  
18. Degree-awarding bodies systematically evaluate and enhance their assessment policies, 
regulations and processes. 
Expectation B7 (External examining) 
Higher education providers make scrupulous use of external examiners. 
 Indicators 
1. Degree-awarding bodies appoint one or more external examiner(s) to carry out the role(s) 
defined in this Chapter for all provision that leads to a higher education qualification of 
the degree-awarding body. 
2. Degree-awarding bodies expect their external examiners to provide informative comment 
and recommendations upon whether or not:  
• the degree-awarding body  is maintaining the threshold academic standards set for 
its awards in accordance with the frameworks for higher education qualifications and 
applicable Subject Benchmark Statements 
• the assessment process measures student achievement rigorously and fairly against 
the intended outcomes of the programme(s) and is conducted in line with the degree 
awarding body’s policies and regulations 
• the academic standards and the achievements of students are comparable with those 
in other UK degree-awarding bodies of which the external examiners have experience. 
3. Degree-awarding bodies expect their external examiners to provide informative comment 
and recommendations on: 
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• good practice and innovation relating to learning, teaching and assessment observed 
by the external examiners 
• opportunities to enhance the quality of the learning opportunities provided to 
students. 
4. Degree-awarding bodies have explicit policies and regulations governing the nomination 
and appointment of external examiners. Degree-awarding bodies can terminate an 
external examiner's appointment at any time, subject to approved institutional 
procedures, for failure by the external examiner to fulfil his/her obligations or if a conflict 
of interest arises which cannot be satisfactorily resolved. 
5. Degree awarding bodies apply the following UK-wide set of criteria for appointing external 
examiners and make every effort to ensure that their external examiners are competent 
to undertake the responsibilities defined by the institution. Degree awarding bodies use 
the criteria to ensure that potential conflicts of interest are identified and resolved prior 
to appointing external examiners or as soon as they arise. 
Person specification 
a) Degree-awarding bodies appoint external examiners who can show appropriate 
evidence of the following: 
i. knowledge and understanding of UK sector agreed reference points for the 
maintenance of academic standards and assurance and enhancement of 
quality 
ii. competence and experience in the fields covered by the programme of study, 
or parts thereof 
iii. relevant academic and/or professional qualifications to at least the level of 
the qualification being externally examined, and/or extensive practitioner 
experience where appropriate 
iv. competence and experience relating to designing and operating a variety of 
assessment tasks appropriate to the subject and operating assessment 
procedures 
v. sufficient standing, credibility and breadth of experience within the discipline 
to be able to command the respect of academic peers and, where 
appropriate, professional peers 
vi. familiarity with the standard to be expected of students to achieve the award 
that is to be assessed 
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vii. fluency in English, and where programmes are delivered and assessed in 
languages other than English, fluency in the relevant language(s) (unless other 
secure arrangements are in place to ensure that external examiners are 
provided with the information to make their judgements) 
viii. meeting applicable criteria set by professional, statutory or regulatory bodies 
ix. awareness of current developments in the design and delivery of relevant 
curricula 
x. competence and experience relating to the enhancement of the student 
learning experience. 
Conflicts of interest 
b) b. Degree-awarding bodies do not appoint as external examiners anyone in the 
following categories or circumstances: 
i. a member of a governing body or committee of the appointing body or one 
of its partners, delivery organisations or support providers, or a current 
employee of the appointing body  or one of its partners, delivery 
organisations or support providers 
ii. anyone with a close professional, contractual or personal relationship with a 
member of staff or student involved with the programme of study 
iii. anyone required to assess colleagues who are recruited as students to the 
programme of study 
iv. anyone who is, or knows they will be, in a position to influence significantly 
the future of students on the programme of study 
v. anyone significantly involved in recent or current substantive collaborative 
research activities with a member of staff closely involved in the delivery, 
management or assessment of the programme(s) or modules in question 
vi. former staff or students of the higher education provider unless a period of 
five years has elapsed and all students taught by or with the external examiner 
have completed their programme(s) 
vii. a reciprocal arrangement involving cognate programmes at another higher 
education provider 
viii. the succession of an external examiner by a colleague from the examiner's 
home department and provider 
ix. the appointment of more than one external examiner from the same 
department of the same higher education provider. 
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Terms of office 
c) The duration of an external examiner's appointment will normally be for four 
years, with an exceptional extension of one year to ensure continuity. 
d) An external examiner may be reappointed in exceptional circumstances but only 
after a period of five years or more has elapsed since their last appointment. 
e) External examiners normally hold no more than two external examiner 
appointments for taught programmes/modules at any point in time. 
6. Degree-awarding bodies ensure that all external examiners they appoint are informed 
about organisational procedures, practices, and academic regulations, and the crucial 
value of external examiners' feedback to the degree-awarding body as part of the broader 
system of quality assurance and enhancement. 
7. Degree-awarding bodies communicate clearly in writing to all concerned the: modules, 
programmes and/or qualifications(s) to which each external examiner is appointed 
various roles, powers and responsibilities assigned to their external examiners, including 
the extent of their authority in examination boards. 
8. Higher education providers include the name, position and institution of their external 
examiners in module or programme information provided to students. 
9. Prior to the confirmation of mark lists, pass lists or similar documents, degree-awarding 
bodies expect external examiners to endorse the outcomes of the assessment processes 
they have been appointed to scrutinise. 
10. Degree-awarding bodies provide external examiners with sufficient evidence to enable 
them to discharge their responsibilities.  
11. Higher education providers recognise the importance, and mutual benefit, of the work 
undertaken by many of their staff as external examiners for other providers and agree 
with staff the time they need to fulfil these duties. 
12. External examiners submit a report annually, at a time determined by the degree-
awarding body, to the head of the degree-awarding body or to one or more named 
individuals that he/she designates. 
13. External examiners' annual reports provide clear and informative feedback to the degree 
awarding body on those areas defined for the role in Indicators 2 and 3 (the core content). 
In addition, their reports: confirm that sufficient evidence was received to enable the role 
to be fulfilled (where evidence was insufficient, they give details) state whether issues 
raised in the previous report(s) have been, or are being, addressed to their satisfaction 
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address any issues as specifically required by any relevant professional body give an 
overview of their term of office (when concluded). 
14. Higher education providers make external examiners' annual reports available in full to 
students, with the sole exception of any confidential report made directly, and separately, 
to the head of the degree-awarding body.  
15. At both organisational and subject/programme level, degree-awarding bodies give full 
and serious consideration to the comments and recommendations contained in external 
examiners' reports. The actions taken as a result of reports, or the reasons for not taking 
action, are formally recorded and circulated to those concerned. Degree-awarding bodies 
ensure that student representatives are given the opportunity to be fully involved in this 
process, enabling them to understand all the issues raised and the degree-awarding 
body's response. At organisational level the general issues and themes arising from the 
reports are reviewed.  
16. Degree-awarding bodies provide external examiners with a considered and timely 
response to their comments and recommendations, outlining any actions they will be 
taking as a result of the reasons for not taking action. 
17. Degree-awarding bodies inform external examiners, in writing at the beginning of their 
term of office, that they have a right to raise any matter of serious concern with the head 
of the degree-awarding body, if necessary by means of a separate confidential written 
report. Degree-awarding bodies provide a considered and timely response to any 
confidential report received, outlining any actions they will be taking as a result.  
18. Where an external examiner has a serious concern relating to systemic failings with the 
academic standards of a programme or programmes and has exhausted all published 
applicable internal procedures, including the submission of a confidential report to the 
head of the degree-awarding body, he/she may invoke QAA's concerns scheme or inform 
the relevant professional, statutory or regulatory body. 
Expectation B8 (Programme monitoring and review) 
Higher education providers, in discharging their responsibilities for setting and maintaining 
academic standards and assuring and enhancing the quality of learning opportunities, operate 







1. Higher education providers maintain strategic oversight of the processes for, and 
outcomes of, programme monitoring and programme review, to ensure processes are 
applied systematically and operated consistently. 
2. Higher education providers take deliberate steps to use the outcomes of programme 
monitoring and review processes for enhancement purposes.  
3. Higher education providers operate a process to protect the academic interests of 
students when a programme is closed.  
4. Higher education providers define processes, roles and responsibilities for programme 
monitoring and programme review and communicate them to those involved. 
5. Higher education providers evaluate their processes for programme monitoring and 
review and take action to improve them where necessary.  
6. Higher education providers make use of reference points and draw on expertise from 
those outside the programme in their processes for programme monitoring and review. 
7. Higher education providers involve students in programme monitoring and review 
processes. 
8. Higher education providers enable staff and other participants to contribute effectively to 
programme monitoring and programme review by putting in place appropriate 
arrangements for their support and development. 
Expectation B9 (Academic appeals and student complaints) 
Higher education providers have procedures for handling academic appeals and student 
complaints about the quality of learning opportunities; these procedures are fair, accessible and 
timely, and enable enhancement. 
 Indicators 
1. Higher education providers make available opportunities for students to raise matters of 
concern without risk of disadvantage. 
2. Higher education providers have procedures which encourage constructive engagement 
with the appeals and complaints process and which offer opportunities for early and/or 
informal resolution. 
3. Higher education providers have accessible appeals and complaints procedures. 
4. Clear and accurate advice and guidance is available for students making an appeal or 
complaint, and for staff involved in handling or supporting appeals and complaints. 
5. Academic appeals and complaints procedures are conducted in a timely and fair manner. 
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6. Higher education providers ensure that appropriate action is taken following an appeal or 
complaint. 
7. Higher education providers monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of their appeals and 
complaints procedures, and reflect on the outcomes of those procedures for 
enhancement purposes. 
Expectation B10 (Managing higher education provision with others) 
Degree-awarding bodies take ultimate responsibility for academic standards and the quality of 
learning opportunities, irrespective of where these are delivered or who provides them. 
Arrangements for delivering learning opportunities with organisations other than the degree 
awarding body are implemented securely and managed effectively. 
 Indicators 
1. A strategic approach to delivering learning opportunities with others is adopted. 
Appropriate levels of resources (including staff) are committed to the activities to ensure 
that the necessary oversight is sustained. 
2. Governance arrangements at appropriate levels are in place for all learning opportunities 
which are not directly provided by the degree-awarding body. Arrangements for learning 
to be delivered, or support to be provided, are developed, agreed and managed in 
accordance with the formally stated policies and procedures of the degree-awarding 
body. 
3. Policies and procedures ensure that there are adequate safeguards against financial 
impropriety or conflicts of interest that might compromise academic standards or the 
quality of learning opportunities. Consideration of the business case is conducted 
separately from approval of the academic proposal.  
4. Degree-awarding bodies that engage with other authorised awarding bodies to provide a 
programme of study leading to a joint academic award satisfy themselves that they have 
the legal capacity to do so. 
5. The risks of each arrangement to deliver learning opportunities with others are assessed 
at the outset and reviewed subsequently on a periodic basis. Appropriate and 
proportionate safeguards to manage the risks of the various arrangements are 
determined and put in place. 
6. Appropriate and proportionate due diligence procedures are determined for each 
proposed arrangement for delivering learning opportunities with an organisation other 
than the degree-awarding body. They are conducted periodically to check the capacity of 
the other organisation to continue to fulfil its designated role in the arrangement. 
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7. There is a written and legally binding agreement, or other document, setting out the rights 
and obligations of the parties, which is regularly monitored and reviewed. It is signed by 
the authorised representatives of the degree-awarding body (or higher education 
provider without degree-awarding powers arranging provision by a third party) and by the 
delivery organisation, support provider or partner(s) before the relevant activity 
commences. 
8. Degree-awarding bodies take responsibility for ensuring that they retain proper control of 
the academic standards of awards where learning opportunities are delivered with others. 
No serial arrangements are undertaken without the express written permission of the 
degree-awarding body which retains oversight of what is being done in its name. 
9. Degree-awarding bodies retain responsibility for ensuring that students admitted to a 
programme who wish to complete it under their awarding authority can do so in the event 
that a delivery organisation or support provider or partner withdraws from an 
arrangement or that the degree-awarding body decides to terminate an arrangement. 
10. All higher education providers maintain records (by type and category) of all 
arrangements for delivering learning opportunities with others that are subject to a formal 
agreement. 
11. Degree-awarding bodies are responsible for the academic standards of all credit and 
qualifications granted in their name. This responsibility is never delegated. Therefore, 
degree-awarding bodies ensure that the standards of any of their awards involving 
learning opportunities delivered by others are equivalent to the standards set for other 
awards that they confer at the same level. They are also consistent with UK national 
requirements. 
12. When making arrangements to deliver a programme with others, degree-awarding bodies 
fulfil the requirements of any professional, statutory and regulatory body (PSRB) that has 
approved or recognised the programme or qualification, in relation to aspects of its 
delivery and any associated formal agreements. The status of the programme or 
qualification in respect of PSRB recognition is made clear to prospective students. 
13. Degree-awarding bodies approve module(s) and programmes delivered through an 
arrangement with another delivery organisation, support provider or partner through 
processes that are at least as rigorous, secure and open to scrutiny as those for assuring 




14. Degree-awarding bodies clarify which organisation is responsible for admitting and 
registering a student to modules or programmes delivered with others, and ensure that 
admissions are consistent with their own admissions policies. 
15. Degree-awarding bodies ensure that delivery organisations involved in the assessment of 
students understand and follow the assessment requirements approved by the degree-
awarding body for the components or programmes being assessed in order to maintain 
its academic standards. In the case of joint, dual/double and multiple awards or for study 
abroad and student exchanges, degree-awarding bodies agree with their partners on the 
division of assessment responsibilities and the assessment regulations and requirements 
which apply. 
16. Degree-awarding bodies retain ultimate responsibility for the appointment, briefing and 
functions of external examiners. The external examining procedures for qualifications 
where learning opportunities are delivered with others are consistent with the degree 
awarding body's approved practices. 
17. Degree-awarding bodies ensure that modules and programmes offered through other 
delivery organisations, support providers or partners are monitored and reviewed 
through procedures that are consistent with, or comparable to, those used for modules 
or programmes provided directly by them.  
18. Degree-awarding bodies ensure that they have effective control over the accuracy of all 
public information, publicity and promotional activity relating to learning opportunities 
delivered with others which lead to their awards. Information is produced for prospective 
and current students which is fit for purpose, accessible and trustworthy. Delivery 
organisations or support providers are provided with all information necessary for the 
effective delivery of the learning or support.  
19. When degree-awarding bodies make arrangements for the delivery of learning 
opportunities with others, they ensure that they retain authority for awarding certificates 
and issuing detailed records of study in relation to student achievement. The certificate 
and/or record of academic achievement states the principal language of instruction 
and/or assessment where this is not English.22 Subject to any overriding statutory or 
other legal provision in any relevant jurisdiction, the certificate and/or the record of 
achievement records the name and location of any other higher education provider 
involved in the delivery of the programme of study.23 Where information relating to the 
language of study or to the name and location of the delivery organisation or partner is 
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recorded on the record of achievement only, the certificate refers to the existence of this 
formal record. 
Expectation B11 (Research degrees) 
Research degrees are awarded in a research environment that provides secure academic 
standards for doing research and learning about research approaches, methods, procedures and 
protocols. This environment offers students quality of opportunities and the support they need to 
achieve successful academic, personal and professional outcomes from their research degrees. 
 Indicators 
1. Higher education providers that are research degree awarding bodies have regulations for 
research degrees that are clear and readily available to research students and staff, 
including examiners. Where appropriate, regulations are supplemented by similarly 
accessible, subject-specific guidance at the level of the faculty, school, department, 
research centre, or research institute.  
2. Higher education providers develop, implement and keep under review codes of practice 
for research degrees, which are widely applicable and help enable the higher education 
provider meet the Expectation of this Chapter. The codes are readily available to all 
students and staff involved in research degrees, and written in clear language understood 
by all users. 
3. Higher education providers monitor their research degree provision against internal and 
external indicators and targets that reflect the context in which research degrees are 
being offered. 
4. Higher education providers accept research students only into an environment that 
provides support for doing and learning about research, and where excellent research, 
recognised by the relevant subject community, is occurring. 
5. Higher education providers' admissions procedures for research degrees are clear, 
consistently applied and demonstrate equality of opportunity. 
6. Only appropriately qualified and prepared applicants are admitted to research degree 
programmes. Admissions decisions involve at least two members of the higher education 
provider's staff who have received training and guidance for the selection and admission 
of research degree students. The decision-making process enables the higher education 
provider to assure itself that balanced and independent admissions decisions have been 
made in accordance with its admissions policy. 
7. Higher education providers define and communicate clearly the responsibilities and 
entitlements of students undertaking research degree programmes.  
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8. Research students are provided with sufficient information to enable them to begin their 
studies with an understanding of the environment in which they will be working. 
9. Higher education providers appoint supervisors with the appropriate skills and subject 
knowledge to support and encourage research students, and to monitor their progress 
effectively. 
10. Each research student has a supervisory team containing a main supervisor who is the 
clearly identified point of contact. 
11. Higher education providers ensure that the responsibilities of research student 
supervisors are readily available and clearly communicated to supervisors and students. 
12. Higher education providers ensure that individual supervisors have sufficient time to carry 
out their responsibilities effectively. 
13. Higher education providers put in place clearly defined mechanisms for monitoring and 
supporting research student progress, including formal and explicit reviews of progress at 
different stages. Research students, supervisors and other relevant staff are made aware 
of progress monitoring mechanisms, including the importance of keeping appropriate 
records of the outcomes of meetings and related activities. 
14. Research students have appropriate opportunities for developing research, personal and 
professional skills. Each research student's development needs are identified and agreed 
jointly by the student and appropriate staff at the start of the degree; these are regularly 
reviewed and updated as appropriate.  
15. Higher education providers put in place mechanisms to collect, review and respond as 
appropriate to evaluations from those concerned with research degrees, including 
individual research students and groups of research students or their representatives. 
Evaluations are considered openly and constructively and the results are communicated 
appropriately. 
16. Higher education providers that are research degree awarding bodies use criteria for 
assessing research degrees that enable them to define their academic standards and the 
achievements of their graduates. The criteria used to assess research degrees are clear 
and readily available to research students, staff and examiners. 
17. Research degree final assessment procedures are clear and are operated rigorously, fairly, 
and consistently. They include input from an external examiner and are carried out to a 
reasonable timescale. Assessment procedures are communicated clearly to research 
students, supervisors and examiners. 
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18. Higher education providers put in place and promote independent and formal procedures 
for dealing with complaints and appeals that are fair, clear to all concerned, robust, and 
applied consistently. The acceptable grounds for complaints and appeals are clearly 
defined. 
 
Part C: Information about Higher Education Provision 
Expectation C 
Higher education providers produce information for their intended audiences about the learning 
opportunities they offer that is fit for purpose, accessible and trustworthy. 
 Indicators 
1. Higher education providers publish information that describes their mission, values and 
overall strategy. 
2. Higher education providers describe the process for application and admission to the 
programme of study. 
3. Higher education providers publish information to help prospective students select their 
programme with an understanding of the academic environment in which they will be 
studying and the provision that will be made to enable their development and 
achievement. 
4. Information on the programme of study is issued to current students at the start of their 
programme and throughout their studies. 
5. Higher education providers set out what they expect of current students and what current 
students can expect of the higher education provider. 
6. When students leave their programme of study, higher education providers issue to them 
a detailed record of their studies, which gives evidence to others of the students' 
achievement in their academic programme. 
7. Higher education providers:  
• set out their arrangements for managing academic standards and quality assurance 
and enhancement and describe the data and information used to support its 
implementation 
• maintain records (by type and category) of all arrangements for delivering higher 
education with others that are subject to a formal agreement.  
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3. Risk-Based Approaches 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore ‘risk-based’ approaches to regulation. It defines ‘risk-
based regulation’ and examines its evolution, merits, and limitations. This is followed by an 
examination of the different ways in which a risk-based approach can be implemented and a 
review of the literature concerning risk-based approaches to quality assurance in higher 
education. 
 
3.1. Defining Risk-Based Regulation 
Risk-based regulation is built upon the allocation of regulatory resource in proportion to the risks, 
calculated as the product of the perceived impact and likelihood of their occurrence, posed to the 
regulator’s objectives (Black, 2005; Rothstein et al., 2006b). Risk-based regulation ostensibly 
provides practitioners with a means with which to “maximise the benefits of regulation while 
minimising the burdens on regulatees by offering ‘targeted’ and ‘proportionate’ interventions” 
(Rothstein et al., 2006a, p.97). For QAA, this means the ability to lighten or eliminate reviews for 
low-risk providers, leaving them free to prosper, whilst using the resource saved to conduct 
reviews of high-risk providers and quickly eliminate or prevent any poor practice, all at the same 
or reduced cost to the taxpayer. In theory, everybody wins. 
Regulators have always had to prioritise their limited resource however; the issue of 
overburdened regulators is not a new one (Pontell, 1978). QAA for example is responsible for 
assuring the quality and standards of over 700 higher education providers in the UK and overseas 
(HEFCE, 2015c), direct regulation of the ‘Access to Higher Education’ qualification, advising the 
privy council on applications for degree awarding powers and the use of the university title, and 
contributes towards decisions resulting in providers being awarded ‘highly trusted status’ by the 
UK Borders Agency. It must fulfil its responsibilities across four different devolved legislatures 
(more if one considers UK higher education provided overseas) and within a limited budget of 
£16M (QAA, 2015b). Risk-based approaches are intended to move this implicit prioritisation of 
resource forward with the explicit determination of risk through assessment frameworks and help 
frame solutions not just in terms of costs and benefits, but also the impact and probability of 
future uncertainties in a “politically compelling” manner (Black, 2005, p.4). 
Risk-based approaches have evolved from their original focus on inspection planning (Hampton, 
2005) to cover the full purview of regulatory duties. Risk-based approaches to enforcement, 
standard setting and licencing continue to be developed, such as the CQC’s risk-based approach 
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to registering health and social care providers legally permitting them to practice controlled 
procedures (CQC, 2015a), as the growth in regulators’ responsibilities is not matched by available 
resource. In line with Students at the Heart of the System (BIS, 2011) and the ongoing debate in 
higher education, this thesis focuses on the risk-based prioritisation of inspections.  
 
3.2. The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation 
Regulation has become pervasive in modern society. Rising international competition, increasing 
economic integration and the embracing of (quasi) markets has resulted in governments 
transforming from providers of macroeconomic stability and ‘merit goods’ to guardians against 
market failures (Loughlin and Scott, 1997; Majone, 1994). Majone argues that the increased 
number of EU directives and necessary harmonisation of its members’ laws, the privatisation of 
state monopolies now requiring price and competition controls, and the introduction of internal 
markets with public providers and commissioners operating through contractual arrangements 
have all led to a proliferation of regulation (Majone, 1997). This shift from the ‘interventionist’ to 
the ‘standard-setting and enforcement’ government has heralded a reduction in central 
administration and a move towards the establishment of specialised arms-length regulatory 
bodies. These bodies are not only tasked with the oversight of private actors’ adherence to 
competition rules in newly created markets, but also the financial management and quality of 
providers in the traditionally ‘public’ spheres such as healthcare and education (Hood et al., 1999).  
With the rise of what has become known as the ‘regulatory state’, and the corresponding rise of 
New Public Management (Hood, 1995), Black (2005) suggests we are now experiencing ‘New 
Public Risk Management’. As the virtues of private business practices were extolled during the 
1980s and 1990s, a strong deregulatory rhetoric developed. In Europe and America regulators 
were accused of stifling growth and burdening industry with ‘red tape’ (Majone, 1990; Breyer et 
al., 1999; Hutter, 2005) and, following a spate of privatisations, the Major Government in the UK 
passed the Deregulation and Contracting out Act (1994).  
In response to concerns over burden and earlier regulatory failings, the mid-1990’s saw the 
popularisation of enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Parker, 2002). Adopted in 
diverse fields including health and safety and the quality assurance of higher education, regulators 
ceded responsibility for assessing compliance with standards to regulatees seen as better placed 
to manage technical issues and instead audited the management systems of regulatees’ 
developed to ensure their own compliance. Self-regulatory approaches were seen as the answer 
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to the inherent limitations of hierarchical oversight, and were cheaper too (Lodge and Wegrich, 
2012).  
The evolution of regulatory practices was continued by the Blair Government with the 
establishment of the Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) and a plethora of independent 
regulatory agencies (see for example Thatcher, 2002; Patterson and Lilburne, 2003). The Better 
Regulation Task Force published its ‘Principles of Good Regulation’ in 1997 (BRTF, 1997) 
advocating risk-based regulatory approaches which built upon enforced self-regulation (Lodge and 
Wegrich, 2012). In the following years the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Treasury followed 
suit between them recommending risk-based approaches for, amongst others, the Gaming Board, 
Maritime and Coast Agency, Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority, Ofsted, the Social Care 
sector and efficiency across government (NAO, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003; BRTF, 2002, 2004; 
Gershon, 2004). 
It was the publication of Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement 
(Hampton, 2005) - the ‘Hampton Report’ - which cemented the use of risk-based approaches 
amongst oversight bodies. Drawing on evidence from the long-standing practice in food safety 
and occupational health and safety regulation, the report emphatically endorsed the use of risk-
based approaches for all UK regulators and gave rise to the ubiquitous ‘Hampton principles’. Later 
that year the then Chancellor Gordon Brown continued to laud risk-based approaches telling the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI): 
“In the old regulatory model – and for more than one hundred years – the implicit principle 
from health and safety to the administration of tax and financial services has been, 
irrespective of known risks or past results, 100 per cent inspection whether it be premises, 
procedures or practices.  
This approach, followed for more than a century of regulation by governments of all 
parties is outdated. The better, and in my opinion the correct, modern model of regulation 
– the risk based approach – is based on trust in the responsible company, the engaged 
employee and the educated consumer, leading government to focus its attention where it 
should: no inspection without justification, no form filling without justification, and no 
information requirements without justification, not just a light touch but a limited touch” 
(Brown, 2005). 
The following year the Better Regulation Commission (BRC) was established “to advise the 
Government on action to reduce unnecessary regulatory and administrative burdens, and ensure 
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that regulation and its enforcement are proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and 
targeted" (BRC, 2006). The institutionalisation of risk-based approaches was completed one year 
later when, following the publication of the Statutory Code of Practice for Regulators, it became a 
legal requirement in the UK for all regulators to develop and operate risk-based frameworks 
(BERR, 2007). As Rothstein et al. (2011) asserted, the regulation of risk became regulation by risk.  
High-profile failings, epitomised by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the financial crisis of 
2008 (see for example Lodge and Wegrich, 2012), have led to a greater scrutiny of risk-based 
regulation, but have not slowed its proliferation. Recent years have seen risk-based approaches 
lauded by The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2010) and 
introduced or revised by inter alia the Care Quality Commission (CQC, 2013a, 2015a), Australia’s 
Tertiary Education Quality Standards Agency (TEQSA, 2012, 2015), NHS Improvement (NHS 
Improvement, 2015), and of course QAA (QAA, 2013a, 2013b). The perceived merits of a risk-
based approach responsible for its proliferation are examined below. 
 
3.3. The Merits of a Risk-Based Approach 
Risk-based approaches would not have become so popular had they not satisfied, or at least been 
perceived to have satisfied, the key regulatory requirements of their time. First and foremost, risk-
based approaches promised a more efficient use of resource. To use the QAA as an example, until 
the recent introduction of the HER approach all universities were reviewed every six years 
regardless of their prior performance or the available intelligence. Investing resource in reviewing 
a university that always demonstrated the highest standards and current data suggests is 
continuing to do so whilst waiting six years to re-review a poorly-performing university that is 
showing no obvious signs of improvement is arguably a poor use of resource. By prioritising these 
universities according to the risk posed to the QAA’s objectives, the high-performing universities 
will be rewarded for their efforts by a reduced burden from review whilst the poorly-performing 
universities will receive the attention they warrant, and the support they need, to improve, all 
with the same amount of overall resource as before.  
Second, the ostensibly objective risk assessments underpinning the risk-based approaches 
promised regulators a defensible rationale for their prioritisation activity (Sunstein, 2002). 
Regulators frequently have more to do, and issues to respond to, than resources permit (Black, 
2005). Regulators , therefore, cannot and do not prevent all harms. This can be easily exemplified: 
major healthcare failings at Bristol Royal Infirmary and Mid-Staffordshire hospital saw the 
unnecessary deaths of hundreds of patients (Healthcare Commission, 2009); confidence in food 
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safety has been harmed by the BSE, Foot and Mouth disease and e-coli crises; and train crashes at 
Potters Bar, Ladbroke Grove and Hatfield killed 42 and injured 634 people in a 30-month period 
(Cullen, 2002; ORR, 2006; Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2005). The seemingly continuous 
stream of failures and a decline in confidence over what regulation can achieve at the same time 
as the adoption of New Public Management practices has seen increased oversight and 
accountability for regulators (Löfstedt, 2008). Conceiving of harms, both to those they are charged 
with protecting and to themselves, in terms of risks to be managed allows regulators to 
demonstrate a rational defence for their actions (Rothstein et al., 2006a). Where low-level 
‘probabilistic’ risks have a high public salience, or where the regulator failed to prevent an incident 
of which the available data contained no forewarning, a demonstrable defence for inaction in the 
form of a risk assessment is highly desirable and has the further benefit of providing transparency 
in an era of heightened public accountability (Rothstein et al., 2006a; Lodge and Wegrich, 2012; 
Demeritt et al., 2015).  
Third, the adoption of en vogue methodologies provides regulators with legitimacy and aids 
bureaucratic survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Risk-based approaches promised regulators not 
only the ability to rationalise, manage and control the notoriously complex challenges of 
regulation, but the ability to do so whilst appearing forward-thinking in a period of political 
enamourment with private-sector practices (Hutter, 2005; Baldwin et al., 2012).  
The appeal of risk-based approaches is clear: practitioners make rational and efficient use of their 
resource, they do so in a readily-defensible manner, appear favourable to Government and allow 
compliant actors to prosper whilst affording non-compliant actors the attention they require. As 
always, however, the devil is in the detail of the regulator’s risk assessment tools and the technical, 
legal and political implementation of their approach.  
 
3.4. The Limitations of a Risk-Based Approach 
There are significant challenges facing the successful implementation of a risk-based approach to 
regulation (Rothstein et al., 2006b). First, the epistemic challenge of correctly determining the 
actuarial risk of regulatory harms occurring. Second, the normative challenge of managing the 
acceptability of risk to different groups ex ante and ex post. Third, the institutional challenges of 





3.4.1. Epistemic Challenges 
A risk-based approach to regulation cannot work without an effective method for determining 
risk. Before any data is entered into a risk model subjective decisions must be made about, 
amongst other things, what risks are to be assessed, what data should be used, how it will be 
weighted and aggregated, how ‘impact’ will be determined, and how much confidence can be 
placed in the data? Even with these questions answered and with the risk model in place 
regulators must still decide how much discretionary judgement to allow when considering the 
output to balance consistency with flexibility. In short, whilst a regulator’s risk model may provide 
an ‘objective’ output indicating the level of risk, a great deal of subjective decision-making is 
required to develop the model, interpret the output and determine the correct response (Slovic, 
1992).  
The collection and use of data also poses a number of challenges. Risk models are often developed 
to utilise the data that is available rather than the information which would be of most use (OECD, 
2010). This is in part driven by the fact that the imposition of additional data collections adds 
‘regulatory burden’ on regulatees, the antithesis of risk-based regulation (see for example Dow 
and Braithwaite, 2013). Risk assessments necessarily based on limited data due to availability 
constraints are unlikely to reach the correct conclusion (Kahneman, 2011; Miller, 1962). Where 
regulatees are aware that the information they provide may be used to prioritise or sanction them, 
that information will cease to be useful for regulatory purposes (Goodhart, 1984) and cooperation 
between the regulator and regulatees will be negatively impacted (Baldwin et al., 2012).  
Even where extensive, high-quality data are available, risk models face challenges. For example, 
Turner (1994) highlights the disputed technical underpinnings of quantitative risk assessments, 
Cohen (1996) and Toft (1996) challenge the higher-level efficacy of the reduction and aggregation 
of data, whilst Taleb (2010) demonstrates the risk model’s inability to account for extreme outlier 
events, or ‘black swans’, such as the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks. More broadly, Reason 
(1990) and King (2014a) have questioned the ability of models to predict human behaviour.  
Whatever the prevailing reason, the sole study to date empirically assessing a regulator’s risk 
prioritisation tool has found it actively misleading. The CQC would have been better off doing the 
opposite of what their ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ system for prioritising hospital inspections 
suggested (Griffiths et al., 2016). Finally, risk models focusing on prioritising the inspection and 
enforcement of individual regulatees may be blind to emerging systematic risks, either because 
they fall outside of the existing risk model’s parameters or because they are affecting all 
regulatees, including those deemed ‘low risk’ and spared inspection. Such dangers were foreseen 
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by Hampton (2005) who suggested the ongoing use of random inspection to continually evaluate 
regulators’ approaches and spot emerging threats across high and low risk providers alike. This 
however failed to prevent the financial crisis of 2008. 
3.4.2. Normative Challenges 
Setting aside the challenges to successfully assessing risk, the rational defence for regulatory 
decision-making offered by an objective risk assessment is likely to be challenged by political 
considerations. The perceived ‘intolerable’ risks which concern the general population often differ 
from ‘true’, ‘probabilistic’ risks which a rational regulator should prioritise (Slovic, 1992; Starr, 
1969). Government ministers however, elected to represent the population and keen to maintain 
their careers, may seek to direct regulatory activity towards low-risk ‘intolerable’ concerns 
(Breyer, 2009). This was exemplified in 2012 by then Health Secretary’s instruction that the CQC 
undertake inspections of all abortion clinics in England following media revelations about doctors 
pre-signing second-opinion forms. Whilst a valid concern, these inspections cost £1,000,000 to 
conduct at short notice and resulted in the cancellation of 580 pre-planned inspections of 
hospitals and care homes that posed a far greater risk (BBC, 2012). Conversely, whilst espousing 
the virtues of risk-based approaches, politicians may be unwilling to accept failures of any size that 
are inevitable when managing risks rather than trying to prevent all harms. Explaining to the family 
of a vulnerable care home resident who died as a result of neglect that their case was, when 
probability and consequence are considered, low impact and therefore of limited interest to the 
regulator is not straightforward. Impact can be very subjective (Beaussier et al., 2016). 
‘Risk colonisation’ means that regulators themselves can also be guilty of prioritising lesser risks 
with a higher salience in an exercise in bureaucratic self-preservation. Rothstein et al. (2006a) cite 
the example of train safety where regulators feel under pressured to allocate more resource 
towards the prevention of low-probability, high-casualty accidents which attract media attention 
and intense lobbying than to high-probability, individual-fatality incidents which total more deaths 
overall. As discussions concerning nuclear power have shown, attempts to resolve the friction 
between ‘intolerable’ and the more ‘probabilistic’ risks via public education are unlikely to be 
successful (Douglas, 1992). Some regulators, such as the UK Pensions Regulator, have attempted 
to accommodate this by including ‘loss of public confidence’ as a criterion of their risk assessment. 
The clear danger however is that this undermines the ‘rational’ tenet of risk-based regulation 
(Baldwin et al., 2012). Even when regulators are able to successfully deal with the disjuncture 
between ‘intolerable’ and ‘probabilistic’ risks, the public’s perception of risk can change much 
quicker than established regulatory frameworks. 
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Individual inspectors also face their own normative challenges. If faced with two similar 
organisations and the performance of the first has led to it being an ‘amber’ risk whilst nothing is 
known about the performance of the second: which should be prioritised? Likewise, where no 
overall aggregated risk score exists, but rather a number of lower-level risk-category scores, 
should an organisation with two ‘amber’ risks be prioritised over another with one ‘red’ risk? It is 
unlikely simple aggregation rules for broad risk assessment categories will be able to fully deal 
with the nuances of such challenges.  
3.4.3. Institutional Challenges 
Successfully allocating resource in proportion to the risks to one’s objectives may not only be 
constrained by epistemic challenges, but also by a regulator’s internal, institutional challenges 
(Lodge and Wegrich, 2012). Regulators can have wide ranging and often contradictory objectives. 
The NHS finance and governance regulator Monitor for example is responsible both for promoting 
competition and protecting the financial health of NHS Foundation Trusts. High barriers of entry 
to the market for new private providers pose a risk to increased competition yet reduce the risk 
of NHS Foundation Trusts running into financial difficulty (PAC, 2014).  
Even when the risk regulatees pose is clear, regulators allocating their resources in accordance to 
those risks cannot be sure it will provide the best use of resource. In practice the resource required 
to rectify non-compliance is not uniform across regulatees but might vary, inter alia in accordance 
with their cultures, attitudes and capacities. The amount of resource required to mitigate the risk 
from a recalcitrant regulatee may far exceed the resource required to educate numerous 
regulatees who wish to comply and simply require the necessary information or education to allow 
them to do so. Any attempt to account for this by the regulator may however prove 
counterproductive as it rewards less amenable regulatees with a lower risk score than they merit.  
Black and Baldwin (2010) further highlight that a standard risk-based approach will not instruct 
practitioners in the best approach to take towards individual regulatees who may respond better 
to different enforcement approaches. For example, risk-based regulators are unlikely to prioritise 
the education and persuasion approach which mitigates the risks posed by a number of smaller 
bodies as their size will limit the impact they can have and therefore the risk they pose. Where the 
non-compliance of smaller, lower impact, bodies is not prioritised, however, issues can 
progressively escalate across a large number of regulatees and develop into a systematic risk.  
Regulators may also face difficulties acting on an identified risk with any great speed as they are 
only one actor in part of a wider regulatory regime (FSA, 2009). Regulatory action often requires 
a co-ordinated, multiagency response. In English healthcare, for example, persistent failings 
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including high death rates at a Foundation Trust may require action from the CQC as the quality 
regulator, Monitor as the governance regulator and body with the ultimate power to impose 
change, and the General Medical Council and/or the Royal College of Surgeons to manage the 
individual medics.  
On an individual level, regulatory staff can also struggle with the implementation of a risk-based 
approach. Not only must regulators overcome the challenges of obtaining sufficient data, 
including the capture of staff members’ tacit knowledge, and the effective calculation of complex 
regulatory risks, but they must then present this in a way simple enough for front-line staff to 
successfully interpret. Staff can find it a difficult transition in culture from the absolute prevention 
of failure and ‘ticking boxes’ to the management of risks of failure, especially the shift away from 
all failures being unacceptable and someone’s fault (Douglas, 1992; OECD, 2010). Black (2005) 
highlights that staff in such circumstances, especially those not enamoured with the new risk-
based approach, may be tempted to reverse engineer risk assessments to ensure a result 
consistent with their perception rather than the probabilistic score from a model. When the risks 
identified by a regulator are clustered, either geographically or by area of expertise, the ability to 
prioritise all these risks may be constrained by the mobility and fungibility of the workforce. 
Finally, risk-based approaches require a substantial analytical underpinning in order to source, 
manage, interpret, score, aggregate and disseminate information on the risks posed by providers. 
With finite resource, this capability must come at the expense of another aspect of the regulator’s 
functions (Lodge and Wegrich, 2012).  
In summary, risk-based approaches theoretically offer regulators an efficient means of operation 
in austere, deregulatory times and a rational defence when challenged over their decision making. 
In practice their implementation is constrained by inter alia political interference, immovable 
public perceptions, ill-defined or contradictory regulatory frameworks, the differing attitudes of 
regulatees, and resource limitations. These constraints are secondary however to the epistemic 
challenges. If a regulator cannot assess risk, a risk-based approach will be fundamentally flawed 
and the subsequent operational challenges are somewhat moot. It is this regulatory challenge of 
assessing risk which this thesis focuses on. 
 
3.5. Variations of Risk-Based Approaches 
Few 21st century regulatory strategy documents have escaped the platitudes of risk-based 
approaches (see for example Australian Skills Quality Authority, 2016; Bar Standards Board, 2016; 
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CQC, 2015a; Ofsted, 2015a; SRA, 2014; TEQSA, 2012, 2015). Regulators, however, rarely detail 
how their approach is risk based. The Care Quality Commission’s experience with its high-profile 
‘Intelligent Monitoring’ approach shows that there are good reasons for their reticence. In 2014, 
following the publication of over 8,000 ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ reports risk rating each GP in the 
country based on available metrics, CQC faced an understandable backlash from GPs many of 
whom were indignant at being publicly stigmatised by a regulator that had not even set foot in 
their premises (Lind, 2014). Relations with GPs were severely damaged and a vote of no 
confidence in the Chief Inspector of Primary Care was passed by the Royal College of General 
Practitioners (RCGP, 2015). There was genuine concern that patients could be deterred from 
seeking necessary treatment (Millett and Bostock, 2014). To compound matters, the publication 
of the individual ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ risk reports allowed the BBC to identify that the 
controversial risk ratings had been calculated incorrectly (Bloch, 2014). Finally, the publication of 
the ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ risk reports for NHS hospitals allowed the risk ratings to be compared 
with the subsequent inspection findings revealing that the risk ratings were worse at prioritising 
inspections than random selection (Griffiths et al., 2016). Despite regulators’ generally limited 
disclosure of the specifics of their risk-based approaches, the approaches can generally be placed 
into one of three broad categories. These three broad categories are explored below. 
3.5.1. Rules-Based Approaches 
Typically utilised by regulators developing their first risk-assessment approach, regulatees can be 
assigned one of a small number of risk categories by means of a simple, and often contextual, 
rules-based assessment. This is exemplified by Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s simple, rules-
based approach based on ship type, age and inspection history (NAO, 2009). Similarly, QAA’s 
Higher Education Review approach differentiates between higher and lower risk providers on the 
basis of compliance history, complaints received, and whether they have “undergone significant 
material change” (QAA, 2013a, 53). Inspectors from the Food Standards Agency score businesses 
on the hazards present and how willing and able they are to manage them, and then use that 
score to calculate the suitable length of time until the next inspection (Food Standards Agency, 
2016). The Environment Agency’s system requires regulatees to complete risk assessments 
themselves based on a series of categorical questions. The result is a transparent calculation which 
determines both the regulatee’s licence fee and their risk-rating which in turn determines their 
inspection frequency (Environment Agency, 2014). 
Such contextual, rules-based approaches have clear advantages. The simplicity of the approach 
means little data or analysis is required saving on staffing and infrastructure costs. The rules-based 
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approach also eliminates many of the epistemic challenges of a risk-based approach by simply 
using little if any data. The use of contextual data over performance data also makes such systems 
hard to game: one cannot readily change a fishing trawler into a canal boat, or amend the result 
of a historical QAA review.  
The simplicity of such approaches does create a number of issues however. First, they are not very 
discerning and, arguably, unfairly discriminatory. In 2011, the European Court of Justice ruled it 
illegal for motor insurers to charge drivers more based on their sex (European Court of Justice, 
2011). Whilst males cost insurers more in pay-outs than females, being a male doesn’t inherently 
make you a more dangerous driver and, as a characteristic outside of an individual’s control, it is 
unfair to discriminate against them. One could extend this argument to all manner of regulatees. 
Being a district general hospital may put you in a class of hospital more likely to be non-compliant 
than a large, urban hospital but the property of being a district general hospital cannot be changed 
nor does it make an individual district general hospital inherently risky. Second, the rules are more 
likely to be based on flawed assumptions than data-led models. The simple criteria are based on 
an a priori selection of measures rather than a statistical analysis of what best predicts regulatory 
findings. As will be shown in chapter six, counterintuitively, those providers that have previously 
been judged ‘unsatisfactory’ by the QAA are actually more likely to be ‘satisfactory’ on their 
subsequent review than those providers that were previously ‘satisfactory’. Third, rules-based 
approaches do not fully resolve issues of prioritisation. Once regulatees have been divided into a 
small number of risk categories, how then are they prioritised within their categories? Finally, 
regulators leave themselves open to challenge when a regulatee deemed ‘low-risk’ is shown to be 
non-compliant and it transpires that performance data not included in the simplistic model 
indicated as much. 
Simple, rules-based approaches utilising contextual data are therefore cheap and transparent, but 
fail to accurately identify individual regulatees of concern and can be unfairly discriminatory. The 
remaining, and most popular, prioritisation techniques rely heavily on the use of metrics to target 
individual regulatees. The key difference between these data-reliant processes is how the metrics 
are selected and the use of ‘expert interpretation’ in the prioritisation decisions.  
3.5.2. Data-Informed Approaches 
Data-informed prioritisation tools aggregate a large number of a priori metrics to generate a risk 
rating and or report used to inform, but not replace, expert judgement. A pioneer in the field, 
Financial Services Authority’s Advanced Risk Responsive Operating Framework (ARROW) tool saw 
45 ‘elements’, irreducible areas of risk, rated on a four-point scale, either subjectively or 
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automatically depending on the element, and mapped to seven ‘risks to objectives’. The ARROW 
tool automated the weighted aggregation of the 45 elements and sent the result to a supervisor 
who had the ability to override any risk rating. The final report was then sent with others to a 
panel to prioritise regulatory action (FSA, 2003, 2002). 
CQC’s aforementioned ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ approach is not dissimilar. Approximately 150 
metrics, each selected in consultation with experts and relating to one of CQC’s five ‘key questions’ 
are each automatically scored on a three-point scale based on deviations from a specified 
performance target or national average. Each metric is either scored ‘no evidence of risk’, ‘risk’, 
or ‘elevated risk’ and assigned a score of zero, one or two respectively. An overall risk score is then 
calculated by summing the assigned metric scores and dividing it by the maximum number of 
points available for a specific provider. These overall risk scores are calculated simultaneously on 
a regular basis and are used to rank the providers. The Chief Inspector and their colleagues then 
prioritise the inspections based on the risk-ranking table and any other evidence that comes to 
light (CQC, 2014b, 2014a). 
Prior to its ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ approach, CQC operated ‘Quality and Risk Profiles’ which 
contained approximately 1,000 metrics for each NHS trust. That is, every metric the CQC could 
obtain that related to one of 16 ‘outcomes’. Each metric was automatically scored on a seven-
point scale based on each provider’s deviation from the national average and then all individual 
metric scores were aggregated, based on three weighting factors, to form an ‘outcome risk 
estimate’ on an eight-point scale for each of the 16 ‘outcomes’ (CQC, 2013c). Rather than a panel, 
an individual inspector would prioritise their own activity based on the QRPs for each of their 60 
or so health and social care providers in their varied portfolio (Griffiths, 2012). 
Australia’s Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) introduced its risk-based 
approach in 2012 and annually assessed risk by casting ‘expert judgement’ on a set of 46 
quantitative and qualitative metrics selected  a priori by experts and awarding a ‘traffic light’ risk 
score of red, amber or green. Overall judgement was made concerning the ‘risk to students’, ‘risk 
of provider collapse’ and ‘risk to sector reputation’ and regulatory action prioritised accordingly 
(TEQSA, 2012). Following strong complaints from the sector about burden and duplication within 
the system, a review into the regulation of the higher education sector was announced the 
following year (TEQSA, 2013). TEQSA’s need for such an ‘elaborate’ risk assessment framework 
and its effectiveness were also questioned (Dow and Braithwaite, 2013). Subsequently, in March 
2014, TEQSA published ‘a simplified and more robust’ regulatory risk framework which comprised 
an annual review in which each provider is ‘holistically’ rated red, amber or green using 
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professional judgement having reviewed the reduced set of 20 metrics, the thresholds for which 
are not published and are determined subjectively (TEQSA, 2014b, 2014a). 
The benefits of prioritising inspections using such ‘data-informed’ approaches include allowing 
regulators to: target individual regulatees, present themselves as monitoring all aspects of 
performance, and provide a rational defence when regulatory failings occur. Risk assessments 
considering large quantities of data are also difficult for regulatees to game; simply shuffling 
resource to improve performance on one metric will likely result in worsening performance on 
another of the large number of metrics. Finally, the attraction of adding a layer of expert 
interpretation is clear. Taking higher education as an example, HEIs vary tremendously and 
knowing that, for example, Oxford has fewer contact hours than most due to their system of 
individual tuition rather than a lack of attention to students, could improve the use of data to 
target those HEIs with ‘unsatisfactory’ quality assurance processes. The expert interpretation of 
the risk scores means regulators are not beholden to the data. Tacit knowledge, notoriously 
difficult to capture in large-scale quantitative models, can be employed when the data is 
misleading. 
‘Data-informed’ approaches have three significant failings however. First, there are a number of 
epistemic issues. The numerous and wide-ranging metrics are selected solely by the regulator or 
in conjunction with interested parties on the a priori basis on what parties believe, rather than 
know empirically, to predict non-compliance, or they are pressured to include for political 
purposes. The one peer-reviewed study to date shows CQC’s Intelligent Monitoring tool to be 
actively worse at identifying non-compliance than random selection (Griffiths et al., 2016). The 
collection of numerous metrics results from investing resource in gathering everything that can 
be measured, rather than developing new, better metrics, and can lead to any signal arising from 
one metric being lost in the noise of others. Furthermore, with significant numbers of metrics, 
even if all performance is normally distributed every regulatee would expect to be flagged as an 
extreme outlier for at least one metric making extreme performance difficult to interpret. This 
was the case with the CQC’s Quality and Risk Profiles where, with approximately 1,000 metrics, 
one would expect a perfectly average hospital to be identified as performing ‘much worse than 
expected’ (two standard deviations worse than the national average) on 25 metrics by chance 
alone. 
Second, there is a limit to how much information someone can process (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
Taking CQC’s QRP as an example, an inspector with responsibility for 60 health and social care 
organisations would be faced with 60 sets of 16 risk estimates, 960 in total, each time the risk 
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assessments were updated. Even ignoring all the additional information contained within each of 
the 960 risk estimates, this is clearly too much information for an individual to rationally process 
and make a reasoned, consistent judgement upon. Obtaining additional consistency over 800 
inspectors, or multiple prioritisation panels, will add yet more difficulty. A further issue caused by 
expert interpretation is the constraint it places on the frequency with which prioritisation 
decisions can be made; physically interpreting thousands of risk assessments is prohibitively 
expensive and time consuming, reinterpreting risk assessments for each regulatee every time a 
metric is updated is impossible (Griffiths, 2012; Pollard, 2011). 
Third, and of greatest importance, is that, even when there are fewer risk assessments to consider, 
the well-established empirical literature tells us that the consistency, and accuracy, of expert 
decisions will be highly problematic. In 1954, Meehl reviewed some 20 studies evaluating the 
performance of expert decision-making and prediction against simple regression models in diverse 
fields including higher education, parole violation, pilot training and clinical recidivism and found 
the models outperformed or equalled experts in every study (Meehl, 1954). The finding that 
simple models are superior, or at worst equal to, expert judgements has been repeatedly and 
consistently confirmed in multiple studies in fields as diverse as business bankruptcy (Deakin, 
1972; Libby, 1976; Beaver, 1966), survival times (Einhorn, 1972), the outcome of American and 
English football games (Forrest et al., 2005; Song et al., 2007), police disciplinary matters (Inwald, 
1988), military training success (Bloom and Brundage, 1947) heart attacks (Lee et al., 1986; 
Goldman et al., 1988), neuropsychological and psychiatric diagnosis (Goldberg, 1965; Wedding, 
1983; Filskov, 1984), financial auditing (Brown, 1983), future prices of Bordeaux wines 
(Ashenfelter, 2008), and violence (Werner et al., 1983; Miller and Morris, 1988). Moreover, Grove 
et als’ (2000) meta-analysis of 136 studies of clinical judgement versus statistical prediction 
concluded that “superiority for [statistical]-prediction techniques was consistent, regardless of the 
judgment task, type of judges, judges' amounts of experience, or the types of data being 
combined” (Grove et al., 2000, p.19). It has even been demonstrated that models outperform 
clinicians when the clinicians have the output of the model available to assist their judgement (see 
for example Goldberg, 1968; Montier, 2009). 
Over 200 robust studies into the performance of expert decision-making versus simple statistical 
models been performed. No convincing exception has been reported (Kahneman, 2011)2. 
Strikingly, Dawes (1979) found that ‘improper’ models, those that have no weighting (β regression 
                                                          
2 Meehl (1965) concluded that one individual study did show clinical judgement to be superior; however, 
this case is widely disputed (Goldberg, 1968, Daves et al. 1988, Kahnemann, 2011).  
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coefficients), outperform expert judgement in many fields. Decades after his original findings and 
following their repeated confirmation, Meehl has concluded “There is no controversy in social 
science that shows such a large body of qualitatively diverse studies coming out so uniformly in 
the same direction as this one” (Meehl, 1986, p.4). 
The reasons for, and extent of, models outperforming expert decision-making will vary by field 
and by expert. There are some universal factors which constrain decision making however. Tetlock 
and Gardner’s (2016) comprehensive Good Judgement Project demonstrated experts were 
consistently overconfident about the completeness of the information available to them and were 
subject to multiple illusions and self-serving biases such as group think, the will to agree with 
superiors, and to avoid absolute judgements (Janis, 1982; Reason, 1990; Mellers et al., 2015). The 
use of expert judgement to prioritise QAA reviews would be further confounded by the regulatory 
environment. Decisions to prioritise reviews would be made in a ‘low validity’ environment in 
which feedback is limited (it is unlikely experts will discover when they have failed to prioritise a 
non-compliant regulatee) and ‘noise’ is substantial (it is not clear whether the non-compliance 
relates to information on which the prioritisation decision was made) (Kahneman and Klein, 2009; 
Tetlock and Gardner, 2016). Indeed, it is such environments where simple models perform best 
against human decision-making; a concern for any risk-based approach built upon expert 
interpretation (Tetlock and Gardner, 2016; Kahneman, 2011). 
‘Data informed’ approaches therefore tend to comprise a large number of metrics selected a priori 
without statistical assessment and aggregated to provide a risk report and overall risk score for 
consideration by experts. They allow regulators to consider, and be seen to consider, a wide range 
of performance measures and incorporate tacit knowledge. These advantages however are 
outweighed by the significant epistemic challenges, issues with consistency, and the fact that 
numerous studies have assiduously demonstrated expert interpretation to be worse than simple 
models.  
3.5.3. Data-Driven Approaches 
Data-driven approaches make use of machine-learning techniques to identify useful metrics and 
develop optimal statistical models. Machine-learning techniques enable computers to analyse 
vast data sets that would be far too large and complex for any conventional statistical tool to 
assess or human to comprehend (Raschka, 2015). The use of machine learning is ubiquitous in the 
modern world. For example, Amazon and Netflix tailor recommendations to individual customers 
based on their purchasing habits and those of millions of other customers; credit companies assess 
their ever-growing databases of transactions to identify patterns of fraudulent spending to freeze 
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accounts, and optical recognition tools continue to learn and identify handwriting (Coglianese and 
Lehr, 2016).  
The use of machine-learning techniques has spread to the regulatory environment and promises 
substantial benefits (Yeung, 2016). With advances in machine-learning, it is now possible in 
principle to examine vast historic data sets and determine precisely which collection of metrics 
best prioritise inspections, excluding imperfect ‘expert’ judgement. In contrast with risk 
assessment tools that aggregate metrics selected a priori, machine learning is non-parametric; the 
algorithms “allow the data to dictate how information contained in input variables is put together 
to forecast the value of an output variable” (Coglianese and Lehr, 2016, p.7; Berk, 2008). With the 
algorithm objectively determining the optimal combination and weighting of metrics to predict 
outcomes, expert interpretation is unnecessary, often impossible given the size of the regulated 
sector and complexity of the model, and, as explored above, actively harmful to the accuracy of 
predictions. In data-driven approaches, risk assessment models will not only be more accurate 
than their predecessors developed by belief, intuition and consensus, they will not suffer from the 
biases that lead to poor expert judgement.  
Purely data-driven approaches have been adopted by a number of government bodies. In 2004, 
the U.S. General Accountability Office identified over 50 federal agencies engaged in ‘data mining’ 
activities (General Accountability Office, 2004). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has developed a machine-learning tool to prioritise a subset of the tens of thousands of new 
chemicals developed each year for comprehensive testing (Kavlock et al., 2012). The U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) uses machine-learning algorithms to prioritise tax collection from self-
employed individuals and small business most at risk of not paying, and tax returns for review 
(DeBarr and Harwood, 2004; Martin and Stephenson, 2005). In the UK, the author has been 
involved in the development of machine learning prioritisation tools for Ofsted and CQC.  
Further to removing the requirement for a priori metric selection and weighting, and problematic 
expert interpretation, purely data-driven approaches have a number of other advantages. First, 
eliminating expert interpretation and, usually, the more automated processes that accompany 
data-driven approaches both reduce costs. Second, the machine-learning algorithms can 
constantly learn and improve themselves, and be continuously monitored and updated with new 
data. Third, the risk assessments are empirically derived and hence provide a robust defence of 
prioritisation decisions in the face of political or media scrutiny.  
These advanced data-driven approaches, however, also have their limitations. Depending on the 
machine-learning approach selected, prioritisation models can be incredibly complex which can 
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make it hard to justify why an individual regulatee has been prioritised for inspection. In practice, 
the more complex approaches, such as support-vector machines, are not used in regulatory 
environments where there is a requirement to fully understand the model (Schutt and O'Neil, 
2013). Purely data-driven approaches also face difficulties trying to incorporate tacit knowledge 
that is not easily or readily quantified. Furthermore, the relationships identified between the data 
and outcomes can only be regarded as correlations, rather than causal inferences. As touched 
upon in section 3.5.1, if an algorithm tends to predict that larger schools are more likely to fail 
their Ofsted inspection than smaller schools, one cannot claim that increasing the size of a school 
will increase its probability of failing its next Ofsted inspection. 
Data-driven approaches, therefore, use machine-learning techniques to objectively determine 
what collection and weighting of metrics best prioritise inspections. Such approaches are not 
reliant on the a priori selection of metrics based on intuition and consensus, but offer an evidence-
based and objective model not hampered by flawed expert interpretation that can be 
continuously monitored and updated. More complex machine-learning models can, however, 
prove challenging to explain and, as with all quantitative models, will struggle to incorporate tacit 
information that cannot easily be quantified or categorised. Providing the most accurate and 
objective prioritisation models, and being best suited to continual monitoring, data-driven 
approaches best fit the stated goal of Students at the Heart of the System and offer the greatest 
promise in successfully introducing a risk-based approach to prioritising quality assurance reviews 
in higher education. 
 
In summary, risk-based systems for prioritising inspections can be broadly grouped into three 
approaches. First, simple, rules-based methods place regulatees into prioritisation groups based 
on a small number of often contextual metrics selected a priori. Second, data-informed 
approaches present and aggregate numerous, wide-ranging metrics selected a priori to inform 
prioritisation decisions by one or more experts. Third, data-driven approaches use machine-
learning techniques to determine the most accurate prioritisation model from the available data. 
It is this data-driven approach that best fits the stated goal of Students at the Heart of the System 
- namely to target QAA reviews via the objective assessment of a basket of data, monitored 
continually but at arm’s length - and offers the greatest chance of success. There has been limited 
academic discussion of the risk assessment methods a risk-based approach to quality assurance 
in UK higher education should take. This literature is reviewed below in the context of the three 
broad categories of risk-based approaches discussed above. 
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3.6. Prioritising Quality Assurance Reviews in Higher Education 
The purported benefits and challenges of a risk-based approach are well documented. The specific 
challenge of determining risk and prioritising regulatory activity as part of a risk-based approach, 
however, has received limited academic attention. The literature pertaining to quality assurance 
in higher education has not deviated from this pattern. Whilst there has been much discussion of 
the number and scope of regulatory bodies (BIS, 2015b, 2016; Brown and Bekhradnia, 2013; HEC, 
2013; Universities UK, 2015), there is a notable lack of detail in the academic literature concerning 
how risk should be assessed. It is the specifics of a risk assessment as part of a risk-based approach 
to quality assurance in higher education that the final section of this chapter will focus on. 
Rather than proposing an approach, Roger Brown, former Chief Executive of HEQC, argues against 
the use of performance indicators to determine risk, the cornerstone of data-informed and data-
driven approaches, arguing “past experience can never be a reliable guide to future performance, 
especially when bearing in mind how quickly things can change” (McClaren and Brown, 2013, 42). 
Whilst it is true that past performance is not a perfect predictor of future performance, 
discounting it entirely as it is not perfect is excessive. Few realistically expect risk-based 
approaches to be 100% accurate, the very notion of a risk-based approach entails the acceptance 
of risk and impossibility of eliminating all harms (Demeritt et al., 2015). The dismissal of past 
performance data on the grounds that it can never be a reliable guide of future performance is 
demonstrably wrong when considering the earlier studies assessing the performance of simple 
statistical models and expert judgement. Moreover, it is somewhat counterintuitive when 
considered in real world terms: it would be a brave patient who chooses the surgeon who has 
never had a successful operation over one that has never had a failure based on the assertion that 
past performance is no guarantee of future success.  In the same paper, Anthony McClaren, Chief 
Executive of QAA until Summer 2015, proposed a combination of performance and contextual 
measures but offered no specific details as to what these measures may be or how they would be 
combined (McClaren and Brown, 2013). 
King (2011b) has suggested approaches that would combine performance data with contextual 
information. Indicators of performance would be combined with measures of a provider’s 
operating environment, internal governance arrangements, the nature of activities it undertakes, 
and the wider impact of governmental and regulatory policy. However, no proposal was offered 
for how the information should be combined, or whether the output from the risk assessment 
would be automatic, as is the case with most rules-based approaches, or determined by expert 
interpretation, as one would expect from a data-informed approach. 
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In 2013, the Higher Education Commission (HEC) published its “Regulating Higher Education” 
report which suggested a risk assessment method similar to a data-informed approach. The HEC 
advocated the limited use of past performance data combined with discretionary expert 
judgement, but were careful to note the need to avoid a formalised indicator set that one would 
expect of a data-informed approach. The use of a more formalised and scoped indicator set, the 
HEC argued, was not supported by evidence and would require “a highly sophisticated, but 
onerous, information strategy that would have led to sector reluctance to comply, as seen in 
Australia” (HEC, 2013, p.60). This argument overlooks the fact that there is also little evidence to 
support any method of risk-based assessment in a regulatory environment, and that the use of 
existing data would add nothing to the burden experienced by higher education providers. 
Building on the work of the HEC, King (2014a) advocated a data-informed approach. King noted 
“the key to making a good regulatory judgement about risk and uncertainty … is not gathering 
masses of quantitative data but devising deliberative and other processes that help to weigh and 
judge data sensibly” (King, 2014b, p.4). Somewhat confusingly however, King also noted that the 
rise of ‘big data’ and the insights it can bring should also be included as, following a substantial 
increase in the information available concerning higher education provision, statistical 
correlations may exist which could forecast the probability of risks occurring and therefore trigger 
concern. King further noted that care should be taken however to understand the factors 
underlying any correlation and to ensure that the volume of available data does not overwhelm 
any model and that the increased collection and use of too much data in the pursuit of accurate 
predictions can see the ‘signal’ drowned out by the ‘noise’. Whilst King is correct to urge caution 
over ensuring an understandable link between indicators and outcomes, the remaining ‘big data’ 
issues highlighted are precisely those the intrinsically linked machine-learning approaches were 
designed to solve. 
The proposals by McClaren and Brown (2013), King (2011a)  and the HEC (2013) demonstrate the 
underlying confusion in higher education research over what constitutes ‘risk-based’ regulation. 
The approaches they recommend, focusing on prioritisation using undefined risk measures and 
significant expert discretion, differ little from the subjective, implicit resource allocations that 
preceded development of a formal risk-based approach. It is unlikely such approaches would 
either reduce burden, reassure the public or be regarded as defensible by the QAA. In addition to 
lacking the explicit, objective risk assessment that defines a risk-based approach, the proposed 
approaches are lacking in detail over the cost and practicalities. What these approaches do 
provide is a demonstration of the lack of comprehensive understanding of risk-based approaches 
in higher education and the clear need for empirical evidence to underpin the debate. 
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The general approaches proposed in the limited literature favour the use of what could broadly 
be categorised as data-informed approaches utilising expert interpretation. No evidence, 
however, has been provided for the effectiveness of expert interpretation, merely theorised 
failings of the alternative, nor have any specific measures or means of combining them been 
proposed. What the evidence reviewed in the previous section has shown is that simple models 
comprising metrics selected by statistical processes will perform better than experts paying 
attention to metrics of their own choosing, or even when provided with the output from said 
model.  
 
In summary, it is clear there is a range of opinions over how a risk-based approach to quality 
assurance in higher education should be operated. Although wide-ranging, these opinions are 
consistent in demonstrating confusion over statistical methods and what constitutes a risk-based 
approach: the solutions proposed are not objective, cost effective, burden reducing, robust or 
defensible. What the proposals do demonstrate is the need for an empirical assessment of 
available data to inform the use of risk-based approaches to quality assurance in higher education. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
Risk-based approaches exploded in popularity at the start of the 21st century and continue to be 
a central tenet of the UK’s regulatory landscape. The ostensible rationale – the quick and effective 
targeting of limited resource to where it will provide the greatest benefit whilst freeing high-
quality providers from unnecessary regulation – is appealing to all parties. The literature however 
has identified numerous challenges to successfully operating a risk-based approach and realising 
its purported benefits. These include: political interference, immovable public perceptions, ill-
defined or contradictory regulatory frameworks, the differing attitudes of regulatees, and 
resource limitations. All these challenges may however be redundant if a regulator cannot 
accurately determine risk as part of a burden reducing, cost effective approach. Despite this there 
have been no empirical studies – in higher education or otherwise – of whether this is possible.  
The limited discussion of risk-based approaches to quality assurance in higher education has been 
lacking in technical detail or empirical underpinning. The proposed solutions have consistently 
demonstrated the confusion over what constitutes a risk-based approach and the statistical 
methods available to support them. This chapter has identified three broad approaches for 
assessing risk and prioritising regulatory activity which have developed as risk-based approaches, 
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and machine-learning techniques, have matured: rules-based, data-informed and data-driven. It 
is this data-driven approach that best fits the stated goal of Students at the Heart of the System 
and offers the greatest promise in successfully introducing a risk-based approach to prioritising 
quality assurance reviews in higher education (BIS, 2011). It is this approach therefore that this 
thesis focusses upon. The following chapter details the specific research questions and the data 




4. Data and Methods 
The purpose of this study is to provide an empirical analysis of whether the approach envisioned 
in Students at the Heart of the System is achievable: can the available data predict the outcome of 
QAA reviews, and hence prioritise them, as part of a risk-based approach to quality assurance? 
This chapter will detail the data available to answer this question, how it was prepared, and the 
chosen modelling and evaluation approaches.  
4.1. Selecting the Data  
The specific research questions and the way in which they are answered are necessarily 
dependent on the nature of the data available. Described below is how the dependent and 
independent variables were selected, what data was excluded and why, and the level at which the 
models were developed. 
4.1.1. Dependent (Outcome) Variable 
QAA’s role is to assure quality. As noted in chapter two, this is defined by whether providers are 
meeting the ‘expectations’ detailed in the Quality Code (QAA, 2011b). Where providers are not 
meeting the expectations, QAA acts to ensure changes are made such that the expectations are 
met. It is where QAA finds issues, i.e. where expectations are not being met, that QAA will have 
impact. The dependent variable must therefore be the outcome of the QAA reviews. Using the 
outcome of inspections as the dependent variable in regulatory models is widely accepted practice 
and the approach adopted by inter alia Ofsted, the General Medical Council and the Food 
Standards Agency (Ofsted, 2015b; Lloyd-Bostock and Hutter, 2008; Food Standards Agency, 2016). 
Some argue that QAA reviews do not get to the heart of quality (e.g. IUSSC, 2009a) and so the 
analysis should focus on predicting a more ‘effective’ measure of quality. Whether or not QAA 
reviews get to the heart of quality, they will have no real effect at providers that are meeting the 
expectations of the Quality Code, but that are not meeting some alternative definition of quality 
not used by QAA. Just as there would be little benefit in sending food standards inspectors to 
perfectly hygienic restaurants serving food that is not to everyone’s taste, there is little benefit in 
QAA prioritising their reviews based on a measure of quality different from their own. The purpose 
of this thesis is to examine whether a risk-based approach can be used effectively to prioritise QAA 
reviews, and therefore it is the outcome of these reviews that are examined. 
As noted in chapter two, in theory risk-based approaches focus on ‘risk’ defined as the product of 
the likelihood of an event occurring and its impact. In practice, however, risk-based quality 
regulators have shied away from incorporating such ‘impact’ measures as they have not wanted 
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to signal that some service providers are more worthy of their attention than others, or that any 
failure is acceptable (see for example CQC, 2013b; QAA, 2013a; Ofsted, 2015a; HEFCE, 2016c). 
Similarly, this analysis also focuses solely on the likelihood of an event occurring, i.e. of a provider 
receiving a negative QAA review, and not the perceived impact. This is for two reasons. First, it is 
not clear ‘impact’ would be used in the prioritisation of reviews, whereas it is certain the likelihood 
that a review will be ‘unsatisfactory’ would be. Second, how ‘impact’ should be measured is 
contestable and no measure of impact has been identified or agreed upon by actors in the higher 
education policy sphere. What is more, we know that if the likelihood of the review outcome 
cannot be predicted then, regardless of how impact is defined, a risk-based approach cannot work. 
Conversely, if the likelihood of an outcome can be predicted, a risk-based approach can work 
whether impact is defined as the number of students at a provider, the amount of taxpayer money 
at risk, the damage to the reputation of UK higher education, or as is most likely the case, not 
considered. 
All electronically-available, complete QAA reviews were extracted from the QAA’s past and 
current databases in late November 2014. A total of 2,847 reviews concerning 888 distinct 
providers, utilising 30 different review methods and dating from September 1999 to November 
2014 were extracted. The reviews were then assessed to determine which methods were 
comparable with the current (2014) approach, i.e. conducted at provider-level and providing 
judgements on some or all of the current review questions: 
• The setting and/or maintenance of academic standards 
• The provision of teaching and learning opportunities 
• The provision of information  
• The enhancement of the quality of students' learning opportunities3 
(QAA, 2013a) 
This provisional list was then reviewed by the QAA and a final set of reviews comparable to the 
current approach, along with mappings for past questions and judgements to the current 
terminology, were agreed. The final data set comprised 853 reviews of 695 distinct providers, 
utilising 10 different review methods and dating from May 2007 to November 2014. This 
represents 62% of all reviews undertaken by the QAA during that time period. The majority of 
                                                          
3 For HEIs the enhancement question was only introduced into the reviews considered in this study as part 
of the Institutional Review method in 2012/13. It was only introduced for FECs in Summer 2013 as part of 
the Review of College Higher Education method and for alternative providers in Summer 2014 as part of 




those excluded were ‘Developmental Engagement’ reviews performed at subject level (QAA, 
2005), or reviews with a narrow, specialist scope such as ‘Early Years Professional Status Audits’ 
or quality assurance reviews undertaken for the General Osteopathic Council (QAA and GOsC, 
2011). The data was then cleaned with missing fields, such as the start date for the review, 
manually added where necessary, and mergers and name changes accounted for to ensure 
continuity where appropriate in the data.4 
The QAA define a review as ‘satisfactory’ if all judgements were either ‘Meets UK expectations’ or 
‘Commended’ (QAA, 2014d). Any review containing a judgement of ‘Requires improvement to 
meet UK expectations’ or ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ is classified as ‘unsatisfactory’. Tables 
4.1 and 4.2 below show the outcome of the 853 reviews by question-level and overall review-level 
judgements respectively. 
 Academic Standards Teaching & Learning Information Enhancement 
Question-Level 
Judgement HEI FEC 
Alt. 
Provider HEI FEC 
Alt. 
Provider HEI FEC 
Alt. 
Provider HEI FEC 
Alt. 
Provider 
Commended N/A N/A N/A 1 8 1 1 2 0 7 11 0 
Meets 181 339 292 183 329 299 34 333 306 43 47 6 
Req. improvement 10 5 21 7 3 19 1 4 1 0 13 3 
Does not meet 0 2 11 0 6 10 0 7 22 0 2 0 
Total 191 346 324 191 346 329 36 346 329 50 73 9 
Table 4.1: The number of QAA reviews comparable to the current approach by question, judgement, 
outcome, and sector between May 2007 and November 2014. 
 Overall 
Overall Review-
Level Judgement HEI FEC 
Alt. 
Provider 
Satisfactory 178 320 286 
Unsatisfactory 13 27 42 
Total 191 347 328 
Table 4.2: The number of QAA reviews comparable to the current approach by overall review-level 
judgement and sector. 
As shown in Table 4.1, for HEIs, the number of ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ and ‘Requires 
improvement to meet UK expectations’ judgements is low in absolute terms. Indeed, no HEI has 
been judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ for any of the four individual questions assessed. 
Whilst this is good news for the sector, such low numbers are a cause for statistical concern. 
Developing a model based on too few outcomes can result in a model which is susceptible to 
                                                          
4 Where a straightforward merger took place, for example with University of Wales, Lampeter and Trinity 
University College merging to form the University of Wales, Trinity St David in 2010, historic performance 
data was calculated using the aggregated data from predecessor bodies where possible.  
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‘overfitting’: a situation whereby the model predicts every sample perfectly having learnt not just 
the general patterns in the data but the unique and specific ‘noise’, the random statistical 
variance, of each occurrence (Babyak, 2004; Schutt and O'Neil, 2013; Kuhn and Johnson, 2013) 
(see section 4.3.1 and Appendix C for a fuller discussion of overfitting). To limit the effect of the 
low number of ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ judgements and there being no 
‘Does not meet UK expectations’ judgements, the dependent variable was considered at overall 
review level, rather than question level, for HEIs. This resulted in final data set of 191 HEI reviews, 
13 of which were classified as ‘unsatisfactory’. 
We are therefore looking to predict which HEIs will fail any of the four questions reviewed by the 
QAA. We are not looking to separately predict outcomes for each of the four questions reviewed 
by the QAA; to do so in a robust way with such low numbers is not possible. Moreover, as 
acknowledged by HEFCE, there would be little reduction in burden if shorter, more focused 
reviews looking at only a subset of the four review questions took place “as the preparations and 
documentation requirements remain the same” (2012b, 74). 
For FECs, the numbers judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or ‘Requires improvement to meet 
UK expectations’ at individual question level were also low. There were 347 FEC reviews in the 
data set of which, overall, 320 were ‘satisfactory’ and 27 were ‘unsatisfactory’. Not all of these 
reviews could be used however. As discussed in greater detail in section 4.1.2.2 below, the two 
key datasets available which could provide metrics for model building relate to financial accounts 
and student characteristics. Without these two rich data sets there is very little data with which 
to predict the outcome of FEC reviews. The finance and student characteristics data sets are only 
available for the years 2007/08 and 2008/09 onwards respectively and both take considerable 
time to be published. Furthermore, to include trend analysis (change-over-time metrics) in order 
to look not just at current performance but also an FECs ‘direction of travel’ requires more than 
one year of data. Therefore, only reviews conducted after July 2011, once sufficient data were 
available, could be included in the analysis. The resulting data set, broken down by question and 
judgement, is shown below in Table 4.3: 
FECs Academic standards 
Learning 
opportunities Information Enhancement Total 
Commended N/A 8 2 11 21 
Meets 159 147 155 47 508 
Requires improvement 3 3 4 13 23 
Does not meet 1 5 3 2 11 
Total 163 163 164 73 727 
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Table 4.3: A breakdown of FEC reviews comparable to the current approach, and for which financial and 
student characteristics data was available, by question and judgement. 
Again, low numbers and proportions of ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ and ‘Requires 
improvement to meet UK expectations’ judgements means that predicting the specific ordinal 
judgement for each question is not possible without a strong likelihood of overfitting the model. 
Thus, as with HEIs, the data was best considered at review level rather than question level. Again, 
this study therefore sought to predict which FECs would fail in any of the four questions reviewed 
by the QAA, not to separately predict outcomes for each of the four questions reviewed by the 
QAA. The reduced data set contained 143 ‘satisfactory’ reviews and 21 ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews 
from the period July 2011 to November 2014. 
For alternative providers the picture was different. There have been a significantly greater number 
of reviews which can be included in the analysis and a greater number of incidents of providers 
receiving judgements of ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or ‘Requires improvement to meet UK 
expectations’. The result is that three of the four questions could in principle be analysed 
individually. Whether this is desirable or beneficial is another matter. First, it has already been 
shown that little resource can be saved, or burden reduced, by conducting reviews focused only 
on a subset of the QAA’s four questions (HEFCE, 2012b). Second, the purpose of the models being 
developed is to prioritise reviews. It is far easier to develop and interpret models where the output 
is a predicted likelihood of a provider failing their review on any one question or multiple 
questions, rather than four distinct probabilities for each provider predicting the likelihood of 
failing each specific question.  
First and foremost, this study therefore sought to predict which alternative providers would fail in 
any of the four questions reviewed by the QAA, not to separately predict outcomes for each of 
the four questions reviewed by the QAA. Subsequently, the academic standards question and the 
four possible ordinal judgements resulting from it were assessed to explore if accurate predictions 
could be made at question level. The teaching and learning and information questions, where 
there are fewer judgements in each of the four possible judgement categories, were then 
considered at a binary ‘unsatisfactory’ / ‘satisfactory’ level to determine if accurate predictions 
can be achieved at this level. The enhancement question was not analysed individually as only nine 
alternative provider reviews in the data set have assessed this question. 
4.1.2. Independent (Predictor) Variables 
In order to determine which metrics best predict the outcome of a QAA review, or failing that 
whether such predictions are impossible, it is necessary to consider as full a set of data as possible. 
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An initial review of the HE data landscape was undertaken, including documentation from the 
Joint Performance Indicator Working Group (JPIWG), Association of Colleges (AoC), BIS, HEFCE, 
HESA and the QAA. This initial review was then complemented by discussion with HESA, QAA, the 
QAA’s external Research Advisory Group, and other relevant experts to establish what data was 
available.  
The more comprehensive the data set is, the better the chances of developing an effective model 
to predict the outcome of a QAA review. However, common sense dictates that some metrics 
cannot feasibly have any direct causal impact on the likelihood of a provider having quality 
assurance issues, such as the estimated percentage of staff/students who travel to work in single 
occupancy car journeys as their primary mode of travel (HESA, 2016). Metrics lacking the slightest 
feasible link to quality and/or quality assurance were therefore discounted at this stage and not 
included in the analyses. Also discounted was information prohibitively resource intensive to 
obtain: not doing so would hinder the supposed ‘efficient’ rationale behind a risk-based approach 
(Hutter, 2005; Hampton, 2005). For example, background checks on each director or trustee of a 
provider may be indicative of risk but obtaining the data for each provider takes several person-
hours; there is frequent director turnover; and as such sourcing and regularly updating the data is 
not feasible. The data available for each provider type are discussed in turn below. 
4.1.2.1. HEIs 
As a long established, quasi-public sector domain traditionally in receipt of large amounts of public 
money that carries with it substantial reporting requirements, the HEI sector is far more data rich 
than the FEC or alternative provider sector. Once all the suitable data had been identified it was 
sourced from the Higher Education Information Database for Institutions (HEIDI) or via the QAA 
for the academic years 2003/04 – 2012/13 where available. The data comprised: 
• Applications data – this includes applications made via the Graduate Teacher Training 
Registry, University and College Admission Service (UCAS), Conservatoires UK Admissions 
Service, and Nursing and Midwifery Admissions Service. 
• Destinations of leavers from HE (DLHE) Survey - the DLHE survey asks leavers from 
higher education what they are doing six months after graduation. 
• Research Statistics – this includes market share of research grants, contracts income, 
research staff and research council research studentships by institution. 




• HESA Performance Indicators – derived metrics covering a number of topics including 
leavers, research, participation of under-represented groups in HE, and continuation 
rates. 
• Staffing metrics – staffing details by academic employment function, mode of 
employment, nationality, source of salary, and terms of employment. 
• Student metrics – student details by mode of study, degree classification, age, domicile, 
gender, and nationality. 
• Staff Student Ratios 
• Finance Indicators – both key financial indicators (KFIs) and full accounts information. 
• Aggregate Offshore Record – details of students studying overseas for a UK HE 
qualification 
• National Student Survey - a high-profile survey aimed at mainly final-year 
undergraduates which gathers opinions relating to six aspects of the learning 
experience, including one question about overall student satisfaction. 
• Previous Quality Assurance Reviews – the outcome of previous, comparable QAA 
reviews. 
• QAA Concerns – the QAA has a “concerns” procedure for investigating systematic issues 
relating to academic standards, learning opportunities and the provision of information 
that individuals do not feel have been satisfactorily addressed by the higher education 
provider in the first instance.  
In total there were 751 HEI metrics prior to any variants being calculated. For a full list of HEI 
metrics used in this thesis see chapter five, Appendix E. 
4.1.2.2. FECs 
The data available to potentially prioritise QAA reviews of higher education in further education 
colleges (HE in FE) as part of a cost-effective, risk-based approach is a fraction of that available for 
HEIs. This is in part due to there being less mandated and centrally controlled data to capture: 
applications are often not made through UCAS, and the majority of HE in FE providers do not 
undertake research or have an overseas campus for example. The main reason for the lack of 
available data however is the diverse nature of delivery in the HE in FE sector and the fractured 
reporting that results. Provision can be financed directly or indirectly by funding councils or via 
bodies such as the Skills Funding Agency (SFA). Different funding channels carry with them 
different data definitions and reporting requirements, which makes reporting on HE in FE a 
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challenge.  Learners in England receiving directly-funded, prescribed provision5 must be recorded 
on the Individual Learner’s Record (ILR) and the Higher Education in Further Education Students 
(HEIFES) early statistical return submitted to HEFCE. Learners receiving indirectly-funded, 
‘prescribed’ provision are recorded by the franchising institution (typically a university) and 
included in their HESA returns along with their direct-provision students and in the Higher 
Education Student Early Statistics (HESES) return. FECs should not include details of indirectly-
funded students in their ILR returns and should instead report the number of such students 
separately; however, instructions on the matter have previously been unclear and not adhered to 
leading to double counting and significant concerns over the quality of student-level data (Storan 
and Hudson, 2015). The challenges of combining data sources with different data definitions and 
multiple reporting issues has led to warnings concerning the accuracy and interpretation of data 
in previous HE in FE research (Clark, 2002; Parry and Thompson, 2002; Tait et al., 2008). 
Once the potential metrics had been identified the data was sourced from QAA, SFA, Ofsted, and 
HEFCE. This resulted in five key data sets summarised below: 
● QAA Concerns 
● Previous Quality Assurance Reviews 
● Ofsted Rating – the published Ofsted rating (which relates to non-HE provision) for the 
FEC at the time of the QAA review. 
● Student Characteristics Data – specifically for this study HEFCE have supplied the student 
characteristics data for HE students studying at FECs, whether that provision is 
franchised or not, by linking the ILR and HESA data set. These data break down student 
numbers by gender, first year/non first year status, age group, domicile, mode of study, 
ethnicity, and level of study6. 
● Financial Accounts – the financial accounts of all FECs containing in excess of 350 metrics 
for each FEC are quality assured and published by the SFA. 
                                                          
5 When a college becomes ‘directly funded’, it receives funding to support a range of HE activities. Colleges 
sign a ‘funding agreement’ with the funder, which sets out ‘conditions of grant’. These conditions mean the 
college must comply with requirements, for which we hold the college directly responsible. Direct funding 
also means that students at the college can access government loans and grants. 
‘Prescribed’ courses are courses that lead to qualifications set out in the Further and Higher Education Act 
(1992). These are: higher degrees, postgraduate diplomas, postgraduate initial teacher training 
qualifications (such as PGCE), first degree (including foundation degree, BSc, BA, Bed), foundation degree 
bridging course, HND, DipHE, HNC, 120-credit point Diploma in Education and Teaching (DET), and CertEd 
(HEFCE, 2016a) . 
6 Whilst these data are not normally published at this level, they would be easily available for any agency-
based review. Further and Higher Education Act, (1992). Cmnd 13, UK. 
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In total there were 181 FEC metrics prior to any variants being calculated. For a full list of FEC 
metrics used in this thesis see chapter six, Appendix F. 
4.1.2.3. Alternative Providers 
There are fewer data available concerning alternative providers than for HEIs of FECs. As discussed 
in chapter two, alternative providers interact with QAA either when applying for course specific 
designation (RCSD), or when applying for ‘Tier 4 Sponsor Status’ (REO). Due to contractual reasons, 
the detailed FSMG checks, which are conducted by a third party, cannot be systematically shared 
with QAA or anyone else and therefore could not form part of this analysis.  
As alternative providers do not receive direct funding from HEFCE or its equivalents there have 
previously been no other reporting requirements placed on them, other than those which apply 
to any other registered company. Alternative providers who receive course designation have been 
required to report a student record data set to HESA from 2014/15 onwards; however, these data 
come too late for this study, are of unknown quality, and account for less than a quarter of QAA’s 
alternative provider reviews in the data set. 
The only data that was centrally available and covered the majority of the alternative providers 
were: 
• QAA Concerns 
• Previous Quality Assurance Reviews 
• Companies House records - In order to obtain further relevant information, the two 
most recent sets of financial accounts available prior to each provider’s review, where 
filed7, were purchased from Companies House and the elements common to all 
accounts, the balance sheets, were transcribed.  
In total there were 38 metrics concerning alternative providers prior to any variants being 
calculated. For a full list of alternative provider metrics used in this thesis see chapter seven, 
Appendix G. 
                                                          
7 Companies are given 21 months after first registering with Companies House to file their first 
year’s accounts and nine months following the end of their financial year to file subsequent 
accounts. Nine alternative providers were so recently established that they had filed no accounts, 
eight providers were also specialist institutions – for example charitable religious organisations – 
for which company accounts could not be found.  
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4.1.3. Linkage Between the Dependent and Independent Variables 
A data-driven approach, as explored in this thesis, automatically derives the best possible model 
for predicting the outcome of QAA reviews based on the available data. The a priori selection of 
metrics believed to be useful in predicting the outcome of reviews is not required. What is 
required a priori, however, is the decision on how the data set(s) should be constituted for the 
machine-learning algorithm to determine the optimal model(s).  
Machine learning approaches cannot consider metrics that cannot be complete for all cases in the 
data set. For example, a machine learning approach could not predict the price farm animals 
would fetch at auction using a measure of the percentage of their milk that was drinkable as male 
farm animals cannot produce milk. For male animals the metric is nonsensical. This leaves the 
modeller with two options. They can develop a single model for all animals and not consider the 
metric regarding the quality of milk. This would result in one model, which would be simpler to 
work with than separate models for male and female animals, but may represent a loss of useful 
information. Alternatively, the modeller could split the data set and develop one model for female 
animals, which considers the quality of their milk, and a separate model for male animals which 
does not. These two models would be more effort to work with than a single, non sex-specific 
model, but the individual models for male and female animals could be no-less and more accurate 
respectively. This consideration impacts on the study in two ways: the exclusion of specific 
provider types from different countries within the UK, and the use of provider-type specific 
models. 
4.1.3.1. Excluding nation and provider-type specific reviews 
QAA is a UK-wide body (with QAA Scotland an independent organisation within QAA) responsible 
for ensuring quality and standards of all higher education delivered by UK establishments, whether 
in the UK or overseas. However, higher education is a devolved matter in the UK and the four 
national funding councils, HEFCE, HEFCW, SFC and DELNI reflect this. As a consequence, the 
complexities of different national legislative frameworks and goals have led the QAA to adopt 
different review approaches for some or all of the constituent nations for each provider type. It 
also means that different data sets are available for different nations. As there is no perfect 
alignment between national / provider type dependent and independent variables a decision has 
to be made about what should be included in the final data set. For example, with no student data 
available for the eight HE in FE providers in Wales, a choice had to be made between developing 
a model including these eight providers but necessarily excluding student and finance data for all 
HE in FE providers, or a model which did not cover the eight Welsh HE in FE providers but could 
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make use of the student and finance data. Given the importance of these data sets and the small 
percentage of HE in FE providers that were Welsh, the decision was made to exclude the Welsh 
HE in FE providers. 
The national / provider type reviews that were excluded from the final data set, and the reason 






Excluded – student-level or finance 
data was not available. There are 8 
HE in FE providers in Wales 
Included 
England Included Included Included 
Scotland 
Excluded as the component 
questions of the Enhancement Led 
Institutional Review were 
incompatible with all other current 
review methods. There are 19 HEIs 
in Scotland 
Not applicable – no Scottish FECs 
provided HE at the point the review 





Excluded – student-level or finance 
data was not available. There are 6 
HE in FE providers in Northern 
Ireland 
Included 
Table 4.4: A breakdown of which provider types are included in each analysis by country. 
In practice, the independent nature of QAA Scotland means that their activities would have been 
separate from the rest of the QAA and therefore the exclusion of Scottish HEIs does not 
significantly compromise any risk-based model. 
4.1.3.2. Focusing on individual sectors 
As described above, there is substantial variation in the volume and nature of metrics available to 
predict the dependent variable – the outcome of QAA reviews - in each sector. It is therefore 
preferable to focus on each provider type – HEIs, FECs and alternative providers – individually and 
make full use of the data available. The output from these three models could be combined for 
practical purposes should QAA require predictions for all providers to be considered together.  
This approach also highlights which metrics that are not currently collected for a given sector may 
be worth investing in or not. For example, if a set of metrics were able to accurately predict the 
likelihood of HEIs receiving an ‘unsatisfactory’ QAA review and they were not available for FECs or 
alternative providers, then this study can evidence that these metrics should be prioritised for 
development beyond HEIs. Conversely, if despite the breadth and depth of HEI-related 
information available, no metrics could have predicted the outcome of past HEI reviews then this 
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may suggest the implementation of a data-driven, risk-based approach will face substantial 
difficulties even with the imposition of additional data collections for FECs and alternative 
providers. 
Focussing on individual sectors therefore makes the best use of the sector-specific data and 
highlights whether the collection of such data in other sectors would prove worthwhile. 
4.1.4. Summary 
Due to the low number of ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ and ‘Requires improvement to meet 
UK expectations’ judgements, the greater ease of modelling and interpretation, and the fact that 
the resource required to review a provider in relation to one question or all four varies little, it is 
the overall outcome of the review, rather than the specific question-level outcomes, that were 
predicted. There is significant variation in the volumes of data available for each of the three 
provider types – HEIs, FECs and alternative providers – and, in order to make the most of this data, 
a separate model was developed for each sector. Due to differences in the delivery of higher 
education provision, data collections, and QAA review methods in each of the four nations of the 
UK, a subset of reviews was excluded from the overall data set.   
 
4.2. Data Preparation 
With the dependent and potential independent variables determined, the next stage for each 
sector was to prepare the data set for modelling. This required a number of processes as shown 
below in Figure 4.1:  
1. Change-over-time variants for each metric were calculated. 
2. Each review was matched with the most up-to-date version of each metric prior to the 
review. 
3. The data set was then assessed to determine which reviews and metrics needed to be 
removed due to lack of coverage or their anomalous nature. 
4. The remaining metrics with missing data were assessed. 
5. Metrics containing missing data then either had missing values imputed (statistically 
estimated) or were removed (see section 4.3.4 and Technical Appendix D for a full 
explanation of imputation).  
6. If appropriate, data was then also standardised or benchmarked. 
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7. Non-variant and highly correlated metrics are removed.  
 
Figure 4.1: The ordered stages of preparing the data for statistical modelling. 
Each of these stages is discussed in turn below followed by the details of the application of the 
whole process to each of the three provider types.  
4.2.1. Change-Over-Time Metrics 
Four change-over-time values were calculated for each applicable metric; these were the one and 
two-year absolute and percentage changes. An example of these calculations is shown below for 
a four-year period for an HEI’s National Student Survey ‘Overall Satisfaction’ score: 
 National Student Survey Overall Satisfaction Score by Academic Year 
Metric Code 2004/05 2005/06 2007/08 2008/09 
Standard 





















(84.33− 82.28)82.28 = 0.025 (81.87− 84.88)84.88 = −0.035 
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Table 4.5: Example calculations of one and two-year absolute and percentage change-over-time metrics. 
For the first year of metric data no change-over-time variants could be calculated as no prior data 
was available. For the second year of metric data the one-year change-over-time metrics could be 
calculated but not the two-year change-over-time metrics. For this reason, where possible, two 
years’ worth of data was collected prior to the first review for each provider type.  
For all three provider types change-over-time variants were calculated for each metric where 
appropriate. Those metrics where change-over-time variants were not deemed appropriate were 
those that related specifically to previous reviews, for example the number of prior reviews which 
were ‘unsatisfactory’. This is unlikely to be different one or two years prior to a review given the 
long spanning, cyclical nature of reviews. Moreover, amending the metric to look at the change 
since last review made little sense as it was often the case that providers had only had one prior 
review if any at all. 
4.2.2. Matching Metrics and Reviews 
Once the change-over-time metrics had been calculated all the data was uploaded into a Microsoft 
SQL Server database. A SQL query was then run to match each review with the most up-to-date 
version of each metric that was published 28 days prior to a review being undertaken. The 
requirement for data to have been published 28 days prior to the review is to allow a realistic 
amount of time for the QAA to source the data, format it, incorporate it into their predictive model 
and act on the outputs. 
4.2.3. Removing Anomalous Reviews and Metrics 
The first stage in dealing with the missing data was to determine if there were any providers which 
were missing data for a significant number of metrics that were complete for nearly all other 
providers. If so, theses anomalous providers were removed. For example, the self-financing 
Ashridge was removed because, although it was classified as a ‘University/HEI’ by QAA and subject 
to an Institutional Audit, it offers only postgraduate ‘executive education’ and does not submit 
data to HESA. 
4.2.4. Missing Data Assessed and Addressed 
At this stage the three data sets, one for each provider type, were large but contained a number 
of instances of missing data. For a metric to be useful it must have a value associated with each 
review in the final data set. Within the data collections available for this study there are two key 
reasons data can be missing: 
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• It may be ‘structurally’ missing, i.e. missing because it cannot exist. For example, the 
proportion of an HEI’s postgraduate students who complete their studies cannot be 
captured for a HEI with no postgraduate study (you cannot divide by zero).  
• Alternatively, it may be missing due to chance factors. An HEI may have filed their data 
return incorrectly leading to that information not being available for one year. Similarly, 
a chance flood of a records office could have destroyed the data for one year. 
Where we do have missing data it can be dealt with in one of three ways: the metric can be 
removed entirely from the data set and the affected reviews retained; the review(s) affected by 
the missing data can be removed from the data set and the metric retained; or, if appropriate, the 
metric can be imputed to provide a statistical estimation of the missing value and both the metric 
and the review(s) can be retained.  
The default approach for a statistical model is to remove those cases, (i.e. in this study the QAA 
reviews), which have any missing values for any of the metrics and this is one of the approaches 
adopted for all three provider types. However, it is argued that this approach may lead to 
estimates which are themselves biased, inaccurate, or both (Harrell, 2001; McKnight et al., 2007; 
Van Buuren, 2012). Moreover, removing those QAA reviews which are affected by missing values 
on a metric, even if it’s only a very small percentage, and retaining the metric in the model will 
lead to increased standard errors, widened confidence-intervals, and a decrease in the power of 
goodness-of-fit tests (Donner, 1982). The latter is of special concern for this data set where the 
number of reviews with an ‘unsatisfactory’ outcome is low. As an alternative, values ‘missing at 
random’ can be imputed – statistically estimated - using a number of techniques (Harrell, 2001; 
Van Buuren, 2012). For further details on the statistical imputation methods used in this thesis see 
Appendix D at the end of this chapter. 
The first step when dealing with missing data therefore is to assess the impact on the overall data 
set of removing specific metrics and reviews which contain missing values and to determine 
whether those missing values can be imputed. Those metrics which contain structurally-missing 
data – that is data that is missing because it cannot exist – must be excluded regardless of whether 
imputation is to be used. The next step is to determine whether to impute the data. To many non-
statisticians this approach may not seem acceptable: no matter how advanced the imputation 
method, data is still being invented. Therefore, where imputation was used, two data sets were 
created for the analysis, one using only naturally-complete metrics and a second including metrics 
with imputed values too. 
106 
 
With the structurally-missing data removed the data can then be imputed. For the naturally-
complete data set not using imputation however, metrics and/or reviews with missing values need 
to be removed. Clearly where there is only one review with values missing for hundreds of metrics, 
it would be preferable to sacrifice that review to retain the hundreds of metrics relevant to all 
other reviews, rather than sacrifice all those potential predictors. Alternatively, if a metric is 
missing values for hundreds of reviews, the preference would be to sacrifice the metric in order 
to maintain the reviews. Deciding which to sacrifice is a matter of judgement and must consider 
the relative importance of the metrics and reviews affected.  
4.2.5. Standardising or Benchmarking Metrics 
In addition to considering a provider’s absolute performance and their ‘direction of travel’ as 
determined by the change-over-time metrics, it may be beneficial to standardise the data to 
account for sector-wide changes in performance, or focus on assessing performance only in 
relation to similar providers.  
The NSS provides a useful example to demonstrate the potential benefit of in-year 
standardisation. The average provider’s NSS overall satisfaction score was 81.89% in 2009/10 and 
84.76% in 2011/12. With a standardised metric, a provider performing exactly in line with the 
average in 2009/10, i.e. with a metric value of 81.89%, would have the same metric value as a 
provider performing exactly in line with average in 2011/12, i.e. with a metric value of 84.76%. 
The standardised metric was calculated using the average metric score and standard deviation for 
each academic year:  Provider metric score –  average metric score for that yearMetric standard deviation for that year  
In the example above both providers would have a standardised score of 0 (their performance is 
exactly equal to the average for that year and so the numerator will be zero in both cases) 
whereas, with the normal, non-standardised metric, the provider reviewed in 2011/12 would be 
seen as performing better than the provider reviewed in 2009/10 by virtue of its higher absolute 
score. For the provider types where standardisation was deemed appropriate, only the metrics 
comparing a provider’s annual performance to others were standardised. It does not make sense 
to standardise metrics relating to how a provider has performed in isolation, for example a 
provider’s previous review outcome, nor would it make sense to attempt to standardise this by 
year. 
Data on the proportion of students who successfully graduate provides a useful example to 
demonstrate the potential benefit of benchmarking. A Russell Group university will have a student 
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population that is, on average, academically higher-achieving than former newer institutions with 
a different mission. Comparing one’s performance against the other may be less informative than 
comparing, for example, Russell Group universities against each other. If one Russell Group 
university is performing far worse than the others, but marginally better than a set of newer 
institutions, the fact that it is not performing as it could be with the resources it has available may 
be more telling than the lesser performance, in absolute terms, of the newer institutions with 
lesser resources. The benchmarked metric was calculated as: Provider metric score –  average metric score for the provider′s benchmark groupMetric standard deviation for the provider′s benchmark group  
Benchmarking was only considered appropriate for HEIs where the provider missions vary 
significantly and identifiable groupings of providers exist. The benchmarking groups used were 
those identified by Wolf (2015): ‘Russell Group’, ‘Other Old’, ‘Former Polytechnic’, and ‘Other 
New’. Not every HEI fit readily into one of these four categories; conservatoires, for example, are 
often well-established but are not comparable to the majority of ‘Other Old’ universities which 
dwarf them in terms of student numbers and diversity of subjects. For that reason, not every HEI 
was assigned a benchmarking group and 38 reviews were excluded from the analysis. This 
reduction in the number of reviews did however increase the number of complete, non-correlated 
metrics available (see 4.2.8.1 below for further details on metric numbers for the HEI analyses). 
4.2.6. Non-Variant and Highly-Correlated Metrics 
Despite having no missing values, some metrics can still be of little or no value when developing a 
predictive model. Indeed, the presence of redundant metrics can hamper model development 
unnecessarily by requiring additional computational effort and increasing the probability of a 
chance, meaningless relationship being identified resulting in a misleading model (Zhao and Cen, 
2013).  
To identify and process these metrics the data was read into the R statistical program. The data 
set was examined to identify metrics that had no variance, i.e. metrics that had the same value 
prior to every review, and therefore did not discriminate between providers in any way. An 
example of this would be a metric of whether or not HEIs hold taught degree awarding powers. 
All do and knowing this does not help predict which HEIs will be judged ‘unsatisfactory’. Non-
variant metrics were therefore removed at this stage. There were a number of instances of near-
zero variance metrics, that is metrics for which values were near, but not fully, uniform across 
each provider, such as the proportion of students aged 17 for HEIs.  These metrics were retained 
at this stage as there was no guarantee that the few providers that differ from the rest on the 
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measure in questions were not the same ones who received ‘unsatisfactory’ judgements. The data 
set was then assessed for highly correlated metrics. The corrplot package in R (Wei, 2013) allows 
for an algorithm to be run such that: 
1. The correlation matrix for all predictors is calculated. 
2. The predictors with the greatest pairwise correlation above a defined cut-off point are 
selected. For this study a high cut-off of 0.9 was used. 
3. The average correlation between each of these selected predictors and all others in the 
data set is calculated. 
4. The variable from the selected pair with the largest average correlation across all 
predictors is removed. 
5. Repeat until no predictors with a pairwise correlation score above the defined cut-off. 
To be clear this only represents a winnowing down of a cluster of highly correlated metrics such 
as the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff from the EU and the number of full-person 
equivalent (FPE) staff from the EU, both of which appear in the initial data set. Not all highly-
correlated metrics are removed; the metric from each highly-correlated pair that is most unique 
amongst the wider data set remains.   
4.2.7. Summary 
In summary, to prepare the data for statistical modelling change-over-time metrics were 
calculated; each review was mapped with the most up-to-date version of each metric prior to the 
review; anomalous reviews and metrics were removed; the remaining metrics were assessed to 
determine whether values were ‘structurally missing’; if appropriate a data set with missing values 
imputed was created along with a data set where all metrics with missing values were removed; 
if appropriate an additional data set containing standardised and benchmarked variants of 
relevant metrics was also created; and finally non-variant and redundant highly-correlated metrics 
were then removed from each data set. 
 
4.2.8. Provider-Type Specific Data Preparation 







The HEI data set initially contained 751 metrics (for a full list see chapter five, Appendix E) which 
increased to 3,698 metrics with the addition of one and two-year absolute and percentage change 
metric variants. The most up-to-date version of each metric available 28 days prior to the start of 
the review was then matched with each of the 191 reviews available. The data set was then 
inspected and seven reviews were removed for their anomalous nature including ‘Richmond, The 
American International University in London’ which is a private provider offering US degrees but 
also has the option to award UK degrees through a validation arrangement with the Open 
University. This provider was classed as a ‘University/HEI’ by QAA and underwent an ‘Institutional 
Audit’ but is not directly funded, does not hold degree-awarding powers and does not submit data 
to HESA. Furthermore, 59 metrics were removed as unsuitable at this early stage due to having 
data for only a small fraction of the reviews. The cleaned data set was then separated into two. 
The first data set concerned all HEIs for which 2,009 of the metrics were deemed to contain 
‘structurally missing’ data and were removed leaving 1,690 metrics. The majority of the metrics 
that were removed were proportions or percentages with possible, and often frequent, zero 
dominators such as the proportion of UK-domiciled Postgraduate leavers who obtained 
qualifications through part-time study and entered further study (including those that are working 
& studying). The second data set concerned only those HEIs with an identifiable and satisfactory 
benchmark grouping, 38 reviews were removed but as a result there were a greater number of 




Figure 4.2: A summary of the data preparation process for HEIs. 
At this point three data sets were formed from the non-benchmarked, 184 review, 1,690 metric 
data set. The first data set contained only naturally-complete metrics - that is metrics with no 
missing or imputed values. To begin with each metric and review contained in the data set was 
assessed to determine the number of missing values. The optimal balance of maintaining a large 
and broad range of metrics was obtained by removing eight reviews of six specialist institutions 
such as London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine which only offer postgraduate degrees. 
None of the reviews removed from the data set were ‘unsatisfactory’, the outcome of the reviews 
that we are most interested in and less common than the ‘satisfactory’ review outcome. The result 
was that only 527 metrics then needed to be removed to produce a naturally-complete data set.  
For the second data set, all reviews were retained and all remaining metrics with missing values 
were imputed. None of the imputed metrics had coverage below 85 per cent. That high value 
meant that the imputation is more likely to be accurate and the analysis robust.  
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The third data set was the standardised data set deemed worth exploring for HEIs given the seven-
year time span between the earliest and latest reviews in the data set and the changes to the 
sector that have occurred in this time. This data set was created by standardising the absolute 
metrics in the imputed data set and then recalculating the absolute change-over-time metrics 
based on the newly standardised metrics. The percentage change-over-time variants were not 
calculated as, once the data had been standardised, there is little difference between absolute 
and percentage changes in metric values. The resulting data set contained 1,471 metrics relating 
to 184 reviews. Finally, the highly-correlated and invariant metrics were removed leaving 753, 
1,052, and 971 metrics in the naturally-complete, imputed and standardised data sets 
respectively.  
4.2.8.2. FECs 
The first step was to calculate one-year absolute and percentage change-over-time variants for 
the 181 metrics where this was appropriate. The two-year change-over-time variants were not 
calculated as this would have required sacrificing a further year of reviews which was deemed 
unacceptable (see section 4.1.1).  Calculating the one-year change-over-time variants increased 
the number of metrics from 181 to 528. Next, eight anomalous reviews, all of which had a 
‘satisfactory’ outcome, were removed from the data set leaving 155 reviews. Examining the data 
at this stage there was a clear division between metrics for which data was available for all 
providers and metrics for which most of the data was consistently missing for a significant number 
of providers. The FEC sector has far fewer metrics available than for HEIs but those that do exist 
are key metrics whose completion rate is high. The number of metrics available was therefore far 
smaller but there were far fewer cases of missing data.  Those metrics that were missing values 
were doing so for structural reasons and imputing the data would provide no benefit. There was 
therefore no imputed data set for FECs. The data was then assessed to determine which metrics 
and/or reviews should be removed to create the naturally-complete data set. The only metric 
retained at the expense of reviews was the FEC’s Ofsted rating at the time of their QAA review. 
This was because there was such a clear rationale for Ofsted inspection ratings to predict the 
outcome of QAA reviews: both are centred on reviews of quality of the FEC. The resulting data set 




Figure 4.3: A summary of the data preparation process for FECs. 
At this stage a second data set was created by standardising the absolute metrics in the cleaned 
data set and then recalculating the absolute change-over-time metrics based on the newly 
standardised metrics. This data set included 131 reviews and 292 metrics; 46 fewer than the 
naturally-complete data set due to redundant percentage change-over-time metrics not being 
calculated as these added no value to standardised metrics. Finally, the highly-correlated and non-
variant metrics were removed leaving 248 and 225 metrics in the naturally-complete and 
standardised data sets respectively. The data was not benchmarked as no clear, meaningful 





4.2.8.3. Alternative Providers 
For alternative providers the first step was to calculate the change-over-time variant of each 
financial metric. More than a year can elapse between sets of accounts being filed with Companies 
House, especially for smaller providers with reduced reporting requirements. Accordingly, the 
change-over-time metrics were calculated as the change from the previous set of published 
accounts, rather than the change from the latest accounts available exactly one year prior. As with 
HEIs and FECs, no change-over-time variants were calculated for QAA Concerns and previous 
review outcome metrics as this added no value: existing metrics detailed all the historic review 
outcomes and QAA Concerns. The calculation of the change-over-time variants increased the 
number of metrics from 38 to 52. No reviews or metrics were deemed anomalous and in need of 
removal; however, financial accounts were unavailable for 23 reviews concerning 22 providers 
and these were removed. All but one these reviews had a ‘satisfactory’ outcome.  
 
Figure 4.4: A summary of the data preparation process for alternative providers. 
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As little other information was available for these 22 providers prior to their reviews, there was 
little chance of imputing accurate and informed values for the missing data and therefore 
imputation was not used. Spanning less than three years and with a limited number of metrics 
suitable for standardisation it was also judged that there would be no benefit in creating a data 
set containing standardised versions of the metrics. Benchmarking was also considered 
inappropriate as no clear, meaningful benchmarking groups existed for alternative providers. 
Four data sets were then created containing the appropriate dependent variable: the overall 
review outcome, the ordinal judgement (does not meet, requires improvement to meet, or meets 
UK expectations) relating to academic standards, and the binary judgement (satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory) relating to teaching and learning and the provision of information. In each case the 
highly-correlated and non-variant metrics were removed leaving 41 metrics in the data set. 
4.2.9. Summary 
To prepare the data for statistical modelling: change-over-time metrics were calculated, each 
review was mapped with the most up-to-date version of each metric prior to the review, 
anomalous reviews and metrics were removed, the remaining metrics are assessed to determine 
whether values were ‘structurally missing’, if appropriate a data set with missing values imputed 
was created along with a data set where all metrics with missing values were removed, if 
appropriate additional data sets containing standardised and benchmarked variants of relevant 
metrics were also created, and finally non-variant and redundant highly-correlated metrics were 
then removed from each data set. 
Four data sets resulted for HEIs: one naturally-complete data set containing only metrics and 
reviews with no missing values; a data set containing eight more reviews and 527 more metrics 
which had their missing values imputed; a third data set that contained metrics that were 
standardised by academic year; and a final data set that contained metrics benchmarked by HEI 
type. For FECs, neither imputation nor benchmarking were appropriate but standardising metrics 
by academic year was; two data sets were subsequently created. For alternative providers, 
imputation, standardisation and benchmarking were not considered appropriate; however, four 
data sets were created in order to examine whether predicting the outcome of specific review 
questions, rather than the overall outcome, would prove beneficial. 
With the data sets complete, the next stage was to perform the statistical analysis and determine 
which metrics, if any, could have predicted the outcome of QAA reviews. The statistical methods 
selected for this task are discussed below. 
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4.3. Statistical Methods 
To identify a subset of metrics that best predicts a categorical outcome one would typically use 
logistic regression and a variable selection/reduction method. However, this approach will not 
work when, as is the case for this analysis, the number of cases (reviews) is less than the number 
of predictors (metrics) (Kuhn and Johnson, 2013; James et al., 2013). Instead, modern machine-
learning techniques are required. This section begins with an introduction to regression and 
variable selection methods and the issues that prevent them from being effective for this analysis. 
The requirements for the predictive models and the details of the machine-learning method which 
best meets them – the elastic net approach - are then discussed. Finally, the methods used to 
evaluate the models developed using the elastic net approach are discussed. 
4.3.1. Classical Statistical Modelling Techniques 
This study aims to select a subset of variables to predict a categorical outcome. Moreover, it aims 
to do so using a data-driven approach, as discussed in chapter three, to provide the best possible 
model. The standard approach to achieve this aim would be to use logistic regression and some 
form of variable selection method. However, this approach was designed for low-dimensional 
data-sets where the number of observations is far greater than the number of possible 
independent variables (predictors). That was not the case for this study. With the exception of the 
alternative provider data sets the number of QAA reviews in each data set was less than the 
number of metrics available. For the alternative provider data sets, the volume of metrics still 
made a machine-learning approach appropriate however. Whilst the standard logistic regression 
approach therefore cannot be used, it is necessary to understand the theory behind this approach, 
and the problems it is caused by high-dimensional data sets such as the ones we have for this 
study, to inform the discussion on machine-learning techniques. 
Ordinary least squares regression is designed to predict continuous variables such as a person’s 
weight. The standard OLS regression model: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 + ⋯+  𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾 
where 𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) is the predicted value of the outcome Y given the value of the i constants β and 
predictors 𝑥𝑥 is not suitable for this analysis for two reasons. First, the outcome is categorical and 
therefore the requirement of homoscedasticity (that the error terms arising from a variable are 
normally distributed) is breached. Second, the outcome is non-numeric and even if the categorical 
variables were coded with a number the output would be flawed as false information would have 
been ascribed to the data (Field et al., 2012). 
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Logistic regression solves these two problems. Instead of predicting a single value, Y, logistic 
regression modifies the ordinary least squares approach and predicts the probability of each 
possible outcome occurring given specific values for the independent variables. The output can 
then be regarded as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) =  11 +  𝑒𝑒−(𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2+⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾) =   𝑒𝑒(𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2+⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾)1 + 𝑒𝑒(𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2+⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾)  
(Liao, 1994). 
To be able to build a full, multivariate logistic regression model to predict the outcome of QAA 
reviews it must be determined which metrics to include in the model. To do so variable selection 
methods are used. There are two main options available. Stepwise selection (Akaike, 1974) has 
proved popular historically but its use is increasingly being discouraged. Indeed, Harrell (2001) 
suggests that had it been developed today, the stepwise selection approach would not have been 
accepted due to its poor performance. Moreover, its use is made practically impossible by the 
volume of potential predictors. Considering only the smallest data set, alternative providers, there 
are still 41 metrics meaning there are a possible 241 = 2,199,023,000,000 potential first-order 
models alone. Hosmer Jr et al. (2013) recommend the purposeful selection approach which starts 
with the univariate analysis of every metric and retains those with a Wald test statistic with a p-
value of p<0.25 (this is higher than the accepted significance threshold of 0.05, because studies by 
Bendel and Afifi (1977) and Mickey and Greenland (1989) show that selection based on the more 
traditional threshold can lead to the exclusion of variables known to be important) and continues 
with careful step-by-step model development on a predictor-by-predictor basis. Whilst a valid 
approach, it is also clearly infeasible for scenarios with such a large number of predictors. 
Aside from both these methods being impractical and often inaccurate, they both have another 
failing which is that they will overfit the data in scenarios such as this where the number of 
independent variables (metrics) is greater than the number of cases (reviews) (Kuhn and Johnson, 
2013). Overfitting occurs when the model developed doesn’t just account for the general patterns 
in the data but it also learns all the unique random variation associated with each case and builds 
this into its predictions. The result is that the model predicts perfectly the outcome of the cases 
that were used to develop it, but produces grossly inaccurate predictions for any new data. If one 
were to predict the party allegiance of British Prime Ministers based on their personal 
characteristics, an overfit model may identify that Britain’s two female Prime Ministers to date 
were Conservative and therefore predict with 100% certainty all future female Prime Ministers 
will be Conservatives. Clearly this is nonsensical, the model has simply, and incorrectly, learned a 
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specific fact based on minimal data and applied it to all future cases resulting in inaccurate 
predictions. With enough metrics, often surprisingly few, it is easy to describe a data set perfectly 
and this is overfitting.  
To illustrate the risk of overfitting, a model containing just the 12 metrics in Table 4.6 below is able 
to predict with perfect accuracy which of the 184 HEIs in the imputed data set would be 
‘unsatisfactory’ and which would be ‘satisfactory’. Moreover, as shown in Figure 4.5, it predicted 
that those that were ‘unsatisfactory’ had a 100% probability of being so, and those that were 
‘satisfactory’ had a 0% chance of being ‘unsatisfactory’; despite it being impossible to deduce any 
causal relationship between most of the 12 metrics and quality assurance matters. 
Metric code Metric description 
STU018_Ca2 The two-year change in the number of full-person equivalent HE students who qualify with lower second class honours 
APL006_Ca2 The two-year change in the proportion of successful applicants whose age is known who are aged 25 & above 
STA054_Abs The proportion of staff (FTE) whose nationality is known who are of "Other-EU" nationality 
STA062_Ca1 The one-year change in the proportion of staff (FTE) who are principally financed by the institution. 
UCA012_Ca1 The one-year change in the institutional distribution of accepted applicants by domicile Other EU 
APL004_Cp2 The two-year percentage change in the proportion of successful applicants whose age is known who are aged 20 & under 
UCA023_Ca1 The one-year change in the market share of applications by age 25 years & above 
STU077_Ca1 The one-year change in the absolute number of HE students (FPE) who are Other European Union domiciles 
APL015_Ca1 The one-year change in the proportion of successful applicants whose domicile is known who are non-EU domiciles 
KFI020_Abs The percentage ratio of contribution from research grants & contracts to research grants & contracts income 
DLH012_Abs The proportion of UK domiciled total leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and were reported as unemployed 6 months later 
RES020_Ca1 The one-year change in the funding council recurrent grant for research (£000s) 
Table 4.6: The 12 metrics that comprise the exemplar model which can describe the HEI data perfectly but 




Figure 4.5: The actual outcome and predicted probabilities of those outcomes for the 184 reviews in the 
HEI data set using the overfit model. 
Whilst this model describes the data perfectly, applying it to the 2012/13 data results in 
predictions of absolute certainty that 18 HEIs would receive an ‘unsatisfactory’ judgement 
following the publication of that data. This is more than have been deemed ‘unsatisfactory’ in 
total since 2007. All the remaining HEIs have a predicted 0% chance of being deemed 
‘unsatisfactory’.  
The results do not indicate that the QAA could have done a perfect job of risk assessment if armed 
with this model. On the contrary, the reason this model has been able to so accurately describe 
the data with which it has been developed, getting each prediction perfectly correct for actual 
reviews, yet seems to make no logical sense when applied to plausible hypothetical data is 
because it has ‘overfit’ the data. The near perfect explanation of the variance is because not only 
has the model picked up any potential predictive signal amongst the data set but it has also 
perfectly described the statistical noise surrounding this signal.  
In part to address the problem of overfitting, a number of new methods have been developed in 
the past decade to make it possible to develop effective models when there are many more 
metrics than observations.  Before the requirements of any model developed to predict QAA 
review outcomes as part of a risk-based approach are considered and the machine-learning 
approach that best meets those requirements is selected, this study does make use of classical 
logistic regression in one way which is discussed below. 
4.3.2. Univariate Analysis 
Before we develop any model, we can run a preliminary analysis of the data to gain an 
understanding of the relationship between individual metrics and the outcome of the QAA 
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reviews. This is achieved by running a simple logistic regression between each individual metric 
and the outcome of the QAA reviews. This does not inform the final, multi-metric model, but is 
simply designed to give an overview of the data set including which individual metrics appear to 
have a strong relationship with the outcome of QAA reviews. There are no concerns about 
overfitting the data or selecting the correct variables when each analysis concerns only one metric.  
Part of the output of each of these individual logistic regression models is a p-value for the metric 
used in that regression. A p-value is “the probability, if the null hypothesis were correct, of getting 
as extreme, or more extreme, a result” (Lander, 2014). In the case of logistic regression, the null 
hypothesis being tested is that the regression coefficient for the parameter in question is zero – 
i.e. that metric has no bearing on the outcome. So when we obtain a p-value of 0.05 this is the 
equivalent of saying that the probability of the metric in question having no relationship with the 
outcome is just 5%, or one in twenty. Likewise, the probability that a metric with a p-value of 0.25 
having no relationship with the outcome is 25%, or one in four. Select metrics, or group of metrics, 
with a p-value of less than the standard 0.05 threshold and the looser 0.25 threshold suggested 
by Hosmer Jr et al. (2013) are discussed prior to each model being developed for each of the three 
provider types.  
It is worth noting at this stage that there are a number of intricacies associated with performing 
regressions using only one predictor when others may also be relevant. Spurious relationships 
may arise due to the model failing to account for a confounding factor, for example a highly 
correlated predictor, which is not accounted for in the multivariate model. James et al. (2013, 
p.136) illustrate the phenomenon with credit card default rate data: 
“Students tend to hold higher levels of debt, which is in turn associated with higher 
probability of default. In other words, students are more likely to have large credit card 
balances, which … tend to be associated with high default rates. Thus, even though an 
individual student with a given credit card balance will tend to have a lower probability of 
default than a non-student with the same credit card balance, the fact that students on the 
whole tend to have higher credit card balances means that overall, students tend to default 
at a higher rate than non-students. This is an important distinction for a credit card company 
that is trying to determine to whom they should offer credit. A student is riskier than a non-
student if no information about the student’s credit card balance is available. However, that 
student is less risky than a non-student with the same credit card balance!”  
Any counterintuitive relationships could be very revealing, the result of pure chance, or the result 
of confounding whereby review outcomes in the metric in question are not directly related but 
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linked by a common variable in the same way that there is no direct link between sunglasses and 
ice cream but sales of both will be correlated as they are both linked to sunshine. Each relationship 
will therefore be discussed to determine why it may exist. 
4.3.3. Model Requirements and Machine-Learning Approaches 
Model development is not a mechanistic process. There is rarely a single ‘best’ model which can 
be developed or selected and the total reliance on quantitative measures of fit is rightly 
discouraged. When developing any model there is a need to balance predictive or descriptive 
power with simplicity, interpretability and ease of use. In the case of data-driven, risk-based 
quality assessment of higher education providers, any model developed needs to be of practical 
use to the QAA or its successor agency. This narrows down the possible statistical approaches that 
can be used. 
First, some situations may require the model to simply describe a binary outcome, did a visitor to 
a website buy a recommended product or not? Other situations require the more complex 
prediction of the probability of an outcome, what is the likelihood a review of a provider will result 
in an ‘unsatisfactory’ judgement? When using the output of a model to prioritise reviews of higher 
education providers there is a clear advantage in knowing not just whether each provider is 
forecast to be ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’, but the probability of each outcome occurring. 
Each provider can then be prioritised in line with how likely it is that they will be judged 
‘unsatisfactory’. 
Second, some models, such as those designed to forecast share prices, can automatically access 
thousands of data points without any need for human interaction. Other models however, such 
as those working with multiple, non-public data sources requiring manual data processing will be 
limited in the volume of data they can use by the resources available to source, process and load 
that data. For higher education providers the data is not readily available in a way that can be 
automated. Instead, any model would be reliant on humans to maintain it and it is not feasible, 
especially as part of a cost effective, burden reducing approach, to have them load thousands of 
metrics on a regular basis. Moreover, it is unlikely that these thousands of metrics will all prove 
useful. The goal is therefore to derive a “basket of data” (BIS, 2011, 3.19) that can be monitored. 
An approach that performs variable selection, that is it eliminates the specific metrics which when 
combined have no predictive value, while retaining the specific metrics that do, is required.  
Third, in some scenarios there is little need to explain how a prediction was reached but a great 
need for the model to be as accurate as possible. It is not necessary for a weather forecaster to 
be able to explain why the thousands of factors and measurements feeding into their model 
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predicts a given chance of rain on a scheduled launch day for a NASA mission, it is however 
important given what is at stake that the predictions are as accurate as can be. Other scenarios 
however do require the models to be accessible, even if this is at the expense of accuracy. A higher 
education provider being reviewed by the QAA whilst similar institutions are not prioritised is 
unlikely to accept being singled out without an explanation as to why (Schutt and O'Neil, 2013; 
James et al., 2013). Moreover, reviewers are more likely to be confident that they are targeting 
their efforts appropriately if they can understand why they have been sent to review a specific 
provider.  
These three criteria rule out complex ‘black box’ methods such as support vector machines which 
can deliver more accurate estimates than others, but do so with highly-complex data 
transformations (Hastie et al., 2011; James et al., 2013). Similarly, boosted tree methods which 
run multiple different models and aggregate them to produce a final prediction not easily 
reproduced or interpreted by humans will not be suitable (Raschka, 2015; Coelho and Richert, 
2015). The criteria also rule out K-nearest neighbour models which are very straightforward: they 
simply look at historic data and find the K providers whose metric performance is closest to the 
provider of interest and take a weighted average of the outcome of their reviews. This approach, 
however, only produces a classification outcome, a single prediction of whether the provider 
would be ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’ but will not accompany this with a probability (Gutierrez, 
2015; Kuhn and Johnson, 2013; Raschka, 2015).  
The statistical approach which best fulfils the requirements of a data-driven, risk-based approach 
to quality assurance in higher education is the elastic net approach. The Elastic Net is a recent 
development which produces a penalised logistic regression model by merging two components: 
ridge regression to stabilise the model coefficients and protect against highly correlated predictors 
(Park and Hastie, 2008; Eilers et al., 2001) and lasso regression for selecting predictors for inclusion 
in the model. 
Logistic regression produces the model which minimises the log-likelihood, that is the difference 
between predicted outcomes and the actual outcomes in the data set. Ridge regression 
regularises this model by seeking to minimise the sum of the log-likelihood plus a penalty factor 
comprising the sum of the squared predictor coefficients: 





Any extreme values are therefore only permitted if they result in a significant reduction in the log-
likelihood, i.e. they significantly improve the accuracy of the model. Whilst this shrinks the 
predictors, none are set to zero, i.e. no predictors are eliminated, unless 𝜆𝜆 → ∞ which makes using 
and interpreting the model near impossible. Lasso regression overcomes this issue by minimising: 
log𝐿𝐿(𝑝𝑝) +  𝜆𝜆��𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗�𝑝𝑝
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This is similar to ridge regression but, rather than utilising an ℓ2 penalty, utilises an ℓ1 penalty 
which forces some of the coefficient estimates to equal zero and thus their corresponding 
predictors are not included in the model (James et al., 2013; Kuhn and Johnson, 2013).  The 
dynamic blending of these two approaches results in the elastic net which operates by minimising: 





Where λ is the parameter controlling the shrinkage (variable selection) and α is the parameter 
controlling the proportion of ridge versus lasso regression used (α=0 will result in complete ridge 
regression and all parameters being included, whilst α=1 will result in complete lasso regression) 
(Lander, 2014). The Elastic Net approach in effect performs the same role as the ‘best subset 
selection’ method; however, it does so in a computationally feasible way given large numbers of 
variables. 
The elastic net approach also benefits from fitting models using k-fold cross validation. This is 
where the observations of the dependent variable, in this case the QAA reviews, are divided into 
k similarly-sized groups (or folds): 
 
Figure 4.6: An example of dividing reviews into k=5 groups for k-fold cross validation. 
Each possible combination of k-1 groups is then used to develop the model and the log-likelihood, 
a measure of the difference between the actual outcomes and those predicted by the model, is 




Figure 4.7: Each combination of the 5 groups used in for 5-fold cross validation model development. 
This results in k cross-validation error scores, one from each training set comprising k-1 groups, 
which are then averaged to calculate the overall cross-validation error. The best model can then 
be selected from those with the smallest cross-validation error. This approach significantly 
reduces overfitting: at no point is all the data contained in one iteration of model development so 
all the ‘statistical noise’ cannot be learned, and any predictions which learn the ‘statistical noise’ 
of the group containing k-1 folds will perform very poorly when validated against the remaining 
fold and therefore will not be suggested as a valid model.  
In summary, the ‘dimensionally-cursed’ data means that a machine-learning approach was 
required for this study. There are a number of such approaches that could have theoretically been 
adopted; however, many of these could never work in practice as part of a risk-based approach to 
quality assurance in higher education. Having considered the criteria a machine-learning approach 
would be required to fulfil, the elastic net approach utilising k-fold cross validation was selected. 





4.3.4. Model Evaluation 
This study makes explicit provision for evaluating the models described in two ways. First, how 
the developed models perform when describing the data that was used in their development is 
evaluated. Second, how well the model performs when predicting the outcome of reviews based 
on new data is evaluated. The evaluation approach adopted makes use of Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curves, the application of the models to alternative data sets, and, for 
alternative providers, holding some data back from model development specifically for testing.  
4.3.4.1. Testing How Well the Model Describes the Data With Which it Was 
Developed 
For validation purposes, it is useful to undertake a summary analysis of model predictions in terms 
of true and false positives and negatives: i.e. to examine the trade-off between successfully 
predicting ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews (true positives) and predicting ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews when 
the review was in fact ‘satisfactory’ (false positives). This is achieved with two complementary 
approaches. First, a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is used. 
  Actual Review Outcome 




Satisfactory True Negative False Negative 
Unsatisfactory False Positive True Positive 
Table 4.7: An illustration of true and false positives and negatives. When predicting unsatisfactory reviews, 
the correct prediction of an ‘unsatisfactory’ review is regarded as a ‘true positive’. The incorrect prediction 
of a ‘positive’ result, i.e. the HEI will be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ is deemed a ‘false positive’. 
Different scenarios have a different acceptable balance between the true and false positives. The 
QAA may not be willing, or have the resource, to review 50 HEIs which turn out to be ‘satisfactory’ 
for the sake of reviewing one that is ‘unsatisfactory’. Conversely, the security services may well be 
willing to actively monitor 50 individuals who subsequently turn out to be innocent for the sake 
of stopping one genuine threat. The ROC curve demonstrates the impact on true-positive and 
false-positive rates of triggering reviews based on different predicted probabilities of a review 
resulting in an unsatisfactory judgement.  
The ROC approach allows us to go beyond the simple classification approach, i.e. did it predict a 
probability of failure greater than 50% or not, and adjust our thresholds which can result in a more 
useful and effective model (Fawcett and Provost, 1997; Provost et al., 1998). Moreover, the ROC 
approach is especially useful in cases such as this where there are skewed class distributions, e.g. 
125 
 
there were a far greater number of ‘satisfactory’ reviews than ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews (Fawcett, 
2006). The ROC also has the benefit of being intuitively graphically displayed.  
 
Figure 4.8: An exemplar ROC curve. 
Each point on an ROC curve indicates the rate of ‘true positives’ at varying thresholds for the 
acceptability of ‘false positives’, in the case of this study the varying probabilities of an 
‘unsatisfactory’ review which would prompt a QAA review. This is best explained by an example. 
Consider a model which predicts the probability that 8 HEIs will be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ by the 





























1 80% Unsatisfactory 1 4 0 3 0.25 0 
2 70% Satisfactory 1 3 1 3 0.25 0.25 
3 65% Unsatisfactory 2 3 1 2 0.5 0.25 
4 58% Unsatisfactory 3 3 1 1 0.75 0.25 
5 52% Satisfactory 3 2 2 1 0.75 0.5 
6 50% Satisfactory 3 1 3 1 0.75 0.75 
7 45% Unsatisfactory 4 1 3 0 1 0.75 
8 37% Satisfactory 4 0 4 0 1 1 
Table 4.8: Exemplar model predictions and the outcome of using different threshold probabilities to 
trigger a review. 
The logical approach would be to order the HEIs by their predicted probabilities of an 
‘unsatisfactory’ review from largest to smallest. If the QAA were to take a predicted probability of 
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being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ of 80% as the threshold to trigger a review only one would take 
place. That HEI would be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ so the decision to review it would be correct 
meaning the model predicted one ‘true positive’. Of the seven HEIs not reviewed, four would have 
been judged ‘satisfactory’ and therefore not reviewing them was the correct decision meaning the 
model produced four ‘true negatives’. There would however have been three ‘unsatisfactory’ HEIs 
not reviewed meaning there were three ‘false negatives’. As no ‘satisfactory’ HEIs would have 
been reviewed there would be ‘false negatives’. This would result in a true positive rate – the 
proportion of ‘unsatisfactory’ HEIs reviewed - of one out of four, or 0.25, and a false positive rate 
– the proportion of ‘satisfactory’ HEIs reviewed – of none in four, or 0. 
Now consider what would happen if the QAA were to lower the threshold predicted probability 
required to trigger a review to 70% meaning two HEIs would be reviewed.  Now one 
‘unsatisfactory’ HEI would be correctly reviewed (one true positive) and one ‘satisfactory’ HEI 
would be incorrectly reviewed (one false positive). Furthermore, three ‘unsatisfactory’ HEIs would 
incorrectly not be reviewed (three false negatives) and three ‘satisfactory’ HEIs would correctly 
not be reviewed (three true negatives). This would result in a true positive rate of 0.25 and a false 
positive rate of 0.25. 
Each lowering of the threshold predicted probability required to trigger a QAA review alters the 
true and false positive rates and is represented by a point on the ROC curve. If the additional 
review triggered by the lowering of the threshold is of an ‘unsatisfactory’ provider, the true 
positive rate will increase and the false positive rate will remain the same, resulting in the line 
moving upwards. Conversely, if the additional review triggered by the lowering of the threshold is 
of a ‘satisfactory’ provider, the true positive rate will remain the same and the false positive rate 
will increase, resulting in the line moving right. The perfect predictive model would therefore have 
a curve that was a vertical line hugging the y-axis – indicating that all the reviews with the highest 
predicted probability of being ‘unsatisfactory’ did indeed result in an ‘‘unsatisfactory’ judgement 
- and then, once all the true positives have been correctly predicted, a horizontal line from the top 
of the y-axis – representing all the reviews below a threshold predicted probability of being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ were not judged ‘unsatisfactory’.  
The diagonal line represents the worst-case scenario: it is the path the results of a predictive model 
would follow if it had no predictive ability whatsoever and could not distinguish between true and 
false positives. It is of course possible a model could be wrong more than 50% of the time, and 
therefore its performance would be shown by a line beneath the diagonal; however, in such cases 
one merely needs to do the exact opposite of what the model suggests to achieve predictions 
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better than chance. The closer the resemblance of the ROC curve to the perfect fit line, the better 
the model is at describing the data (Verostek, 2014). How close this fit is, and thus how well the 
model describes the data, can be measured by the area under the curve (AUC) with values close 
to 0.5 indicating no discriminatory power and values close to 1 indicating an excellent fit. Using 
the AUC to compare models however should be done with caution as two ROC curves may well 
have the same AUC value but cross several times. 
The second complementary approach used to evaluate how well the model describes the data 
used in its development is a visual inspection of the model’s predictions and the actual review 
outcomes. This is achieved with a table similar to Table 4.8 above and a graphical representation 
akin to Figure 4.9 below. 
 
Figure 4.9: An example of the predicted probabilities from a successful model and actual review outcomes 
with the reviews ordered by the predicted probability of being ‘unsatisfactory’. 
Figure 4.9 provides an example of a distribution that would result from a successful model: there 
is a clear range of predicted probabilities with the majority of reviews predicted to be either 
‘unsatisfactory’ or ‘satisfactory’ with a high degree of certainty. By definition, we would expect 
nine out of 10 reviews predicted to be ‘unsatisfactory’ with a probability of 90% to result in an 
‘unsatisfactory’ judgement and, by extension, would expect to see one out of 10 result in a 
‘satisfactory’ judgement. It is to be expected therefore that, even with a very accurate predictive 
model, a proportionate number of ‘satisfactory’ reviews will be found to the left-hand side of the 
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plot amongst the ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews, and likewise a proportionate number of ‘unsatisfactory’ 
reviews will be found to the right-hand side of the plot amongst the ‘satisfactory’ reviews.  
4.3.4.2. Testing How Well the Model Performs Predicting Additional Cases 
When developing a predictive model an analyst must decide how to ‘spend’ their data, i.e. how 
much of it should be dedicated to developing (or ‘training’) the model and how much of it should 
be held back, not used in the model development, and instead used to test the predictive 
performance of the developed model. When the number of cases, or ‘reviews’ in this study, is 
large setting aside a portion of the data allows for an unbiased evaluation of the final model. The 
trade-off however is that not all of the known information is used to develop the model in the first 
place.  
A benefit of the cross-validation approach used in this study is that withholding testing data for 
the purposes of assessing model accuracy is not necessary. Indeed, multiple studies have shown 
the limitation of approaches based on withholding data for testing (see for example (Martin and 
Hirschberg, 1996; Molinaro et al., 2005)). Hawkins et al. (2003) conclude that such approaches 
“do not match the cross-validation itself for reliability in assessing model fit.” Where holding back 
testing data is still useful however is as a sense check – even if we have a well-performing, cross-
validated model it can be reassuring to know whether it is an effective predictor in the real world 
by seeing its application to new data. 
Due to the different nature of the three provider types, the timing of the analyses and the 
availability of data featured in the developed models, a tailored approach was adopted to provide 
this sense check for each. These are discussed in turn below. 
4.3.4.2.1. HEIs 
For HEIs the number of reviews is small and the proportion of ‘unsatisfactory’ judgements the 
study aims to predict is low. A strong case can therefore be made against splitting the data as each 
case contributes significantly to the model-building process. Instead, another way to sense check 
the model is required. 
One option that had to be ruled out was waiting for further HEI reviews to be conducted and 
comparing the outcome to what the model predicted. HEIs are only reviewed once every six years 
and, with nearly all HEIs reviewed in the first four years of the current six-year cycle, there was no 
prospect of a robust sample of reviews building up for sense checking the model. There are 
however two approaches available. First, although certainly not robust or definitive, as a sense 
check we can apply HEI models to the data sets concerning the 2012/13 academic year and can 
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gain an approximation of which HEIs are predicted as most likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ now. The 
results can then be assessed to see whether they appear highly or moderately plausible, or totally 
implausible, using other publicly-available (non-QAA) judgements on the sector. Data 
confidentiality prevents any HEIs being named as part of this analysis, but it was achieved by 
grouping institutions using their (somewhat contested) 2014 Guardian University Rankings (The 
Guardian, 2013). Second, by applying the latest data available at a specific point in the time in the 
past we can see which HEIs would have been at the top of the QAA’s priority list and where on 
that priority list those providers that were actually reviewed around that time were positioned. 
The results of both these checks must be regarded with caution but provide two basic sense checks 
on the likely validity of the model(s). 
4.3.4.2.2. FECs 
For FECs, as with HEIs, the number of reviews is small and the proportion of ‘unsatisfactory’ 
judgements the study aims to predict is low. Again, a strong case can therefore be made against 
splitting the data using an alternative method to sense check the model. 
Two approaches were adopted. First, over 50 reviews have taken place since the original review 
data was gathered and the updated metrics which comprise the predictive models are available. 
This means the new predictions created by the models can be directly tested against the outcome 
of the new reviews using the ROC and visualisation methods described above in 4.4.4.1 above. 
Second, as with HEIs we can apply the model to existing performance data at a specific, historic 
point in time to provide a view of what the QAA would have been presented with at the time had 
they been using the model, rather than the perfect hindsight we have now, and seeing where on 
the distribution of predictions those FECs reviewed within one year were placed.  
Unlike HEIs, FEC rankings are not available nor do most people know the reputation of each FEC’s 
HE provision; however, this is of little concern as testing on actual reviews is far superior to using 
reputational rankings as a proxy. 
4.3.4.2.3. Alternative Providers 
As with FECs, new reviews of alternative providers have taken place since the data was gathered 
for this analysis. These reviews could not be used to test the model however as the data necessary 
to predict the outcome of these new reviews – the providers’ financial accounts submitted to 
Companies House - are prohibitively resource intensive to obtain. The two other testing 
approaches adopted for HEIs and FECs, assessing predictions against provider rankings and 
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applying the model to a fixed historical point, would not be possible as no such rankings exist and 
many young providers do not have historic financial information respectively.  
For the alternative provider analysis, however, there is a greater number of reviews and 
‘unsatisfactory’ judgements than for HEIs or FECs and we can set aside some data for model testing 
without a major impact on the model development process. Prior to the development of each 
alternative provider model, a representative sample of reviews was selected using the caret 
package in R (Kuhn, 2008) and set aside for testing while the remaining reviews were used to 
develop the model. The model was subsequently tested using this withheld data and the ROC and 
visualisation methods described above.  
4.3.4.3. Defining ‘Success’ 
Few would disagree that a model which performs as shown in Figure 4.9 is a success. Were the 
QAA able to conduct reviews in order of their likelihood to result in an ‘unsatisfactory’ judgement 
and halt their review activity at the optimal point following the final ‘unsatisfactory’ review, all 17 
‘unsatisfactory’ reviews could have been conducted with only 12 ‘satisfactory’ providers being 
reviewed. This would be an error rate – i.e. the proportion of reviews conducted that turned out 
to be ‘satisfactory’ – of 12/(12+17) = 41%. Providers prioritised for review were almost 50% more 
likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ than not and 31 ‘satisfactory’ providers would have been spared the 
burden of a review.  
As performance of the model diminishes, however, perceptions of its success become more 
subjective. Discussion of model success must consider three factors. First, how well does the 
model differentiate the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers from the ‘satisfactory’ providers? This will be 
defined by the shape of the curve: a sweeping ‘backwards S’ shape curve covering a range of 
probabilities will differentiate well, while a flatter curve, or one over a narrower range of 
probabilities, will perform worse. Second, and, not withstanding outliers, connected to the shape 
of the curve is how many ‘satisfactory’ providers could have been spared their review had QAA 
stopped at the optimal point? As noted above, there is no objective definition of an acceptable 
curve. It will depend on the tolerance of QAA and other key stakeholders for false negatives and 
the number of reviews QAA are resourced to conduct in a given time period. Both the models’ 
ability to differentiate providers and the shape of the curve will affect the model’s error rate. Third, 
how well does the model perform when applied to new data? A model which describes the data 
with which it was developed very well, and with a low error rate, will be of little use if it does not 
work when applied to new data.  
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In summary, how well each model describes the data with which it was developed was assessed 
using an ROC curve and the associated AUC value, and visualisation of each model’s output. This 
approach assessed how many ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ providers would be reviewed as 
the predicted probability of a provider being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ required to trigger a review 
was lowered. Each model was also tested to see how well it performs on new data although the 
specifics of this vary by sector due to the nature and availability of their data. For HEIs the models’ 
predictions were compared with (somewhat contested) rankings and their performance at a 
specific point in time is evaluated. For FECs more recent reviews and metric data became available 
since the models were developed which was used to provide a real-life evaluation of how the 
model would perform. For alternative providers a representative subset of the data was held back 
from the model development process and used to test the final model. It is the combination of 
these tests which define the success of a model; however, that success is often subjective. 
4.3.5. Summary 
The classical statistical methods for modelling categorical outcomes were not suitable for this 
study. Having a greater number of metrics than reviews mean that using such approaches would 
result in a model which is greatly overfit; i.e. a model that doesn’t just account for the general 
patterns in the data but it also learns all the unique random variation associated with each case 
and does a poor job at predicting new cases as a result. Instead, a machine-learning approach was 
required. Having considered the criteria a machine-learning approach would be required to fulfil, 
the elastic net approach utilising k-fold cross validation was selected. Each model developed using 
the elastic net approach was evaluated to determine how well it described the data with which it 
was developed and how well it predicted outcomes based on new data. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to detail the methods used to determine whether metrics could 
have predicted the outcome of QAA reviews and therefore have been used to prioritise reviews 
according to risk. 
First, I have detailed the dependent and independent variables used in this study and that, due to 
the nature of data and the improved model accuracy that will result, separate models will be 
developed primarily at the overall review outcome level.  
Second, I have detailed the steps taken to prepare the data ready for developing the models. This 
requires calculating change-over-time metric variants, matching reviews with the latest available 
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metrics, removing anomalous reviews and metrics, assessing and addressing the missing data 
including, where appropriate, imputing data, standardising and benchmarking data where 
appropriate, and removing redundant non-variant and highly-correlated metrics. 
Third, I have detailed the statistical modelling approach used, the reasons for its selection, and 
how the models developed will be evaluated.  
The next stage is to detail the application of the methods discussed here to the data sets for the 
three provider types: HEIs, FECs and alternative providers respectively.  
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Appendix C – Overfitting 
As stated in section 4.4.1 overfitting occurs when a model doesn’t just account for the general 
patterns in the data but it also learns all the unique random variation associated with each case 
and builds this into its predictions. The result is that the model predicts perfectly the outcome of 
the cases that were used to develop it, but produces grossly inaccurate predictions for any new 
data.  
An overview of an overfit model was given in section 4.4.1. Below the model is explored further 
to demonstrate clearly incorrect predictions produced by a model which, on initial fitting, seems 
to be extremely accurate.  
The overfit model contains twelve metrics described below in Table 4.8 and calculates the 
probability of a QAA review having an ‘unsatisfactory’ outcome as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺1 + 𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺   
where: 
 𝐺𝐺 =  −397.2 +  (1 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈018_𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈2) + (9629 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿006_𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈2)  +  (−2207 ×
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴054_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈)  +  (11630 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴035_𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈1) + (39.3 × 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴012_𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈1) +  (5436 ×
𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿004_𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝2) + (−1059 × 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴023_𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈1) + (−1.1 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈077_𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈1) +  (5200 ×
𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿015_𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈1) + (−0.6 × 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾020_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈)  +  (14.1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷012_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈)  + (0.04 ×
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆020_𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈1) 
The predictions that result when this model is applied to the HEI data are all flawlessly correct; 
those reviews that resulted in an ‘unsatisfactory’ judgement were forecast as being 
‘unsatisfactory’ with absolute certainty (i.e. 100% probability) and those reviews that resulted in 
a ‘satisfactory’ judgement were forecast as being ‘satisfactory with absolute certainty (i.e. 0% 




Figure 4.5 (repeated): The actual outcome and predicted probabilities of those outcomes for the 184 
reviews in the HEI data set using the overfit model. 
Whilst this model describes the data perfectly, applying it to the 2012/13 data results in 
predictions of absolute certainty that 18 HEIs would receive an ‘unsatisfactory’ judgement 
following the publication of that data. This is more than have been deemed ‘unsatisfactory’ in 
total since 2007. All the remaining HEIs have a predicted 0% chance of being deemed 
‘unsatisfactory’. The model perfectly describes the data, including all the errors and variance, but 
is a poor predictor of future reviews (James et al., 2013). The reason why is best explained by 
exploring the output of the model for three hypothetical HEIs with plausible and naturally arising 












Metric code Metric description HEI A HEI B HEI C 
STU018_Ca2 The two-year change in the number of full-person equivalent HE student who qualify with lower second class honours 150 0 -300 
APL006_Ca2 The two-year change in the proportion of successful applicants whose age is known who are aged 25 & above 0.07 0 -0.03 
STA054_Abs The proportion of staff (FTE) whose nationality is known who are of "Other-EU" nationality 0.42 0.0314 0.01 
STA062_Ca1 The one-year change in the proportion of staff (FTE) who are principally financed by the institution. 0.02 0 -0.01 
UCA012_Ca1 The one-year change in the institutional  distribution of accepted applicants by domicile Other EU 0.3 0 0.15 
APL004_Cp2 The two-year percentage change in the proportion of successful applicants whose age is known who are aged 20 & under 0.25 0 -0.1 
UCA023_Ca1 The one-year change in the market share of applications by age 25 years & above 0.01 0 -0.02 
STU077_Ca1 The one-year absolute change in the number of HE students (FPE) who are Other European Union domiciles 250 0 -100 
APL015_Ca1 The one-year change in the proportion of successful applicants whose domicile is known who are non-EU domiciles 0.5 0 -0.25 
KFI020_Abs The percentage ratio of contribution from research grants & contracts to research grants & contracts income 0.25 0.0225 -0.1 
DLH012_Abs 
The proportion of UK domiciled total leavers who obtained 
qualifications through full-time study and were reported as 
unemployed 6 months later 
0.02 0.045 0.05 
RES020 _Ca1 The one-year change in the funding council recurrent grant for research (£000s) 10000 0 -500 
Table 4.9: The hypothetical performance of three HEIs on the 12 measures contained in the exemplar 
model which describe the data set near perfectly. 
HEI A’s performance is what many would strive for: amongst other things it has seen an increase 
in the proportion of successful mature applicants, an increase in the value of research grants from 
its funding council, and a low unemployment rate for its leavers. Its probability of receiving an 
unsatisfactory review can be calculated as: 
𝑒𝑒3819.651 + 𝑒𝑒3819.65 = 1 
In other words, the ‘desirable’ values it obtains on the model variables result in a prediction of 
absolute certainty – a 100% probability - that the HEI would be ‘unsatisfactory’ if reviewed. 
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HEI B has experienced no change whatsoever over the past two years and is performing on the 
boundary of the lowest quartile for the three metrics evaluating its current performance, rather 
than its change in performance. Its probability of receiving an unsatisfactory review can be 
calculated as: 
𝑒𝑒−465.901 + 𝑒𝑒−465.90 = 0 
In other words, by performing relatively poorly but not getting any worse, the HEI is forecast to 
be ‘satisfactory’ with absolute certainty. 
 
Amongst other things HEI C has seen a decrease in the number of successful mature applicants, a 
reduction in the value of their research grants from their funding council, and relatively high 
unemployment amongst its leavers. Its probability of receiving an unsatisfactory review can be 
calculated as: 
𝑒𝑒−2852.561 + 𝑒𝑒−2852.56 = 0 
Even though it is performing poorly, indeed because it is performing poorly on the select metrics 
which have overfit the model but do not describe any of the general, meaningful trends that help 
predict the outcome of QAA reviews, HEI C is still forecast as being ‘satisfactory’ with absolute 
certainty. 
This model then describes the data with which it was developed very well but performs poorly 
with the new hypothetical data. Any HEI such as HEI B which does not change very specific aspects 
of its staff, student and successful applicants mix is predicted as having a 0% chance of being 
‘unsatisfactory’, no matter how poorly they are performing. Any HEI such as HEI A which seems to 
be improving and performing above average on the three absolute measures in the model is 
predicted as being certain to be ‘unsatisfactory’ whereas any HEI, such as HEI C, performing poorly 
and getting worse is predicted as being certain to be ‘satisfactory’. Clearly performing well on 
certain measures and improving should not be a sign of guaranteed ‘unsatisfactory’ review 
outcomes. Likewise, performing poorly on some measures and getting worse should not be a sign 
of guaranteed ‘satisfactory’ performance.  
This example demonstrates the importance of using a statistical approach which is not susceptible 
to overfitting and evaluating a model once developed.  
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Appendix D – Imputation Methods 
Imputation, or statistical estimation, can sometimes be used to fill in the missing values in a data 
set. Imputation can be used where values are not missing for structural reasons - it is not possible 
to estimate the completion rate of postgraduate taught students at an HEI which does not offer 
postgraduate taught degrees – but rather where they are ‘missing at random’ – they should exist 
but have not been collected or made available for some non-systematic reason. As detailed in 
section 4.3.8.1 imputation was only deemed suitable for HEIs and for FECs or alternative providers 
which have much greater uniformity and coverage in their data sets.  
There are two possible approaches to imputation. Single imputation uses the information 
available from one variable, for example it may fill missing values with the mean value for that 
metric. Multiple imputation utilises additional data and uses this to make an approximation of 
missing values, for example for if one NSS metric value is missing for an HEI a multiple imputation 
approach could consider which other HEIs performed most like the HEI with the missing value on 
the questions for which data is not missing, and use their values for the question that does contain 
missing data. The K nearest neighbours (KNN) method I used for all data sets except one (discussed 
below), does just that. I used the DMwR package in R (Torgo, 2013) to calculate a weighted average 
of the five nearest neighbours, defined by their Euclidean distance, for each missing value (Batista 
and Monard, 2002) . This approach is deemed more robust than single imputation methods as it 
takes more information into account and produces an HEI-specific estimation of each missing 
value (Zhao and Cen, 2013). 
For one data source, the staffing metrics, it was not possible to use the KNN method due to the 
number of missing values. The proportion was still low, no more than 15% of the values were 
missing for any metric; however, this meant an alternative single approach was required. With 
less than 15% of the values missing the difference between simply imputing the median and the 
more computationally intensive bootstrapping approach is extremely negligible (Harrell, 2001). 
The staffing metrics were therefore imputed with the metric median value.    
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5. Predicting the Outcome of HEI Reviews 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine which metrics, if any, could have predicted the 
outcome of past QAA HEI reviews as part of a robust model and how accurately they could have 
done so. To do so most effectively and comprehensively four separate questions are explored: 
1. Using only complete metrics, could the outcome of QAA HEI reviews have been 
successfully predicted? 
2. With the use of statistical imputation and all comprehensive metrics, could the 
outcome of QAA HEI reviews have been successfully predicted? 
3. With the use of statistical imputation and all in-year standardised, comprehensive 
metrics, could the outcome of QAA HEI reviews have been successfully predicted? 
4. With the use of statistical imputation and all comprehensive, benchmarked 
metrics, could the outcome of QAA HEI reviews have been successfully predicted? 
An overview of the HEI sector and its specific challenges are detailed below. A step-by-step 
description of the analyses and results is then presented followed by a brief discussion of the 
findings. The analyses for the first two questions are presented in full detail to ensure readers 
have a comprehensive understanding of the approach. 
 
5.1. Sector Overview 
In 2011/12 there were 164 HEIs in the UK responsible for 2,500,000 HE students. This dwarfed the 
estimated 674 alternative providers and 253 FECs responsible for 160,000 and 118,000 UK HE 
students respectively (HESA, 2012; BIS, 2013; HEFCE, 2015a). The HEI sector is unique in being 
data rich but case poor; there are thousands of HEI-focused metrics available but there have only 
been 13 incidents of HEIs being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ by the QAA. Responsible for the majority 
of HE provision, HEIs are the most compliant of the three provider types by a considerable margin. 
However, whilst the likelihood of an HEI receiving an ‘unsatisfactory’ review is low when compared 
with other provider types, the impact of that failure, either in terms of the number of students 
affected or the harm done to the reputation of UK higher education, is far greater.  
Over the seven-year period covered by the data set (2007-2014) there have been some significant 
changes to the HEI landscape. Foremost was the near tripling of tuition fees to £9,000 a year from 
2012/13 with the aim of encouraging more of a ‘market’ for higher education. The hoped for 
competition on fees did not materialise; rather than charging £9,000 only in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ the average full-time fee in 2015/16 is £8,703 (Hope, 2011; OFFA, 2015). Increased 
fees however resulted in students increasingly seeing themselves as consumers and expecting 
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more from their universities (Universities UK, 2013). A second major change was the lifting of the 
student numbers cap. In 2012/13 HEIs were allowed to recruit as many ‘AAB’ students as they 
wished, in 2013/14 this was extended to include ‘ABB’ students, and for the 2015/16 academic 
year the cap was lifted for all students (Hillman, 2014). Throughout this recent period of change 
the QAA’s approach has remained consistent. Due to the cyclical nature of HEI reviews only a small 
number were undertaken in 2013 and 2014 and so these any impact is unlikely to have filtered 
through to the data and have an impact on this study. 
  
5.2. Results – Naturally-Complete Data 
Using only naturally-complete metrics, could the outcome of QAA HEI reviews have been 
successfully predicted? 
5.2.1. Initial Data Exploration 
The first step was to run a univariate analysis for each of the 753 metrics to gain an understanding 
of the relationships between individual metrics and the outcome of QAA reviews. Table 5.1 below 
shows the 14 metrics with a p-value of less than 0.05: 
Metric Code Metric Description P-value 
UFI015_Ca1 The one-year change in the difference between historical cost depreciation & the actual charge for the year calculated on the re-valued amount 0.0058 
STU018_Ca2 The two-year change in the number of HE student qualifiers (Full-Person Equivalent - FPE) who are Lower second class honours 0.0123 
STA054_Abs Proportion of staff (Full-Time Equivalent - FTE) whose nationality is known who are of "Other-EU" nationality 0.0159 
STA032_Ca1 The one-year change in the number of staff (FTE) who are Principally financed by the institution 0.0160 
STU109_Cp1 The one-year percentage change in the number of HE students (FPE) who are "UK LEA mandatory/discretionary awards" funded 0.0179 
STU079_Cp1 Proportion of HE students (FPE) who are UK domiciles 0.0214 
KFI008_Abs Percentage ratio of tuition fees & education contracts to total income 0.0221 
UFI042_Abs Balance sheet - Provisions for liabilities and charges - Balance as at 31 July 0.0240 
STU085_Cp1 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Non-UK domicile 0.0379 
STA031_Ca1 The one-year change in the number of staff (FTE) who are wholly institutionally financed 0.0391 
STU077_Ca1 The one-year change in the number of HE students (FPE) who are Other European Union domiciles 0.0421 
STU024_Abs Proportion of all FPE HE Student Qualifiers who achieve a Lower Second Class Honours degree (out of all applicable degrees) 0.0432 
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KFI020_Abs Percentage ratio of contribution from research grants & contracts to research grants & contracts income 0.0465 
NSS005_Abs Q5 - The criteria used in marking have been clear in advance 0.0499 
Table 5.1: All metrics from the naturally-complete HEI data set with a univariate p-value < 0.05. 
With 753 metrics we would expect by chance alone to see 753 x 0.05 = 38 metrics flag at the p < 
0.05 level and 753 x 0.25 = 188 metrics flag at the p < 0.25 level even if there were no meaningful 
relationships. This is greater than the actual numbers of 14 and 164 metrics respectively that 
achieved these significance levels; it is far from certain therefore that the data demonstrates any 
real-world significance rather than just chance relations. 
Examining these metrics further suggests that they may not be as much use as hoped. Figure 5.1 
below shows the distribution of the metric with the greatest statistical significance, UFI015_Ca1 - 
The one-year change in the difference between historical cost depreciation & the actual charge for 
the year calculated on the re-valued amount, and whilst four of the 13 reviews which resulted in 
an ‘unsatisfactory’ judgement have a metric score of less than 0, the remaining nine do not. 
Although no HEI that was in the minority of organisations with a metric score greater than 0 was 
deemed ‘unsatisfactory’, the majority of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ HEIs scored 0. This is 
not particularly helpful in identifying those that will be deemed ‘unsatisfactory’. Moreover, it is 
not clear why this metric may help identify quality assurance failings. 
 
Figure 5.1: A plot of the ‘one-year change in the difference between historical cost depreciation & the 
actual charge for the year calculated on the re-valued amount’ prior to each review and the outcome of 
that review. 
Figure 5.2 below concerning the one-year percentage change in the proportion of full-person 
equivalent (FPE) students who were domiciled in the UK prior to beginning their course exhibits a 
similar pattern. The HEI with the greatest percentage increase was judged ‘unsatisfactory’, as were 
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a number of other HEIs seeing a relatively large percentage increase in the proportion of FPE 
students who were domiciled in the UK prior to beginning their course. However, these 
‘unsatisfactory’ HEIs are distributed amongst a number of ‘satisfactory’ HEIs and seven of the 13 
‘unsatisfactory’ HEIs had no change or a slight decrease in the proportion of FPE students who 
were domiciled in the UK prior to beginning their course. One can imagine concerns over quality, 
not stemmed by ‘unsatisfactory’ quality assurance processes, leading to a decrease in 
international students wishing to study at an institution; however, there are multiple other 
possible explanations including the opening or closing of courses disproportionately popular or 
unpopular with international students, or fee changes in specific years making UK HEIs as a whole 
more or less attractive (such temporal issues would be addressed by the in-year standardisation 
of metrics used in section 5.4). 
 
Figure 5.2: A plot of the latest value of ‘the one-year percentage change in the proportion of full-person 
equivalent (FPE) students who were domiciled in the UK prior to beginning their course’ prior to each 
review and the outcome of that review. 
The one National Student Survey (NSS) metric to have a p-value of less than 0.05 was NSS005_Abs 
- Q5 - The criteria used in marking have been clear in advance shown in Figure 5.3 below. One can 
see a connection between marking criteria being made clear in advance and chapter B6 of QAA’s 
Quality Code for Higher Education titled “Assessment of Students and the 




Figure 5.3: A plot of the latest value of ‘NSS Q5 - The criteria used in marking have been clear in advance’ 
prior to each review and the outcome of that review. 
On closer inspection however the relationship is actually the opposite of what might be expected. 
Those reviews resulting in an ‘unsatisfactory’ judgement tend to be preceded by an NSS metric 
score that is average or better including three in the top 10. The cluster of ‘satisfactory’ providers 
on the left of the plot are those that performed worst when students were asked if marking criteria 
were made clear prior to submission of work. 
The inspection of significant individual metrics is not reassuring. There were a substantial number 
of metrics with significant p-values when modelled in isolation against the review outcomes; 
however, this represented fewer than we would expect to see by chance and, on closer inspection, 
many of the results did not seem useful for predictive purposes. The next step is to see if a model 
can be developed which combines individual metrics, not useful in isolation, into something 
greater than the sum of its parts.  
5.2.2. Fitting the Model 
As detailed in the methods chapter the elastic net approach requires two tuning parameters: λ to 
control the shrinkage (variable selection) and α to control the proportion of ridge versus lasso 
regression used. These parameters are determined by running the elastic net model at various 
levels of α for which we obtain the minimised cross-validation errors and the optimal values of λ 
used to achieve these. It is considered best practice to prefer the lasso to the ridge regression and 
so only values of α ≥ 0.5 are considered (Lander, 2014). Both the optimal value of λ (λmin) and the 
largest value of λ with a cross-validation error that is within one standard error of the minimum 
(λ1se) are returned. The latter is of interest as the principle of parsimony suggests that we should 
prefer the simpler model that will be created using λ1se despite it being slightly less accurate. We 
therefore consider two plots at each stage of model-fitting – the optimum model and the best, 
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simpler but less accurate model within specified limits – before choosing the preferred model for 
evaluation. 
Figure 5.4 below shows the cross-validation errors obtained for various levels of α when using the 
λ1se value (top) and the λmin value (bottom). In both cases the cross-validation error is minimised 
by α = 0.5: 
 
Figure 5.4: A plot of α vs cross-validation error. The lower the error the better. The top panel shows the 
error rate for the λ1se approach (λ1se = 0.131) and the bottom panel  shows the error by the value of λ 
which minimises the error (λmin  =0.131). 
Knowing the optimal value of α we can fit the model. To reiterate, fitting the model using λ1se we 
should obtain a model which is simpler but less accurate than we may otherwise obtain. The 
diagnostic plot for this model can be seen on the left-hand side of Figure 5.5 below. The values at 
the top of the plot indicate the number of predictors included in the model. Each point and the 
vertical lines above and below it shows the cross-validation error and corresponding confidence 
intervals for different values of log(λ). Although not clear in either plot as in both instances they 
overlap, two vertical dashed lines appear on each plot. The leftmost dashed vertical line illustrates 
the value of λ where the cross-validation error is smallest while the right dashed vertical line 
indicates the next largest value of λ error within one standard error of the minimum. Again, 
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following the principle of parsimony we may prefer a simpler but less accurate model depending 
on the circumstances. 
 
Figure 5.5: Diagnostic plot for the λ1se and λmin models for naturally-complete HEI data. 
As the value of log(λ) increases, minimising the cross-validation error – that is the prediction errors 
made by each model as it is developed when tested on a subset of the data – becomes 
proportionately less important to the model development and minimising the number of metrics 
in the model becomes more important. In both the cases shown above as log(λ) increases the 
cross-validation error decreases regardless suggesting that a large number of the metrics have 
little if any predictive power when fitted using a cross-validated approach. Those metrics which 
remain in a model at each stage are those which minimise the sum of (1) the difference between 
the models predictions and the actual outcome, and (2) a penalty term which is reduced by having 
fewer metrics in the model. 
The position of the overlapping dashed vertical lines in both the λ1se (lefthand) and λmin (righthand) 
plots indicates that, in both cases, the model with the lowest cross-validation error and the simpler 
model with an acceptably worse cross-validation error are both the same: they contain no metrics. 
Such a model suggests that no combination of the metrics provide a significantly better prediction 
of which providers are more likely to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ than simply assuming all providers 
have an equal chance. The λ1se and λmin models both predict each providers probability of being 
judged ‘unsatisfactory’ as: 
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𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) =  𝑒𝑒−2.52881 + 𝑒𝑒−2.5288 =  7.39% 
This is simply the number of ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews in the data sets divided by the total number 
of reviews (13 ÷ 176 = 0.0738636). 
Having considered all naturally-complete metrics with a feasible link to quality assurance, not just 
in their absolute state but also modified to account for changes over time – both in percentage 
and absolute terms - no suitable model has been obtained. No robust model exists which is a 
better predictor than simply assuming all HEIs have an equal chance of receiving an 
‘unsatisfactory’ review. Therefore, the answer to our first question: 
Using only naturally-complete metrics, could the outcome of QAA HEI reviews have been 
successfully predicted? 
is no. Even with perfect hindsight using only naturally complete metrics we could not have 
successfully predicted the outcome of QAA HEI reviews. Prioritising the QAA’s reviews of HEIs 
based on some combination of these metrics would fare no better than treating all HEIs equally 
regardless of the data. 
 
5.3. Results – Imputed Data 
With the use of statistical imputation and all comprehensive metrics, could the outcome of 
QAA HEI reviews have been successfully predicted? 
If we are unable to reliably predict the outcome of QAA reviews when we discard metrics with 
missing values, can we have more success when we estimate these missing values and retain the 
metrics? Doing so provides us with 299 additional metrics and gives us a better chance of forming 
an accurate model.  
5.3.1. Initial Data Exploration 
As the imputed data set contains all the metrics that feature in the naturally-complete data set 
there is substantial overlap in the metrics with significant p-values. In total there were 42 metrics 
with a p-value less than 0.05 and 270 with a p-value less than 0.25, almost exactly in line with the 
number we would expect to occur by chance alone. Table 5.2 below shows the data sets from 












Destination of Leavers Survey 1 
National Student Survey (NSS) 1 
Unit Expenditure 1 
Table 5.2: A breakdown of the metric types with a p-value less than 0.05 for the imputed HEI data set. 
Once more, the majority of the metrics are not those one would likely select a priori to predict the 
outcome of QAA reviews. The one NSS metric is, as before, NSS005_Abs - Q5 - The criteria used in 
marking have been clear in advance. The one DLHE metric is DLH012_Abs – The proportion of UK 
domiciled total leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and were reported as 
unemployed. These metrics are, however, dwarfed in number by the applications, staffing, 
students and other indicators. 
The metric with the lowest p-value: APL004_Cp1 – the one-year percentage change in the 
proportion of successful applicants whose age is known who are aged 20 are & under shown below 
in Figure 5.6: 
 
Figure 5.6: A plot of the latest value of ‘the one-year percentage change in the proportion of successful 




Here we can see that the p-value is being strongly influenced by two outlying reviews which 
resulted in an ‘unsatisfactory’ rating following a decrease in the proportion of successful 
applicants who were aged 20 or under. Again the pattern does not hold for the remainder of the 
‘unsatisfactory’ reviews which are evenly spread throughout a series of ‘satisfactory’ reviews. It is 
also once more the case that there is no obvious reason why there should be a link between the 
metric and the outcome of quality assurance reviews. 
One of the more promising metrics on first inspection is STA054_Abs - Proportion of staff (FTE) 
whose nationality is known who are of "Other-EU" nationality shown below in Figure 5.7: 
 
Figure 5.7: A plot of the latest value of ‘Proportion of staff (FTE) whose nationality is known who are of 
"Other-EU" nationality’ prior to each review and the outcome of that review. 
Those HEIs who received ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews tended to have a low proportion of EU staff who 
were not from the UK. As with all the other metrics discussed above however, these 
‘unsatisfactory’ reviews share the same characteristics as a large number of ‘satisfactory’ reviews. 
Again, it is not immediately apparent why – although that is not to say a relationship is not 
meaningful – the proportion of FTE staff who are from the EU but are not British would impact on 
quality assurance review findings. 
The fact that some of the metrics show a tendency for ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews to be situated at 
one end of the distribution in overall performance, as illustrated above, may be of limited use. If, 
as we see, the ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews are grouped with a larger number of ‘satisfactory’ reviews 
then the predictive power of that metric is extremely limited. Even if all of the ‘unsatisfactory’ 
reviews were preceded by performance in the worst third for a metric or collection of metrics for 
all reviews that would still mean there was only a 13 in 59 or 22% chance that an HEI in that bottom 
third of performance would subsequently be judged ‘unsatisfactory’. It is unlikely that HEIs would 
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tolerate being prioritised for review based on the results of a metric which only correctly predicted 
‘unsatisfactory’ performance 22% of the time (or perhaps more aptly, incorrectly predicted 
‘unsatisfactory’ performance 78% of the time). What will be of value is if a model can be created 
which combines the metrics of poor performance in a number of areas into a definitive signal that 
an HEI is likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ whilst not prioritising too many HEIs performing poorly on 
some metrics but are ‘satisfactory’ overall. 
5.3.2. Fitting the Model 
With the imputed metrics we obtain the diagnostic plots shown below in Figure 5.8. As before 
using the λ1se approach results in the intercept-only model which suggests all HEIs have an equal 
chance of receiving an ‘unsatisfactory’ review regardless of all the available data. With the 
inclusion of the imputed metrics however we obtain a λmin model which contains three metrics. 
 
Figure 5.8: Diagnostic plots for the λ1se (left) and λmin (right) model for imputed HEI data. 
The three metrics are: 
1. APL006_Ca1 - the one-year change in the proportion of successful applicants whose age is 
known who are aged 25 & above. 
2. KFI020_Abs - the percentage ratio of contribution from research grants & contracts to 




Research grants & contracts Income −  Total research grants & contracts expenditure Research grants & contracts Income  
and is a measure of the difference between how much money an HEI has received for, and 
spent on, research in a given year. High negative values indicate an HEI spending far more on 
research than the income it has received for that purpose in that year. 
3. STA062_Ca1 - the one-year change in the proportion of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff who 
are principally financed by the institution. 
 
The model calculates the probability of an HEI receiving an ‘unsatisfactory’ review using these 
three metrics as follows: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + (5×𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴006_Ca1)+(−0.000088×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾020_Abs)+(11.16×STA062_Ca1)1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + (5×𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴006_Ca1)+(−0.000088×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾020_Abs)+(11.16×STA062_Ca1) 
As the coefficient (the number by which the metric is multiplied in the above equation) is positive 
for the applications and staffing metrics , positive values of each metric lead to increases in the 
predicted probability of an ‘unsatisfactory’ review whilst negative values lead to decreases. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, an increase in the proportion of successful applicants whose age is 
known who are aged 25 & above and the proportion of staff who are principally financed by the 
institution will lead to an increase in the predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. As 
the coefficient is negative for the finance metric the opposite is true: negative values, indicating 
an HEI spending more on research than the income it has received for that purpose in a given year, 
will lead to increases in the predicted probability of an ‘unsatisfactory’ review whilst positive 
values will lead to decreases. 
To demonstrate the effect that changes in performance for each metric will have on the predicted 
likelihoods of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’, the model is explored below for three hyopthetical 
HEIs. 
An HEI with a decrease in the proportion of successful applicants whose age is known and who are 
aged 25 & above on the previous year will have a negative value of APL006_Ca1 which, when 
multiplied by the positive coefficient (5.00), will decrease the predicted likelihood of being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’. If we consider three hypothetical HEIs each of which previously had 10% of their 
succesful applicants whose age was known who were over 25, and finance and staffing numbers 
which remained constant such that KFI020_Abs and STA062_Ca1 equal zero, then we can 
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demonstrate the effects of a change in the make-up of successful applicants. Let HEIs A, B and C 
respectively see their proportion of succesful applicants whose age is known and who are aged 25 
or over this year be  20%, 10% and 5% respecitvely. This is a 100% increase, no change, and a 50% 
decrease: 
HEI Previous Proportion 
Current 
Proportion APL006_Ca1 Probability of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ 
A 0.10 0.20 0.20 – 0.10 = 0.10 𝑒𝑒
(−2.61 +(5.00  × 0.1)+ 0 + 0)1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 +(5.00  × 0.1)+ 0 + 0) = 10.813% 
B 0.10 0.10 0.10 – 0.10 = 0 𝑒𝑒
(−2.61 +(5.00  × 0)+ 0 + 0)1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 +(5.00  × 0)+ 0 + 0) = 6.845% 
C 0.10 0.05 0.05 – 0.10 = -0.05 𝑒𝑒
(−2.61 +(5.00  × −0.05)+ 0 + 0)1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 +(5.00  × −0.05)+ 0 + 0) = 5.417% 
Table 5.3: The hypothetical application outcomes of three HEIs and the resulting predicted likelihood of 
being judged ‘unsatisfactory’.  
HEI A having doubled its proportion of succesful applicants aged 25 or over has a predicted 
likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ of 10.81% whereas HEI C, which has halved its 
proportion of succesful applicants aged 25 and over, has a  predicted likelihood of being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ of 5.42%. Whilst the probability of either being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ remains 
low in absolute terms, HEI A is now almost twice as likely to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ than HEI C. 
An HEI spending more money on research than it receives specifically for that purpose will have a 
negative value of KFI020_Abs which, when multiplied by the negative coefficient (-0.000088), will 
increase the predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. If we again consider three 
hypothetical HEIs each of which have received £10M in research funding, and have maintained 
staffing and application numbers such that STA035_Ca1 and APL006_Ca1 equal zero, then we can 
demonstrate the effects of research spending levels on the predicted likelihood of being 
‘unsatisfactory’. Let HEI A spend £20M on research, HEI B £10M on research, and HEI C £5M on 
research. This is twice as much, exactly the same, and half what they are respectively funded 







HEI Research Funding 
Research 
Expenditure KFI020_Abs Probability of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ 
A £10M £15M 10 − 2010 = −1 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + 0+ (−0.000088 × −1)+0)1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + 0+ (−0.000088 × −1)+0) = 6.8503% 
B £10M £10M 10 − 1010 = 0 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + 0+ (−0.000088 × 0)+0)1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + 0+ (−0.000088 × 0)+0) = 6.84976% 
C £10M £5M 10 − 510 = 0.5 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + 0+ (−0.000088 × 0.5)+0)1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + 0+ (−0.000088 × 0.5)+0) = 6.84948% 
Table 5.4: The hypothetical research funding and expenditure of three HEIs and the resulting predicted 
likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. 
This time the effect is clearly more marginal. HEI A overspending by 100% has a predicted 
likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ of 6.85% whereas HEI C which spends just half its 
budget has a minutely-lower predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ of 6.849%. It is 
important to note that this metric deals with relative amounts and therefore sees no difference 
between an HEI which spends £2bn on reaseach when only allocated £1bn, and an HEI which 
spends £2,000 on research when it has only been allocated £1,000. 
Finally, an HEI which increases the proportion of full-time equivalent staff it prinicipally finances 
will have a positive value of STA062_Ca1 which, when multiplied by the positive coefficient 
(11.16), will increase the predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. If we again consider 
three hypothetical HEIs each of which had 5% full-time equivalent staff on permanent or open-
ended contracts in the previous year, and have maintained applicant and finance numbers such 
that APL006_Ca1 and KFI020_Abs equal zero, then we can demonstrate the effects of staffing 
levels on the predicted likelihood of being ‘unsatisfactory’. Let HEI A principally finance 10% of its 
full-time equivalent staff, and HEIs B and C 5% and 2.5% respectively. This is double, exactly the 
same, and half the proportion each respective instiution had the year before: 
HEI Proportion last year 
Proportion 
this year STA062_Ca1 
Probability of being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ 
A 5% 10% 0.10 – 0.05 = 0.05 𝑒𝑒
�−2.61 + 0+ 0+ (11.16 × 0.05)�
1+𝑒𝑒�−2.61 + 0+ 0+ (11.16 × 0.05)� = 11.385% 
B 5% 5% 0.05 – 0.05 = 0 𝑒𝑒
�−2.61 + 0+ 0+ (11.16 × 0)�
1+𝑒𝑒�−2.61 + 0+ 0+ (11.16 × 0)� = 6.85% 
C 5% 2.5% 0.025 – 0.05 = -0.025 𝑒𝑒
�−2.61 + 0+ 0+ (11.16 × −0.025)�
1+𝑒𝑒�−2.61 + 0+ 0+ (11.16 × −0.025)� = 5.270% 
Table 5.5: The hypothetical proportions of staff funded principally by the institution for three HEIs and the 
resulting predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. 
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The effects are similar to those seen for metric APL006_Ca1 in table 5.3. With an 11.385% 
probability of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ HEI A is roughly twice as likely as HEI C to be 
‘unsatisfactory’; however, in absolute terms the likelihood of either being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ 
remains low. 
As shown in Table 5.6 below, if we combine these three metrics we can see that HEI A which has 
doubled its proportion of succesful applicants aged 25 or over, is spending 50% more on research 
than it had received for that purpose, and has doubled the proportion of full-time equivalent staff 
it principally employed has a 17.48% predicted likelihood, or roughly 1 in 6 chance, of being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’. HEI C on the other hand, spending only half of its research funding budget and 
having halved the number of staff principally financed by the institution, has just a 4.15% predicted 
likelihood, or roughly 1 in 24 chance, of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’.  
HEI Probability of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ 
A 𝑒𝑒
(−2.61+(5×0.1)+(−0.000088 × −1)+(11.16 × 0.05))1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61+(5×0.1)+(−0.000088 × −1)+(11.16 × 0.05)) = 17.48103% 
B 𝑒𝑒
(−2.61+(5×0)+(−0.000088 × 0)+(11.16 × 0))1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61+(5×0)+(−0.000088 × 0)+(11.16 × 0)) =  6.84976% 
C 𝑒𝑒
(−2.61+(5×−0.05)+(−0.000088 × 0.5)+(11.16 × −0.025))1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61+(5×−0.05)+(−0.000088 × 0.5)+(11.16 × −0.025)) =  4.152515% 
Table 5.6: The hypothetical values of APL006_Ca1, KFI020_Abs and STA062_Ca1 metrics and the resulting 
predicted likelihood of an HEI being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. 
As with the metrics considered in isolation, it is clear that the effects of changes in performance 
on the predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ can be substantial in relative terms, 
but are still fairly limited in absolute terms. Extreme performance still results in a predicted 
likelihood of being ‘satisfactory’ greater than 80%. The narrow range of predicted probabilities 
suggest that the model is unlikely to perform well. Neither the highest nor lowest probabilities are 
far from the proportion of reviews which were judged unsatisfactory in the data set (13 ÷ 184 = 
7.07%) which was the sole predictor used in the λ1se model. The limited range of predicted 
probabilities is the result of a lack of certainty in the model; when a model has difficulty identifying 
which HEIs will or will not be found ‘unsatisfactory’ the predicted likelihoods of the event occuring 






5.3.3. Evaluating the Model 
Figure 5.9 below shows the ROC curve for this model which has a fairly weak ‘area under the curve’ 
value of 0.720 suggesting a poor rate of ‘unsatisfactory’ HEIs being succesfully prioritised as the 
threshold criterion for triggering a review is lowered: 
 
Figure 5.9: The ROC curve for the HEI model featuring the imputed metrics APL006_Ca1, KFI020_Abs and 
STA062_Ca1. 
Table 5.7 below shows in greater detail the effect of lowering the threshold required for the 
model’s predicted probability of failure to trigger a review. The first four ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews 
could have been predicted with only two ‘satisfactory’ reviews being incorrectly prompted; 
however, the predictions worsen after intial success.  
 
Predicted Probability of an 
'unsatisfactory' outcome 
required to trigger a review 
Number of 'unsatisfactory' 
reviews (true positives) 
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23.09% 1 0 0.93 
19.76% 2 0 0.94 
9.68% 3 2 0.93 
9.45% 4 2 0.94 
8.17% 5 11 0.90 
7.21% 6 32 0.79 
7.10% 7 41 0.74 
7.01% 8 56 0.67 
6.94% 9 62 0.64 
6.89% 10 72 0.59 
6.81% 11 89 0.51 
6.74% 12 95 0.48 
5.91% 13 161 0.13 
Table 5.7: The number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ HEI reviews that would have resulted from 
decreasing the threshold required to prompt a review based upon the λmin model. 
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To have detected all the ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews the QAA would have had to conduct 161 
additional ‘satisfactory’ reviews. Therefore, 174 reviews would have been required to detect the 
13 ‘unsatisfactory’ providers – an error rate of 92.53%. Even if the one ‘hard to predict’, outlying 
‘unsatisfactory’ provider is removed from the equation, 95 unnecessary reviews would have to be 
conducted to discover the 12 cases of ‘unsatisfactory’ performance – an error rate of just 88.79%. 
The accuracy rate detailed in Table 5.7 – the proportion of correct predictions made by the model 
– is deceptive as there is a high proportion of HEIs that are ‘satisfactory’; simply predicting all HEIs 
will be ‘satisfactory’ would result in a reasonable accuracy rate of 171 ÷ 184 = 92.9%. The model’s 
performance quickly falls below this level after its intitial success.  
Figure 5.10 below shows the same data as Table 5.7 but graphically. It is clear there is one 
‘unsatisfactory’ review which the model struggles to predict and the remainder are spread 
throughout a large number of ‘satisfactory’ reviews. 
 
Figure 5.10: Probabilities predicted by the imputed-data model of each of the 184 complete, comparable 
HEI reviews and their actual outcome. 
As shown with the worked example of the model above, the narrow range of predicted 
probabilities does not mean small changes in metric performance lead to significant changes in 
predicted probabilities. Rather, the lack of relationship between the metrics and the outcome of 
QAA reviews seemingly results in the best possible model struggling to predict an ‘unsatisfactory’ 
outcome with any degree of certainty.  
As stated in the previous methods chapter, witholding data to test the model or waiting for new 
reviews to take place is not an option for HEIs. Instead, two alternative approaches are adopted 
to sense check the model. Figure 5.11 below show the model’s application to the 2012/13 data 
along with each HEIs (somewhat contested) Guardian rankings for that academic year. This gives 
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us an approximation of which HEIs would have been prioritised for review in 2014/15 had the 
model been in place. There is still a strong clustering of highly-ranked HEIs predicted as being most 
likely to have an ‘unsatisfactory’ review including three of the UK’s ostensibly top 10 unviersities 
in the 25 most likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’. Of greater concern however is the even narrower range 
of predicted probabilities. The model once again struggles to predict ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews with 
any certainty as the underlying relations are so weak. Putting aside the narrow range of 
probabilities, some highly-ranked HEIs are considered two or three times more likely to be 
‘unsatisfactory’ than many lower ranked HEIs. There are two possible non-exclusive explanations 
for this: the model is nonsensical and/or there are a number of highly-regarded HEIs in the UK 
who have significant quality assurance issues which are going unnoticed. 
 
Figure 5.11: Probabilities predicted by the HEI model featuring the imputed metrics 
APL006_Ca1,KFI020_Abs and STA062_Ca1 of each UK HEI receiving an unsatisfactory review based on 
2012/13 data. 
Taking an historic point in time, in this case 1st October 2009, and using the most up-to-date 
instances of the three metrics in the model available at the time we can gain a snapshot of the 
prioritisation list the QAA would have had at that time. Those HEIs that were reviewed within one 




Figure 5.12: Probabilities predicted by the HEI model featuring the imputed metrics 
APL006_Ca1,KFI020_Abs and STA062_Ca1 of each UK HEI receiving an unsatisfactory review based on 
latest available data on 1st October 2009. 
We can see that Brunel University, judged to be ‘unsatisfactory’ before the end of 2009, was 
ranked as one of the least likely to HEIs to be ‘unsatisfactory’. Of the remaining two HEIs judged  
‘unsatisfactory’ within one year one was reassuringly ranked third most likely to be; however the 
other would have only been prioritised behind 49 others. Again, the range of predicted 
probabilities is very narrow and we can either reason that the model is very poor and would have 
led to a very high number of incorrectly prioritsied reviews or, less likely, there were very many 
‘unsatisfactory’ HEIs which were not reviewed. 
5.3.4. Summary 
For this question we have considered all imputed metrics with a feasible link to quality assurance 
that could form part of a cost-effective, data-driven, risk-based approach, not just in their absolute 
state but also modified to account for changes over time, both in percentage and absolute terms. 
The addition of the imputed metrics has meant we have been able to develop a predictive model 
better than simply assuming an equal probability of all HEIs being ‘unsatisfactory’: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + (5×𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴006_Ca1)+(−0.000088×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾020_Abs)+(11.16×STA062_Ca1)1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + (5×𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴006_Ca1)+(−0.000088×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾020_Abs)+(11.16×STA062_Ca1) 
However, the answer to question two: 
With the use of statistical imputation and all comprehensive metrics, could the outcome of 
QAA HEI reviews have been successfully predicted? 
is no. The very narrow range of predicted probabilities contained in the best possible model shows 
that there is little relation between the metrics and the outcome of QAA reviews. This is reflected 
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in the fact that for all of the 13 ’unsatisfactory’ reviews to have been prioritised (even operating 
with the benefit of perfect hindsight), 161 unnecessary ‘satisfactory’ reviews would have to have 
been conducted. This is only ten reviews short of having conducted all the reviews anyway and 
represents a 92.5% error rate amongst the HEIs reviewed. Furthermore, examining how the model 
would have performed at a specific point in time shows a similar picture; 121 HEIs were predicted 
as more likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ on 1st October 2009 than Brunel, found ‘unsatisfactory’ just 
ten weeks later. Finally, looking at the latest available data at the time of writing the predictions 
are again a cause for concern with three of the UK’s top 10 HEIs in the top 25 most likely to be 
‘unsatisfactory’. 
 
5.4. Results – Imputed Data Standardised In-Year 
With the use of statistical imputation and all in-year standardised, comprehensive metrics, 
could the outcome of QAA HEI reviews have been successfully predicted?  
If statistical imputation has provided us with a better model than the one based on only the 
naturally complete data, can standardising this data within each year further improve the model 
by accounting for sector-wide trends over time in the data? 
5.4.1. Initial Data Exploration 
The standardised dataset is based on the imputed data set and therefore contains the exact same 
number of metrics. We would therefore expect to see a similar number of metrics with a p-value 
of less than 0.05 and this was the case. Again there were 42 metrics with a p-value less than 0.05 
although there was some difference in the metrics. The one previously significant DLHE metric no 
longer features suggesting changes in employment rates over time were having a confounding 
effect. Conversely, the student:staff ratio becomes a significant univariate metric at the 5% level 
once general trends over time are accounted for. Table 5.8 below shows the data sets from which 








Data Set Number of metrics where p<0.05 
Applications / UCAS 14 
Students 9 
Finance 9 
HESA Performance Indicators 4 
Research Statistics 3 
Staffing 2 
Student:Staff Ratio 1 
Table 5.8: A breakdown of the metrics with a p-value less than 0.05 for the imputed, standardised HEI data 
set. 
The standardisation of the metrics has led to an increase in the already proportionately high 
number of metrics relating to applications which have a significant relationship with the outcome 
of the QAA reviews. The distribution of APL025_Ca2 – the two-year change in the total number of 
applicants, the metric with the lowest p-value, shown below in Figure 5.13, indicates a relationship 
between institutions receiving a greater number of applications prior to their review than two 
years before it. 
 
Figure 5.13: A plot of the two-year change in the standardised total number of applicants prior to each 
review and the outcome of that review. 
Again, we see the familiar pattern of more than half of the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers towards one 
extreme of the distribution distributed amongst a considerable number of ‘satisfactory’ providers 
and several ‘unsatisfactory’ providers towards the other end of the distribution. One can see an 
intuitive link that providers with declining quality, which has not been prevented due to 
‘unsatisfactory’ quality assurance, could suffer a decline in the proportion of applications 
compared to other HEIs. 
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One other metric of note to have a p-value less than 0.05 with the use of in-year standardisation 
was the student:staff ratio calculated simply as the number of students at an institution divided 
by the number of staff. When a metric is standardised the mean is subtracted from a value so 
those institutions with a negative value on the y-axis of Figure 5.14 below had a below average 
number of students per member of staff. It is this characteristic – having fewer students per 
member of staff than average – which somewhat counterintuitively correlates with being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’. 
 
Figure 5.14: A plot of the one-year change in the in-year standardised student to staff ratio prior to each 
review and the outcome of that review. 
The next step is to determine whether any combination of these metrics could have provided an 
effective, cross-validated model which would have allowed for the ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews to 
have been successfully prioritised.  
5.4.2. Fitting the Model 
Figure 5.15 below shows that, as with the naturally-complete data, no cross-validated model 
provides a better fit than simply assuming all institutions have the same probability of being 




Figure 5.15: The diagnostic plots for the λ1se (left) and λmin (right) model for standardised, imputed HEI 
data. 
Therefore, the answer to our question: 
With the use of statistical imputation and all in-year standardised, comprehensive 
metrics, could the outcome of QAA HEI reviews have been successfully predicted? 
is again, no. The obvious question at this point is how is this the case when the non-standardised 
imputed data did produce a model, albeit a questionable one? The answer is that for HEIs, 
absolute performance is seemingly a better predictor than relative. For example, if a single HEI 
were in £5,000,000 worth of debt in 2008 whilst all other HEIs were debt free, it is still in a better 
position than being in £75,000,000 worth of debt in 2012 when all other HEIs are in £100,000,000 
worth of debt. Despite being relatively worse off than other HEIs in 2008 and relatively better off 
than other HEIs in 2012, it is still the case that the HEI’s financial position is far worse in 2012, and 
likely putting a far greater strain on quality assurance activities. One HEI’s debt does not affect the 
ability of another’s to fund quality assurance or other activities. Clearly this may not be the case 
for all metrics, but it appears to be the case for those which give the best prediction of the 
outcome of QAA reviews.  
 
5.5. Results – Benchmarked Data 
With the use of statistical imputation and all comprehensive, benchmarked metrics, could the 
outcome of QAA HEI reviews have been successfully predicted?  
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If standardising the data by year has failed to provide an adequate model, might benchmarking 
the data – standardising it by HEI type – prove more successful? 
5.5.1. Initial Data Exploration 
Coincidentally, there was the same number of metrics with a p-value less than 0.05 for the 
benchmarked data as there was for the standardised data set, despite the benchmarked data set 
containing a larger number of metrics. The 42 metrics with a p-value less than 0.05 were markedly 
different from the standardised data set; the ‘Applications/UCAS’ data which contributed the 
greatest number of significant individual metrics for the standardised data set does not feature at 
all for the benchmarked data set. Instead, staffing, students and finance metrics are more 
significant. The one NSS measure significant in the earlier analyses is no longer present. Table 5.9 
below shows the specific data sets from which the metrics with a p-value less than 0.05 came: 





HESA Performance Indicators 2 
Destination of Leavers 1 
Previous Review Findings 1 
Table 5.9: A breakdown of the metrics with a p-value less than 0.05 for the imputed, benchmarked HEI 
data set. 
The distribution of UFI086_Abs – the retained proceeds of sales (total capital expenditure), the 
metric with the lowest p-value shown below in Figure 5.16, indicates a relationship between 
institutions receiving a greater amount of funds retained from sales of capital than their 




Figure 5.16: A plot of the benchmarked ‘retained proceeds of sales’ recorded under total capital 
expenditure prior to each review and the outcome of that review. 
Again, there is the familiar pattern of several ‘unsatisfactory’ providers with extreme values at one 
end of the distribution, but the remainder distributed evenly throughout the ‘satisfactory’ 
providers. It is not immediately obvious what causal link could exist between the metric score and 
review findings.   
Figure 5.17 below shows a similar pattern with two ‘unsatisfactory’ providers having an extremely 
high proportion of their academic staff who are leaving being both ‘teaching and research’ staff 
compared to their peers. The remaining ‘unsatisfactory’ providers are however evenly distributed 
throughout the ‘satisfactory’ providers. One can envision the proportion of staff who are leaving 
being ‘teaching and research’ staff impacting on quality assurance activities, but the proportion of 
staff is not the same as number of staff (it could be minimal), and more staff focused on teaching 




Figure 5.17: A plot of the benchmarked proportion of full-person equivalent academic staff leavers 
(excluding atypical leavers) who were classed as ‘teaching & research’ prior to each review and the 
outcome of that review. 
The next step is to determine whether any combination of benchmarked metrics could have 
provided an effective, cross-validated model which would have allowed for the ‘unsatisfactory’ 
reviews to have been successfully prioritised.  
5.5.2. Fitting the Model 
Figure 5.18 below shows that, as with the naturally-complete data and in-year standardised data, 
no cross-validated model provides a better fit than simply assuming all institutions have the same 
probability of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ regardless of the metrics available: 
 
 Figure 5.18: The diagnostic plots for the λ1se (left) and λmin (right) model for benchmarked, imputed data. 
Therefore, the answer to the question: 
With the use of statistical imputation and all comprehensive, benchmarked metrics, could the 
outcome of QAA HEI reviews have been successfully predicted?  
is again, no. Considering metric performance in relation to similar HEIs, rather than all HEIs with 
their differing mission, has failed to produce a model which is any better than ignoring the data 
and assuming all HEIs have an equal chance of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. This finding adds 
further weight to the suggestion in 5.4.2 above that absolute metric performance has a stronger 
relation with the outcome of QAA reviews than relative performance. Just as increasing the 
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amount of debt an HEI is in worsens its financial position and may affect its ability to fund quality 
assurance activities, regardless of whether other HEI’s take on even more debt at the same time, 




Having analysed over 750 metrics, all those that could feasibly form part of a cost-effective, data-
driven, risk-based approach, not just in their absolute form but multiple change-over-time 
variants, in their natural, imputed, standardised and benchmarked form, no possible combination 
of metrics could have effectively predicted the outcome of previous QAA reviews of HEIs, even 
with perfect hindsight.  
The best model we were able to obtain was based on the imputed data: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + (5×𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴006_Ca1)+(−0.000088×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾020_Abs)+(11.16×STA062_Ca1)1 + 𝑒𝑒(−2.61 + (5×𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴006_Ca1)+(−0.000088×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾020_Abs)+(11.16×STA062_Ca1) 
However, there are significant concerns about the effectiveness of this model. Most notably, the 
very narrow range of predicted probabilities which resulted in ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews being 
distributed throughout ‘satisfactory’ reviews when ordered by the predicted likelihood of being 
‘unsatisfactory’, and a very high error rate (92.5%). When applied to the 2012/13 data, the range 
of predicted probabilities remained very narrow and a large proportion of well-ranked HEIs were 
amongst those predicted as most likely to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’. This is in part a result of the 
model making ineffective predictions, but it may also be the case that there is a significant amount 
of ‘unsatisfactory’ quality assurance being conducted in the UK’s purported top HEIs. Finally, when 
applied to the data available at a fixed historical point in time to provide a realistic view of what 
the QAA would have been faced with, the model placed two of the three HEIs found 
‘unsatisfactory’ within one year a long way down the prioritisation list.  
Evaluation of the best possible model strongly suggests there is no effective relationship between 
the metrics and the outcome of QAA reviews. Looking at the metrics contained in the model, this 
is perhaps unsurprising. It is not entirely apparent why they should be able to foretell quality 
assurance failures. Considering the three metrics in turn: 
1. APL006_Ca1 - the one-year change in the proportion of successful applicants whose age 
is known who are aged 25 & above. 
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2. KFI020_Abs - the percentage ratio of contribution from research grants & contracts to 
research grants & contracts income. 
3. STA062_Ca1 - the one-year change in the proportion of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff 
who are principally financed by the institution. 
An increase in the value of the staffing metric could feasibly (although tenuously) serve as a proxy 
for flagging institutions who are changing their workforce which creates disruption and introduces 
a lack of continuity. There are many possible challenges to this explanation however. The metric 
is based on relative numbers and does not account for base values; for example, if two HEIs both 
had an equal number of students and one doubled its staff, principally financed by the institution, 
from 500 to 1,000 and the other doubled its staff from 5,000 to 10,000 they would both be 
predicted to be equally and highly likely to be judged ‘unsatisfactory. This is despite the fact that 
the latter HEI would have ten times as many experienced staff familiar with the existing quality 
assurance processes and able to protect quality and standards. 
An alternative explanation for an increase could be that an HEI is maintaining its staffing numbers 
but that these staff are not as able to attract research funding as they were in the past and so are 
now reliant on the institution. If so, this would show a similar outcome to KFI020_Abs; however, 
it is difficult to see how either relates to one or more of the four areas covered by a QAA review: 
academic standards, the quality of teaching and learning, the provision of information or 
enhancement. Likewise, it is difficult to fathom how an increase in the proportion of 
undergraduate students whose age is known and who are aged 25 or over could feasibly serve as 
an indicator of academic standards, the quality of teaching and learning, the provision of 
information or enhancement. Furthermore, the metric only accounts for relative, not absolute, 
changes and so is more sensitive to changes at smaller institutions.  
The best model therefore not only fails to identify ‘unsatisfactory’ provision with any degree of 
certainty, has a very high error rate and a questionable output when applied to 1st October 2009 
and the latest data, but it is also not intuitive either. There is no obvious reason why a model 
comprising these three metrics would have the ability to forecast the outcome of QAA reviews. 
 
5.7. Discussion 
A data-driven, risk-based approach to prioritising QAA HEI reviews, as envisioned in the 2011 
White Paper Students at the Heart of the System, will not work. Despite considering all metrics 
that could feasibly form part of a practical risk-based approach, not just in their natural form but 
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calculating change-over-time, imputed, standardised and benchmarked variants, no effective 
model exists. One immediate question that results from this finding is what does this mean for 
higher education policy? If a data-driven, risk-based approach cannot work for HEIs which account 
for approximately 90% of students, then at best such an approach can only be successfully applied 
to the minority of HE provided by FECs and alternative providers. 
In November 2015 the quantitative findings from this thesis were made public. Senior Managers 
from QAA, HEFCE, BIS, and various representative bodies, senior academics and journalists 
attended a seminar hosted by King’s Policy Institute and the International Centre for University 
Policy Research. The results were also presented at the annual conferences of the European 
Quality Assurance Forum and Society for Research into Higher Education, and published in the 
Times Higher Education magazine (EQAF, 2015; SRHE, 2015; Havergal, 2015). Finally, the author 
gave oral evidence to a closed session of BIS’s Assessing Quality in Higher Education inquiry as well 
as submitting written evidence (Griffiths, 2015). Four months after the presentation of these 
findings, HEFCE published its ‘Revised Operating Model for Quality Assessment’ which (somewhat 
pointedly) stated: 
“Throughout this process, the relevant funding body will remain mindful of the 
complexities involved in making judgements about a higher education provider’s 
performance, and will recognise that data analysis and dialogue in these circumstances 
needs to be robust, sophisticated and nuanced. It is particularly important to note here 
that we are not advocating a crude metrics-driven approach, using data to predict 
providers that might or might not have received successful outcomes under previous 
quality assessment approaches. Rather, data is used as one source of information to 
inform a broader judgement supported where needed by suitably qualified and 
independent experts.” 
(HEFCE, 2016c, 109) 
Similarly, in January 2016, Ian Kimber, Director of Quality Development at QAA, wrote: 
“On the face of it, [the findings of this thesis] could call into question the application of 
metrics to identify areas of ‘risk’ on which to focus quality assurance effort. However, I 
would argue that the findings underline the need for a contextualised and nuanced 
approach to the use of metrics, both in terms of identifying potential quality risk and of 




It is not possible to say with certainty whether expert interpretation will be successful without 
conducting an empirical evaluation, prioritising one group of providers by expert consideration 
and a second group by data-driven approaches alone, including reviews of providers not 
prioritised by either method to detect false negatives. As noted in section 3.5.2 however, the 
literature suggests it is likely such an approach will be unsuccessful, especially in the low-validity, 
‘noisy’ setting that is QAA review prioritisation. The difficulties of expert interpretation may be 
compounded by the lack of relation between indicators selected a priori by HEFCE, including NSS 
and continuation rate metrics, and the outcome of QAA reviews. 
The issue of expert interpretation is somewhat secondary however. This analysis sought to 
determine which metrics could have successfully predicted the outcome of QAA HEI reviews, and 
with that whether or not a purely data-driven approach such as that envisaged in Students at the 
Heart of the System could be successful. It cannot, and this appears to have been accepted by the 
sector which has retreated from talk of such an approach to focus on a ‘data informed’ method 
instead. 
HEIs are more data rich than FECs and alternative providers, but they are also very different. A 
purely data-driven, risk-based approach cannot work for HEIs, the next question is can such an 




Appendix E – HEI Metrics 
The set of 754 metrics used in this study prior to change-over-time, in-year standardisation and 
benchmarking calculations being added.  
Area Metric Code Proposed metrics 
Applications 
APL001 Proportion of all applicants of total applicants whose age is known who are aged 20 & under 
APL002 Proportion of all applicants of total applicants whose age is known who are aged 21 - 24 
APL003 Proportion of all applicants of total applicants whose age is known who are aged 25 & above 
APL004 Proportion of successful applicants whose age is known who are aged 20 & under 
APL005 Proportion of successful applicants whose age is known who are aged 21 - 24 
APL006 Proportion of successful applicants whose age is known who are aged 25 & above 
APL007 Proportion of successful applicants to total applicants whose age is known who are aged 20 & under 
APL008 Proportion of successful applicants to total applicants whose age is known who are aged 21 - 24 
APL009 Proportion of successful applicants to total applicants whose age is known who are aged 25 & above 
APL010 Proportion of all applicants whose domicile is known who are UK domiciles 
APL011 Proportion of all applicants whose domicile is known who are "Other-EU" domiciles 
APL012 Proportion of all applicants whose domicile is known who are non-EU domiciles 
APL013 Proportion of successful applicants whose domicile is known who are UK domiciled 
APL014 Proportion of successful applicants whose domicile is known who "Other-EU" domiciled 
APL015 Proportion of successful applicants whose domicile is known who are non-EU domiciles 
APL016 Proportion of successful applicants to applicants whose domicile is known who are UK domiciles 
APL017 Proportion of successful applicants to applicants whose domicile is known who are "Other-EU" domiciles 
APL018 Proportion of successful applicants to applicants whose domicile is known who are non-EU domiciles 
APL019 Proportion of total applicants whose gender is defined who are female 
APL020 Proportion of total applicants whose gender is defined who are male 
APL021 Proportion of total successful applicants whose gender is defined who are female 
APL022 Proportion of total successful applicants whose gender is defined who are male 
APL023 Proportion of successful female applicants to all female applicants (whose gender is known) 
APL024 Proportion of successful male applicants to all male applicants (whose gender is defined) 
APL025 Total number of applicants 
APL026 Total number of successful applicants 




DLH001 Proportion of UK domiciled Postgraduate leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and entered employment (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH002 Proportion of UK domiciled First degrees leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and entered employment (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH003 Proportion of UK domiciled Other UG leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and entered employment (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH004 Proportion of UK domiciled Total leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and entered employment (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH005 Proportion of UK domiciled Postgraduate leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and entered employment (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH006 Proportion of UK domiciled First degrees leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and entered employment (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH007 Proportion of UK domiciled Other UG leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and entered employment (including those that are working & studying) 







DLH009 Proportion of UK domiciled Postgraduate leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and were reported as unemployed 
DLH010 Proportion of UK domiciled First degrees leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and were reported as unemployed 
DLH011 Proportion of UK domiciled Other UG leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and were reported as unemployed 
DLH012 Proportion of UK domiciled Total leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and were reported as unemployed 
DLH013 Proportion of UK domiciled Postgraduate leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and were reported as unemployed 
DLH014 Proportion of UK domiciled First degrees leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and were reported as unemployed 
DLH015 Proportion of UK domiciled Other UG leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and were reported as unemployed 
DLH016 Proportion of UK domiciled Total leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and were reported as unemployed 
DLH017 Proportion of UK domiciled Postgraduate leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and entered further study (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH018 Proportion of UK domiciled First degrees leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and entered further study (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH019 Proportion of UK domiciled Other UG leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and entered further study (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH020 Proportion of UK domiciled Total leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and entered further study (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH021 Proportion of UK domiciled Postgraduate leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and entered further study (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH022 Proportion of UK domiciled First degrees leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and entered further study (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH023 Proportion of UK domiciled Other UG leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and entered further study (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH024 Proportion of UK domiciled Total leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and entered further study (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH025 Proportion of UK domiciled Postgraduate leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and were reported as having an unknown destination 
DLH026 Proportion of UK domiciled First degrees leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and were reported as having an unknown destination 
DLH027 Proportion of UK domiciled Other UG leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and were reported as having an unknown destination 
DLH028 Proportion of UK domiciled Total leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time study and were reported as having an unknown destination 
DLH029 Proportion of UK domiciled Postgraduate leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and were reported as having an unknown destination 
DLH030 Proportion of UK domiciled First degrees leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and were reported as having an unknown destination 
DLH031 Proportion of UK domiciled Other UG leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and were reported as having an unknown destination 
DLH032 Proportion of UK domiciled Total leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time study and were reported as having an unknown destination 
DLH033 
Proportion of UK domiciled Total leavers who obtained qualifications through full-time 
study and entered employment (including those that are working & studying) or entered 
further study (including those that are working & studying) 
DLH034 
Proportion of UK domiciled Total leavers who obtained qualifications through part-time 
study and entered employment (including those that are working & studying) or entered 
further study (including those that are working & studying) 
Research 
Statistics 
RES001 Statistic A:  Market share of OSI Research Councils (Actual) research grants & contracts income 
RES002 Statistic A: Market share of OSI Research Councils (Adjusted) research grants & contracts income 
RES003 Statistic A: Market share of UK-based charities (Actual) research grants & contracts income 





RES005 Statistic A: Market share of UK cent govt/local, health & hospital authorities (Actual) research grants & contracts income 
RES006 Statistic A: Market share of UK cent govt/local, health & hospital authorities (Adjusted) research grants & contracts income 
RES007 Statistic A: Market share of UK industry, commerce & public corporations (Actual) research grants & contracts income 
RES008 Statistic A: Market share of UK industry, commerce & public corporations (Adjusted) research grants & contracts income 
RES009 Statistic A: Market share of EU sources (Actual) research grants & contracts income 
RES010 Statistic A: Market share of EU sources (Adjusted) research grants & contracts income 
RES011 Statistic A: Market share of Other overseas sources (Actual) research grants & contracts income 
RES012 Statistic A: Market share of Other overseas sources (Adjusted) research grants & contracts income 
RES013 Statistic A: Market share of Other sources (Actual) research grants & contracts income 
RES014 Statistic A: Market share of Other sources (Adjusted) research grants & contracts income 
RES015 Statistic A: Total Actual market share of research grants & contracts income 
RES016 Statistic A: Total Adjusted market share of research grants & contracts income 
RES017 Statistic C: Market share of research staff and research council research studentships  - Research council research studentships 
RES018 Statistic D: Proportion of total research income from external sources (%)(6) 
RES019 Statistic E: Proportion of total academic income earned for research (%)(6) 
RES020 Funding council recurrent grant for research (£000s) 




UCA001 Number of (HESA All) new entrants 
UCA002 Number of (HESA) Full-time first degree/DipHE/HND entrants 
UCA003 Number of UCAS Acceptances 
UCA004 Institutional distribution of applications by domicile UK 
UCA005 Institutional distribution of applications by domicile Other EU 
UCA006 Institutional distribution of applications by domicile Non-EU 
UCA007 Market share of applications by domicile UK 
UCA008 Market share of applications by domicile Other EU 
UCA009 Market share of applications by domicile Non-EU 
UCA010 Market share of applications by domicile Total 
UCA011 Institutional distribution of accepted applicants by domicile UK 
UCA012 Institutional distribution of accepted applicants by domicile Other EU 
UCA013 Institutional distribution of accepted applicants by domicile Non-EU 
UCA014 Market share of accepted applicants by domicile UK 
UCA015 Market share of accepted applicants by domicile Other EU 
UCA016 Market share of accepted applicants by domicile Non-EU 
UCA017 Market share of accepted applicants by domicile Total 
UCA018 Institutional distribution of applications by age 20 years & under 
UCA019 Institutional distribution of applications by age 21 to 24 years 
UCA020 Institutional distribution of applications by age 25 years & above 
UCA021 Market share of applications by age 20 years & under 
UCA022 Market share of applications by age 21 to 24 years 
UCA023 Market share of applications by age 25 years & above 
UCA024 Market share of applications by age Total 
UCA025 Institutional distribution of accepted applicants by age 20 years & under 
UCA026 Institutional distribution of accepted applicants by age 21 to 24 years 
UCA027 Institutional distribution of accepted applicants by age 25 years & above 
UCA028 Market share of accepted applicants by age 20 years & under 
UCA029 Market share of accepted applicants by age 21 to 24 years 
UCA030 Market share of accepted applicants by age 25 years & above 
UCA031 Market share of accepted applicants by age Total 







UCA033 Institutional distribution of applications by gender Female 
UCA034 Market share of applications by gender Male 
UCA035 Market share of applications by gender Female 
UCA036 Market share of applications by gender Total 
UCA037 Institutional distribution of accepted applicants by gender Male 
UCA038 Institutional distribution of accepted applicants by gender Female 
UCA039 Market share of accepted applicants by gender Male 
UCA040 Market share of accepted applicants by gender Female 





UEX001 Total academic departments: Statistic A: Total expenditure per FTE student 
UEX002 Total academic departments: Statistic B: % spent on academic staff 
UEX003 Total academic departments: Statistic C: % spent on non-academic staff 
UEX004 Total academic departments: Statistic D: % spent on non-staff costs 
UEX005 Statistic F: Total academic services expenditure per FTE student 
UEX006 Administration & central services: Statistic K: Total administration & central services expenditure per FTE student(3) 
UEX007 Administration & central services: Statistic L: % spent on central administration & services 
UEX008 Administration & central services: Statistic M: % spent on general educational expenditure 
UEX009 Administration & central services: Statistic N: % spent on staff & student facilities 
UEX010 Premises: Statistic O: Total premises expenditure per FTE student 
UEX011 Premises: Statistic P: % spent on staff costs 
UEX012 Premises: Statistic Q: % spent on non-staff costs 
UEX013 Premises: Statistic U: % spent on repairs & maintenance 





PIC073 Full-time first degree leavers in the eligible population 
PIC074 Full-time first degree respondents to DLHE survey 
PIC075 Percent of full-time first degree leavers who responded to the DLHE survey 
PIC076 Full-time first degree leavers in the base population 
PIC077 Number of full-time first degree leavers in the base population who were employed, studying or both. 
PIC078 Percent of full-time first degree leavers who were employed, studying or both 
PIC079 Benchmark - full-time first degree leavers who were employed, studying or both 
PIC080 Percent of full-time first degree respondents who were not available for work 
PIC081 Percent of full-time first degree respondents who refused to take part in the survey 
PIC082 Percent of full-time first degree target population who were medical, dental or veterinary graduates 
PIC083 Percent of full-time first degree target population who were on sandwich courses 
PIC084 Number of PhDs awarded per academic staff costs 
PIC085 Research grants & contracts income per academic staff costs 
PIC086 Number of cost centres with academic staff costs 
PIC087 Measure of specialisation per academic staff costs 
PIC088 Number of PhDs awarded per funding council research allocation 
PIC089 Research grants & contracts income per funding council research allocation 
PIC090 Number of cost centres with funding council funding for research 
PIC091 Measure of specialisation per funding council research allocation 
PIC092 QR research funding (£) 
PIC160 Number of PhDs awarded 
PIC093 Number of full-time undergraduate entrants 
PIC094 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants 
PIC095 Percent of full-time undergraduate entrants who are young 
PIC096 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants with known state school data 
PIC097 Percent of young full-time undergraduate entrants with known state school data 
PIC098 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants from state schools or colleges 
PIC099 Indicator - Percent of young full-time undergraduate entrants from state schools or colleges 







PIC101 Location adjusted benchmark - young full-time undergraduate entrants from state schools or colleges 
PIC102 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants with known NS-SEC data 
PIC103 Percent of young full-time undergraduate entrants with known NS-SEC data 
PIC104 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants from NS-SEC classes 4,5,6 & 7 
PIC105 Percent of young full-time undergraduate entrants from NS-SEC classes 4,5,6 & 7 
PIC106 Benchmark - young full-time undergraduate entrants from NS-SEC classes 4,5,6 & 7 
PIC107 Location adjusted benchmark - young full-time undergraduate entrants from NS-SEC classes 4,5,6 & 7 
PIC108 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants with known participation neighbourhood data 
PIC109 Percent of young full-time undergraduate entrants with known participation neighbourhood data 
PIC110 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods 
PIC111 Percent of young full-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods 
PIC112 Benchmark - young full-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods 
PIC113 Location adjusted benchmark - young full-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods 
PIC114 Number of full-time first degree entrants 
PIC115 Number of mature full-time first degree entrants 
PIC116 Percent of full-time first degree entrants who are mature 
PIC117 Number of mature full-time first degree entrants with known highest qualification on entry & participation neighbourhood data 
PIC118 Percent of mature full-time first degree entrants with known highest qualification on entry & participation neighbourhood data 
PIC119 Number of mature full-time first degree entrants whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC120 Number of mature full-time first degree entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC121 Percent of mature full-time first degree entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC122 Benchmark - mature full-time first degree entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC123 Location adjusted benchmark - mature full-time first degree entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC124 Number of full-time undergraduate entrants 
PIC125 Number of mature full-time undergraduate entrants 
PIC126 Percent of full-time undergraduate entrants who are mature 
PIC127 Number of mature full-time undergraduate entrants with known highest qualification on entry & participation neighbourhood data 
PIC128 Percent of mature full-time undergraduate entrants with known highest qualification on entry & participation neighbourhood data 
PIC129 Number of mature full-time undergraduate entrants whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC130 Number of mature full-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC131 Percent of mature full-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC132 Benchmark - mature full-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC133 Location adjusted benchmark - mature full-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC134 Number of young part-time undergraduate entrants 
PIC135 Percent of part-time undergraduate entrants who are young 
PIC136 Number of young part-time undergraduate entrants with known highest qualification on entry & participation neighbourhood data 






PIC138 Number of young part-time undergraduate entrants whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC139 Number of young part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC140 Percent of young part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC141 Benchmark - young part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC142 Location adjusted benchmark - young part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC143 Number of mature part-time undergraduate entrants 
PIC144 Percent of part-time undergraduate entrants who are mature 
PIC145 Number of mature part-time undergraduate entrants with known highest qualification on entry & participation neighbourhood data 
PIC146 Percent of mature undergraduate entrants with known highest qualification on entry & participation neighbourhood data 
PIC147 Number of mature part-time undergraduate entrants whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC148 Number of mature part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC149 Percent of mature part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC150 Benchmark - mature part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC151 Location adjusted benchmark - mature part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC152 Number of part-time undergraduate entrants 
PIC153 Number of part-time undergraduate entrants with known highest qualification on entry & participation neighbourhood data 
PIC154 Percent of undergraduate entrants with known highest qualification on entry & participation neighbourhood data 
PIC155 Number of part-time undergraduate entrants whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC156 Number of part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC157 Percent of part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC158 Benchmark - Part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC159 Location adjusted benchmark - Part-time undergraduate entrants from low participation neighbourhoods whose highest qualification on entry isn’t HE 
PIC001 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants last year 
PIC002 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants last year who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC003 Percent of  young full-time undergraduate entrants last year who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC004 Benchmark - young full-time first degree entrants who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC005 Benchmark - young full-time other undergraduate entrants who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC006 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC007 Percent of young full-time first degree entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC008 Benchmark - young full-time first degree entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC009 Benchmark - young full-time other undergraduate entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC010 Number of young full-time undergraduate entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC011 Percent of young full-time undergraduate entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC012 Benchmark - young full-time first degree entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC013 Benchmark - young full-time other undergraduate entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC014 Number of mature full-time undergraduate entrants 
PIC015 Number of mature full-time undergraduate entrants who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC016 Percent of mature full-time first degree entrants who continue or qualify at same HEI 






PIC018 Benchmark - mature full-time other undergraduate entrants who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC019 Number of mature full-time undergraduate degree entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC020 Percentage of mature full-time undergraduate degree entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC021 Benchmark - mature full-time first degree entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC022 Benchmark - mature full-time other undergraduate entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC023 Number of mature full-time undergraduate entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC024 Percent of mature full-time undergraduate entrants who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC025 Benchmark - mature full-time first degree entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC026 Benchmark - mature full-time other undergraduate entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC027 Number of full-time undergraduate entrants 
PIC028 Number of full-time undergraduate entrants who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC029 Percent of full-time undergraduate entrants who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC030 Benchmark - full-time first degree entrants who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC031 Benchmark - full-time other undergraduate entrants who continue or qualify at same HEI 
PIC032 Number of full-time undergraduate entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC033 Percent of full-time undergraduate entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC034 Benchmark - full-time first degree entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC035 Benchmark - full-time other undergraduate entrants who transfer to other UK HEI 
PIC036 Number of full-time undergraduate entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC037 Percent of full-time undergraduate entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC038 Benchmark - full-time first degree entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC039 Benchmark - full-time other undergraduate entrants who are no longer in HE 
PIC040 Number of young undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered 
PIC041 Number of young undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who resume at the same HEI 
PIC042 Percent of young undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who resume at the same HEI 
PIC043 Number of young undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who transfer to another UK HEI 
PIC044 Percent of young undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who transfer to another UK HEI 
PIC045 Number of young undergraduate degree entrants not in HE for two consecutive years 
PIC046 Percent of young undergraduate degree entrants not in HE for two consecutive years 
PIC047 Number of mature undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered 
PIC048 Number of mature undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who resume at the same HEI 
PIC049 Percent of mature undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who resume at the same HEI 
PIC050 Number of mature undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who transfer to another UK HEI 
PIC051 Percent of mature undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who transfer to another UK HEI 
PIC052 Number of mature undergraduate degree entrants not in HE for two consecutive years 
PIC053 Percent of mature undergraduate degree entrants not in HE for two consecutive years 
PIC054 Number of undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered 
PIC055 Number of undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who resume at the same HEI 
PIC056 Percent of undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who resume at the same HEI 
PIC057 Number of undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who transfer to another UK HEI 
PIC058 Percent of undergraduate degree entrants not in HE the year after they entered & who transfer to another UK HEI 
PIC059 Number of undergraduate degree entrants not in HE for two consecutive years 
PIC060 Percent of undergraduate degree entrants not in HE for two consecutive years 






PIC062 Number of full-time first degree students who are in receipt of DSA 
PIC063 Percent of full-time first degree students who are in receipt of DSA 
PIC064 Benchmark - full-time first degree students who are in receipt of DSA 
PIC065 Number of full-time undergraduate students 
PIC066 Number of full-time undergraduate students who are in receipt of DSA 
PIC067 Percent of full-time undergraduate students who are in receipt of DSA 
PIC068 Benchmark - full-time undergraduate students who are in receipt of DSA 
PIC069 Number of part-time undergraduate students 
PIC070 Number of part-time undergraduate students who are in receipt of DSA 
PIC071 Percent of part-time undergraduate students who are in receipt of DSA 
PIC072 Benchmark - part-time undergraduate students who are in receipt of DSA 
Student-
Staff Ratios SSR001 Ratio by Institution 
HESA 
Finance 
UFI001 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Expenditure - Exceptional items 
UFI002 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Expenditure - Staff costs 
UFI003 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Expenditure - Other operating expenses 
UFI004 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Expenditure - Depreciation 
UFI005 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Expenditure - Interest & other finance costs 
UFI006 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Expenditure - Total Expenditure 
UFI007 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Income - Funding body grants 
UFI008 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Income - Tuition fees & education contracts 
UFI009 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Income - Research grants & contracts 
UFI010 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Income - Other income 
UFI011 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Income - Endowment & investment income 
UFI012 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Income - Total Income (group & share of joint venture(s)) 
UFI013 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Minority interest - Total 
UFI014 
Consolidated income and expenditure account - Note of group historical cost surpluses & 
deficits for the year ended 31 July - Surplus/(deficit) on continuing operations before 
taxation 
UFI015 
Consolidated income and expenditure account - Note of group historical cost surpluses & 
deficits for the year ended 31 July - Difference between historical cost depreciation & the 
actual charge for the year calculated on the re-valued amount 
UFI016 
Consolidated income and expenditure account - Note of group historical cost surpluses & 
deficits for the year ended 31 July - Realisation of property revaluation gains of previous 
years 
UFI017 
Consolidated income and expenditure account - Note of group historical cost surpluses & 
deficits for the year ended 31 July - Historical cost surplus/(deficit) for the year before 
taxation 
UFI018 
Consolidated income and expenditure account - Note of group historical cost surpluses & 
deficits for the year ended 31 July - Historical cost surplus/(deficit) for the year after 
taxation 
UFI019 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Surplus/(deficit) for the year retained within general reserves - Total 
UFI020 Consolidated income and expenditure account  - Taxation - Total 
UFI021 Consolidated income and expenditure account - Transfer from/(to) accumulated income in endowment funds - Total 
UFI022 Balance sheet - Creditors: Amounts falling due after more one year - Reimbursable to the Funding Council Balance as at 31 July 
UFI023 Balance sheet - Creditors: Amounts falling due after more one year - External borrowing Balance as at 31 July 
UFI024 Balance sheet - Creditors: Amounts falling due after more one year - Other Balance as at 31 July 





UFI026 Balance sheet - Creditors: Amounts falling due within one year - Creditors Balance as at 31 July current year 
UFI027 Balance sheet - Creditors: Amounts falling due within one year - Current portion of long-term liabilities Balance as at 31 July 
UFI028 Balance sheet - Creditors: Amounts falling due within one year - Bank overdrafts Balance as at 31 July 
UFI029 Balance sheet - Creditors: Amounts falling due within one year - Total Creditors Balance as at 31 July 
UFI030 Balance sheet - Current assets - Stock Balance as at 31 July 
UFI031 Balance sheet - Current assets - Debtors Balance as at 31 July 
UFI032 Balance sheet - Current assets - Investments Balance as at 31 July 
UFI033 Balance sheet - Current assets - Cash at bank & in hand Balance as at 31 July 
UFI034 Balance sheet - Current assets - Total Current Assets Balance as at 31 July 
UFI035 Balance sheet - Deferred capital grants - Balance as at 31 July 
UFI036 Balance sheet - Endowment Assets - Balance as at 31 July 
UFI037 Balance sheet - Endowments - Total Endowments Balance as at 31 July 
UFI038 Balance sheet - Fixed Assets - Tangible assets Balance as at 31 July 
UFI039 Balance sheet - Fixed Assets - Total Fixed Assets Balance as at 31 July 
UFI040 Balance sheet - Net assets including pension asset/(liability) - Balance as at 31 July 
UFI041 Balance sheet - Net current assets/(liabilities) - Balance as at 31 July 
UFI042 Balance sheet - Provisions for liabilities and charges - Balance as at 31 July 
UFI043 Balance sheet - Reserves - Income & expenditure account Balance as at 31 July 
UFI044 Balance sheet - Total assets less current liabilities - Balance as at 31 July 
UFI045 Balance sheet - Total funds - Balance as at 31 July 
UFI046 Cash flow statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Payments to acquire tangible assets Year ended 31 July 
UFI047 Cash flow statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Payments to acquire endowment asset investments Year ended 31 July 
UFI048 Cash flow statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Total payments to acquire fixed/endowment assets Year ended 31 July 
UFI049 Cash flow statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Receipts from sale of tangible assets Year ended 31 July 
UFI050 Cash flow statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Receipts from sale of endowment assets Year ended 31 July 
UFI051 Cash flow statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Deferred capital grants received Year ended 31 July 
UFI052 Cash flow statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Endowments received Year ended 31 July 
UFI053 Cash flow statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Other items Year ended 31 July 
UFI054 Cash flow statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Net cash inflow/(outflow) from capital expenditure & financial investment Year ended 31 July 
UFI055 Cash flow statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Capital element of finance lease repayments Year ended 31 July 
UFI056 Cash flow statement - Financing - Mortgages & loans acquired Year ended 31 July 
UFI057 Cash flow statement - Financing - Mortgage & loan capital repayments Year ended 31 July 
UFI058 Cash flow statement - Financing - Other items Year ended 31 July 
UFI059 Cash flow statement - Financing - Net cash inflow/(outflow) from financing Year ended 31 July 
UFI060 Cash flow statement - Increase/(decrease) in cash in the year - Year ended 31 July 
UFI061 Cash flow statement - Management of liquid resources - Year ended 31 July 
UFI062 Cash flow statement - Reconciliation of net cash flow movement in net funds/(debt) - Increase/(decrease) in cash in the year  ended 31 July 
UFI063 Cash flow statement - Reconciliation of net cash flow movement in net funds/(debt) - Net funds/(debt) at 1 August Year ended 31 July 
UFI064 Cash flow statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Income from endowments Year ended 31 July 





UFI066 Cash flow statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Other interest received Year ended 31 July 
UFI067 Cash flow statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Interest paid Year ended 31 July 
UFI068 Cash flow statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Other items Year ended 31 July 
UFI069 Cash flow statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Net cash inflow/(outflow) from returns on investments & servicing of finance Year ended 31 July 
UFI070 Cash flow statement - Taxation - Total 
UFI071 Tuition fees & education contracts analysed by domicile, mode, level & source - FE Course Fees - Total 
UFI072 Tuition fees & education contracts analysed by domicile, mode, level & source - Non-Credit bearing Course Fees - Total 
UFI073 Tuition fees & education contracts analysed by domicile, mode, level & source - Research Training Support Grants - Total research training support grants 
UFI074 Tuition fees & education contracts analysed by domicile, mode, level & source - Total Tuition Fees and Education Contracts - Total 
UFI075 Income analysed by source - Other Income - Residences & catering operations (including conferences) 
UFI076 Income analysed by source - Other Income - Grants from local authorities 
UFI077 Income analysed by source - Other Income - Income from health & hospital authorities (excluding teaching contracts for student provision) 
UFI078 Income analysed by source - Other Income - Release of deferred capital grants 
UFI079 Income analysed by source - Other Income - Income from intellectual property rights 
UFI080 Income analysed by source - Other Income - Other operating income 
UFI081 Income analysed by source - Other Income - Total Other Income 
UFI082 Income analysed by source - Total Income 
UFI083 Income analysed by source - Total Tuition Fees and Education Contracts - Total 
UFI084 Capital expenditure - Total Capital Expenditure - Total Actual Spend 
UFI085 Capital expenditure - Total Capital Expenditure - Funding Council grants 
UFI086 Capital expenditure - Total Capital Expenditure - Retained proceeds of sales 
UFI087 Capital expenditure - Total Capital Expenditure - Internal funds 
UFI088 Capital expenditure - Total Capital Expenditure - Loans 
UFI089 Capital expenditure - Total Capital Expenditure - Other external sources 
HESA - KFIs 
KFI001 1 - Total income in £000s 
KFI002 2 - Percentage ratio of total funding body grants to total income 
KFI003 3 - Percentage ratio of recurrent teaching grants from funding bodies for HE provision to total income 
KFI004 4 - Percentage ratio of recurrent research grants from funding bodies for HE provision to total income 
KFI005 5 - Percentage ratio of recurrent (other) grants from funding bodies for HE provision to total income 
KFI006 6 - Percentage ratio of total funding body grants for HE provision to total income 
KFI008 8 - Percentage ratio of tuition fees & education contracts to total income 
KFI009 9 - Percentage ratio of full-time home/European Union (EU) HE student fees to total income 
KFI010 10 - Percentage ratio of non-EU HE course fees to total income 
KFI011 11 - Percentage ratio of income from research grants & contracts to total income 
KFI012 12 - Percentage ratio of Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) research council grants & contracts to total income 
KFI014 14 - Percentage ratio of UK industry, commerce & public corporations research grants & contracts to total income 
KFI016 16 - Percentage ratio of EU research grants & contracts to total income 
KFI018 18 - Percentage ratio of other income to total income 
KFI019 19 - Percentage ratio of total endowment & investment income to total income 
KFI020 20 - Percentage ratio of contribution from research grants & contracts to research grants & contracts income 
KFI022 22a - Percentage ratio of historical surplus/(deficit) for the year after taxation to total income 
KFI024 23 - Ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
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HESA - KFIs 
KFI025 24 - Ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities 
KFI027 26a - Days ratio of net liquidity to total expenditure (excluding depreciation) 
KFI029 27a - Days ratio of total general funds to total expenditure 
KFI031 28 - Days of current income (excluding funding body grants for HE provision (SFC for all provision)) represented by debtors 
KFI032 29 - Percentage ratio of total long-term borrowings to total income 
KFI033 30a - Percentage ratio of total staff costs to total income 
KFI035 31 - Percentage ratio of total net cash inflow from operating activities to total income 
KFI036 32a - Gearing ratio 
KFI038 33a - Percentage ratio of premises repairs & maintenance to total expenditure 
KFI040 34a - Days ratio of total net cash inflow to total expenditure (excluding depreciation) 
KFI043 36 - Percentage ratio of interest & other finance costs to total income 
Staffing 
STA001 Number of academic staff (FPE) leavers (exc. atypical) who are Teaching only 
STA002 Number of academic staff (FPE) leavers (exc. atypical) who are Research only 
STA003 Number of academic staff (FPE) leavers (exc. atypical) who are Teaching & research 
STA004 Number of academic staff (FPE) leavers (exc. atypical) who are Neither teaching nor research 
STA042 Proportion of academic staff (FPE) leavers (exc. atypical) who are Teaching only 
STA043 Proportion of academic staff (FPE) leavers (exc. atypical) who are Research only 
STA044 Proportion of academic staff (FPE) leavers (exc. atypical) who are Teaching & research 
STA005 Number of academic staff (FPE) leavers (exc. atypical) who are Full-time 
STA006 Number of academic staff (FPE) leavers (exc. atypical) who are Part-time 
STA007 Proportion of all academic leavers (exc. atypical) who were in full-time employment 
STA008 Proportion of all academic leavers (exc. atypical) who were in part-time employment 
STA009 Number of academic staff (FPE) starters (exc. atypical) who are Teaching only 
STA010 Number of academic staff (FPE) starters (exc. atypical) who are Research only 
STA011 Number of academic staff (FPE) starters (exc. atypical) who are Teaching & research 
STA012 Number of academic staff (FPE) starters (exc. atypical) who are Neither teaching nor research 
STA045 Proportion of academic staff (FPE) starters (exc. atypical) who are Teaching only 
STA046 Proportion of academic staff (FPE) starters (exc. atypical) who are Research only 
STA047 Proportion of academic staff (FPE) starters (exc. atypical) who are Teaching & research 
STA013 Number of academic staff (FPE) starters (exc. atypical)who are Full-time 
STA014 Number of academic staff (FPE) starters (exc. atypical) who are Part-time 
STA015 Proportion of all academic starters (exc. atypical) who were in full-time employment 
STA016 Proportion of all academic starters (exc. atypical) who were in part-time employment 
STA055 Growth in number of academic staff (FPE - exc. atypical) who are Teaching only 
STA056 Growth in number of academic staff (FPE - exc. atypical) who are Research only 
STA057 Growth in number of academic staff (FPE - exc. atypical) who are Teaching & research 
STA058 Growth in number of academic staff (FPE - exc. atypical) who are Neither teaching nor research 
STA059 Growth in number of academic staff (FPE - exc. atypical) who are Full-time 
STA060 Growth in number of academic staff (FPE - exc. atypical) who are Part-time 
STA017 Number of staff (FTE) who are Teaching only 
STA018 Number of staff (FTE) who are Research only 
STA019 Number of staff (FTE) who are Teaching & research 
STA020 Number of staff (FTE) who are Neither teaching nor research 
STA021 Number of staff (FTE) who are Not applicable/Not required (Default code) 
STA048 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are Teaching only 
STA049 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are Research only 
STA050 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are Teaching & research 
STA051 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are Neither teaching nor research 
STA022 Number of staff (FTE) who are Non academic 
STA023 Number of staff (FTE) who are Academic 
STA052 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are Academic 




STA025 Number of staff (FTE) who are part-time 
STA026 Proportion of staff who are full-time 
STA027 Number of staff (FTE) who are of UK nationality 
STA028 Number of staff (FTE) who are of "Other EU" nationality 
STA029 Number of staff (FTE) who are of Non-EU nationality 
STA030 Number of staff (FTE) whose nationality is unknown 
STA053 Proportion of staff (FTE) whose nationality is known who are of UK nationality 
STA054 Proportion of staff (FTE) whose nationality is known who are of "Other-EU" nationality 
STA031 Number of staff (FTE) who are Wholly institutionally financed 
STA032 Number of staff (FTE) who are Principally financed by the institution 
STA033 Number of staff (FTE) who are Other sources of finance 
STA034 Number of staff (FTE) who are Not applicable/not required 
STA061 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are Wholly institutionally financed 
STA062 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are Principally financed by the institution 
STA063 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are Other sources of finance 
STA035 Number of staff (FTE) who are Open-ended/permanent 
STA036 Number of staff (FTE) who are Fixed-term contract 
STA037 Number of staff (FTE) who are Atypical 
STA064 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are Open-ended/permanent 
STA065 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are Fixed-term contract 
STA038 Number of staff (FTE) who are typical 
STA039 Number of staff (FTE) who are Atypical 
STA066 Proportion of staff (FTE) who are typical 
Students 
STU001 Total FTE Student Instance Count 
STU005 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are 17 and under 
STU006 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are 18-20 years 
STU007 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are 21-24 years 
STU008 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are 25-29 years 
STU009 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are 30 and over 
STU010 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Age unknown 
STU011 Proportion of all students whose age is known who are aged 17 and under 
STU012 Proportion of all students whose age is known who are aged 18 - 20 years 
STU013 Proportion of all students whose age is known who are aged 21 - 24 years 
STU014 Proportion of all students whose age is known who are aged 25 - 29 years 
STU016 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are First class honours 
STU017 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Upper second class honours 
STU018 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Lower second class honours 
STU019 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Third class honours / Pass 
STU020 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Unclassified 
STU021 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Classification not applicable 
STU022 Proportion of all FPE HE Student Qualifiers who achieve a First Class Honours degree (out of all applicable degrees) 
STU023 Proportion of all FPE HE Student Qualifiers who achieve an Upper Second Class Honours degree (out of all applicable degrees) 
STU024 Proportion of all FPE HE Student Qualifiers who achieve a Lower Second Class Honours degree (out of all applicable degrees) 
STU025 Proportion of all FPE HE Student Qualifiers who achieve a Third Class Honours degree (out of all applicable degrees) 
STU027 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Known to be disabled 
STU028 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are No known disability 
STU029 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Not known/sought 
STU030 Proportion with disability status known who are disabled 
STU031 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are United Kingdom 
STU032 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Other European Union 
STU033 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Non-European-Union 




STU035 Proportion of HE Student Qualifiers (FPE) who are domiciled in the EU 
STU037 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are White 
STU038 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Black and Minority Ethnic 
STU039 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Not known 
STU040 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Non-UK domicile 
STU041 Proportion of HE student qualifiers (FPE) whose ethnicity known and is White (UK) 
STU042 Proportion of HE student qualifiers (FPE) whose ethnicity known and is BME (UK) 
STU044 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are female 
STU045 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are male 
STU046 Proportion of HE student qualifiers (FPE) whose sex is determinate and who are male 
STU048 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are UK 
STU049 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Other EU 
STU050 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Non-EU 
STU051 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Unknown 
STU052 Proportion of HE student qualifiers (FPE) whose nationality is known and who are from the UK 
STU053 Proportion of HE student qualifiers (FPE) whose nationality is known and who are from the Other EU 
STU055 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Full-time 
STU056 Number of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are Part-time 
STU057 Proportion of HE student qualifiers (FPE) who are full-time 
STU059 Number of HE students (FPE) who are 18 and under 
STU060 Number of HE students (FPE) who are 19 years 
STU061 Number of HE students (FPE) who are 20 years 
STU062 Number of HE students (FPE) who are 21 - 24 
STU063 Number of HE students (FPE) who are 25 - 29 
STU064 Number of HE students (FPE) who are 30 and over 
STU065 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Age unknown 
STU066 Proportion of HE students whose age is known who are aged 18 and under 
STU067 Proportion of HE students whose age is known who are aged 19 years 
STU068 Proportion of HE students whose age is known who are aged 20 years 
STU069 Proportion of HE students whose age is known who are aged 21 - 24 years 
STU070 Proportion of HE students whose age is known who are aged 25 - 29 years 
STU072 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Known to be disabled 
STU073 Number of HE students (FPE) who are No known disability 
STU074 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Not known/sought 
STU075 Proportion of HE students (FPE) who disability status is known and who are disabled 
STU076 Number of HE students (FPE) who are UK domiciles 
STU077 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Other European Union domiciles 
STU078 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Non-European-Union  domiciles 
STU079 Proportion of HE students (FPE) who are UK domiciles 
STU080 Proportion of HE students (FPE) who are Other European Union domiciles 
STU082 Number of HE students (FPE) who are White 
STU083 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Black and Minority Ethnic 
STU084 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Not known 
STU085 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Non-UK domicile 
STU086 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose ethnicity is known and who are White 
STU087 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose ethnicity is known and who are Black and Minority Ethnic 
STU089 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Eligible to pay home fees 
STU090 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Not eligible to pay home fees 
STU091 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Eligibility to pay home fees not assessed 
STU092 Number of HE students (FPE) who are First year students 
STU093 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Non-first year students 
STU094 Number of HE student (FPE) who are Female 




STU096 Proportion of HE student (FPE) whose sex is determined and who are Male 
STU097 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Postgraduate (research) students 
STU098 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Postgraduate (taught) students 
STU099 Number of HE students (FPE) who are First degree students 
STU100 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Other undergraduate students 
STU101 Proportion of HE students (FPE) who are Postgraduate (research) students 
STU102 Proportion of HE students (FPE) who are Postgraduate (taught) students 
STU103 Proportion of HE students (FPE) who are First degree students 
STU108 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "No award or financial backing" funded 
STU109 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "UK LEA mandatory/discretionary awards" funded 
STU110 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "Institutionally waived/award" funded 
STU111 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "Research councils and British Academy" funded 
STU112 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "Charities and international agencies" funded 
STU113 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "UK central govt/local, health, employment and agriculture authorities/bodies" funded 
STU114 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "EU sources" funded 
STU115 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "Other overseas sources" funded 
STU116 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "UK industry/commerce and students employer" funded 
STU117 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "Absent/no fees" funded 
STU118 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "Not known/Other" funded 
STU119 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose funding method is known and who are "No award or financial backing" funded 
STU120 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose funding method is known and who are "UK LEA mandatory/discretionary awards" funded 
STU121 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose funding method is known and who are "Institutionally waived/award" funded 
STU122 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose funding method is known and who are "Research councils and British Academy" funded 
STU123 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose funding method is known and who are "Charities and international agencies" funded 
STU124 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose funding method is known and who are "UK central govt/local, health, employment and agriculture authorities/bodies" funded 
STU125 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose funding method is known and who are "EU sources" funded 
STU126 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose funding method is known and who are "Other overseas sources" funded 
STU127 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose funding method is known and who are "UK industry/commerce and students employer" funded 
STU129 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Full-time 
STU130 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Part-time 
STU131 Proportion of HE students (FPE) who are Full-time 
STU132 Number of HE students (FPE) who are UK nationals 
STU133 Number of HE students (FPE) who are "Other-EU" nationals 
STU134 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Non-EU nationals 
STU135 Number of HE students (FPE) whose nationality is unknown 
STU136 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose nationality is known who are UK nationals 
STU137 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose nationality is known who are "Other-EU" nationals 
STU139 Number of HE students (FPE) who are in their Foundation year 
STU140 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Year 1 
STU141 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Year 2 
STU142 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Year 3 
STU143 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Year 4 
STU144 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Year 5 
STU145 Number of HE students (FPE) who are Year 6+ 
STU146 Number of HE students (FPE) whose year of study is unknown 




STU148 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose year of study is known and who are Year 1 
STU149 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose year of study is known and who are Year 2 
STU150 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose year of study is known and who are Year 3 
STU151 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose year of study is known and who are Year 4 
STU152 Proportion of HE students (FPE) whose year of study is known and who are Year 5 
STU154 Number of HE students (FTE) who are aged 18 and under 
STU155 Number of HE students (FTE) who are aged 19 years 
STU156 Number of HE students (FTE) who are aged 20 years 
STU157 Number of HE students (FTE) who are aged 21 - 24 
STU158 Number of HE students (FTE) who are aged 25 - 29 
STU159 Number of HE students (FTE) who are aged 30 and over 
STU160 Number of HE students (FTE) whose age is unknown 
STU161 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose age is known and who are aged  18 and under 
STU162 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose age is known and who are aged  19 years 
STU163 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose age is known and who are aged  20 years 
STU164 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose age is known and who are aged  21 - 24 
STU165 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose age is known and who are aged  25 - 29 
STU167 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Known to be disabled 
STU168 Number of HE students (FTE) who are No known disability 
STU169 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Not known/sought 
STU170 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose disability status is known and who are disabled 
STU171 Number of HE students (FTE) who are UK domiciles 
STU172 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "Other European Union" domiciles 
STU173 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Non-European-Union domiciles 
STU174 Proportion of HE students (FTE) who are UK domiciles 
STU175 Proportion of HE students (FTE) who are "Other European Union" domiciles 
STU177 Number of HE students (FTE) who are White 
STU178 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Black and Minority Ethnic 
STU179 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Not known 
STU180 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Non-UK domicile 
STU181 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose ethnicity is known and who are White 
STU182 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose ethnicity is known and who are Black and Minority Ethnic 
STU184 Number of HE students (FTE) who are eligible to pay home fees 
STU185 Number of HE students (FTE) who are not eligible to pay home fees 
STU186 Number of HE students (FTE) whose eligibility to pay home fees has not been assessed 
STU187 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose eligibility to pay home fees has been assessed and who are eligible to pay home fees 
STU189 Number of HE students (FTE) who are first year students 
STU190 Number of HE students (FTE) who are non-first year students 
STU191 Proportion of HE students (FTE) who are first year students 
STU192 Number of HE students (FTE) who are female 
STU193 Number of HE students (FTE) who are male 
STU194 Proportion of HE students (FTE) who are male 
STU195 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Postgraduate (research) students 
STU196 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Postgraduate (taught) students 
STU197 Number of HE students (FTE) who are First degree students 
STU198 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Other undergraduate students 
STU199 Proportion of HE students (FTE) who are Postgraduate (research) students 
STU200 Proportion of HE students (FTE) who are Postgraduate (taught) students 
STU201 Proportion of HE students (FTE) who are First degree students 
STU206 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "No award or financial backing" funded 
STU207 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "UK LEA mandatory/discretionary awards" funded 
STU208 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "Institutionally waived/award" funded 
STU209 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "Research councils and British Academy" funded 




STU211 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "UK central govt/local, health, employment and agriculture authorities/bodies" funded 
STU212 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "EU sources" funded 
STU213 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "Other overseas sources" funded 
STU214 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "UK industry/commerce and students employer" funded 
STU215 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "Absent/no fees" funded 
STU216 Number of HE students (FTE) who are "Not known/Other" funded 
STU217 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose funding method is known and who are "No award or financial backing" funded 
STU218 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose funding method is known and who are "UK LEA mandatory/discretionary awards" funded 
STU219 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose funding method is known and who are "Institutionally waived/award" funded 
STU220 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose funding method is known and who are "Research councils and British Academy" funded 
STU221 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose funding method is known and who are "Charities and international agencies" funded 
STU222 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose funding method is known and who are "UK central govt/local, health, employment and agriculture authorities/bodies" funded 
STU223 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose funding method is known and who are "EU sources" funded 
STU224 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose funding method is known and who are "Other overseas sources" funded 
STU225 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose funding method is known and who are "UK industry/commerce and students employer" funded 
STU230 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Full-time 
STU231 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Sandwich 
STU232 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Part-time 
STU233 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Writing up 
STU234 Proportion of HE students (FTE) who are not on sabbatical who are Full-time 
STU235 Proportion of HE students (FTE) who are not on sabbatical who are Sandwich 
STU236 Proportion of HE students (FTE) who are not on sabbatical who are Part-time 
STU238 Number of HE students (FTE) who are UK nationals 
STU239 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Other EU nationals 
STU240 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Non-EU nationals 
STU241 Number of HE students (FTE) whose nationality is unknown 
STU242 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose nationality is known and who are UK nationals 
STU243 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose nationality is known and who are Other EU nationals 
STU245 Number of HE students (FTE) who are in their foundation year 
STU246 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Year 1 
STU247 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Year 2 
STU248 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Year 3 
STU249 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Year 4 
STU250 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Year 5 
STU251 Number of HE students (FTE) who are Year 6+ 
STU252 Number of HE students (FTE) who study year is unknown 
STU253 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose year of study is known and who are in their foundation year 
STU254 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose year of study is known and who are Year 1 
STU255 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose year of study is known and who are Year 2 
STU256 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose year of study is known and who are Year 3 
STU257 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose year of study is known and who are Year 4 
STU258 Proportion of HE students (FTE) whose year of study is known and who are Year 5 
Contextual 
Indicators 
RDAP Does the provider have Research Degree Awarding Powers 
FDAP Does the provider have Foundation Degree Awarding Powers 
TDAP Does the provider have Taught Degree Awarding Powers 






AOR002 Number of transnational Postgraduate taught students 
AOR003 Number of transnational First degree students 
AOR004 Number of transnational Other undergraduate students 
AOR005 Number of transnational Further education students 
AOR006 Total number of transnational students 
AOR007 Number of transnational students located within the EU 
AOR008 Number of transnational students located outside of the EU 
AOR009 Number of transnational students educated by Overseas campus of reporting HEI 
AOR010 Number of transnational students educated by Other arrangement including collaborative provision 
AOR011 Number of transnational students educated by Distance, flexible or distributed learning 
AOR012 Number of transnational students educated by Overseas partner organisation 




PRV001 Outcome of previous review 
PRV003 Has ever received a negative review (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
PRV004 Outcome of previous comparable review 
NSS 
NSS001 Q1 - Staff are good at explaining things 
NSS002 Q2 - Staff have made the subject interesting 
NSS003 Q3 - Staff are enthusiastic about what they are teaching 
NSS004 Q4 - The course is intellectually stimulating 
NSS005 Q5 - The criteria used in marking have been clear in advance 
NSS006 Q6 - Assessment arrangements & marking have been fair 
NSS007 Q7 - Feedback on my work has been prompt 
NSS008 Q8 - I have received detailed comments on my work 
NSS009 Q9 - Feedback on my work has helped me clarify things I did not understand 
NSS010 Q10 - I have received sufficient advice & support with my studies 
NSS011 Q11 - I have been able to contact staff when I needed to 
NSS012 Q12 - Good advice was available when I needed to make study choices 
NSS013 Q13 - The timetable works efficiently as far as my activities are concerned 
NSS014 Q14 - Any changes in the course or teaching have been communicated effectively 
NSS015 Q15 - The course is well organised & is running smoothly 
NSS016 Q16 - The library resources & services are good enough for my needs 
NSS017 Q17 - I have been able to access general IT resources when I needed to 
NSS018 Q18 - I have been able to access specialised equipment, facilities or room when I needed to 
NSS019 Q19 - The course has helped me present myself with confidence 
NSS020 Q20 - My communication skills have improved 
NSS021 Q21 - As a result of the course, I feel confident in tackling unfamiliar problems 
NSS022 Q22 - Overall satisfaction 
QAA 
Concerns 
CON001 Count of QAA concerns raised, upheld or otherwise, since previous review 
CON002 Count of QAA concerns raised which do not relate to quality, standards, information or enhancement (and are therefore automatically invalid) 
CON003 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to academic standards 
CON004 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to the quality of learning opportunities 
CON005 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to the provision of information 
CON006 Count of QAA concerns not upheld since previous review which relate to academic standards 
CON007 Count of QAA concerns not upheld since previous review which relate to the quality of learning opportunities 
CON008 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review 
CON009 Count of QAA concerns not upheld since previous review which relate to the quality of learning opportunities 
Table 5.10: The set of 754 metrics used in the HEI study prior to change-over-time and benchmarking 
calculations being added.  
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6. Predicting the Outcome of FEC Reviews 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine which metrics, if any, could have predicted the 
outcome of past QAA reviews of further education colleges (FECs), and how accurately they could 
have done so. To do so most effectively and comprehensively two separate questions are 
explored: 
1. Using naturally-complete metrics, could the outcome of QAA FEC reviews have 
been successfully predicted? 
2. Using naturally-complete metrics standardised for each year, could the outcome of 
QAA FEC reviews have been successfully predicted? 
As detailed in the earlier methods chapter, imputation would not benefit the FEC analysis and so 
is not considered here. The chapter begins with an overview of the HE in FE sector and its unique 
challenges, followed by a step-by-step description of the two analyses, which is in turn followed 
by a short discussion of the findings.  
 
6.1. Introduction 
Further education colleges do not have the power to award undergraduate or postgraduate 
degrees. Instead, they deliver higher education in one of four ways: 
• Validation – a partnership arrangement where a degree-awarding body judges that a 
course designed and delivered by an FEC meets the requirements for a degree. 
Successful completion of the course results in an award from the validating body. 
• Franchise arrangements – a partnership arrangement where a course designed by a 
degree-awarding body is delivered by the partner FEC. Successful completion of the 
course results in an award from the degree-awarding body.  
• Higher National Certificates and Diplomas (HNCs and HNDs) – FECs teach qualifications 
designed and awarded by Edexcel/Pearson equivalent to the first and second year of an 
undergraduate degree respectively. 
• Foundation Degree Awarding Powers – at the time of writing four UK colleges have been 
granted the right to award their own foundation degrees: degrees developed in 
association with employers that are equivalent to two thirds of a full honours 




As the number of students at alternative providers has rocketed and the number at HEIs has 
continued to increase, student numbers in FECs have at best remained steady (AoC, 2013, 2014). 
This is in part a reflection of the localised, vocational nature of the majority of higher education 
provided by further education colleges (HE in FE) (Parry et al., 2012). Regardless, HE in FE is 
provided by 254 colleges, more than the 163 traditional HEIs, and covered some 144,000 students 
in 2014/15 (HESA, 2015; AoC, 2014).  Therefore, whilst the impact of quality in failures is small 
relative to HEIs, both in terms of the number of students affected and the reputation to the sector 
as a whole, it is still substantial in absolute terms.  
The HE in FE sector shares characteristics with both the HEI and alternative provider sector. HE in 
FE providers are not-for-profit organisations required to report some student and finance data, 
although only a fraction of what is required of HEIs, to national funding councils and have, until 
recently, had limited incidents of ‘unsatisfactory’ quality assurance. As with alternative providers, 
the majority of HE in FE is delivered by organisations dwarfed in size by HEIs. HE in FE is unique 
however in that its delivery is not the main objective of the provider.   
 
6.2. Results – Non-Standardised Metrics 
Using only naturally-complete metrics, could the outcome of QAA FEC reviews have been 
successfully predicted? 
The first FEC analysis examines which metrics, including change-over-time variants, with no 
missing values prior to each review could have predicted the outcome of those reviews. 
6.2.1. Initial Data Exploration 
To begin with a univariate analysis was run for each of the 248 metrics to determine their 
individual ability to predict the outcome of the reviews. By chance alone we would expect to see 
248 x 0.05 = 12.4 and 248 x 0.25 = 62 significant metrics at the p < 0.05 and p < 0.25 levels 
respectively. This is very close to the 14 and 63 metrics found to be significant at these respective 







Metric Code Metric Description P-value 
FIN052_Ca1 The one-year change in net cash inflow/(outflow) from operating activities 0.004 
FIN092_Ca1 The one-year change in cash generated from operations to income 0.007 
FIN118_Abs The average number of student learners per total non-teaching staff 0.012 
FIN105_Abs Dependency on higher education income 0.019 
FIN100_Ca1 The one-year change in adjusted operating position (£'000) 0.025 
FIN103_Cp1 The one-year percentage change in available reserves as a percentage of income 0.026 
FIN103_Ca1 The one-year change in available reserves as a percentage of income 0.030 
FIN056_Abs Net cash inflow/(outflow) from returns on investments and servicing of finance 0.031 
FIN107_Abs Contribution to income from "other" income generating activities 0.033 
FIN107_Ca1 The one-year change in the contribution to income from "other" income generating activities 0.034 
FIN010_Ca1 The one-year change in interest and other finance costs 0.037 
LEV003_Abs Number of HE students whose level of study is 'First degree' 0.045 
LEV009_Ca1 The one-year change in the number of HE students whose level of study is 'HND' 0.046 
FIN083_Cp1 The one-year percentage change in total net debt 0.047 
Table 6.1: All metrics from the naturally-complete FEC data set with a univariate p-value < 0.05. 
The majority of significant metrics are finance related and, reassuringly, could feasibly influence 
the amount of resource FECs focus on quality assurance.  
Examining the metric with the lowest p-value, the one-year change in net cash inflow/(outflow) 
from operating activities, it is apparent that FECs that had a reduction in net cash flow from their 
operating activities were subsequently more likely to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ in their QAA 
review.  
 
Figure 6.1: A plot of the ‘one-year change in net cash inflow/(outflow) from operating activities’ prior to 
each review and the outcome of that review. 
Once again it is clear that the metric has some value. A number of ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs are 
amongst those with the greatest reduction in net cash flow from their operating activities. 
However, there certainly isn’t a definitive relationship between a large reduction in net cash flow 
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from operating activities and an FEC subsequently being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. There are a large 
number of FECs that were judged ‘satisfactory’ amongst the ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs that saw a 
decrease in their net cash flow from their operating activities. Moreover, there are a number of 
‘unsatisfactory’ FECs whose performance on the metric was at or above average. 
Figure 6.2 below indicates that there is a pattern for those FECs where higher education makes up 
a smaller proportion of their income, to be more likely to be found ‘unsatisfactory’. Intuitively one 
can foresee that FECs where higher education is proportionally less important will be less likely, 
or less able, to dedicate the necessary resource to its quality assurance. Once more though the 
‘unsatisfactory’ FECs are spread amongst a larger number of ‘satisfactory’ FECs. The metric does 
however effectively predict that those FECs for which higher education makes up a substantial 
proportion of their income will be ‘satisfactory’. 
 
Figure 6.2: A plot of the ‘income dependency on higher education income’ prior to each review and the 
outcome of that review. 
The obvious explanation for the prevalence of finance metrics exhibiting a strong relationship with 
the outcome of QAA FEC reviews, other than the prevalence of finance metrics in the data set, is 
that having ‘satisfactory’ quality assurance in place takes resource. If FECs are short on resource, 
then quality assurance activity will suffer. Another possible explanation is that the finance metrics 
are confounding with time. FEC budgets have come under considerable pressure in recent years 
(Kewin and Janowski, 2014; Wolf, 2015) which has coincided with the introduction of the more 
challenging HER methodology for FECs by the QAA (QAA, 2011a, 2014c). At the same time, as 
shown below in Figure 6.3, there has been a marked increase in ‘unsatisfactory’ judgements at 
FECs. The extent to which funding cuts or methodology changes are responsible for this increase 
in the ‘unsatisfactory’ performance of FECs is unclear. The impact of the sector-wide shifts over 
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time are minimised in the second analysis in this chapter in which metrics are standardised in-
year. 
 
Figure 6.3: The number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews of FECs by year. 
Two metrics of interest for which the interpretation of the p-value is less straightforward due to 
their categorical nature are OFS001 – Ofsted rating at the time of the QAA review and PRV004 - 
Outcome of previous comparable QAA review shown below in Figures 6.4 and 6.5 respectively.  
Ofsted reviews assess all provision, higher education or otherwise, at FECs and so, despite the 
small proportion of overall provision that higher education constitutes for most colleges, one 
might reasonably expect a strong relationship between Ofsted and QAA review outcomes. 
However, an FEC’s Ofsted rating at the time of their review was not a significant predictor of the 
outcome of their QAA review. Approximately the same proportion of FECs with each Ofsted rating 
went on to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ by the QAA, albeit a little higher for those deemed to 
‘require improvement’ and irrelevant for those deemed ‘inadequate’ as low numbers – two - 





Figure 6.4: Values of OFS001 - Ofsted rating at the time of the QAA review and the subsequent QAA review 
outcome. 
The ‘no previous comparable review’ category of the PRV004 - Outcome of previous comparable 
QAA review metric did have a significant p-value of 0.0329; however, this was because FECs that 
had never received a comparable QAA review were far less likely to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ 
than FECs that had had a previous comparable review, regardless of its finding. This could simply 
be chance or an affectation of the cyclical nature of QAA reviews. Those who have had a previous 
review have simply ‘had their turn’ again recently facing the tougher HER approach and were 
therefore more likely to be found ‘unsatisfactory’. 
 
Figure 6.5: Values of PRV004 - Outcome of previous comparable QAA review and the subsequent QAA 
review outcome. 
Again, the exploratory analysis of individual metrics is not reassuring. There were no more metrics 
with p-values of less than 0.05 or 0.25 than we would expect to see by chance alone. Moreover, 
these metrics exhibited a pattern familiar from the previous HEI chapter: a high proportion, but 
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not all, of the ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews were towards one end of the overall distribution, but spread 
amongst a large number of ‘satisfactory’ reviews. Those metrics one would likely have selected a 
priori, such as the outcome of Ofsted inspections or the outcome of previous QAA reviews appear 
to be of limited use in isolation. The next stage is to explore whether these metrics can be 
combined to form a useful overall model for prioritising reviews as part of a data-driven, risk-
based approach to quality assurance.  
6.2.2. Fitting the Model 
The first stage is to develop the elastic net model. Running the elastic net procedure we obtain 
the diagnostic plots shown below in Figure 6.6. The λmin model is again preferred to the λ1se 
model as it is more acurate and in this case simpler too. 
 
Figure 6.6: The diagnostic plots for the λ1se (left) and λmin (right) model for the non-standardised FEC data. 
The λmin model contains three metrics: 
• PRV004 – the outcome of previous comparable QAA review.  
• FIN107_Abs - the contribution from ‘other’ income generating activities. That is, non-
educational income generating activities not classed as farming , catering, residences, 
and conferences. 




As the PRV004 – the outcome of previous comparable QAA review metric has three possile values 
(FECs can have previously been reviewed and had a positive or negative outcome or they can have 
not been previously reviewed), one category – having previously received a negative review – is 
treated as the baseline and the model has two separate terms to account for the other 
eventualities. Specifically the model calculates the probability of an FEC receiving an 
‘unsatisfactory’ review using these three metrics as follows: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃)+(0.16×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)+(−0.00008×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁107_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)+(0.14×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁103_𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝1))1 + 𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃)+(0.16×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)+(−0.00008×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁107_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)+(0.14×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁103_𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝1)) 
Where:  
   PRV004.NPV = 1 if the FEC has had no previous comparable review, 0 otherwise 
   PRV004.POS = 1 if the FEC has had a positive previous comparable review, 0 otherwise 
As the coefficient is positive for the FIN103_Cp1 – the one-year percentage change in available 
reserves as a percentage of income metric, an increase in an FEC’s available reserves as a 
percentage of income, i.e. the amount they are relying on savings to run their day-to-day 
operations, will increase their predicted likelihood of being found ‘unsatisfactory’. This could 
conceivably be a valid predictor of quality assurance review findings; those growing more reliant 
on reserve income will likely be looking to cut costs which could impact on their quality assurance 
activities. Moreover, they could feasibly already be suffering from a fall in student numbers 
because of their declining quality that their ‘unsatisfactory’ quality assurance processes have 
failed to halt. 
As the coeffecient for the FIN107_Abs - the contribution from ‘other’ income generating activities 
metric is negative, the lower the contribution from ‘other’ income generating activities, the 
greater the predicted likelihood of being found ‘unsatisfactory’. As FIN017_Abs is in absolute 
metric, it will make no difference how much this value has changed since the previous year or 
what percentage of of income generating activities are categorised as ‘other’ – only the absolute 
size of the income generated which has been categorised as ‘other’. It is hard to see any obvious 
meaningful connection between ‘other’ income generating activities and the outcome of quality 
assurance reviews.  
An FEC that has a positive previous comparable QAA review will, somewhat counterintuitively, see 
its predicted likelihood of being found ‘unsatisfactory’ increase whilst the oppostive is true for an 
FEC with no previous comparable review. As discussed earlier, this is likely to be a proxy for the 
timing of the review and thus whether or not the organisation has undergone a tougher HER 
review. There is however also the possibility that FECs previously judged ‘satisfactory’ may be 
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more likely to become complacent with regards their quality assurance processes in contrast to 
those FECs that have previously been found ‘unsatisfactory’ and therefore are focusing on 
improvement. 
6.2.2.1. A Worked Exploration of the Model 
To better understand the effect of changes in performance for each metric contained in the model 
we can consider three hyopthetical FECs whose performance, and the resulting predicted 
probability of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’, are detailed below. 
First, if we consider three hypothetical FECs all of which had neither generated nor lost ‘other’ 
income in the most recent financial year and had no change in the percentage of their income that 
derived from available reserves such that FIN107_Abs = 0 and FIN103_Cp1 = 0 for all three. 
Furthermore, FEC A has had a previous review which resulted in an ‘unsatisfactory’ judgement, 
FEC B has had no previous review, and FEC C has had a previous review which resulted in a 
‘satisfactory’ judgement. Their performance and the resulting predicted likelihood of being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ can be seen below in Table 6.2: 
FEC PRV004.NPV PRV004.POS Predicted Probability of ‘Unsatisfactory’ Judgement 
A 0 0 𝑒𝑒
(−1.67 + (−0.38×0)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×35)+(−0.14×0))1 + 𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×0)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×35)+(−0.14×0)) =  15.80% 
B 1 0 𝑒𝑒
(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×35)+(−0.14×0))1 +  𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×35)+(−0.14×0)) = 11.38% 
C 0 1 𝑒𝑒
(−1.67 + (−0.38×0)+(0.16×1)+(−0.00008×35)+(−0.14×0))1 +  𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×0)+(0.16×1)+(−0.00008×35)+(−0.14×0)) = 18.05% 
Table 6.2: The predicted likelihoods of hypothetical FECs being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. 
Having previously had a postive QAA review gives FEC C the highest predicted likelihood of being 
unsatisfactory (18.05%), FEC A has the second highest predicted probability of being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ (15.80%) having previously had a negative QAA review, and finally FEC B which 
has never had a QAA review has the lowest predicted probability of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ 
(11.38%). 
Second, we consider three FECs each of which has had no previous comparable QAA review and 
had no change in the percentage of their income that derived from available reserves such that 
PRV004.NPV = 1, PRV004.POS = 0, and FIN103_Cp1 = 0 for all three. Furthermore, FEC A has an 
average contribution from ‘other’ income generating activities of £35,000, FEC B has income from 
‘other’ contributions of £5,000,000 (towards the maximum in the data set), and FEC C has a loss 
of £5,000,000 from ‘other’ activities (towards the maximum in the data set). Their performance 
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and the resulting predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ can be seen below in Table 
6.3: 
FEC FIN107_Abs Predicted Probability of ‘Unsatisfactory’ Judgement 
A 35 𝑒𝑒
(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×35)+(−0.14×0))1 +  𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×35)+(−0.14×0)) = 11.38% 
B 5,000 𝑒𝑒
(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×5000)+(−0.14×0))1 + 𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×5000)+(−0.14×0)) = 7.94% 
C -5,000 𝑒𝑒
(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×−5000)+(−0.14×0))1 +  𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×−5000)+(−0.14×0)) = 16.11% 
Table 6.3: The predicted likelihoods of hypothetical FECs being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. 
Using some of the more extreme entries in the data set the FIN017_Abs metric has a slightly 
greater impact than an FECs previous QAA review activity.  
Third, we consider three FECs each of which has had no previous comparable QAA review and 
neither lost nor generated ‘other’ income such that PRV004.NPV = 1, PRV004.POS = 0, and 
FIN107_Abs = 0 for all three. Furthermore, FEC A has an average one-year change in available 
reserves as a percentage of income of 13.26% while FEC B and FEC C have changes of -100% and 
100%, towards the extremes of entries in the data set, respectively. Their performance and the 
resulting predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ can be seen below in Table 6.4: 
FEC FIN103_Cp1 Predicted Probability of ‘Unsatisfactory’ Judgement 
A 13.26% 𝑒𝑒
(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×0)+(0.14×0.1326))1 + 𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×0)+(0.14×0.1326)) = 11.22% 
B -100.00% 𝑒𝑒
(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×0)+(0.14×−1))1 +  𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×0)+(0.14×−1)) = 10.07% 
C 100.00% 𝑒𝑒
(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×0)+(0.14×1))
1+ 𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×1)+(0.16×0)+(−0.00008×0)+(0.14×1)) = 12.90% 
Table 6.4: The predicted likelihoods of hypothetical FECs being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. 
The impact of the metric when considered in isolation and with extreme values is less than for the 
other two metrics contained in the model. 
By combining the three hypothetical FECs performance when the metrics were allowed to vary we 





FEC PRV004.NPV PRV004.POS FIN107_Abs FIN103_cp1 Predicted Probability of ‘Unsatisfactory’ Judgement 
A 0 0 35 13.26% 15.56% 
B 1 0 5,000 -100.00% 6.98% 
C 0 1 -5,000 100.00% 27.49% 
Table 6.5: The predicted likelihoods of hypothetical FECs being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. 
FEC B, performing in a manner that leads to each metric in the model lowering its predicted 
probability of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ has a predicted probability of being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ of 6.98%. FEC C, performing in a manner that leads to each metric raising its 
predicted probability of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ has a predicted probability of being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ of 27.49% - 3.94 times greater than FEC B. 
As with the metrics considered in isolation, it is clear that the effects of changes in performance 
on the predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ can be substantial in relative terms, 
but is still fairly limited in absolute terms. The narrow range of predicted probabilities once more 
suggests that the model will have a high error rate and, as with the HEI model, is indicative of the 
lack of a strong relationship between the metrics and QAA review outcomes. The fact that the 
model cannot identify which FECs will or will not be found ‘unsatisfactory’ with any degree of 
certainty has again resulted in the predicted likelihoods of the event occuring clustering close to 
the probability of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ regardless of the data, in this instance 20 ÷ 131 = 
15.27%. That is, all FECs will be predicted to be more or less equally likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ 
regardless of thei performance.  
6.2.3. Evaluating the Model 
6.2.3.1. Testing the Fit of the Model 
Figure 6.7 below shows the ROC curve for this model when applied to the data used to develop it. 
The fairly impressive ‘area under the curve’ value of 0.854 suggests a reasonable rate of 





Figure 6.7: The ROC curve for the FEC model featuring the non-standardised metrics PRV004, FIN107_Abs 
and FIN103_Cp1. 
Table 6.6 and Figure 6.8 below show in greater detail the effect of lowering the threshold required 
to trigger a review. The model’s performance appears an improvement on what was achieved for 
HEIs. The first five ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews could have been prioritised without any ‘satisfactory’ 
reviews being incorrectly prompted and, at the optimal cuf-off point (statistically speaking), 17 
‘unsatisfactory’ reviews (three short of the total of 20) could have been prioritised with only 27 
‘satisfactory’ reviews being incorrectly prioritised. To have prioritised all ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews 
102 reviews would have been required – an error rate of 82 / (20 + 82) = 80.39% amongst those 
FECs prioritised for review. This is an improvement on the error rate of 88.79% obtained for HEIs 
when the one hard-to-predict ‘unsatisfactory’ review was discounted; however, it is still means 
more than four in five FECs prioritised for review by the model would have been judged 
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45.05% 1 0 0.85 
28.81% 2 0 0.86 
25.10% 3 0 0.87 
23.09% 4 0 0.88 
20.49% 5 0 0.89 
18.70% 6 3 0.87 
18.48% 7 5 0.86 
18.45% 8 8 0.85 
18.39% 9 9 0.85 
18.36% 10 9 0.85 
18.35% 11 9 0.86 
18.24% 12 15 0.82 
18.22% 13 16 0.82 
18.18% 14 16 0.83 
18.16% 15 16 0.84 
18.02% 16 27 0.76 
18.01% 17 27 0.77 
17.85% 18 34 0.73 
15.77% 19 49 0.62 
11.39% 20 82 0.37 
Table 6.6: The number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ FEC reviews that would have resulted from 
decreasing the threshold required to prompt a review using the λmin model.  
It is clear from Figure 6.8 there is an initial cluster of succesful predictions followed by an area of 
reasonable success before the number of incorrectly prioritsed ‘satisfactory’ reviews begins to 
increase. It appears there is a set of characteristics shared by the majority – although certainly not 
all – ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs, along with a greater number of ‘satisfactory’ FECs. As noted in the 
earlier worked example of the model, there is a narrow range of predicted probabilities which 
contributes to a high error rate. No FEC is predicted to be ‘unsatisfactory’ with a probability 




Figure 6.8: Predicted probabilities for each of the 131 complete, comparable reviews and their actual 
outcome. 
Setting aside the narrow range of predicted probabilities and focusing on the ordering of reviews, 
the model, at first, does a reasonable job of prioritising ‘unsatisfactory’ providers. The final three 
‘unsatisfactory’ FECs however mean that, if no ‘unsatisfactory’ provision is deemed acceptable, 
nearly all FECs would need to be reviewed. However, the low number of metrics in the model 
suggests that it is not overfitting the data; the early success and low number of metrics in the 
model indicates that it is picking-up on a genuine signal in the data. 
There are two further tests we can perform at this point to assess the accuracy and usefulness of 
the model. First, we can look at the performance of the model’s predictions at a specific point in 
the past to assess its real world use. Second, we can look to see how the model performed at 
predicting the outcome of the reviews that have taken place since the original data set for this 
study was collected. This will show how the model would have performed had it been used by the 
QAA after September 2014. 
6.2.3.2. Assessing the Model’s Predictions 
Figure 6.9 below shows the distribution of the predicted probabilities of each FEC being 
‘unsatisfactory’ on 5th November 2013. Those points coloured white represent FECs not reviewed 
within a year of 5th November 2013, those coloured orange represent those FECs found 
‘satisfactory’ within one year, and those points coloured blue represent those found 




Figure 6.9: Predicted probabilities of each FEC being ‘unsatisfactory’ on 5th November 2013. 
One can see that there were a sizeable number of FECs deemed at greater risk of being 
’unsatisfactory’ than those that were reviewed as part of the QAA’s cyclical approach. Figure 6.10 
below shows the same data with the FECs not reviewed within one year removed for a clearer 
picture: 
 
Figure 6.10: Predicted probabilities of each FEC being ‘unsatisfactory’ on 5th November 2013 with those 
FECs not reviewed within one year removed. 
The very narrow range of predicted probabilities, as indicated by the shallow gradient of most of 
the curve, and, of greater concern, the significant number of ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs towards the 
‘lower risk’ end of the distribution suggest the model would not have been succesful. 
Figure 6.11 below show the model’s application to all 50 of the QAA FEC reviews which took place 




Figure 6.11: The predicted probabilities and actual outcomes of FEC reviews conducted since the original 
data set was obtained and therefore not used in the development of the model. 
The model performs poorly: nine of the 14 ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs were amongst the bottom half of 
FECs prioritised.  
 
Figure 6.12: The ROC curve for the model applied to FEC reviews conducted since the original data set was 
obtained and therefore not used in the development of the model. 
The area under the ROC curve is 0.379 which, as it is less than 0.5, confirms that the QAA would 
be better off doing the exact opposite of what the model suggests and prioritising for review those 
predicted as being least likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ and working their way through to those 
predicted most likely. No one realistically expects a data-driven, risk-based system to perfectly 
predict those providers that will be ‘unsatisfactory’, but at an absolute minimum a greater 
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proportion of those providers deemed high risk should be found to be ‘unsatisfactory’ compared 
to those deemed low risk. This model cannot do that. 
6.2.4. Summary 
For this question, we have considered all metrics with a feasible link to quality assurance that 
could form part of a cost-effective, data-driven, risk-based approach, not just in their absolute 
state but also modified to account for changes over time, both in percentage and absolute terms. 
The best predictive model was determined to be: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃)+(0.16×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)+(−0.00008×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁107_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)+(0.14×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁103_𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝1))1 + 𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃)+(0.16×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)+(−0.00008×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁107_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)+(0.14×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁103_𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝1)) 
Where:  
• FIN107_Abs is the contribution from ‘other’ income generating activities  
• FIN103_Cp1 is the one-year percentage change in available reserves as a percentage 
of income 
• PRV004.NPV = 1 if the FEC has had no previous comparable review, 0 otherwise 
• PRV004.POS = 1 if the FEC has had a positive previous comparable review, 0 otherwise 
However, the answer to the question: 
Using naturally-complete metrics, could the outcome of QAA FEC reviews have been 
successfully predicted? 
is no. The model initially appeared an improvement on the HEI model with just 16 ‘satisfactory’ 
FECs being unnecessarily prioritised for review by the point 15 ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs, three-
quarters of the total, had been correctly prioritised. However, to have prioritised all 
‘unsatisfactory’ FECs for review would have required 82 ‘satisfactory’ FECs to have been 
unnecessarily reviewed: an error rate of 80.4% amongst those FECs prioritised for review, and 
sparing just 29 of the 111 ‘satisfactory’ FECs in the data set from review.  
Some may argue that by allowing five ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs to go unreviewed all but 16 of the 
‘satisfactory’ FECs could be spared a review and the model is therefore a success. Such a result, 
however, relies on knowing exactly when to stop conducting reviews, a difficult decision without 
the benefit of perfect hindsight, and ignores the more realistic application of the model to a 
specific point in time. The ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs are distributed evenly throughout and had the 
QAA conducted their reviews in order of the predicted probability that they would result in an 
‘unsatisfactory’ judgement, a large number of ‘satisfactory’ FECs would have been reviewed and 
a large number of ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs would not have been reviewed. 
202 
 
Of greater concern are the narrow range of predicted probabilities and the application of the 
model to new data. In this case the model is actively misleading suggesting that either the model 
was based on chance relations despite the efforts taken to guard against this, or that the weak 
underlying relationship between metrics and review outcomes which did exist no longer does. The 
next step is to see if the accuracy and continued use of the model can be improved by taking into 
account changes in the sector over time with the use of in-year standardised metrics.  
 
6.3. Results – Standardised Metrics 
Using naturally-complete, in-year standardised metrics, could the outcome of QAA FEC 
reviews have been successfully predicted? 
6.3.1. Initial Data Exploration 
From the initial univariate analyses there were a greater number of standardised metrics with a 
p-value less than 0.05 than was the case for the unstandardised metrics. These metrics are similar 
in nature to the significant non-standardised metrics focusing mainly on finance. 
Metric Code Metric Description P-value 
FIN057_Abs Cash Flow Statement - Taxation 0.000007 
CON002 Count of QAA concerns raised which do not relate to quality, standards, information or enhancement (and are therefore automatically invalid) 0.00011 
PRV013 Worst judgement concerning enhancement in previous comparable review 0.000138 
FIN010_Ca1 Income and Expenditure - Expenditure - Interest and other finance costs 0.009946 
PRV011 Worst judgement concerning information in previous comparable review 0.014564 
FIN107_Ca1 Ratio analysis - Income generating activities - Contribution from other income generating activities 0.014895 
FIN103_Ca1 Ratio analysis - Margin - Available reserves as a percentage of income 0.018166 
FIN105_Abs Ratio analysis - Income - Dependency on Higher Education income 0.025443 
FIN092_Ca1 Ratio analysis - Cash generated from operations to income 0.029809 
FIN118_Abs Supplementary Benchmarking Information - Expenditure -Staff number and cost details and staff numbers/costs per SLN/FTE - Ave SLN learners per total non-teaching staff 0.034173 
LEV008_Abs Proportion of HE students whose level of study is 'HNC' 0.034651 
FIN107_Abs Ratio analysis - Income generating activities - Contribution from other income generating activities 0.036317 
FIN056_Abs Cash Flow Statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Net cash inflow/(outflow) from returns on investments and servicing of finance 0.040083 
FIN067_Ca1 Cash Flow Statement - Financing - Repayment of amounts borrowed - secured and unsecured loans 0.040694 
FIN056_Ca1 Cash Flow Statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Net cash inflow/(outflow) from returns on investments and servicing of finance 0.041048 
AGE001_Abs Number of HE students aged under 21 0.042613 
LEV003_Abs Number of HE students whose level of study is 'First degree' 0.042787 
FIN093_Ca1 Ratio analysis - Gearing - Debt charges as a percentage of income 0.045885 
FIN049_Ca1 Balance Sheet - I&E account including pension reserve 0.045921 
LEV008_Ca1 Proportion of HE students whose level of study is 'HNC' 0.046601 
Table 6.7: All metrics from the standardised FEC data set with a univariate p-value < 0.05. 
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Looking at the metric with the lowest p-value FIN057_Abs - Cash Flow Statement – Taxation we 
can see a quirk of the standardisation process. One extreme outlier can have the effect of, for all 
intents and purposes, reducing the genuine, lesser variation between other providers down to 
zero. 
 
Figure 6.13: A plot of the standardised ‘Cash Flow Statement – Taxation’ metric prior to each review and 
the outcome of that review. 
This problem could in theory be rectified by using Winsorisation where, in its simplest form, cases 
are ranked according to their naive z-scores and the top and bottom 10% for example are all 
assigned the z-score of the FEC at the 10th and 90th percentile respectively (Spiegelhalter, 2005). 
Whilst this reduces the impact of outliers it does so by altering some, in this example 20%, of 
providers’ performance data masking their poor performance and with it making interpretation 
of the metrics more challenging. It is therefore not used here. In the case of the FIN057_Abs - Cash 
Flow Statement – Taxation metric, the p-value is significant because the single extreme value 
relates to a ‘satisfactory’ review and hence extreme negative values are perfectly associated with 
being subsequently judged ‘satisfactory’. Fortunately, the majority of metrics are not affected by 
extreme outliers.  
The LEV003_Abs – Number of HE students whose level of study is 'first degree' (i.e. an 
undergraduate degree) metric shown below in Figure 6.14 is more promising. Whilst it is again the 
case that the ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs are distributed amongst a number of ‘satisfactory’ FECs, those 
FECs with an above average number of students studying for a first degree, i.e. with a z-score 
greater than zero, are all ‘satisfactory’. Whilst metrics such as this cannot pinpoint ‘unsatisfactory’ 




Figure 6.14: A plot of the standardised ‘Proportion of HE students whose level of study is HNC’ metric prior 
to each review and the outcome of that review. 
6.3.2. Fitting the Model 
When attempting to combine these in-year standardised metrics into a predictive model the result 
is that, as with HEIs, no cross-validated model performs significantly better than simply treating 
all FECs as equally likely to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ regardless of the available data. 
 
Figure 6.15: The diagnostic plots for the λ1se (left) and λmin (right) model for standardised FEC data. 
Therefore, using naturally-complete, in-year standardised metrics, the outcome of QAA FEC could 
not have been successfully predicted. It appears that standardising the data within year has in fact 
hindered, rather than helped, with the prediction of ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs. The most likely 
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suggestion as for why this might be is the same as for HEIs: that review outcomes are absolute not 
relative. If, for example, an FEC is in dire financial straits, it’s quality assurance processes will not 
be helped by other FECs being in an even worse financial position.  
 
6.4. Summary 
The best model calculated the predicted probability of an FEC being ‘unsatisfactory’ using non-
standardised versions of the outcome of the previous comparable QAA review, the contribution 
from ‘other’ income generating activities, and the one-year percentage change in available 
reserves as a percentage of income. Specifically the model was defined as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃)+(0.16×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)+(−0.00008×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁107_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)+(0.14×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁103_𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝1))1 + 𝑒𝑒(−1.67 + (−0.38×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃)+(0.16×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃004.𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)+(−0.00008×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁107_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)+(0.14×𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁103_𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝1)) 
Where: 
   PRV004.NPV = 1 if the FEC has had no previous comparable review, 0 otherwise 
   PRV004.POS = 1 if the FEC has had a positive previous comparable review, 0 otherwise 
In seeking to determine which metrics, if any, would have successfully predicted the outcome of 
QAA FEC reviews we have considered all metrics with a feasible link to quality assurance that could 
form part of a cost-effective, data-driven, risk-based approach, not just in their absolute state but 
also modified to account for changes over time, both in percentage and absolute terms. The best 
predictive model performed well to begin with but had a high error rate and its predictions were 
very poor when applied retrospectively to a specific point in time and to new reviews. Indeed, the 
QAA would have successfully prioritised more ‘unsatisfactory’ new reviews by focusing on those 
predicted as being least likely to be ‘satisfactory’. Standardising the metrics to measure deviations 
from the norm for the year in which the data was recorded resulted in no model being a significant 
improvement on assuming an equal likelihood for all FECs being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ and 
ignoring the data entirely. Therefore, neither standardised nor non-standardised metrics could 
have successfully predicted the outcome of QAA FEC reviews. 
 
6.5. Discussion 
As with HEIs, no effective model would have allowed the QAA to successfully prioritise 
‘unsatisfactory’ FEC reviews. Even if one loosely defines success as identifying a ‘high risk’ group 
of FECs containing a greater proportion of ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs than a ‘low risk’ group – a 
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definition the QAA and students would be unlikely to accept –the model could not have achieved 
this at a specific point in time.  
The FEC model was the only one that could be tested to see how it performed with new data and 
new reviews following the development of the model. That performance was bad. The inability of 
the model to effectively predict the the outcome of a new set of QAA FEC reviews suggests that 
the weak links between the metrics and review outcomes no longer holds (if indeed they were 
ever more than coincidental). This highlights the challenges of using any predictive measures in a 
constantly changing environment. What is a succesful predictor one day may no longer be the 
next. The severity of this problem will be environment specific: there have not been regular 
changes requiring Amazon to make substantive changes to its model for predicting what 
customers might like based on past purchases, nor have there been substantive changes requiring 
the Met Office to change the factors considered when forecasting weather. The higher education 
sector is different however: devolution, funding cuts to FECs, the marketisation of the sector, the 
tripling of tuition fees, the removal of the student numbers cap, student visa changes and Brexit 
could all feasibly change the sector such that existing relationships between metrics and the 
outcome of QAA reviews breakdown and new ones are formed (or not). This topic will be discussed 
in depth in chapter eight which explores the reasons behind the quantitative finding.  
It was suggested in the discussion of the previous HEI chapter that, arguably, despite not being 
possible for HEIs, operating a purely data-driven, risk-based approach to prioritising QAA reviews 
could still prove useful if it could succesfully prioritise FEC and alternative provider reviews. This 
chapter has demonstrated that such a risk-based approach is also not viable for FECs. The one 
hope left for such an approach is for alternative providers which, although they only make up a 
fraction of the sector by student numbers, are the most numerous and subject to the greatest 
number of reviews.  
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Appendix F – FEC Metrics 
The set of 181 metrics used in this study prior to change-over-time calculations being added. 




AGE001 Number of HE students aged under 21 
AGE002 Proportion of HE students aged under 21 
AGE003 Number of HE students aged 21-24 
AGE004 Proportion of HE students aged 21-24 
AGE005 Number of HE students aged 25 and over 
AGE006 Proportion of HE students aged 25 and over 
DOM001 Number of HE students whose domicile is 'Other EU' 
DOM002 Proportion of HE students whose domicile is 'Other EU' 
DOM003 Number of HE students whose domicile is 'non-EU' 
DOM004 Proportion of HE students whose domicile is 'non-EU' 
DOM005 Number of HE students whose domicile is 'UK' 
DOM006 Proportion of HE students whose domicile is 'UK' 
ENT001 Number of HE students who are entrants 
ENT002 Proportion of HE students who are entrants 
ENT003 Number of HE students who are non-entrants 
ENT004 Proportion of HE students who are non-entrants 
ETH001 Number of HE students who are Asian or Asian British 
ETH002 Proportion of HE students who are Asian or Asian British 
ETH003 Number of HE students who are Black or Black British 
ETH004 Proportion of HE students who are Black or Black British 
ETH005 Number of HE students whose ethnicity is 'Other (including mixed)' 
ETH006 Proportion of HE students whose ethnicity is 'Other (including mixed)' 
ETH007 Number of HE students whose ethnicity is unknown 
ETH008 Proportion of HE students whose ethnicity is unknown 
ETH009 Number of HE students who are White 
ETH010 Proportion of HE students who are White 
GEN001 Number of HE students who are female 
GEN002 Proportion of HE students who are female 
GEN003 Number of HE students who are male 
GEN004 Proportion of HE students who are male 
LEV001 Number of HE students whose level of study is 'Diploma' 
LEV002 Proportion of HE students whose level of study is 'Diploma' 
LEV003 Number of HE students whose level of study is 'First degree' 
LEV004 Proportion of HE students whose level of study is 'First degree' 
LEV005 Number of HE students whose level of study is 'Foundation degree' 
LEV006 Proportion of HE students whose level of study is 'Foundation degree' 
LEV007 Number of HE students whose level of study is 'HNC' 
LEV008 Proportion of HE students whose level of study is 'HNC' 
LEV009 Number of HE students whose level of study is 'HND' 






LEV011 Number of HE students whose level of study is 'Postgraduate research' 
LEV012 Proportion of HE students whose level of study is 'Postgraduate research' 
LEV013 Number of HE students whose level of study is 'Postgraduate taught' 
LEV014 Proportion of HE students whose level of study is 'Postgraduate taught' 
LEV015 Number of HE students whose level of study is 'Undergraduate other' 
LEV016 Proportion of HE students whose level of study is 'Undergraduate other' 
MOD001 Number of HE students who are full-time 
MOD002 Proportion of HE students who are full-time 
MOD003 Number of HE students who are part-time 
MOD004 Proportion of HE students who are part-time 
Finance 
FIN001 Income and Expenditure - Income - Funding body grants 
FIN002 Income and Expenditure - Income - Tuition fees & education contracts 
FIN003 Income and Expenditure - Income - Research grants and contracts 
FIN004 Income and Expenditure - Income - Other income 
FIN005 Income and Expenditure - Income - Endowment and investment income 
FIN006 Income and Expenditure - Income - Total income 
FIN007 Income and Expenditure - Expenditure - Staff costs 
FIN008 Income and Expenditure - Expenditure - Other operating expenses 
FIN009 Income and Expenditure - Expenditure - Depreciation 
FIN010 Income and Expenditure - Expenditure - Interest and other finance costs 
FIN011 Income and Expenditure - Expenditure - Total expenditure 
FIN012 Balance Sheet - Fixed Assets - Land & Buildings 
FIN013 Balance Sheet - Fixed Assets - Equipment 
FIN014 Balance Sheet - Fixed Assets - Investments 
FIN015 Balance Sheet - Fixed Assets - Other 
FIN016 Balance Sheet - Fixed Assets - Total fixed assets 
FIN017 Balance Sheet - Debtors - Amounts falling due after one year 
FIN018 Balance Sheet - Current Assets - Fixed assets held for resale 
FIN019 Balance Sheet - Current Assets - Stocks and stores in hand 
FIN020 Balance Sheet - Current Assets - Trade debtors 
FIN021 Balance Sheet - Current Assets - Other debtors 
FIN022 Balance Sheet - Current Assets - Restricted cash and short term investments 
FIN023 Balance Sheet - Current Assets - Cash and short term investments  
FIN024 Balance Sheet - Current Assets - Total current assets 
FIN025 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due Within One Year - Overdrafts  
FIN026 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due Within One Year - Loans 
FIN027 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due Within One Year - Capital element of finance leases 
FIN028 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due Within One Year - Trade creditors 
FIN029 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due Within One Year - Tax and pension contributions 
FIN030 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due Within One Year - Payments on account 
FIN031 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due Within One Year - Fixed asset creditors 




FIN033 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due Within One Year - Total current liabilities 
FIN034 Balance Sheet - Net current assets / (liabilities) 
FIN035 Balance Sheet - Total assets less current liabilities 
FIN036 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due After One Year - Loans 
FIN037 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due After One Year - Capital element of finance leases 
FIN038 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due After One Year - Other liabilities 
FIN039 Balance Sheet - Creditors: Amount Falling Due After One Year - Total long-term liabilities 
FIN040 Balance Sheet - Provisions for liabilities 
FIN041 Balance Sheet - Net assets excluding pension asset/ (liability)  
FIN042 Balance Sheet - Net pension asset/ (liability) 
FIN043 Balance Sheet - Net assets including pension asset/ (liability)  
FIN044 Balance Sheet - Deferred capital grants 
FIN045 Balance Sheet - Revaluation reserve 
FIN046 Balance Sheet - Restricted reserves 
FIN047 Balance Sheet - I&E account excluding pension reserve 
FIN048 Balance Sheet - Pension reserve 
FIN049 Balance Sheet - I&E account including pension reserve 
FIN050 Balance Sheet - Total reserves 
FIN051 Balance Sheet - Total Funds 
FIN052 Cash Flow Statement - Net cash inflow/(outflow) from operating activities 
FIN053 Cash Flow Statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Interest received 
FIN054 Cash Flow Statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Interest paid 
FIN055 Cash Flow Statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Interest element of finance lease rental payments 
FIN056 Cash Flow Statement - Returns on investments and servicing of finance - Net cash inflow/(outflow) from returns on investments and servicing of finance 
FIN057 Cash Flow Statement - Taxation 
FIN058 Cash Flow Statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Payments to acquire fixed assets 
FIN059 Cash Flow Statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Receipts from sale of fixed assets 
FIN060 Cash Flow Statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Deferred capital grants received 
FIN061 Cash Flow Statement - Capital expenditure and financial investment - Net cash inflow/(outflow) from capital expenditure 
FIN062 Cash Flow Statement - Management of liquid resources - Withdrawals or disposals (shown as positive figure) 
FIN063 Cash Flow Statement - Management of liquid resources - Deposits or acquisitions (shown as negative figure) 
FIN064 Cash Flow Statement - Management of liquid resources - Net cash inflow/(outflow) from management of liquid resources 
FIN065 Cash Flow Statement - Financing - New loans 
FIN066 Cash Flow Statement - Financing - New finance leases 
FIN067 Cash Flow Statement - Financing - Repayment of amounts borrowed - secured and unsecured loans 
FIN068 Cash Flow Statement - Financing - Repayment of finance leases (capital element) 
FIN069 Cash Flow Statement - Financing - Net cash inflow/ (outflow) from financing 




FIN071 Cash Flow Statement - Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net funds/(debt) - Increase/ (decrease) in cash  
FIN072 Cash Flow Statement - Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net funds/(debt) - Cash to repay debt 
FIN073 Cash Flow Statement - Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net funds/(debt) - Cash used to increase liquid resources 
FIN074 Cash Flow Statement - Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net funds/(debt) - New loans and finance leases 
FIN075 Cash Flow Statement - Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net funds/(debt) - Change in net funds/(debt) 
FIN076 Cash Flow Statement - Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net funds/(debt) - Net funds/(debt) at beginning of year 
FIN077 Cash Flow Statement - Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net funds/(debt) - Net funds/(debt) at end of year 
FIN078 Cash Flow Statement - Analysis of net debt - Cash and short term investments 
FIN079 Cash Flow Statement - Analysis of net debt - Bank overdrafts 
FIN080 Cash Flow Statement - Analysis of net debt - Total cash and short term investments 
FIN081 Cash Flow Statement - Analysis of net debt - Debt due within 1 year 
FIN082 Cash Flow Statement - Analysis of net debt - Debt due after 1 year 
FIN083 Cash Flow Statement - Analysis of net debt - Total 
FIN084 Cash Flow Statement - Income used in ratio analysis  
FIN085 Cash Flow Statement - Ratio analysis - Liquidity - Ratio analysis - Liquidity - Cash days in hand 
FIN086 Ratio analysis - Liquidity - Adjusted cash days in hand 
FIN087 Ratio analysis - Liquidity - Current ratio 
FIN088 Ratio analysis - Liquidity - Adjusted current ratio 
FIN089 Ratio analysis - Liquidity - Trade debtors days - excluding Skills Funding Agency, EFA and HEFCE 
FIN090 Ratio analysis - Liquidity - Trade creditors days - non pay expenditure 
FIN091 Ratio analysis - Liquidity - Quick ratio 
FIN092 Ratio analysis - Cash generated from operations to income 
FIN093 Ratio analysis - Gearing - Debt charges as a percentage of income 
FIN094 Ratio analysis - Gearing - Interest as a percentage of income 
FIN095 Ratio analysis - Gearing - Total borrowing as a percentage of income 
FIN096 Ratio analysis - Gearing - Total borrowing as a percentage of reserves 
FIN097 Ratio analysis - Gearing - Total borrowing as a percentage of reserves and debt 
FIN098 Ratio analysis - Margin - Operating surplus / (deficit) after taxation (£'000) 
FIN099 Ratio analysis - Margin - Operating surplus / (deficit) as a percentage of income 
FIN100 Ratio analysis - Margin - Adjusted operating position (£'000) 
FIN101 Ratio analysis - Margin - Adjusted operating position as a percentage of income 
FIN102 Ratio analysis - Margin - Historical cost surplus/ (deficit) as a percentage of income 
FIN103 Ratio analysis - Margin - Available reserves as a percentage of income 
FIN104 Ratio analysis - Income - Dependency on European income 
FIN105 Ratio analysis - Income - Dependency on Higher Education income 
FIN106 Ratio analysis - Income - Dependency on all other income 
FIN107 Ratio analysis - Income generating activities - Contribution from other income generating activities 
FIN108 Ratio analysis - Income generating activities - Contribution from farming 




FIN110 Ratio analysis - Analysis of staff costs - Staff costs as % of income (incl. contract tuition services / incl. restructuring) 
FIN111 Ratio analysis - Analysis of staff costs - Staff costs as % of income (incl. contract tuition services / excl. restructuring) 
FIN112 Ratio analysis - Analysis of staff costs - Admin. costs proportion 
FIN113 Analysis of income - Funding body grants - Higher Education Funding Council in England (HEFCE) - Higher Education   
FIN114 Analysis of income - Funding body grants - Higher Education Funding Council in England (HEFCE) - Franchised 
FIN115 Analysis of income - Funding body grants - Higher Education Funding Council in England (HEFCE) - Release of capital grants 
FIN116 Analysis of income - Funding body grants - Higher Education Funding Council in England (HEFCE) - Other HEFCE 
FIN117 Supplementary Benchmarking Information - Expenditure -Staff number and cost details and staff numbers/costs per SLN/FTE - Ave SLN learners per FTE teacher  
FIN118 
Supplementary Benchmarking Information - Expenditure -Staff number and cost 
details and staff numbers/costs per SLN/FTE - Ave SLN learners per total non-
teaching staff 




PRV001 Outcome of previous review 
PRV003 Has ever received a negative review (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
PRV004 Outcome of previous comparable review 
QAA Concerns 
CON001 Count of QAA concerns raised, upheld or otherwise, since previous review 
CON002 Count of QAA concerns raised which do not relate to quality, standards, information or enhancement (and are therefore automatically invalid) 
CON003 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to academic standards 
CON004 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to the quality of learning opportunities 
CON005 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to the provision of information 
CON006 Count of QAA concerns not upheld since previous review which relate to academic standards 
CON007 Count of QAA concerns not upheld since previous review which relate to the quality of learning opportunities 
CON008 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review 
CON009 Count of QAA concerns not upheld since previous review which relate to the quality of learning opportunities 
Table 6.8: The set of 181 metrics used in the HEI study prior to change-over-time and benchmarking 




7. Predicting the Outcome of Alternative Provider Reviews 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine which metrics, if any, could have predicted the 
outcome of past QAA reviews of alternative providers, and how accurately they could have done 
so. The number of comparable reviews of alternative providers undertaken means that this 
question can be explored both at the overall review-level, and at the more granular question-level. 
Moreover, in two cases it is possible for the question-level analysis to explore the prediction of 
specific judgements rather than the aggregated ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’ outcomes.  
The reason for examining whether the outcome of past QAA reviews could have been predicted 
is to determine whether a data-driven, risk-based approach to quality assurance could have been 
effective and, if so, which metrics could be useful when operating such an approach in the future. 
As previously discussed, however, there are significant institutional and normative challenges 
associated with using predictions of the likelihood of receiving one of three or four judgements 
for four questions to decide where to prioritise a review. Making prioritisation decisions based on 
up to 15 predicted probabilities per provider – the probabilities of being judged ‘Meets UK 
expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ or ‘Does not meet UK 
expectations’, for four questions plus the probability of being judged ‘Commended’ for three of 
the four questions - for hundreds of providers is not practical. Furthermore, with little if any 
reduction in burden when only one question, rather than four, is assessed as part of a review it 
may not be helpful either (HEFCE, 2012b, 74). This analysis therefore begins by answering the 
question most likely to be of use for the future operation of a data-driven, risk-based approach in 
the alternative provider sector where incomplete data is not an issue: 
1. Using naturally-complete metrics, could the overall outcome of QAA alternative provider 
reviews have been successfully predicted? 
While challenging to interpret and operationalise, it may be the case that considering the 
likelihood of an alternative provider having quality assurance issues at a question, rather than 
review, level leads to great improvements in accuracy. Furthermore, considering the answer to 
each question at the granular ‘Does not meet, ‘Requires improvement to meet’, and ‘Meets’ UK 
expectations level rather than the aggregated ‘unsatisfactory’ / ‘satisfactory’ level may further 
improve accuracy. In order to assess whether there is a significant improvement in accuracy worth 
accepting the additional complexity of a granular question-level approach for, the second research 




2. Using naturally-complete metrics, could the exact outcome of QAA reviews of academic 
standards at alternative providers have been successfully predicted? 
As detailed below, the result of this question is that predicting the exact outcome of the reviews, 
i.e. the probability a provider is likely to be ‘Meets UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvements to 
meet UK expectations’ and ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, makes no practical difference to 
accuracy, yet makes modelling and interpretation far more challenging. Therefore, the remaining 
two review questions for which there is sufficient data - teaching and learning and the provision 
of information – are considered to see if their outcomes could be predicted more accurately than 
the overall review-level outcome; however, this is done at the aggregated ‘unsatisfactory’ / 
‘satisfactory’ level. The remaining questions are therefore: 
3. Using naturally-complete metrics, could the aggregated outcome of QAA reviews of 
teaching and learning at alternative providers have been successfully predicted? 
4. Using naturally-complete metrics, could the aggregated outcome of QAA reviews of the 
provision of information at alternative providers have been successfully predicted? 
Standardisation of the data by year has not been considered for alternative providers as the 
reviews have all taken place within the space of two years. The chapter begins with an overview 
of the alternative provider sector and its unique challenges. This is followed by a step-by-step 
description of the analysis and results, and finally a brief discussion of the findings. 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The term ‘alternative provider’ is confusing and something of a catch-all. BIS defines ‘alternative 
providers’ (in England-only presumably) as “higher education providers who do not receive 
funding from, and are not regulated by, the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE)” (BIS, 2015a, 1), but such a definition could be expanded to FECs. In reality, an ‘alternative’ 
provider is a provider that is not a Higher Education Institution (HEI) as designated by the 1992 
Higher Education Act and is not an FEC. Whilst all alternative providers are private, not all private 
providers are alternative providers, the University of Buckingham for example is a private HEI. 
To make matters more confusing, not all alternative providers in England appear on HEFCE’s  
“Register of Higher Education Providers” (HEFCE, 2015b). This is because only providers which 
meet one of the below criteria are featured: 
• receive direct public grants for HE; 
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• have courses which have been specifically designated by Government as eligible for the 
purposes of English student support funding; 
• are higher education institutions (HEIs); 
• and / or have the right to award one or more types of UK degree. 
Therefore, those alternative providers that do not provide designated courses but have either 
unsuccessfully applied for course designation or have applied for HTS, successfully or otherwise, 
will have been reviewed by the QAA but will not feature on HEFCE’s register.  The Bedfordian 
Business School, for example, has applied for HTS and teaches Pearson HNCs and HNDs as well as 
programmes franchised from the University of Maribor in Slovenia (QAA, 2014e) but no UK-based 
degrees; thus it was reviewed by the QAA but does not feature on HEFCE’s register. No register of 
higher education providers exists for Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland; however, the vast 
majority of alternative providers are based in England – 264 out of the 273 contained in the data 
set. 
The lack of clarity over what constitutes an alternative provider makes determining the size of the 
sector difficult. As of August 2015 HEFCE’s register contained 117 alternative providers which have 
specific courses that are eligible under student support regulations and the QAA had records of 
428 alternative providers (HEFCE, 2015c). There are an unknown number of providers offering 
international awards that have not sought highly trusted status or course designation and 
therefore do not fall under the remit of the QAA or national funding councils.  
What is clear is that the number of alternative providers, and the number of students studying at 
them, has grown dramatically since the 2011 White Paper sought to “make it easier for new 
providers to enter the sector” by removing “the regulatory barriers that are preventing a level 
playing field for higher education providers of all types, including further education colleges and 
other alternative providers” (BIS, 2011, 10). Just two academic years after the White Paper had 
been released, the number of students studying with alternative providers grew from 7,000 to 
53,000 with half of the total growth accounted for by just five providers (NAO, 2014). Data from 
the Student Loans Company shows that the amount paid out in tuition fee loans to full-time 
students at alternative providers in England-only rose from £16M in 2010/11 to £192M in 2013/14 
(author analysis based upon SLC, 2015). 
The hundreds of organisations that make up the alternative provider sector in the UK are diverse. 
Founded in 1992, granted degree-awarding powers in 2007 and the ‘university’ title in 2013, BPP 
University delivers ‘education of the professions’, such as business and law, across 12 locations in 
the UK. Conversely, in 2013/14, there were a minimum of 32 providers, many of which were very 
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young, with 50 students or fewer8. Indeed, the median age of an alternative provider in the data 
set used for this study, based upon their date of incorporation, was under 9.5 years. The 
overwhelming majority of provision is focused on business and management; however, there are 
a number of niche providers focusing on the arts, faith, and even needlework.  
When loans for students on alternative providers’ designated courses where introduced in 
2011/12, no limits were placed on the number of students that providers could recruit  and some 
expanded rapidly. By the time the Government introduced controls in November 2013, having 
spent far more than it had budgeted for, Regent’s College had expanded from having 10 HND 
students to over 1,000. Similarly, the intake at St. Patrick’s College ballooned from 50 to over 4,000 
in one year (McGettigan, 2014). Concerns over rapid expansion were accompanied by evidence of 
very high drop-out and absence rates, poor administration and inappropriate recruitment 
practices including colleges recruiting on the streets and students being accepted onto courses 
while lacking adequate English language skills (PAC, 2015). The QAA’s review activity shows that 
these concerns were to some extent justified. 42 of the 328 alternative provider reviews 
considered in this study, 12.8%, resulted in an ‘unsatisfactory’ overall judgement. This is higher 
than the 7.8% for FECs and 6.3% for universities; however, 286 out of 328 reviews resulting in a 
‘satisfactory’ judgement overall still represents a broadly compliant sector.  
 
7.2. Results – Review-Level Outcomes 
Using naturally-complete metrics, could the overall outcome of QAA alternative provider 
reviews have been successfully predicted? 
7.2.1. Initial Data Exploration 
The first step in the analysis was to explore which individual metrics had a strong relationship 
with the overall ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’ outcome of the reviews. The only metrics with a 
p-value less than 0.25 were financial metrics developed from the providers’ financial accounts 
                                                          
8 The figure of at least 33 alternative providers with 50 or fewer students was derived from Student Loan 
Company Figures. These figures show that 1,614 full-time students took out student loans to cover tuition 
fees for courses at alternative providers that had 50 students or fewer in total. The number of such providers 
was not detailed and therefore 33 represents the absolute minimum, i.e. it assumes each provider had 50 
students. In reality the number of such alternative providers is likely much greater. 
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and the provider’s age, defined as the number of days since their incorporation, at the time of 
their review: 
Metric Code Metric Description P-value 
APA001 Age at time of review 0.003 
APA011 Cash at Bank and in Hand 0.017 
APA018 Total Net Assets/ (Liabilities) 0.034 
APA006 Tangible Assets 0.057 
APA013 Creditors: Amounts Falling Due Within One Year 0.066 
APA003 Satisfied Mortgage Charges 0.247 
Table 7.1: A breakdown of all metrics from the overall review level alternative provider data set with a p-
value of less than 0.25. 
Unlike some of the metrics with low p-values for HEIs and FECs, one can conceive these finance 
metrics having an impact on quality assurance processes: providers who are troubled financially 
may be less focused on quality and the processes that assure it than those who are financially 
sound.  
Figure 7.1 below shows the metric with the smallest p-value, APA001 – the provider’s age at the 
time of their review in days. None of the older providers have been found ‘unsatisfactory’: 
 
Figure 7.1: A plot of the provider’s age at the time of their review and the overall outcome of that review. 
There also appears to be a clustering of younger providers that have been judged ‘unsatisfactory’; 
however, this appears to be an effect of scaling and when the much older providers are removed 




Figure 7.2: A plot of the provider’s age at the time of their review and the overall outcome of that review 
for providers established less than 8,000 (c.21years 11 months) days at the time of their review. 
This again appears to be a case of the metric being useful in identifying providers that are likely to 
be ‘satisfactory’, but less useful in identifying providers likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ which are 
spread out amongst a large number of ‘satisfactory’ providers. 
The same pattern is present for the amount of money providers have ‘at the bank or in hand’. 
Figure 7.3 below shows that those providers with a relatively large amount of cash at the bank or 
in hand have always been found ‘satisfactory’: 
 
Figure 7.3: A plot of each provider’s cash at the bank or in hand according to their latest set of accounts 
prior to their review and the overall outcome of that review. 
However, focusing on the providers with less than £1,100,000 in cash at the bank or in hand shows 
that there are a number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ providers with no ‘cash at the bank 
or in hand’. Moreover, there are also a number of ‘unsatisfactory’ providers with several hundred 




Figure 7.4: A plot of each provider’s cash at the bank or in hand according to their latest set of accounts 
prior to their review and the overall outcome of that review for providers with less than £1.1M cash. 
Again, the pattern is repeated when we examine each provider’s total net assets or liabilities: 
there is a group of providers with relatively substantial assets who have all been found 
‘satisfactory’, and a group of providers with no assets or liabilities most of whom have been found 
‘satisfactory’ interspersed with the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers. Interestingly, all of the providers 
with greater liabilities than assets, indicated by points below 0 on the y-axis, have been found 
‘satisfactory’: 
 
Figure 7.5: A plot of the provider’s total net assets/(liabilities) at the time of their review and the outcome 
of that review. 
Examining the outcome of the previous comparable reviews shown below in figure 7.6 reveals 




Figure 7.6: The outcome of provider’s reviews following their previous comparable review broken down by 
the outcome of the previous comparable review. 
All seven reviews of providers that had already had a negative review were ‘satisfactory’. Whilst 
one could argue this is a testament to the review process with all providers putting right their 
areas for concern, the sample size is too small to draw any meaningful conclusion. An alarming 
five out of the 46 reviews which followed on from a previous positive review found the provider 
to be ‘unsatisfactory’ showing a worrying ability for performance to decline. 
In summary, there are a small number of financial metrics which allow us to identify which 
providers are most likely to be ‘satisfactory’, but are of limited use when trying to distinguish the 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers. ‘Satisfactory’ performance in a previous comparable review is, if 
anything, an indication of an increased likelihood of being ‘unsatisfactory’ according to the data. 
7.2.2. Fitting the Model 




Figure 7.7: The diagnostic plots for the λ1se (left) and λmin (right) model for alternative provider overall 
review level outcomes. 
On this occasion the choice between the λ1se model and the λmin model is not straightforward. The 
ostensibly more accurate λmin model contians seven metrics: 
• APA004 - Financial Accounts Type (e.g. ‘Total exemption’, ‘Full’). 
• PRV002 - Has the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last 
review? 
• PRV003 - Has ever received a negative review? 
• APA001 - Age at time of review. 
• APA011 - Amount of Cash At Bank And In Hand (£000’s). 
• CON002 - Count of QAA concerns raised which do not relate to quality, standards, 
information or enhancement (and are therefore automatically invalid). 
• CON005 - Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to the provision 
of information. 
Whereas the λ1se model, which represents a simpler but less accurate model within specified limits 
contains a subset of four of those metrics: 
• APA004 – Financial Accounts Type (e.g. ‘Total exemption’, ‘Full’). 
• PRV002 - Has the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last 
review? 
• PRV003 - Has ever received a negative review? 
• APA001 - Age at time of review. 
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The specific nature of the CON005 metric and the very small relative size of the coefficients for 
the additional metrics included in the λmin model suggest that these additional metrics only serve 
to overfit the model, or at the very least complicate it for very minimal gain. For that reason the 
λ1se model is explored further. 
The specific λ1se model calculates the probability of an unsatisfactory review as: 
𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴1 + 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 
where:  
 
𝐴𝐴 =  −2.25 + (0.84 ×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴004.𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) + �−0.25 ×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴004.𝐾𝐾𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿�+ (−0.12 ×𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃002.𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆+ (−0.10 ×𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃003.𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) + (−0.00002 ×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴001)  
and: 
 
   APA004.TES = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘Total exemption SMALL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
   APA004.FUL = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘FULL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
   PRV002.YES = 1 if the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last review, 0 otherwise 
   PRV003.YES =1 if the provider has ever received a negative review, 0 otherwise 
As the coefficients of the APA004.FUL, PRV002.YES and PRV003.YES metrics are negative, the 
result of these conditions being met, i.e. the provider is classified as a ‘FULL’ body by Companies 
House, the provider having previously received a negative outcome in their last review, and if the 
provider has ever received a negative review, is that the likelihood of the provider being 
‘unsatisfactory’ decreases. Likewise the older the provider, i.e. the larger the value of APA001, the 
lower the predicted likelihood of the provider being ‘unsatisfactory’. With a positive coefficient, a 
provider classed as ‘Total exemption SMALL’ by Companies House will have an increased predicted 
likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’. 
Larger providers being less likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ is perhaps unsurprising, the larger the 
organisation the more effort and resource can be dedicated to quality assurance and quality 
assurance reviews. Those providers that have previously been found ‘unsatisfactory’ subsequently 
being less likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ than those providers that haven’t is somewhat 
counterintuitive but can be understood. A provider that has previously been judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ will have an understanding of the areas where it needs to improve and will be 





7.2.3. Evaluating the Model 
Having given worked examples of how each model works in the previous chapters a further 
demonstration will not be given for the alternative provider models. The next stage is therefore 
to evaluate how well the model fits the data with which it was developed. 
7.2.3.1. Testing the Fit of the Model 
Figure 7.8 below shows the ROC curve for this model when applied to the data used to develop it. 
The ‘area under the curve’ value of 0.778 suggests a reasonable rate of ‘unsatisfactory’ FECs being 
succesfully prioritised as the threshold criteria for triggering a review is lowered: 
 
Figure 7.8: The ROC curve for the λ1se model fitted to the training data set for overall review level, 
alternative provider outcomes. 
Figure 7.9 and Table 7.2 below show the effect of lowering the threshold required for the model’s 




Figure 7.9: Predicted probabilities for each of the 245 complete, comparable reviews used to train the 
model and their actual outcome. 
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19.46% 5 9 0.84 
19.43% 10 17 0.82 
19.38% 15 27 0.79 
19.12% 20 50 0.74 
18.90% 25 67 0.70 
9.24% 30 106 0.64 
7.21% 33 167 0.55 
Table 7.2: The number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ alternative provider reviews that would have 
resulted from decreasing the threshold required to prompt a review (only select points are shown). 
The model performs well to begin with, with the first nine ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews being predicted 
with just 13 ‘satisfactory’ reviews being prioritised. However, as with previous models the error 
rate then begins to increase and 167 ‘satisfactory’ reviews would have been incorrectly prioritised 
before all of the ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews had been conducted. This, with perfect hindsight, is an 
error rate of 167 / (33 + 167) = 83.5% amongst the providers prioritised for review; worse than 




The high error rate is once again a result of the narrow range of predicted proababilities: the 
relationship between the metrics and the outcome of the reviews is weak resulting in uncertain 
predictions. Althougth there is more differentiation between the predicited probabilities 
compared to the HEI and FEC models, some of this is simply due to three of the four metrics in the 
model being discrete. The actual predicted probabilities still differ little with no review forecast as 
being ‘unsatisfactory’ with a probability of greater than 20%. 
The model therefore appears to be of little benefit if the policy goal is to identify all the 
‘unsatisfactory’ performance. Even with the unrealistic benefit of perfect hindsight allowing the 
QAA to stop performing reviews imediately after the final ‘unsatisfactory’ provider has been 
reviewed, 200 out of 245 reviews would have been required. If the policy goal is to identify a high-
risk group of providers of which a greater proportion turn out to be ‘unsatisfactory’ compared to 
the low-risk group, acccepting that in a risk-based system some failure must be tolerated, then 
this appears possible. Abritrarily dividing the providers into equally-sized low and high risk groups 
– i.e. the riskiest 50% being categorised as ‘high risk’ and the least risky 50% being categorised as 
‘low risk’ – 28 out of the 33 ‘unsatisfactory’ providers would be in the high-risk group. 
7.2.3.2. Assessing the Model’s Predictions 
As discussed previously in the methods chapter, the number of reviews of alternative providers 
allowed for 20% of the data to be held back when developing the model specifically to test its 
performance. Figure 7.10 below show the ROC curve for the model’s application to the training 
set comprising 60 reviews:  
 
Figure 7.10: The ROC curve for the λ1se model fitted to the test data set for overall review level outcomes. 
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The ROC Curve has a similar appearance and similar AUC value of 0.769 to that of the model. 
Figure 7.11 below shows the effect of lowering the threshold required to trigger a review for the 
test data.  
Figure 7.11: The predicted probabilities and actual outcomes of the reviews contained in the testing set 
for alternative providers. 
When applied to new data the model reassuringly performs similarly to when it is applied to the 
training data and better than other models have performed previously. Of the first eight reviews 
that would have been prioritised, four would have resulted in an ‘unsatisfactory’ judgement; 
however, as is a familiar pattern now, after some initial success there are a number of providers 
that are not prioritised until after a significant number of ‘satisfactory’ reviews. Even if the QAA 
had the ability to stop reviewing alternative providers at the optimal point immediately after the 
least likely ‘unsatisfactory’ review has been conducted, the model would still have had an error 
rate amongst reviewed providers of 40 / (40 + 8) = 83.3%. The model still performs well if the 
policy goal is merely to identify a high and low risk group: 6 out of 8 ‘unsatisfactory’ providers 
appear in the riskiest half of providers.  
The model’s similar performance when applied to the training and test data reassures us that the 
model is not overfit, it has not learned the specific ‘noise’ arising from the training set and is 
picking up on genuine (albeit weak) patterns in the data, i.e. that smaller providers and those who 
have not previously been judged ‘unsatisfactory’ are slightly more likely to be so in the future. This 
is not universally the case however. 
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As discussed in the earlier methods chapter there are two tests that we have not been able to 
perform due to the resource demands of acquiring new data. The first is to apply the model to 
recent reviews to see if the relationship still holds. The FEC analysis showed that relationships 
which had previously existed no longer do so making the model operationally useless. The second 
is to pick a specific point in time and calculate each provider’s risk score. If a large number of those 
not reviewed within a year were predicted as more likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ than those 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers that were reviewed, then either there is a lot of ‘unsatisfactory’ 
provision going unreviewed or the model may not work so well in real time. Any perceived success 
must therefore be viewed with caution. 
7.2.3.3. Summary 
The best model calculated the predicted probability of an alternative provider being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ overall based on previous review performance and the age and size of the 
provider. The model determined the predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ as: 
𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴1 + 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 
Where:  
 
𝐴𝐴 =  −2.25 + (0.84 ×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴004.𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) + �−0.25 ×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴004.𝐾𝐾𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿�+ (−0.12 ×𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃002.𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆+ (−0.10 ×𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃003.𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) + (−0.00002 ×𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴001)  
And: 
 
   APA004.TES = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘Total exemption SMALL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
   APA004.FUL = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘FULL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
   PRV002.YES = 1 if the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last review, 0 otherwise 
   PRV003.YES =1 if the provider has ever received a negative review, 0 otherwise 
In some regards the model was the most promising yet: the predictions based on the held-back 
testing data reassures us that the model was picking up on weak but genuine underlying patterns 
in the data and the metrics themselves make intuitive sense. One can conceive how larger, more 
established providers, and those that have previously been found ‘unsatisfactory’ and been 
required to focus on improving could be less likely to be found ‘unsatisfactory’. The model still 
faces significant challenges in that, as with all previous models, a significant number of 
‘satisfactory’ reviews would have to be prioritised in order to successfully identify all the 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers. There is a large amount of uncertainty in the model and an error rate 
that the sector, if not the QAA also, would likely find unacceptable. The model did however do a 
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reasonable job of identifying a ‘high risk’ group which contained the majority of ‘unsatisfactory’ 
providers– 6 out of 8 in the test dataset. Therefore, the answer to the question 
Using naturally-complete metrics, could the overall outcome of QAA alternative 
provider reviews have been successfully predicted?  
is dependent on the policy definition of success. If any ‘unsatisfactory’ provision going unreviewed 
is unacceptable then the answer is no, near enough all providers would have needed to have been 
reviewed in order for all ‘unsatisfactory’ provision to have been identified. If some ‘unsatisfactory’ 
provision going unreviewed is acceptable, then the model would have managed to have prioritised 
the majority of ‘unsatisfactory’ providers in the first 50% of providers to be reviewed. Even then, 
the weak underlying relationships that inform the model are susceptible to breaking down 
completely in a rapidly evolving sector meaning there is no guarantee the model would continue 
to work in the future. 
 
7.3. Results – Academic Standards 
Using naturally-complete metrics, could the exact outcome of QAA reviews of academic 
standards at alternative providers have been successfully predicted?  
Putting aside the normative challenges of combining different probabilities for the different 
questions that make up a QAA review, the ability to successfully predict the more granular ‘Does 
not meet UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ or ‘Meets UK 
expectations’ outcome for each review question represents the ideal for a fully risk-based 
approach to prioritisation. If the QAA could predict the outcome, it would then be able to prioritise 
those providers most likely to be judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ first, before the 
providers most likely to be judged ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ next, in a way 
that focusing on the provider deemed most likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ may not allow. As there 
are sufficient numbers of each ordinal judgement (‘Does not meet UK expectations’, ‘Requires 
improvement to meet UK expectations’, and ‘Meets UK expectations’) for the academic standards 
question, this analysis will explore whether it is possible, and helpful, to predict more granular 
review outcomes. 
7.3.1. Initial Data Exploration 
The first step in the analysis was to examine how similar the outcome of the academic standards 
question was to the overall outcome of reviews of alternative providers. Table 7.3 below shows 
228 
 
that of 41 reviews which were ‘unsatisfactory’ overall, 31 were ‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to 
academic standards.  
 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory 
 
Does not meet UK 
expectations 
Requires improvement to 
meet UK expectations 
Meets UK 
expectations 
Overall review outcome 41 264 
Academic standards outcome 11 20 270 
Table 7.3: The results for the overall outcome and academic standards section of each alternative provider 
review. Note that four reviews did not assess academic standards. 
With over three quarters of providers judged ‘unsatisfactory’ overall having also been judged 
‘unsatisfactory’, i.e. either ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or ‘Requires improvement to meet UK 
expectations’, in relation to academic standards it is likely the models for predicting the outcome 
of the overall review and the outcome of the academic standards question will be similar. 
The second step was to explore which individual metrics had a strong relationship with the 
ordered ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ and 
‘Meets UK expectations’ outcomes of the academic standards section of the reviews. Seven 
metrics had a p-value less than 0.25: four finance metrics, three of which were also significant in 
relation to the overall review findings in the previous section, two QAA Concerns metrics, and the 
provider’s age at the time of their review. 
Metric 
Code Metric Description P-value 
APA009 Investments / Stocks 0.000 
APA011 Cash at Bank and In Hand 0.009 
APA001 Age at time of review 0.010 
CON003 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to academic standards 0.087 
APA006 Tangible Assets 0.105 
APA013 Creditors: Amounts Falling Due Within One Year 0.123 
CON005 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to the provision of information 0.156 
Table 7.4: A breakdown of all metrics from the academic standards alternative provider data set with a p-
value of less than 0.25. 
It is easy to conceive why the count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to 
academic standards metric has a significant relationship with the outcome of the review of 
alternative providers’ academic standards: those providers for which the QAA have investigated 
concerns and found ‘unsatisfactory’ performance are likely to have issues which may not be 
resolved by the inevitable, soon-to-follow review. The nature of the relationship between review 
outcomes relating to academic standards and the CON005 - QAA concerns relating to the provision 
of information metric is less apparent. 
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Figure 7.12 below shows the amount of money providers have ‘at the bank or in hand’. As was the 
case for the overall model in the previous section, those providers with a relatively large amount 
of cash at the bank or in hand have always been found ‘satisfactory’. What also becomes clear 
here is that there is no differentiation between the ‘cash at bank and in hand’ of providers judged 
‘Does not meet UK expectations’ and providers judged ‘Requires improvement to meet UK 
expectations’. This again appears to be a case of the metric being useful in identifying providers 
who are likely to be ‘satisfactory’, but less useful in identifying providers likely to be 
‘unsatisfactory’ – regardless of the degree to which they are ‘unsatisfactory - which are spread out 
amongst a large number of ‘satisfactory’ providers. 
 
Figure 7.12: A plot of each provider’s cash at the bank or in hand according to their latest set of accounts 
prior to their review and the outcome of the academic standards question of that review. 
As with the analysis for the overall review outcome, focusing on the providers with less than 
£1,100,000 in ‘cash at the bank or in hand’ shows the pattern more clearly. There is no difference 
in metric performance for those judged ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ and 




Figure 7.13: A plot of each provider’s cash at the bank or in hand according to their latest set of accounts 
prior to their review and the outcome of the academic standards question of that review for providers 
with less than £1.1M cash. 
On closer inspection the CON003 - count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which 
relate to academic standards metric seems somewhat affected by low numbers. Only two 
alternative providers have had QAA concerns relating to academic standards upheld, one provider 
which had two such concerns was subsequently found to ‘Require improvement to meet UK 
expectations’ whereas the second which had had a single QAA concern upheld was found to ‘Meet 
UK expectations’ on the subsequent review. The same is also true for the CON005 - count of 
concerns upheld since previous review which relate to the provision of information metric as both 
the providers which had QAA concerns relating to academic standards upheld also had QAA 
concerns relating to the provision of information upheld at the same time.  
In summary, the majority of alternative providers judged ‘unsatisfactory’ overall were judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to academic standards. One would therefore expect to see similarities 
in the significant metrics for the overall and academic standards models. These similarities were 
present with the small number of financial metrics which can identify which providers are most 
likely to be judged ‘Meets UK expectations’. Also significant for the academic standards model 
were two QAA Concerns metrics; however, on closer inspection this is an anomaly as the result of 
the rarity of QAA concerns being upheld. Again the metrics appear to be able to identify a subset 
of alternative providers most likely to be performing to the desired standard but are less able to 





7.3.2. Fitting the Model 
One part of the process that remains unchanged whether the dependent variable is the binary 
‘satisfactory’ / ‘unsatisfactory’ outcome or the more granular judgements is selecting the best 
model.  
 
Figure 7.14: The diagnostic plots for the λ1se (left) and λmin (right) model for the multinomial academic 
stadnards model. 
On this occasion there is little difference between the λ1se model (lefthand plot) and the λmin  model 
(righthand plot). At the point where they are at their most accurate, both models include a small 
number of variables with very small coefficients suggesting a degree of overfitting. At the point 
where each model is at its most parsimonious – i.e. it has the fewest metrics with a fit that is within 
one standard deviation of the minimum – it contains no metrics whatsoever. That result means 
that the QAA could be best off by ignoring the data entirely and assuming each provider had the 
same chance of being of being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ (11/301 = 3.7%), ‘Requires 
improvement to meet UK expectations’ (20/301 = 6.6%), or ‘Meets UK expectations’ (270/301 = 
89.7%). The best fitting and most appropriate model is the λmin model considered further below. 
One aspect of the analysis that is different when there are more than two possible review 
outcomes is how the model is constructed. In effect three models are created, each to predict the 
likelihood of each of one of the three outcomes occuring and comprising an independent set of 
metrics. The probability for each provider being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, 
‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ and ‘Meets UK expectations’ will always total 
one. The three models which constitute the λmin model contain the following metrics: 
To predict the likelihood of being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’: 
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• APA004 – Financial Accounts Type (e.g. ‘Total exemption’, ‘Full’). 
• PRV001 - Outcome of previous review 
• PRV004 - Outcome of previous comparable review 
• PRV006 - Worst judgement in previous comparable review 
• PRV009 - Worst judgement concerning learning in previous comparable review 
• PRV010 - Outcome concerning learning in previous comparable review 
• PRV012 - Outcome concerning information in previous comparable review 
To predict the likelihood of being judged ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’: 
• APA004 – Financial Accounts Type (e.g. ‘Total exemption’, ‘Full’). 
• PRV001 - Outcome of previous review 
• APA002 – Count of the number of outstanding mortgage charges against the provider9. 
• APA014_Ca1i – The change in Net Current Assets/ (Liabilities) since the last set of 
accounts was filed. 
• CON003 - Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to academic 
standards 
To predict the likelihood of being judged ‘meets UK expectations’: 
• APA004 – Financial Accounts Type (e.g. ‘Total exemption’, ‘Full’). 
• PRV002 - Has the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last 
review? 
• PRV003 - Has ever received a negative review? 
• APA001 - Age at time of review. 
• APA009 – Amount of Investments / Stocks (£000’s) held. 
• APA011 – Amount of Cash At Bank And In Hand (£000’s). 
• APA016 - Creditors: Amounts Falling Due After One Year (£000’s). 
• CON002 - Count of QAA concerns raised which do not relate to quality, standards, 
information or enhancement (and are therefore automatically invalid). 
There is significant overlap in the metrics used in each model. In each case the specific probabilities 
are given by: 
                                                          
9 A mortgage charge is the means by which lenders enforce their rights to a property in the event of a debt 
not being paid. The greater the number of outstanding mortgage charges, the greater the number of 
current debtors the company has. 
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𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈 𝑈𝑈𝐾𝐾 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴1 + 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 
Where, to one significant figure: 
𝐴𝐴 =  �−1.8 + (4.6 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴004.𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) − (0.2 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃001.𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆)� + (0.7 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃004.𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶)+ (4.𝑅𝑅 − 14 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃006.𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 ) + (1.𝑅𝑅 − 15 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃009.𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅)+ (4.𝑅𝑅 − 15 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃010.𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅) + (1.𝑅𝑅 − 16 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃012.𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅)) 
APA004.TES = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘Total exemption SMALL’ body by Companies    House, 0 
otherwise 
PRV001.POS = 1 if the outcome of the provider’s previous review is positive, 0 otherwise 
PRV004.NPC =1 if the provider has had no previous comparable review, 0 otherwise 
PRV006.NPR = 1 if the provider has no previous ‘worst judgement’ as they have no previous comparable 
review, 0 otherwise 
PRV009.NPR = 1 if the provider has never previously received a judgement concerning teaching and learning, 
0 otherwise 
PRV010.NPR = 1 if the provider has not received a judgment concerning teaching and learning in a previous 
comparable review, 0 otherwise 
PRV012.NPR = 1 if the provider has never previous been reviewed in relation to the provision of information, 
0 otherwise 
𝑃𝑃(𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈 𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈 𝑈𝑈𝐾𝐾 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵1 + 𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵 
Where, to one significant figure: 
𝐵𝐵 =  (−0.7 +  (0.7 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴004.𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴) − (0.002 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃001.𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆)− (0.08 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴002)+ (0.0003 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴014_𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈1𝑈𝑈) + (2.9 × 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁003 )) 
APA004.SMA = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘SMALL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑈𝑈𝐾𝐾 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶  
Where, to one significant figure: 
𝐶𝐶 =  (2.4 + (0.0002 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴001) + (3.5 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴004.𝐾𝐾𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿) − (1.7 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴004.𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) + (0.0004× 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴009) + (0.001 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴011) − (0.0001 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴016 ) + (0.6 × 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁002)+ (1.8 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃002.𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) + (1.𝑅𝑅 − 14 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃003.𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) 
APA004.FUL = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘FULL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
PRV003.YES = 1 if the provider has ever received a negative review, 0 otherwise 
The large number of metrics contained in the three models makes their interpretation far from 
intuitive. The main effects are that being classified as a ‘Total exemption SMALL’ company for 
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reporting purposes by Companies House and having never had a previous, comparable review 
greatly increase the likelihood of being forecast ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ whereas having 
had a positive previous comparable review reduces the likelihood. The likelihood of being forecast 
‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ increases when classified as ‘SMALL’ by 
Companies House, QAA concerns have been upheld in relation to academic standards at the 
provider, and, somewhat counterintuitively, when a provider has seen an increase in their net 
assets since their last set of accounts was submitted. Conversely, the likelihood of being judged 
‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ is reduced by having a positive previous review 
outcome and, albeit by a very small amount, having outstanding mortgage charges. Finally, the 
chances of a provider being forecast to be ‘Meets UK expectations’ are increased by being large 
with a strong financial position, having had invalid QAA concerns raised against them, and having 
had a negative outcome for their last review. Perhaps more logically than for the other two 
models, the chances of being forecast to be ‘Meets UK expectations’ are reduced by being small 
and having large payments to make within one year. 
7.3.3. Evaluating the Model 
Evaluating the model becomes far more challenging when we are attempting to predict the 
likelihood of three outcomes, i.e. ‘Meets UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to meet UK 
expectations’, or ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, rather than two, i.e ‘satisfactory’ or 
‘unsatisfactory’. To understand why, it is easiest to consider the practical challenges of 
implementing a risk-based approach centred on a model predicting the likelihood of three 
outcomes occuring. The first challenge is defining what is a successful prediction? Should one class 
predicting ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ as a poor outcome when the result is that the provider 
actually ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’? Similarly, how should the providers be 
prioritised? If one provider has a 30% predicted likelihood of being ‘Requires improvement to 
meet UK expectations’ and a 30% predicted likelihood of being ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ 
should that be prioritised over an second provider with a 40% predicted likelihood of being ‘Does 
not meet UK expectations’ and 60% likelihood of being ‘Meets UK expectations’? The former has 
the higher overall likelihood of being ‘unsatisfactory’ whereas the latter has a higher likelihood of 
being the most severe level of ‘unsatisfactory’. Such practical, normative challenges translate to 
the model evaluation. An ROC curve is based upon correct and incorrect predictions, if a correct 
prediction cannot be defined then an ROC curve cannot be developed. If one defines a correct 
prediction as the the most likely outcome occurs, then a model which successfully predicts a large 
number of providers will be ‘unsatisfactory’ but gets the ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ / 
‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ classification wrong will be evaluated as worse 
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than a model which does a far worse job of predicting ‘satisfactory’ versus ‘unsatisfactory’ 
providers, but correctly identifies the precise class when it does get them correct. 
7.3.3.1. Testing the Fit of the Model 
As Figure 7.15 below illustrates, visualising the model predictions and review outcomes for our 
representative training data set of 211 reviews is far more challenging when considering three 
dimensions compared to two: 
 
Figure 7.15: A 3D plot of each provider’s review outcome and predicted probability of being judged ‘Does 
not mee UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ or ‘Meets UK expectations’. 
Each circle indicates and individual alternative provider and the blue, yellow or orange colour of the circle 
indicate the provider was judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to meet UK 
expectations’, or ‘Meets UK expectations’ respectively.  
All reviews except two are clustered in the top-left corner of the plot with a predicted probability 
that they will be judged ‘Meets UK expectations’ of greater than 80%. The narrow range of 
predicted proababilities in the best possible model suggests a weak relationship between the 
metrics and the categorical outcome of the academic standards question of QAA reviews. 
Clearly interpreting the model with three possible outcomes, and hence in three dimensions, is 
challenging (and would be even more so if the fourth ‘Commended’ outcome was applicable to 
the academic standards question). A more straightforward way to evaluate how well the model 
fits the data with which it was developed is to see how many reviews would have been required 
236 
 
to succesfully prioritise the reviews of all providers who are judged either ‘Does not meet UK 
expectations’ or ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’. The prioritisation can 
realistically be done in two ways. The reviews could be prioritised either by the combined 
probability of being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or ‘Requires improvement to meet 
UK expectations’, or simply by the probability of being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’. 
Both of these options are explored in turn below. 
Figure 7.18 and Table 7.5 below show that when the reviews are priotrised by the combined 
probability of a provider being judged either ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or ‘Requires 
improvement to meet UK expectations’, 101 out of the 211 reviews in the training data set would 
have been required to identify all the providers judged either ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or 
‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’. Whether one views success in terms of 
identifying all ‘unsatisfactory’ provision or the less stringent identification of a high-risk group 
containing a greater proportion of the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers than a low-risk group, the model 
performs reasonably well. The range of predicted probabilities is again very narrow and the lack 
of certainty in the model is reflected in another high error rate: 79 out of the 101 (78%) providers 
prioritised would have been reviewed unnecessarily but this would still have meant – if operating 
with perfect hindsight and the ability to stop reviewing immediately after the last ‘unsatisfactory’ 
provider had been identified - the QAA could have avoided 110 unnecesary reviews. Everyone of 




Figure 7.16: Predicted probabilities for each of the 211 complete, comparable reviews used to train the 
model, ordered by the combined proability of being judged either ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or 
‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectation’, and their actual outcome. 
Predicted Probability of Outcome Number of Judgements 





















91.28% 0.08% 91.21% 8.72% 0 1 0 
45.14% 44.37% 0.76% 54.86% 1 1 1 
27.30% 8.30% 18.99% 72.70% 1 2 1 
24.92% 9.40% 15.52% 75.08% 1 3 8 
24.90% 9.63% 15.27% 75.10% 1 4 8 
24.59% 9.51% 15.08% 75.41% 1 5 8 
24.52% 9.51% 15.01% 75.48% 2 5 9 
24.47% 9.43% 15.04% 75.53% 2 6 9 
24.36% 9.46% 14.89% 75.64% 3 6 10 
24.28% 9.41% 14.87% 75.72% 3 7 10 
23.88% 9.29% 14.59% 76.12% 3 8 13 
23.79% 8.68% 15.12% 76.21% 4 8 13 
23.62% 9.33% 14.29% 76.38% 5 8 14 
23.12% 8.94% 14.18% 76.88% 6 8 16 
22.86% 8.82% 14.04% 77.14% 7 8 17 
19.18% 3.82% 15.36% 80.82% 7 9 35 
17.54% 6.77% 10.76% 82.46% 7 10 46 
17.39% 6.73% 10.66% 82.61% 7 11 46 
16.95% 6.57% 10.38% 83.05% 7 12 50 
15.86% 5.76% 10.10% 84.14% 7 13 51 
15.65% 6.04% 9.61% 84.35% 8 13 51 
7.96% 0.59% 7.37% 92.04% 8 14 79 
Table 7.5: The number of ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to meet UK 
expectations’ and ‘Meets UK expectations’judgement that would have resulted from decreasing the 
threshold – defined as the probability of being judged either ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or ‘Requires 
improvement to meet UK expectations’ – required to prompt an alternative provider review. 
Figure 7.17 and Table 7.6 below show that prioritising reviews based on the predicted probability 
of a provider being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ – a feasible approach for any oversight 
body whose priority is to visit the worst providers first, then visit the less severe ‘Requires 
improvement to meet UK expectations’ providers next – yields slightly worse results that 
prioritising the providers based on the combined probability. Due to two outliers, 183 reviews 
would need to be prioritised in order to review all of the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers. In this scenario 
161 out of the 183 (88%) providers prioiritised would have been reviewed unnecessarily. Under 
this prioritisation approach the eight providers judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ would 
have all been reviewed after 63 reviews, marginally fewer than the 72 reviews under the first 
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approach. 20 of the 22 unsatisfactory providers would have still been prioritised as part of the 
50% of riskiest providers however. 
 
Figure 7.17: Predicted probabilities for each of the 211 complete, comparable reviews used to train the 
model, ordered by the combined proability of being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, and their 
actual outcome. 



















44.37% 0.76% 54.86% 1 0 1 
9.63% 15.27% 75.10% 1 1 6 
9.51% 15.08% 75.41% 1 2 8 
9.51% 15.01% 75.48% 2 2 8 
9.46% 14.89% 75.64% 3 2 9 
9.43% 15.04% 75.53% 3 3 10 
9.41% 14.87% 75.72% 3 4 10 
9.40% 15.52% 75.08% 3 5 10 
9.33% 14.29% 76.38% 4 5 13 
9.29% 14.59% 76.12% 4 6 14 
8.94% 14.18% 76.88% 5 6 15 
8.82% 14.04% 77.14% 6 6 17 
8.68% 15.12% 76.21% 7 6 19 
8.30% 18.99% 72.70% 7 7 23 
6.77% 10.76% 82.46% 7 8 40 
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6.73% 10.66% 82.61% 7 9 41 
6.57% 10.38% 83.05% 7 10 41 
6.04% 9.61% 84.35% 8 10 45 
5.76% 10.10% 84.14% 8 11 45 
3.82% 15.36% 80.82% 8 12 62 
0.59% 7.37% 92.04% 8 13 119 
0.08% 91.21% 8.72% 8 14 161 
Table 7.6: The number of ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to meet UK 
expectations’ and ‘Meets UK expectations’judgment that would have resulted from decreasing the 
threshold – defined as the probability of being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ – required to 
prompt an alternative provider review. 
Interestingly, regardless of how the more granular predictions are used to prioritise reviews, the 
model cannot effectively differentiate the providers judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ and 
the providers judged ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’. This defeats the main 
purporse of the more granular probabilities: prioritising of the more serious ‘Does not meet UK 
expectations’ cases first. No matter which probability, or combination of probabilities, is used to 
prioritise reviews it is again the case that the distribution of predicted probabilities is very flat with 
only one provider having a predicted probability of being ‘unsatisfactory’ greater than 50%. 
Despite the lack of certainty in the model’s predictions, and the high error rate associated with it, 
all the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers would have been prioritised in the first 50% of reviews when the 
combined probability was used to determine the order of reviews. Whether this was good fortune, 
or the result of genuine underlying relationships between the metrics and review outcomes, will 
be made clearer by applying the model to the test data. 
7.3.3.2. Assessing the Model’s Predictions 
To test the academic standards model 30% of the reviews were held back. Figure 7.18 and Table 
7.7 show how the model performed on the test data when the reviews are ordered by the 
combined probability of a provider being judged either ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or 




Figure 7.18: Predicted probabilities for each of the 90 complete, comparable reviews used to test the 
model, ordered by the combined proability of being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, and their 
actual outcome. 
Predicted Probability of Outcome Number of Judgements 





















24.43% 9.47% 14.96% 75.57% 1 0 5 
23.95% 9.60% 14.35% 76.05% 1 1 6 
23.77% 9.20% 14.57% 76.23% 1 2 6 
23.60% 9.30% 14.30% 76.40% 1 3 8 
22.75% 8.80% 13.95% 77.25% 1 4 11 
22.00% 8.52% 13.48% 78.00% 2 4 11 
16.55% 6.10% 10.45% 83.45% 2 5 22 
14.27% 2.95% 11.32% 85.73% 2 6 27 
4.13% 1.53% 2.60% 95.87% 3 6 42 
Table 7.7: The number of ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to meet UK 
expectations’ and ‘Meets UK expectations’judgement that would have resulted from decreasing the 
threshold – defined as the probability of being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ – required to 
prompt an alternative provider review. 
The same pattern that was witnessed when assessing the fit of the model is apparent in the test 
data. This matching pattern provides reassurance that the model has identified true patterns in 
the data without also incorporating the statistical noise and random variation. When prioritised 
in order of the combined probability of being judged either ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or 
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‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ all ‘unsatisfactory’ providers would have been 
reviewed by the point 51 of the 90 reviews had taken place. This means that, had the QAA 
conducted these reviews and stopped at the optimal point 41 reviews of ‘satisfactory’ providers 
could have been avoided. Of the 51 reviews that would have taken place however, 42 (82%) would 
have been of ‘satisfactory’ providers. All but one of the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers were in the 
riskiest half of providers. Whilst the model struggles to accurately predict whether individual 
providers will be ‘unsatisfactory’, it is able to identify a high-risk group which will contain the 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers along with four times as many ‘satisfactory’ providers. Seemingly, all 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers share certain characteristics, but only 20% of providers with those 
characteristics are ‘unsatisfactory’. As with each model in this chapter two further tests – assessing 
the model’s predictions with the new data and at a specific point in time - would be beneficial but 
were not possible.  
7.3.3.3. Binary Model 
The fact that the granular model’s best predictions come from combining the probabilities of 
being ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ and ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’, 
and that model fails to effectively differentiate between providers judged ‘Does not meet UK 
expectations’ and providers judged ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’, raises an 
obvious question: is the more complex to interpret and maintain granular model worth the 
additional effort over the binary ‘satisfactory’ / ‘unsatisfactory’ model?  
The optimal binary model for the academic standards question contained six metrics: 
• APA001 - Age at time of review. 
• APA004 – Financial Accounts Type (e.g. ‘Total exemption’, ‘Full’). 
• APA011 – Amount of Cash At Bank And In Hand (£000’s). 
• PRV002 - Has the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last 
review? 
• CON002 - Count of QAA concerns raised which do not relate to quality, standards, 
information or enhancement (and are therefore automatically invalid). 
• CON003 - Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to academic 
standards 
As expected there is some overlap with the model for the overall review outcome. The binary 
academic standards model contains three of the four metrics that comprise the overall model. 
The specific probability of each provider being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ is given by: 
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𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴1 + 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 
Where: 
𝐴𝐴 =  �−2.0 −  (0.0002 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴001) + (0.92 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴004.𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) − (0.99 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴004.𝐾𝐾𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿)�
− (0.0005 × 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴011) −  (1.72 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃001.𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 ) − (0.62 × 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁002)+ (2.68 × 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁003)) 
APA004.TES = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘Total exemption SMALL’ body by Companies    House, 0 
otherwise 
APA004.FUL = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘FULL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
PRV001.POS = 1 if the outcome of the provider’s previous review is positive, 0 otherwise 
The model has an impressive ROC ‘area under the curve’ value of 0.842. Figure 7.19 and Table 7.8 
below show the performance of the model on the data with which it was developed: 
 
Figure 7.19: Predicted probabilities for each of the 211 complete, comparable reviews used to train the 


























































n 67.62% 1 0 0.90 
18.52% 5 10 0.87 
18.35% 9 13 0.88 
18.10% 13 20 0.86 
16.33% 17 50 0.74 
15.53% 20 56 0.73 
7.25% 21 90 0.57 
7.15% 22 91 0.57 
Table 7.8: The number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ alterntative provider reviews that would have 
resulted from decreasing the threshold required to prompt a review (only select points are shown). 
Considering the outcome of the academic standards question at a binary level results in very 
similar performance. When prioritised in order of the predicted likelihood of being 
‘unsatisfactory’, 113 out of the 211 reviews in the training data set would have been required to 
identify all the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers. This is only 12 more than for the more granular model 
and identifying all ‘unsatisfactory’ provision despite being far simpler. 91 out of the 113 (80.5%) 
providers prioritised would have been reviewed unnecessarily which is a marginally higher error 
rate than for the more granular model (78%). All but two of the 22 ‘unsatisfactory’ providers were 
in the riskiest 50% of providers. 
As shown in Figure 7.20 and Table 7.9 below, the model performs similarly when applied to the 




Figure 7.20: Predicted probabilities for each of the 90 complete, comparable reviews in the withheld test 
data set and their actual outcome. 
  




















































23.20% 1 2 0.89 
22.84% 2 3 0.89 
22.79% 3 4 0.89 
22.73% 4 5 0.89 
22.36% 5 5 0.90 
21.97% 6 6 0.90 
20.95% 7 10 0.87 
16.91% 8 22 0.74 
4.40% 9 52 0.42 
Table 7.9: The number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ alterntative provider reviews that would have 
resulted from decreasing the threshold required to prompt a review (only select points are shown) when 
applied to the testing data. 
The more granular model is therefore only marginally more accurate than the binary ‘satisfactory’ 
/ ‘unsatisfactory’ model for the academic standards review question. Despite the more granular 
model being far more complex to interpret and requiring more effort to maintain, it fails to 
succesfully differentiate between providers judged to be ‘Does not meet UK expectation’ or 
‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ to allow for the better targetting of resource: 





The individual metrics that were significant predictors of academic standards followed a now 
familiar pattern and demonstrated which providers were most likely to be ‘satisfactory’ but were 
of limited use in identifying providers judged either ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or ‘Requires 
improvement to meet UK expectations’. Both the λmin and λ1se granular models were complicated 
to interpret and intially appeared to slightly overfit the data with the inclusion of metrics with 
questionable coefficients. The λmin model explored in this section contained 16 metrics covering 
each of the three key data sources: finance, QAA concerns and previous review performance.  
When the reviews were prioritised based on the combined probability of being judged ‘Does not 
meet UK expectations’ or ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ all such providers 
were prioritised in the riskiest half of providers. Promisingly the same was true when the model 
was applied to the test data not used in the development of the model. The model had a high 
error rate which suggests that all ‘unsatisfactory’ providers share some charactertistics, but those 
characteristics are shared by four times as many ‘satisfactory’ providers making accurate 
prioritisation impossible. Furthermore, the model struggled to successfully differentiate between 
those providers that were judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ and those that were judged 
‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’. 
The answer to the question posed at the start of this section:  
Using naturally-complete metrics, could the exact outcome of QAA reviews of academic 
standards at alternative providers have been successfully predicted?  
is no: the exact ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to meet UK 
expectations’ and ‘Meets UK expectations’ outcomes could not be predicted. On a positive note, 
the binary ‘satisfactory’/ ‘unsatisfactory’ outcome for the academic standards review question 
was better predicted by both the granular and binary models. 
The fact that the question-level analysis was marginally more accurate than the review-level 
model suggests that it is worth exploring the data at question level for the two remaining areas 
where there is sufficient data: teaching and learning and the provision of information. It has 
already been discussed that there are significant normative challenges working with predicted 
probabilities of outcomes as granular as question (e.g. academic standards, teaching and learning, 
etc.) and specific outcome-level (e.g. ‘Does not meet UK expectations’, ‘Requires improvement to 
meet UK expectations’). The fact that best results come from combining the predicted 
probabilities of the provider being judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or ‘Requires 
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improvement to meet UK expectations’, coupled with the challenges of operating an approach at 
a finer level, suggests that the best way forward is to assess the two remaining questions but at 
the binary ‘satisfactory’/ ‘unsatisfactory’ level. 
 
7.4. Results – Teaching and Learning 
Using naturally-complete metrics, could the aggregated outcome of QAA reviews of teaching 
and learning at alternative providers have been successfully predicted? 
7.4.1. Initial Data Exploration 
The first step in the analysis was to examine how similar the outcome of the teaching and learning 
question was to the overall outcome of reviews of alternative providers.  
 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory 
 
Does not meet 
UK expectations 
Requires improvement 
to meet UK expectations 
Meets UK 
expectations Commended 
Overall review outcome 41 264 
Teaching and Learning outcome 10 18 276 1 
Table 7.10: The results for the overall outcome and teaching and learning section of each alternative 
provider review. 
With 28 out of 41 providers judged ‘unsatisfactory’ overall having also been judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to teaching and learning it is likely the models for predicting the 
outcome of the overall review and the outcome of the teaching and learning question will be 
similar. 
The second step in the analysis was to explore which individual metrics had a strong relationship 
with the ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’ outcome of the teaching and learning review question. 
The only metrics with a p-value less than 0.25 were financial metrics developed from the 
providers’ accounts: 
Metric Code Metric Description P-value 
APA001 Age at time of review 0.035 
APA002 Number of outstanding mortgage charges 0.140 
Table 7.11: A breakdown of all metrics from the teaching and learning data set with a p-value of less than 
0.25. 
Two significant metrics is fewer than there were for the outcome of the review overall and for the 
academic standards question. The provider’s age at the time of the review was a significant metric 
in both previous analyses and makes intuitive sense when thought of as a proxy for experience. 
The APA002 – Number of outstanding mortgage charges metric was not a significant individual 
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predictor of either the overall review outcome or the academic standards question. Figure 7.21 
below shows that the metrics’ significance in relation to teaching and learning is a quirk of the 
data: providers with a greater number of outstanding mortgage charges have in the past been less 
likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’. This makes little intuitive sense. There is no obvious reason why those 
providers with fewer existing debts would be more likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to 
teaching and learning. Having four or more outstanding mortgage charges is rare, and of those 
few providers that have four or more, none have been found unsatisfactory’ with regards teaching 
and learning. 
 
Figure 7.21: Each provider’s count of outstanding mortgage charges at the time of their review and the 
outcome of the teaching and learning question of that review. 
 
7.4.2. Fitting the Model 







Figure 7.22: The diagnostic plots for the λ1se (left) and λmin (right) model for the binary teaching and 
learning model. 
 
The λmin and λ1se models are very similar and neither seem to overfit the data so the preference is 
for the more accurate λmin model. This model contains six metrics including both significant metrics 
discussed above and four of the six metrics that make up the binary academic standards model.  
• APA001 - Age at time of review. 
• APA002 – Count of the number of outstanding mortgage charges against the provider. 
• APA004 – Financial Accounts Type (e.g. ‘Total exemption’, ‘Full’). 
• PRV002 - Has the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last 
review? 
• PRV003 - Has ever received a negative review? 
• CON002 - Count of QAA concerns raised which do not relate to quality, standards, 
information or enhancement (and are therefore automatically invalid). 
The specific λmin model calculates the probability of an unsatisfactory review as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴1 + 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 




APA004.FUL = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘FULL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
APA004.GRP = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘GROUP’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
APA004.SMA = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘SMALL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
APA004.TES = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘Total exemption SMALL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
PRV002.YES = 1 if the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last review, 0 otherwise 
PRV003.YES =1 if the provider has ever received a negative review, 0 otherwise 
As the coefficients for the APA004.SMA and APA004.TES metrics are positive, the likelihood of 
receiving an ‘unsatisfactory’ review will increase for small providers. Conversely, the likelihood 
will decrease for providers classed as ‘Full’ or ‘Group’ and also, counterintuitively, for those 
providers that have either previously been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last 
review, have ever received a negative review, or have ever been the subject of an invalid QAA 
Concern. Each of these metrics and their possible links with quality assurance processes have been 
discsussed in previous sections and so will not be discussed again here.  
7.4.3. Evaluating the Model 
7.4.3.1. Testing the Fit of the Model 
Figure 7.24 below shows the ROC curve for this model when applied to the data used to develop 
it. The ‘area under the curve’ value of 0.753 suggests a reasonable rate of ‘unsatisfactory’ 
alternative providers being succesfully prioritised as the threshold criteria for triggering a review 
is lowered. The shape of the ‘curve’, with the majority of the area under the curve being created 
on the righthand side of the plot, indicates a high proportion of early predictions were incorrect 





Figure 7.23: The ROC curve for the λmin model fitted to the training data set for teaching and learning. 
Figure 7.24 and Table 7.10 below show the effect of lowering the threshold required for the 
model’s predicted probability of a provider being ‘unsatisfactory’ to trigger a review and confirm 
the pattern suggested above by the ROC curve. 
 
Figure 7.24: Predicted probabilities for each of the 215 complete, comparable teaching and learning 
review questions used to train the model and their actual outcome. 
  

















































n 17.50% 1 0 0.91 
14.66% 4 17 0.85 
14.30% 8 37 0.77 
13.30% 12 59 0.69 
12.51% 16 70 0.66 
9.64% 20 103 0.52 
Table 7.12: The number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews that would have resulted from 
decreasing the threshold required to prompt a review concerning teaching and learning. 
The model performs relatively poorly to begin with prioritsing a number of ‘satisfactory’ providers 
amongst the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers but a collection of ‘unsatisfactory’ providers in the second 
quartile means that all but one ‘unsatisfactory’ provider are prioritised in the top 45% of riskiest 
providers. Once the one outlying provider has been prioritised all ‘unsatisfactory’ providers would 
be categorised in the top 57.5% of providers by risk. Had the system been implemented perfectly 
with the review activity being ceased immediately after the final ‘unsatisfactory’ review had been 
undertaken this would have resulted in an error rate of 103 / (20 + 103) = 83.7%. Whilst this figure 
is unlikely to sit well with alternative providers categorised as high risk, it could have prevented 
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92 reviews of ‘satisfactory’ providers. Indeed, all bar one of the ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews resided in 
the riskiest 50% of providers. Once more the narrow range of predicted probabilities, the 
subsequent high error rate, and the fact that that all bar one ‘unsatisfactory’ review was in the 
riskiest 50% of providers suggests there are characteristics shared by ‘unsatisfactory’ providers, 
but unfortunately these characteristics are shared by a far greater number of ‘satisfactory’ 
providers. 
7.4.3.2. Assessing the Model’s Predictions 
More important than how well the model fits the data with which it was developed is how well it 
performs when making new predictions. The model performs poorly. The ROC curve which passes 
below the 45 degree line towards the end indicating that – at that point – the QAA would be better 
off doing the opposite of what the model suggests. The curve does recover and finish above the 
45 degree line; however, the low area under the curve value of 0.610 indicates that the model is 
ineffective. 
 
Figure 7.25: The ROC curve for the λmin model fitted to the test data set. 





Figure 7.26: The predicted probabilities and actual outcomes of the teaching and learning question for 
reviews contained in the testing set. 






14.69% 1 8 
14.53% 2 11 
13.40% 3 20 
13.37% 4 20 
11.97% 5 34 
10.29% 6 42 
7.38% 7 49 
1.31% 8 75 
Table 7.13: The number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews that would have resulted from 
decreasing the threshold required to prompt a review concerning teaching and learning. 
Although half of the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers would have been identified having undertaken just 
over a quarter – 24 out of 90 – reviews, to have identified the remaining half of ‘unsatisfactory’ 
providers nearly all - 83 of the 90 - providers would have had to have been reviewed. Just 5 out of 
8 of the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers were amongst the riskiest 50% of providers. 
The relationships between the selected metrics and the outcome of the teaching and learning 
review question suggested by the model were seemingly just chance relations in the subset of 






The best model calculated the predicted probability of an alternative provider being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to their teaching and learning based on previous review performance, 
the age, size and financial position of the provider, and the number of invalid QAA concerns raised 
against them. The model determined the predicted likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴1 + 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 
where: A = -2.08 + (-1.28 x APA004.FUL) + (-0.11 x APA004.GRP) + (0.80xAPA004.SMA) + (0.47 x APA004.TES) +      (-0.81 x PRV002.YES) + (-0.43 x PRV003.YES) + (-0.00006 x APA001) + (-0.14 x APA002) + (-0.63 x CON002) 
and: 
APA004.FUL = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘FULL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
APA004.GRP = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘GROUP’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
APA004.SMA = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘SMALL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
APA004.TES = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘Total exemption SMALL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
PRV002.YES = 1 if the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last review, 0 otherwise 
PRV003.YES =1 if the provider has ever received a negative review, 0 otherwise 
Whilst the model was a good fit for the data with which it was developed, it performed poorly on 
the testing data suggesting the initial good fit was the result of chance relations in the data set 
rather than any significant underlying pattern. As with the majority of models seen so far, this 
model faces significant challenges in that a significant number of ‘satisfactory’ reviews would have 
to be prioritised in order to successfully identify all the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers and only just 
over half – 5 out of 8 – ‘unsatisfactory’ providers were identified in the riskiest half of providers. 
Therefore, the answer to the question 
Using naturally-complete metrics, could the aggregated outcome of QAA reviews 
of teaching and learning at alternative providers have been successfully predicted?  
is no. Regardless of our definition of success the best available model performed poorly.  
In seeking to determine which metrics, if any, would have successfully predicted the overall 
outcome of QAA reviews of teaching and learning at alternative providers, this analysis has 
considered all metrics with a feasible link to quality assurance, even those not centrally available 
and requiring significant resource to source and process, not just in their absolute state but also 
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modified to account for changes over time. The best predictive model was still not able to 
successfully identify a high-risk group of providers who were significantly more likely to be judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to teaching and learning than the low-risk group.  
Of the two question-level analyses conducted thus far one has been slightly more accurate than 
the overall model and the other has been poor. The next stage is to conduct the final question-
level analysis. 
 
7.5. Results – The Provision of Information 
Using naturally-complete metrics, could the aggregated outcome of QAA reviews of the 
provision of information at alternative providers have been successfully predicted? 
7.5.1. Initial Data Exploration 
The outcome of the provision of information question overlaps less with the overall review 
outcomes when compared with the academic standards and teaching and learning review 
questions. Table 7.12 below shows that of 41 reviews which were ‘unsatisfactory’ overall, 22 were 
‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to the provision of information.  
 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory 
 
Does not meet 
UK expectations 
Requires improvement 
to meet UK expectations 
Meets UK 
expectations Commended 
Overall review outcome 41 264 
Provision of information 21 1 283 0 
Table 7.14: The results for the overall outcome and the provision of information section of each 
alternative provider review. 
Closer inspection reveals that 16 of the 21 providers judged ‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to the 
provision of information were also judged ‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to academic standards. It is 
therefore probable that the provision of information model and a binary ‘satisfactory’ / 
‘unsatisfactory’ model for the academic standards question would be similar. 
Six metrics had a p-value less than 0.25: five finance metrics, two of which were not significant 






Metric Code Metric Description P-value 
APA009 Investments / Stocks 0.000 
APA001 Age at time of review 0.020 
APA011 Cash At Bank And In Hand 0.081 
APA013 Creditors: Amounts Falling Due Within One Year 0.085 
APA002 Outstanding Mortgage Charges 0.159 
APA006 Tangible Assets 0.200 
Table 7.15: A breakdown of all metrics from the provision of information data set with a p-value of less 
than 0.25. 
As expected given the overlap in question-level outcomes, five of the six significant metrics were 
also significant in the academic standards analysis. The more significant of the two metrics not yet 
shown in detail – APA013 Creditors: amount falling due within one year – is shown in Figure 7.27 
below. 
 
Figure 7.27: The amount each provider has falling due to creditors within one year at the time of their 
review and the outcome of their review. 
The distribution is similar to the APA001 – Cash at bank and in hand metric. Moreover, the pattern 
is now extremely familiar: a subset of ‘satisfactory’ providers can be identified but the 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers are distributed evenly amongst a large number of ‘satisfactory’ 
providers. The metric is therefore of limited use in accurately identifying ‘unsatisfactory’ provision. 
7.5.2. Fitting the Model 
The λmin  model contains eight metrics, five fewer than the λ1se model which appears to be 




Figure 7.28: The diagnostic plots for the λ1se (left) and λmin (right) model for the provision of information 
model. 
The λmin  model contains the following metrics: 
• APA004 - Accounts Type 
• PRV002 - Has been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last review 
• PRV003 - Has ever received a negative review 
• APA001 - Age at time of review 
• APA002 - Outstanding Mortgage Charges 
• APA011 - Cash At Bank And In Hand 
• APA018 - One-year change in total net assets/(liabilities) 
• CON002 - Count of QAA concerns raised which do not relate to quality, standards, 
information or enhancement (and are therefore automatically invalid) 
Financial ill-health, a lack of experience, and student concerns reported to QAA (albeit concerns 
not relating to systematic quality assurance failings) could all feasibly lead to an increased 
likelihood of quality assurance failures. The specific λmin model is similar to the models seen 
already in this chapter with a small number of additional metrics and calculates the probability of 
an ‘unsatisfactory’ review as: 




A = -2. 72 +  (-0.00005 x APA001) + (-0.03 x APA002) + (-0.65 x APA004.FUL) + (0.83 x APA004.TES) +         (-0.00003 x APA011) + (-0.0001 x APA018_Ca1) + (-0.4 x PRV002.YES) + (-0.38 x PRV003.YES) + (-0.08 x CON002) 
and: 
APA004.FUL = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘FULL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
APA004.TES = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘Total exemption SMALL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
PRV002.YES = 1 if the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last review, 0 otherwise 
PRV003.YES = 1 if the provider has ever received a negative review, 0 otherwise 
As was the case for the earlier questions in this chapter providers classed as ‘Total Exemption 
SMALL’ are more likely to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ and providers classed as ‘FULL’ are less likely 
to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’. The older the provider and the healthier its finances the less likely it 
is to be found ‘unsatisfactory’. As with the previous teaching and learning model, those providers 
who have been the subject of an inappropriate QAA concern are less likely to be ‘unsatisfactory’.   
7.5.3. Evaluating the Model 
7.5.3.1. Testing the Fit of the Model 
Figure 7.29 below shows the ROC curve for this model when applied to the data used to develop 
it. The fairly impressive ‘area under the curve’ value of 0.797 suggests a reasonable rate of 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers being succesfully prioritised as the threshold criteria for triggering a 
review is lowered.  
 
Figure 7.29: The ROC curve for the λmin model fitted to the training data set for the provision of 
information. 
Figure 7.30 and Table 7.14 below show the effect of lowering the threshold required for the 




Figure 7.30: Predicted probabilities for each of the 230 complete, comparable provision of information 
review questions used to train the model and their actual outcome. 
 
  



















































12.71% 1 0 0.93 
12.48% 4 10 0.90 
12.22% 7 28 0.83 
11.85% 10 41 0.79 
11.39% 13 57 0.73 
5.70% 16 107 0.53 
4.51% 17 133 0.42 
Table 7.16: The number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews that would have resulted from 
decreasing the threshold required to prompt a review concerning the provision of information (only select 
points are shown). 
The model performs reasonably well with all but two of the 17 ‘unsatisfactory’ providers in the 
training data set are grouped together amongst the higher risk providers. However, the predicted 
probabilities vary even less than in the earlier models where the range was already concerningly 
narrow. Moreover, if no ‘unsatisfactory’ provision is deemed acceptable then, even with perfect 
hindsight, 133 ‘satisfactory’ providers would be reviewed before all 17 ‘unsatisfactory’ providers 
were. This represents an error rate of 133 / (133 + 17) = 88.7% amongst those providers prioritised 
for review: a rate likely unacceptable to providers. Once more it appears what little weak 
relationship there is between ‘unsatisfactory’ providers and the metrics also exists for nine times 
as many ‘satisfactory’ providers. 
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7.5.3.2. Assessing the Model’s Predictions 
Thirty per cent of the reviews of alternative providers which assessed the provision of information 
were held back when developing the model specifically to test its performance. It is apparent from 
Figure 7.32 below that the model performs well on the testing data. Indeed, with an area under 
the curve value of 0.829, the model performs marginally better on the withheld testing data than 
on the training data with which it was developed. 
 
Figure 7.31: The ROC curve for the λmin model fitted to the testing data set for the provision of information. 





Figure 7.32: The predicted probabilities and actual outcomes of the provision of information review 
questions contained in the testing set. 
  





















































12.59% 1 3 0.91 
12.49% 2 5 0.89 
12.47% 3 5 0.91 
12.42% 4 5 0.92 
4.31% 5 42 0.44 
Table 7.17: The number of ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews that would have resulted from 
decreasing the threshold required to prompt a review concerning the provision of information. 
The model does a good job of prioritising four out of the five ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews very early 
on; however, the final ‘unsatisfactory’ provider would not have been reviewed until 42 
‘satisfactory’ providers had been incorrectly prioritised. This results in a very high error rate of 
89.4%. As with previous models, it appears that the majority, but not all, providers judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ for the information question share some similar characteristics; however, so too 
do many times more ‘satisfactory’ providers. Further caution must also be expressed as it is not 
possible to assess the predictions of the model at a specific point in time in order to gauge if the 
relationships in the model may exist only amongst those alternative providers reviewed. It has 
also not been possible to assess the models performance against new data to determine whether 




The best model calculated the predicted probability of an alternative provider being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to their provision of information based on previous review 
performance, the age, size and financial position of the provider, and the number of QAA concerns 
relating to academic standards upheld against them. The model determined the predicted 
likelihood of being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴1 + 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 
where: A = -2. 72 +  (-0.00005 x APA001) + (-0.03 x APA002) + (-0.65 x APA004.FUL) + (0.83 x APA004.TES) +         (-0.00003 x APA011) + (-0.0001 x APA018_Ca1) + (-0.4 x PRV002.YES) + (-0.38 x PRV003.YES) + (-0.08 x CON002) 
and: 
APA004.FUL = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘FULL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
APA004.TES = 1 if the provider is classified as a ‘Total exemption SMALL’ body by Companies House, 0 otherwise 
PRV002.YES = 1 if the provider been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last review, 0 otherwise 
PRV003.YES = 1 if the provider has ever received a negative review, 0 otherwise 
Nearly all providers judged ‘unsatisfactory’ in relation to the provision of information question 
were prioritised amongst the most risky both in the training and testing data sets implying it is 
based on genuine relations in the data. This relationship was not universal however and a minority 
of ‘unsatisfactory’ providers were deemed a low priority. As with the preceding models, there 
appears to be a weak relationship between the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers and the metrics, but the 
characteristics shared by ‘unsatisfactory’ providers are also shared by many times more 
‘satisfactory’ providers resulting in a high error rate. Therefore, the answer to the question 
Using naturally-complete metrics, could the aggregated outcome of QAA reviews of 
the provision of information at alternative providers have been successfully 
predicted?  
is once more dependent on how success is defined. If it were deemed acceptable that two out of 
the 17 ‘unsatisfactory’ providers went unreviewed, then, with perfect hindsight, 85 ‘satisfactory’ 
providers could also have been spared a review. To have reviewed all 17 ‘unsatisfactory’ providers 
however would have required the QAA to have conducted 150 reviews, 133 of which would have 
resulted in a ‘satisfactory’ judgement. These two approaches, even with the benefit of perfect 
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hindsight, still had very high error rates of 80.5% and 88.7% respectively, neither of which are 
likely to be accepted by providers.  
 
7.6. Overall Summary 
Alternative providers are responsible for a small but growing proportion of UK higher education. 
The limited data requirements placed on alternative providers means that very little is known 
about their provision; this poses a challenge to developing a data-driven, risk-based approach. 
One aspect of the alternative provider data set that is advantageous is the number of reviews, 
and moreover the number of ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews, that have taken place. This has allowed 
for the exploration of whether previous QAA review outcomes could have been predicted at 
both review and question level and also for testing data to be held back for validating any 
models.  
If the QAA were to make decisions on which providers to review based on the analysis of how 
likely each provider was to perform on each of the four review questions they would face a 
number of normative challenges. Each of the hundreds of providers would have a ‘risk profile’ 




opportunities Information Enhancement 
Commended N/A 1.2% 31.8% 0.3% 
Meets 83.5% 43.8% 49.0% 92.3% 
Requires improvement 6.9% 32.6% 5.7% 6.8% 
Does not meet 9.6% 22.4% 13.5% 0.6% 
Table 7.18: Example probabilities of being judged each possible outcome for each question in a QAA 
review. 
Should a provider which is likely to be ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ on one question but ‘Meets 
UK expectations’ for the remaining three questions be prioritised over another provider likely to 
be ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’ for two questions and ‘Meets UK 
expectations’ for the remaining two questions? Determining which providers should be prioritised 
over others inevitably results in aggregating the data. What’s more, there is no difference in the 
burden imposed on providers when being reviewed in relation to one targeted question or 
comprehensively reviewed on all four questions (HEFCE, 2012, 74). Our first question was 
therefore: 
1. Could the overall outcome of QAA alternative provider reviews have been successfully 
predicted using metrics? 
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The best model calculated the predicted probability of an alternative provider being judged 
‘unsatisfactory’ overall based on previous review performance and the age and size of the 
provider. The model was more promising than we have seen for HEIs or FECs: the predictions 
based on the held-back testing data reassured us that the model was picking up on genuine 
underlying patterns in the data and the metrics themselves make intuitive sense. These genuine 
patterns however were weak with the characteristics shared by most ‘unsatisfactory’ providers 
also shared by a far greater number of ‘satisfactory’ providers. The result was that, as with all 
previous models, a substantial number of ‘satisfactory’ reviews would have to be prioritised in 
order to successfully identify all the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers. Even with perfect hindsight, over 
80% of the reviews undertaken would still have been required to identify all ‘unsatisfactory’ 
provision. If we were to accept some ‘unsatisfactory’ provision not being prioritised however the 
model did a reasonable job: combining the training and testing data sets 34 out of 41 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers were in the riskiest 50% of providers.  
Although there are difficulties in operationalising an approach which assigns multiple probabilities 
to each provider it could be the case that this approach yields more accurate predictions and 
should therefore be explored. In the most extreme case we would look to make predictions for 
each possible outcome of a question (as shown in Table 7.16 above) rather than at the aggregated 
‘satisfactory’/ ‘unsatisfactory’ level. Our second question was therefore: 
2. Could the exact outcome of QAA reviews of academic standards at alternative providers 
have been successfully predicted using metrics? 
The λmin model explored in this section contained 16 metrics covering each of the three key data 
sources: finance, QAA concerns and previous review performance. The model, as with all previous 
models, had a high error rate but it did appear more promising at identifying all ‘unsatisfactory’ 
provision. Indeed, when the reviews were prioritised based on the combined probability of being 
judged ‘Does not meet UK expectations’ or ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’, all 
such providers were prioritised in the riskiest half of providers. More promisingly the same was 
true when the model was applied to the test data not used in the development of the model. 
Whether the model could be considered a success is again dependent on whether success is 
defined as identifying all ‘unsatisfactory’ providers with the minimum of unnecessary additional 
reviews, or less stringently as successfully identifying a high-risk group which contains a greater 
proportion of ‘unsatisfactory’ providers than the low-risk group. For both the training and test 
data all of the ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews were contained in the 50% of riskiest providers; however, 
even if the QAA had stopped conducting reviews at the optimal point – immediately after the final 
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‘unsatisfactory’ review had taken place - of those providers reviewed approximately 80% would 
have been judged ‘satisfactory’ and therefore could be seen as being reviewed unnecessarily. 
The granular model showed slightly improved performance compared to the overall review level 
model but struggled to differentiate between those providers who were judged ‘Does not meet 
meet UK expectations’ and ‘Requires improvement to meet UK expectations’. Indeed, the model 
performed best when reviews were prioritised by combining the likelihood of a provider being 
judged ‘Does not meet meet UK expectations’ and ‘Requires improvement to meet UK 
expectations’ and was only a marginal improvement on a far more straightforward binary 
‘satisfactory’ / ‘unsatisfactory’ model. The two remaining questions for which there was sufficient 
data, teaching and learning and the provision of information, were explored but with the 
judgements aggregated to ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’. The remaining two questions were 
therefore: 
3. Could the aggregated outcome of QAA reviews of teaching and learning at alternative 
providers have been successfully predicted using metrics? 
4. Could the aggregated outcome of QAA reviews of the provision of information at 
alternative providers have been successfully predicted using metrics? 
For the teaching and learning question the best model calculated the predicted probability of a 
provider being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ using their previous review performance, the age, size and 
financial position of the provider, and the number of invalid QAA concerns raised against them. 
Whilst the model fit the data with which it was developed well, it performed very poorly on the 
held-back testing data suggesting the initial good fit was the result of chance relations in the data 
set rather than any significant underlying pattern. Regardless of our definition of success the best 
available model performed poorly. To have identified all of the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers in the 
test data nearly all - 83 of the 90 - providers would have had to have been reviewed. Just 5 out of 
8 of the ‘unsatisfactory’ providers were amongst the riskiest 50% of providers. 
For the provision of information, the best model calculated the predicted probability of a provider 
being judged ‘unsatisfactory’ using their previous review performance, the age, size and financial 
position of the provider, and the number of invalid QAA concerns. The model performed similarly 
with the data with which it was developed and the held-back testing data suggesting that it was 
based on genuine characteristics. As with previous models however, those characteristics were 
only shared by the majority of ‘unsatisfactory’ providers and also by a far greater number of 
‘satisfactory’ providers resulting in a very high error rate for the model. 
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As noted in section 4.3.4.3 whether or not a model can be deemed a success is subjective. The 
success of the models can in part be determined by the proportion of ‘satisfactory’ providers 
prioritised for review (the error rate), and how many reviews were conducted in total before all 
‘unsatisfactory’ provision had been detected. To varying degrees, the overall review level, 
academic standards and provision of information models were able to consistently identify a set 
of characteristics shared by the majority of ‘unsatisfactory’ providers. However, these 
characteristics are also shared by a far greater number of ‘satisfactory’ providers. The result was 
that, in each case, the error rate was very high. With such a narrow range of predicted probabilities 
and high error rate, the alternative provider models would be unlikely to win much support from 
the providers themselves, a significant number of which would suffer the burden of a review, a 
burden which their competitors may well be spared, knowing they have been singled out by a 
prioritisation system that is wrong more than 80% of the time. Further to the additional burden, 
the provider may also suffer reputational damage after being selected as a high risk provider.  
One could argue that the error rate is of little concern if a subset, say 50%, of providers could be 
identified which contained all ‘unsatisfactory’ provision. Yes, some providers would be incorrectly 
prioritised for review, but half of all providers could still be spared a review. Although the 
‘satisfactory’ providers that underwent a review may disagree, reviews do not serve to simply 
identify poor practice, but also share best practice and help rectify small issues before they grow 
large. The issue here is that, whilst most ‘unsatisfactory’ providers (and a greater number of 
‘satisfactory’ providers) share the characteristics which allow the model to identify them, not all 
do. Just one outlying provider would mean that either the size of the high risk group must become 
so large few if any ‘satisfactory’ providers are spared review, or some ‘unsatisfactory’ provision 
must be accepted.  
Another element to consider when judging the success of a model is how it performs on new data. 
For alternative providers we were able to test the models’ performance on withheld testing data 
from the same original data set and, notwithstanding the teaching and learning model, the 
patterns identified held true for testing data. This suggests that the characteristics shared by 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers (and a greater number of ‘satisfactory’ providers) which were the basis 
of the model, were based on genuine underlying relationships between the metrics and the 
outcome of the review. There are two reasons why we should remain cautious about these results 
however. First, these predictions are made with perfect hindsight and so represent the optimal 
performance the QAA could have ever hoped to have achieved. Due to the resource required to 
obtain further data we cannot examine the picture the QAA would have been presented with at a 
given point in time; if we could do so it may be the case that those found ‘unsatisfactory’ were 
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amongst the lowest risk providers at that point in time and would therefore not have been 
reviewed. Second, again due to the resource required to obtain new data, we have not been able 
to apply the model to more recent data to see if the patterns accounted for in the model still hold. 
As we saw with FECs, relationships between the data and review outcomes can shift dramatically 
resulting in a previously-valid model becoming less effective than random selection. 
In part the success of the alternative provider models would also depend on how they were 
utilised. As Table 7.16 above demonstrates, determining the order in which providers should be 
prioritised for review faced with 15 different probabilities for each provider is challenging. 
Combining binary question-level models would reduce this to four probabilities, but still poses the 
same challenge: how should those probabilities be combined? Given that two of the three 
question-level models only represent a marginal improvement on the overall model whilst one is 
actually worse, no model could be formed for the enhancement question, the fact that there is no 
real reduction in burden when reviewing a subset of the four questions, and the normative 
challenges posed, using a single overall review level model seems preferable. 
Realistically, to be considered a success despite having a high error rate, a model must at least be 
robust enough to reassure those providers singled out for review that there won’t be other 
providers that have been spared review that will subsequently be judged ‘unsatisfactory’. 
Moreover, the students who stand to suffer if ‘unsatisfactory’ provision goes undetected would 
understandably want to know that QAA were confident there were no issues at their provider if it 
were to be excused from reviews. None of the alternative provider models appear to be that 




The findings for the alternative provider sector were the most promising yet. A successful model 
that could underpin a data-driven, risk-based approach to prioritising QAA reviews still could not 
be found however. Even if a successful model could be found, the relatively low number of 
students, amount of taxpayer money at stake, and low profile of the providers mean that, with 
any feasible definition of ‘impact’ arising from quality assurance failures, alternative providers 
would pose little risk in comparison to HEIs and FECs.  
For the analyses detailed in the last three chapters, this thesis had considered thousands of 
metrics, not just in their natural format but absolute and percentage change-over-time variants, 
267 
 
standardised data to account for sector wide changes over time and performance relative to 
peers, and imputed the data to account for missing values. In addition to readily available data, 
this thesis contains confidential data sourced from the QAA, non-standard HE specific data sets 
for HE in FE, 600 sets of financial accounts bought and transcribed from Companies House, and 
has used advanced machine-learning techniques not available even five years ago. This thesis has 
conclusively shown that no effective model exists that could allow QAA to successfully operate a 
cost-effective, data-driven, risk-based approach to prioritising individual providers for review. 
Were the QAA to adopt a data-driven, risk-based approach, some ‘satisfactory’ providers would 
be unfairly burdened with additional reviews, potentially distracting them from delivering their 
‘satisfactory’ provision and unfairly stigmatising them as a high risk provider, whilst some 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers would go without a review for an extended period of time to the 
detriment of students and the reputation of the UK higher education sector. 
The obvious question these findings give rise to is why is there no meaningful relationship between 
the metrics and the outcome of QAA reviews? This question is the subject of the next chapter.  
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Appendix G – Alternative Provider Metrics 
The set of 41 metrics used in this study prior to change-over-time calculations being added. 
Area Metric Code Metric Description 
QAA 
Concerns 
CON001 Count of QAA concerns raised, upheld or otherwise, since previous review 
CON002 Count of QAA concerns raised which do not relate to quality, standards, information or enhancement (and are therefore automatically invalid) 
CON003 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to academic standards 
CON004 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to the quality of learning opportunities 
CON005 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review which relate to the provision of information 
CON006 Count of QAA concerns not upheld since previous review which relate to academic standards 
CON007 Count of QAA concerns not upheld since previous review which relate to the quality of learning opportunities 
CON008 Count of QAA concerns upheld since previous review 




PRV001 Outcome of previous review 
PRV002 Has been reviewed and received a negative outcome in the last review 
PRV003 Has ever received a negative review 
PRV004 Outcome of previous comparable review 
PRV005 Has had a comparable review and received a negative outcome in the last comparable review 
PRV006 Worst judgement in previous comparable review 
PRV007 Worst judgement concerning standards in previous comparable review 
PRV008 Outcome concerning standards in previous comparable review 
PRV009 Worst judgement concerning learning in previous comparable review 
PRV010 Outcome concerning learning in previous comparable review 
PRV011 Worst judgement concerning information in previous comparable review 
PRV012 Outcome concerning information in previous comparable review 
PRV013 Worst judgement concerning enhancement in previous comparable review 
PRV014 Outcome concerning enhancement in previous comparable review 
Accounts 
information 
APA001 Age at time of review 
APA002 Outstanding Mortgage Charges 
APA003 Satisfied Mortgage Charges 
APA004 Accounts Type 
APA005 Called-Up Share Capital Not Paid 
APA006 Tangible Assets 
APA007 Other Fixed Assets 
APA008 Total Fixed Assets 
APA009 Investments / Stocks 
APA010 Debtors 
APA011 Cash At Bank And In Hand 
APA012 Total Current Assets 
APA013 Creditors: Amounts Falling Due Within One Year 
APA014 Net Current Assets/ (Liabilities) 
APA015 Total Assets Less Current Liabilities 
APA016 Creditors: Amounts Falling Due After One Year 
APA017 Other Long-Term Liabilities 
APA018 Total Net Assets/ (Liabilities) 
Table 7.19: The set of 41 metrics used in the alternative provider study prior to change-over-time 
calculations being added.  
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8. Why Can’t the Available Data Predict the Outcome of QAA Reviews? 
Risk-based approaches have come to be seen as a regulatory panacea (Black and Baldwin, 2010). 
Proponents argue that risk-based regulation allows for targeted and effective oversight, freeing 
compliant actors from the burden of regulation whilst identifying and resolving non-compliance 
more quickly and thus reducing the cost of regulation. The QAA, having been in the minority 
amongst oversight bodies for not being ‘risk-based’, Students at the Heart of the System called for 
it to adopt “…a genuinely risk-based approach, focusing [its] effort where it will have most impact” 
and to “explore options in which the frequency – and perhaps need – for a full, scheduled 
institutional review will depend on an objective assessment of a basket of data” (BIS, 2011, 3.19). 
Despite their popularity and high-profile failings, the quantitative aspects of risk-based 
approaches have faced little scrutiny. The one peer-reviewed assessment to date evaluated the 
Care Quality Commission’s current ‘Intelligent Monitoring’ tool for prioritising inspections of NHS 
hospital trusts; even with possibly the most comprehensive set of performance data available to 
any regulator in the world, the metrics and weightings selected by the CQC proved worse at 
identifying poorly-performing hospital trusts than random selection (Griffiths et al., 2016). This 
thesis has provided the first comprehensive, empirical analysis of whether any selection of metrics 
and weightings can form part of a successful data-driven approach to quality assurance in higher 
education; it cannot. 
The obvious question, and focus of this chapter, is why can’t the available data predict the 
outcome of QAA reviews? HEIs have a vast quantity of data available: we know about students’ 
applications to universities, who the students are, where they come from and how they progress, 
the staff that teach them, the research the staff perform when not teaching, the financial health 
of the establishment in which they do their research, the satisfaction of the students who are 
taught there, and the employment rates and salaries of those who qualify. Yet despite all this we 
cannot predict how they will fare in their QAA review. Although many hold an innate distrust for 
metrics in higher education, and for the ability of a review to get to the heart of quality assurance 
at a provider, the failure of the former to predict the latter will certainly come as a surprise to 
those who have championed a data-driven, risk-based approach. 
The prima facie reason for the failure of the data to predict the outcome of QAA reviews is that 
they are simply measuring different things. The qualitative indicators contained in the QAA’s 
Quality Code that act as guide for reviewers focus on processes which are difficult, if not 
impossible, to capture as a quantitative metric; the vast data sets collected turn out not to be 
‘about’ quality, or related quality processes, in any coherent way. This is obvious, and correct, but 
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also somewhat reductionist or indeed tautological. No-one believes they are directly measuring 
precisely the same thing; rather, both QAA reviews and the available metrics are seen as proxies 
for quality. QAA’s belief is that by assuring processes, ‘quality’ will follow (Williams, 2009; Kimber, 
2015). Similarly, HEFCE and others believe that ‘quality’ is indicated by, or directly defined by, 
outcome measures such as student satisfaction, class sizes, contact hours, and retention (see for 
example HEFCE, 2016c; BIS, 2016). As both QAA reviews and metrics are seen as proxies for 
quality, it has been assumed that one could be used to predict the other. For example, low student 
satisfaction scores may arise because poor quality assurance processes, which will subsequently 
be judged negatively by the QAA, fail to prevent poor quality provision and do not promote good 
quality. Conversely, high student satisfaction rates may be seen to arise in part because good 
quality assurance processes, which will be judged positively by the QAA, lead to good quality 
outcomes. 
This analysis identifies three possible reasons for the inability of the data to predict QAA review 
outcomes in practice.  
Either 
1. no subset of the available metrics is a reliable proxy for ‘quality’ and/or 
2. the outcome of QAA reviews aren’t reliable proxies for ‘quality’, hence the former 
cannot predict the latter.  
Or 
3. both a subset of the available data and QAA review outcomes are reliable proxies for 
‘quality’; however, they are measuring different notions of the subjective and hard 
to define notion of ‘quality’.  
As discussed in greater detail below, a mixed-methods approach is used to examine these three 
reasons. This is followed by a discussion of the prima facie reason for the failure of metrics to 
predict the outcome of QAA reviews; the logical assumptions that must hold true for a data-driven, 
risk-based approach to work; and an exploration of the three possible reasons why such an 
approach does not work. 
 
8.1. Data and Methods 
An empirical epistemology, as adopted for the statistical modelling, emphasises rationality, 
determinacy and impersonality with knowledge detached from the history and experience of 
where it was created to seek general predictive conclusions (Usher, 1997). This approach is 
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appropriate for determining what available data, if any, accurately predicts the risk of quality 
assurance failings. However, it is not appropriate for exploring why it is not possible to predict 
quality assurance failings in UK higher education. This exploratory analysis cannot definitively 
prove why a data-driven, risk-based approach to quality assurance in UK higher education did not 
work with current or feasible data. It can however ascertain the logical assumptions and 
preconditions necessary for such an approach to work and the factors identified by key 
stakeholders that may undermine those. The analysis combines the findings from in-depth 
interviews with key stakeholders, the analysis of policy documents and academic literature, 
written and oral evidence from select committee inquiries, and my own experience shadowing a 
QAA review.  
The first data source explored was the written and oral evidence from two key parliamentary 
select committee inquiries: the 2009 Innovation, Universities and Science Select Committee 
Students and Universities inquiry and the 2015 Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee 
Assessing Quality in Higher Education inquiry. These inquiries provided invaluable insight into the 
development of QAA’s review process and current thinking respectively. The Assessing Quality in 
Higher Education inquiry provided oral testimony from 27 key stakeholders including the Chief 
Executives from QAA, HEFCE, OFFA, OIA, the Minister for Universities and Science, the Director of 
Higher Education at BIS, QAA reviewers and heads of mission groups including GuildHE and the 
Russell Group. I also gave oral evidence to a closed session of the committee pertaining to the 
quantitative findings of this thesis and submitted one of 83 pieces of written evidence the inquiry 
received (Griffiths, 2015). Whilst not always directly addressing the inability of data to predict the 
outcome of QAA reviews, these hearings provide invaluable insight into the theoretical 
underpinnings for QAA’s approach and the use of data in higher education regulation. 
Alongside the select committee evidence, summarised responses to three relevant consultations 
were considered: HEFCE’s 2012 ‘A Risk-Based Approach to Quality Assurance’ consultation, and 
the Quality Assessment Review Steering Group’s  ‘The Future of Quality Assessment in Higher 
Education’ ‘discussion document’ and ‘Future Approach to Quality Assessment in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland’ consultation. These consultation outcomes, summarised by HEFCE with the 
exception of the QARSG’s 2015 ’discussion document’ summarised by MRUK Research, provide a 
breakdown of responses from interested parties and select quotes.  
Semi-structured interviews were then conducted with representatives of all the key stakeholders 
including past and present senior managers from higher education regulatory bodies, QAA 
reviewers, student representatives from NUS, senior managers and academics at HEIs, FECs, 
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alternative providers, and a ‘Professional, Statutory or Regulatory Body’ (PSRB) with responsibility 
for academic standards of qualifying degrees for their profession. All interviewees were offered 
anonymity being referred to only by a broad reference to their role to contextualise any comments 
drawn from the interview. All interviewees except for Roger Brown, former Chief Executive of the 
Higher Education Quality Council, took up this offer and have been referred to by a general 
descriptor.  
These interviews were used to explore and develop the themes emerging from the documentary 
analysis, to gain new insights as to why data cannot predict the outcome of QAA reviews, and to 
gain an understanding of the reasoning behind certain decisions that the documentary analysis 
could not provide. The interviews were not designed to solely examine hypotheses developed 
from the documentary research, but also to examine whether further hypotheses existed and to 
explore them. Any new ideas generated in the interviews led to further documentary analysis and 
the reshaping of subsequent interviews to further explore these topics. As such, the research did 
not use either a purely deductive or purely inductive approach, but an abductive approach which 
contained elements of both (Peirce, 1958; Locke et al., 2008) 
Further to the interviews, I shadowed QAA reviewers on a three-day Higher Education Review. 
This involved observing interviews with senior leaders, students, information specialists and 
employers working with the institution. Furthermore, I observed the deliberative process of 
reaching a review judgement and deciding upon commendations and recommendations for 
improvement. I have also spent considerable time with QAA staff developing an in-depth 
understanding of the organisation and shaping ideas for the thesis. 
As an interviewer and observer it was necessary for me to acknowledge the influence my presence 
may have (Alasuutari, 1995). Although in many circumstances my status as an academic could 
qualify me as an ’elite’ this was unlikely to be true for this study; those interviewed were senior, 
successful individuals many of whom have been, or continue to be, academics themselves. This 
may in itself have proven beneficial as, having been in my position, they may be more minded to 
help me and support the study. Regardless of how I was viewed, the topic will have impacted upon 
the type of responses I received. The topics discussed were often highly political in nature, 
especially given the uncertainty over the future of QAA and HEFCE at the time, and the study has 
the potential to provide an evidence base which may undermine individual decisions and 
government policy. It is reasonable to assume interviewees were naturally keen to preserve the 
reputation of their organisations and their own future resulting in measured and politically-filtered 
responses. I have also been mindful of the influence my professional background as a health and 
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social care regulator. Whilst this provides valuable insight into the realities of regulatory practice, 
it may also serve as a hindrance in framing my thoughts and leading to presumptions based on 
experiences in another sector that are incorrect or unfounded. I cannot change these 
circumstances, but by acknowledging the reflexive challenges I can be aware of the impact they 
will have on the construction of knowledge. 
Together, the interviews, select committee evidence, consultation responses, academic literature, 
and review observation provide a comprehensive evidence base with which to systematically 
explore why performance and resources data cannot predict the outcome of QAA reviews. The 
exploration begins with the logical assumptions that must hold to successfully operate a data-
driven, risk-based approach to quality assurance in higher education. This is then followed by an 
in-depth exploration of each assumption and its potential flaws.  
 
8.2. Logical Assumptions for Risk-Based Quality Assurance 
The QAA does not assess quality of provision directly: it neither observes teaching nor reviews 
students’ work. Rather, higher education providers theoretically ensure the quality of their own 
provision by validating all new courses, monitoring courses annually, reviewing courses using 
nationally agreed reference points every five years, and appointing external examiners to check 
quality and standards. In their own words, “the QAA checks the checking” (QAA, 2012a).  
The checks performed by the QAA concern the 19 ‘expectations’ detailed in the Quality Code 
(2011b) (for full details see chapter two – Appendix B). It is easy to see from the Quality Code why 
accusations of QAA only being interested in processes and paperwork arise (see for example 
Alderman, 2009; Charlton, 2001). Academic standards expectations A2.2 and A3.1 for example 
state: 
A2.2 “Degree-awarding bodies maintain a definitive record of each programme and 
qualification that they approve (and of subsequent changes to it) which constitutes 
the reference point for delivery and assessment of the programme, its monitoring 
and review, and for the provision of records of study to students and alumni.” 
(QAA, 2011c, p.21) 
A3.1 “Degree-awarding bodies establish and consistently implement processes for the 
approval of taught programmes and research degrees that ensure that academic 
standards are set at a level which meets the UK threshold standard for the 
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qualification and are in accordance with their own academic frameworks and 
regulations.” 
(QAA, 2011c, p.23) 
The more detailed 11 expectations relating to ‘assessing and enhancing academic quality’ are 
accompanied by 129 qualitative indicators to support reviewers in making their judgement. These 
indicators are similarly qualitative, subjective and requiring of human judgement: 
B1.5 “Higher education providers make use of reference points and expertise from 
outside the programme in programme design and in their processes for 
programme development and approval.” 
(QAA, 2012d, p.12)  
B2.8 “Higher education providers determine how decisions and the reasons for those 
decisions are recorded and conveyed to prospective students.” 
(QAA, 2012e, p.17) 
B5.2 “Higher education providers create and maintain an environment within which 
students and staff engage in discussions that aim to bring about demonstrable 
enhancement of the educational experience.” 
(QAA, 2012f, p.8) 
The QAA’s expectations and related indicators, which heavily emphasise processes, are therefore 
very different in nature to the available performance and resource data such as application rates, 
student satisfaction, or financial health. One could therefore simply ascribe the failure of the data 
to predict the outcome of QAA reviews to comparing proverbial ‘apples and oranges’. 
This explanation certainly has merit. It is however, as stated earlier, somewhat reductionist. 
Policymakers did not believe QAA expectations and available performance measures are exactly 
the same; rather, both are proxies for, or direct measures of, quality. As Peter Williams, then CEO 
of QAA testified to the Innovation, Universities Science and Skills Committee in 2009: 
“… Process and outcomes are very strongly linked. It is not an accident. It is because things 
are done that other things happen. Because teachers plan their teaching, then students 
will learn. Because students are guided in their learning, they will learn. It is that careful, 
systematic approach which is important …”  
(Williams, 2009, Q.342) 
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Furthermore, the QAA contest the charge that they are focused exclusively on processes 
regardless of the outcomes that result. As one QAA Senior Manager stated when interviewed for 
this study: 
“A central part of the process going back to audit, are the questions 'Okay, how do you 
know this thing? Show us evidence this thing's working effectively.' And that very quickly 
leads on to discussions about outcomes and data ... We've always been interested in 
outcomes; the idea that we would give an institution a gold rating regardless of what the 
data is saying is ludicrous.” 
Therefore, QAA contend that their assessments consider both processes and outcomes to provide 
an assessment of quality. One example might be retention rates insofar as having appropriate 
processes in place should prevent high dropout rates, whilst not having appropriate processes in 
place makes high dropout rates more likely. Moreover, where retention rates are poor, this will 
result in the QAA investigating the processes when conducting their review. As the earlier analysis 
demonstrated, however, continuation rates do not predict the outcome of QAA reviews.  
HEFCE and others also contend that performance data is indicative of, or indeed a direct measure 
of, quality. As one HEFCE Senior Manager told me: 
“What we’ll actually be looking at is what the indicators tell us about the quality of 
academic experience and, ultimately, the outcomes for students.” 
BIS and others therefore thought it entirely feasible, although we now know it not to be possible, 
that the available performance data – one measure of quality – could have predicted the outcome 
of QAA reviews – another measure of quality. For it to have done so, three requirements would 
have had to have held true. 
First, the available data must provide a reliable proxy for quality. Second, QAA reviews must 
provide a reliable proxy for quality. Third, even if both the available data and QAA reviews provide 
reliable proxies for quality, it must be the same definition of quality. Accordingly, there are three 
possible overarching and reasons why the available metrics cannot predict the outcome of QAA 
reviews. 
Either 
1. no subset of the available metrics is a reliable proxy for ‘quality’ and/or 
2. the outcome of QAA reviews aren’t reliable proxies for ‘quality’, hence the former 




3. both a subset of the available data and QAA review outcomes are reliable proxies for 
‘quality’; however, they are measuring different notions of the subjective, contested 
notion of ‘quality’ and hence the data will not be able to predict the outcome of QAA 
reviews. 
Each of these three explanations are explored in detail below. 
 
8.3. Data as a Proxy for ‘Quality’ in Higher Education 
Complaints about the use of metrics in the public sector are commonplace (see for example Smith, 
1995; Cave et al., 1997; Freeman, 2002). This analysis explores the possible reasons why the 
available data may not be a reliable proxy for ‘quality’, and hence cannot predict the outcome of 
QAA reviews. Interviewees identified three overarching reasons: gaming and data quality, the 
definition and use of metrics, and the granularity and focus of metrics. Select committee hearings 
concerning the use of data to determine teaching excellence also identified timeliness as an issue 
and, whilst excellence and quality are not necessarily interchangeable, in this case timeliness of 
data is a valid concern for assessing quality and is therefore considered. Each of these four reasons 
is explored in turn below. 
8.3.1. Data Quality and Gaming 
“Academics are a clever bunch of people.  They will optimise behaviours to achieve the best 
possible outcomes against the indicators that are being used to measure them.” 
(Wilsdon, 2015b, Q.113) 
In interviewing key actors for this chapter, the ‘gaming’ of metrics was often cited as key reason 
for the failure of the data to predict the outcome of QAA reviews. Studies in healthcare and 
education, similar quasi-markets for public goods, show that the use of high-profile metrics often 
leads to providers seeking to improve their metric performance whilst not improving the 
underlying performance the metric was designed to measure (see for example Smith, 1995; 
Propper and Wilson, 2003; De Bruijn, 2002). Higher education is no different (Huber and Rothstein, 
2013; Wilsdon, 2015a).  
Interviewees stated that the importance placed on university league tables and the ‘Key 
Information Set’ (KIS) meant that high-profile metrics, such as the National Student Survey (NSS) 
and Destination of Leavers of Higher Education (DLHE) survey, were gamed. Examples ranged from 
the ‘vanilla’ to outright cheating. At the lower end of the scale one professor cited the allocation 
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of nearly the entire student engagement budget for undergraduate students to the weeks in the 
run up to the NSS in their final year. A greater threat to the validity of the measure was revealed 
to me by a former lecturer who recalled that, shortly before the NSS became available for students 
to complete at his former institution, 
“colleagues would remind students that ‘the universities ranking and reputation are 
strongly influenced by the NSS, and the value of your degree and attractiveness to 
employers were influenced by those rankings and reputation. Please bear this in mind when 
completing your survey.’” 
At the most extreme end of the scale, the University of Derby was recently revealed to have been 
cheating the DLHE survey by simply pretending not to have made contact with those students who 
had failed to continue their education or find employment within six months (Ratcliffe and Adams, 
2013).  
The planned use of retention, satisfaction and employment metrics to measure ‘teaching 
excellence’ as part of the upcoming TEF has elicited prospective plans for similar manipulation of 
key measures. One QAA staff member recalled hearing that the leaders of a chemistry course 
containing a sandwich year had said “if we're going to be judged on how much our graduates are 
earning we're going to encourage them to do a placement with a management consultancy rather 
than with a chemical lab.” Similarly, the Principal of Queen Mary’s University London testified to 
the BIS Select Committee’s ‘Assessing Quality in Higher Education’ inquiry  
“if we were so inclined and if there were a funding system that gave us this incentive, the 
temptation … would be to say, ‘There is a very easy way of achieving 100% retention. You 
minimise your educational standards to the point where no one fails—job done.’” 
(Gaskell, 2015, Q13)  
Interviewees clearly felt that the ability of the data to act as a proxy for quality was severely limited 
by the manipulation and distortion of key measures to the extent that they were unreliable. 
Despite the frequency with which gaming was cited as a reason to question the ability of data to 
serve as a reliable proxy for ‘quality’, it should be remembered that it is difficult, and often 
fraudulent, to manipulate the vast majority of the thousands of measures considered as part of 
this analysis. Those measures include inter alia financial health, applications, and continuation 
rates. Whilst it is clear the ability of one or more key metrics to serve as a proxy for ‘quality’ will 
be limited by gaming, and hence possibly predict the outcome of QAA reviews, these metrics 
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represent a small fraction of the overall data set and the effect of gaming on this comprehensive 
analysis will have been minimal.  
8.3.2. Metric Definition and Usage 
“There are so many factors affecting future employment it seems to us difficult if not impossible 
to make a meaningful linkage to teaching quality.” 
(BIS Select Committee, 2016b, p.10) 
Present in the interviews, academic literature, parliamentary hearings and consultations was 
concern over how some measures have been designed and misused. Metrics do not need to be 
gamed to be poor or ambiguous indicators of the performance they were designed to measure. 
For example, the NSS has been criticised on the grounds that higher education is a post-experience 
good and students are not in a position to fully judge the education they have received, especially 
in the stressful second term of the third year leading up to final exams (Baker, 2011). Citing the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) Task Force on Past Performance’s review of customer 
satisfaction, King (2011a) demonstrated the weakness of such an approach where consumers 
often lack the ability to understand the complex good they are consuming. Some measures, 
therefore, are constrained as proxies for ‘quality’ by their design and their capture of flawed 
information. 
A concern expressed across all forms of evidence considered for this study was that, whilst metrics 
often do a good job of measuring that which they have been designed to measure, what they are 
designed to measure is partly outside of the control of the provider, and therefore a questionable 
proxy for its quality. The employment destination and earnings of graduates, for example, can be 
affected by inter alia the social capital of students, the regional economy, the subject studied and 
the vocational nature of some jobs. Likewise, as noted by the Business, Innovation and Skills 
Committee (2016b), retention figures can be affected by personal circumstances of students 
entirely separate from provider performance, such as family tragedy or financial difficulty. The 
change in language in recent years from ‘Teaching’ to ‘Learning and Teaching’ reflects that higher 
education is a two-way process. Whilst lecturers can engage and persuade students, no pedagogy 
can force a recalcitrant student to learn. Where measures are partly outside of the control of 
providers, there is a clear constraint for that measure acting as a proxy for their quality, and hence 
its ability to predict another proxy for quality. 
Whether within the control of a provider or not, a metric used inappropriately will be of little 
benefit. This is the case with a large number of metrics that were originally designed as market 
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information to promote competition between providers touted as metrics for a risk-based 
approach to quality assurance (BIS, 2011; HEC, 2013; King, 2014a). As one higher education policy 
analyst told me: 
“The NSS is a very blunt tool. Student satisfaction is not the same as the quality of an 
experience, nor is it the same as quality in general. A student can be very satisfied with a 
three-year course because they could go out drinking every night for three years and still 
get a 2:1” 
Indeed, one study has found no correlation between student satisfaction and subsequent 
performance on standardised Primary Medical Qualification exams (Lancaster and Fanshawe, 
2015). 
In many cases the metrics being employed as measures of quality are chosen because they are 
what is available, and because what should be being measured, can’t be (Bevan and Hood, 2006; 
Gibbs, 2010). This was typified by the much criticised inclusion of a ‘telephone expenditure per 
FTE student’ metric in the 1989 ‘University Management Statistics and Performance Indicators’ 
list (CVCP and UFC, 1989; Cave et al., 1997, p.54-7). As far back as 1985 the CVCP/UGC Working 
Group stressed “there are few indicators of teaching performance that would enable a systematic 
external assessment of teaching quality to be made” and later cautioned against “concentrating 
solely on the measurable to the neglect of the wide range of qualitative factors which are 
impossible to quantify” (CVCP and UGC, 1987, p.4).  
A review of the available metrics suggests that, as with teaching quality, there are few metrics 
enabling systematic external assessment of academic standards, the provision of information, or 
enhancement either. Metrics of higher education inputs, such as funding and the entry 
qualifications of new students, and outputs, such as degree result and employment rates, lend 
themselves to easy quantification and are captured. What students experience during their 
education, such as the degree to which teaching is valued and the quality of feedback to students, 
are difficult to quantify and are therefore seldom captured in a standardised, centralised form that 
lends itself to a data-driven, risk-based approach. As one senior academic stated during their 
interview: 
“We've been at this quite a while haven’t we, don’t you think if we actually had any decent 
metrics of student education someone would have discovered them by now? All that 
happens is that the metrics used distort the whole process.” 
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The available data may therefore not serve as an effective proxy for quality because there are no 
measures that come close to assessing the key aspects of quality in higher education which are 
difficult to quantify. Hence, the QAA have adopted the 129 qualitative indicators detailed in the 
Quality Code that need to be assessed in person. 
The diversity and autonomy of the higher education sector also provide a challenge for the use of 
quantitative metrics. As far back as 1985, the Jarratt Report noted that “objectives and aims of 
universities are defined only in very broad terms” (CVCP, 1985, 3.30). The lack of specified 
institutional or sector-wide goals for diverse, not-for-profit universities presented a serious 
problem for quality evaluation (Bourke, 1986). This issue has become more acute as the higher 
education sector has significantly expanded and diversified in recent years. Even when institutions 
share clear goals, evidence shows that entrance scores and acceptance rates which predicted the 
institutional reputation and student graduation rates in large, research universities were far less 
effective, or wholly ineffective, in smaller, non-selective universities (Schmitz, 1993). If the data 
that serve as a proxy for quality vary by provider within a sector, an effective, homogenous subset 
of those data, something practically necessary for an effective data-driven, risk-based approach 
to operate, will not be able to act as a proxy for quality. 
The ability of metrics to serve as a proxy for ‘quality’, and hence possibly predict the outcome of 
QAA reviews, can therefore also be constrained by their inability to quantify certain aspects of the 
‘quality’ of provision, misuse, the impact of factors outside of providers’ control, or those 
differences between providers in a diverse sector.  
8.3.3. Granularity and Focus 
“When you have key performance indicators such as [the ones in this study] and a complex 
organisation like a university or a college, you can’t measure all the elements that you need to … 
You may have a dozen [indicators], you may have hundreds, but it’s a very small projected space 
from the entire complexity of the structure you are looking at. And therefore you lose hugely the 
whole picture as soon as you start looking at KPIs.” 
Interview with QAA Reviewer  
A further limitation of higher education data which may impact on their ability to serve as a proxy 
for quality, that was highlighted by some interviewees, was the level at which the data are 
aggregated. All data considered as part of this study, and the overwhelming majority of higher 
education data, are at provider-level. Despite sharing the same institution-level metrics however, 
universities and FECs are large, complex, decoupled organisations often with significant variation 
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between and within departments (Weick, 1976; Perrow, 1999). Indeed, in 2015, the University of 
Liverpool’s first-degree courses in dentistry and ophthalmics had the joint highest and lowest 
course satisfaction rates in the country respectively (HEFCE, 2016b). Provider-level metrics 
average out pockets of poor and high quality, diluting any signal in metric performance and making 
it harder for metrics to identify providers with areas of concern. The differences in performance 
between departments are themselves inimical to the idea that quality assurance processes should 
ensure a minimum level of quality across an institution. As one QAA Senior Manager said during 
their interview: 
“To paraphrase Martin Luther King, a threat to quality somewhere is a threat to quality 
everywhere … your systems can't be working properly if you are having problems and 
tolerating problems in a particular area.” 
Whilst data may mask pockets of poor-quality provision, QAA reviewers may be more likely to 
detect such areas of concern via the student report submitted prior to the review, or through 
discussions with students during the review. During the author’s shadowing of a Higher Education 
Review, a meeting with students quickly highlighted misleading claims made about one specific 
HND programme and students’ ability to transfer into and ‘top up’ their qualification at other 
institutions. 
More granular data however is not a simple solution. It is often the case that the point at which 
the data has been reduced down to a grain that is fine enough to be useful, is where the numbers 
involved become too small to form any meaningful, robust inference from them. Given the size of 
many programmes this issue cannot be resolved (Brown, 2007; Gibbs, 2010). 
Metric focus, how specific or narrowly-focused a metric is, may also be key. Whilst HEIs have a far 
greater number of metrics, the majority of these metrics are far more narrowly focused than is 
the case for alternative providers where the predictive models performed marginally better. It 
may be the case that having 118 very specific HEI finance metrics obscures the ‘quality’ signal 
detected in the 18 more general alternative provider finance metrics. 
Therefore, the ability of the data to act as a reliable proxy for quality, and hence possibly predict 
the outcome of QAA reviews, may also be constrained by the data being aggregated to too high a 






“It is important to understand that, when you are looking at metrics and data, you are looking at 
information, typically, from a couple of years ago.” 
(Gill, 2015, Q.110)  
Although not actively proposed as a reason why data may not serve as a proxy for higher education 
quality by interviewees, attendees at recent select committee hearings were keen to highlight the 
challenges posed by the timeliness of data (Horseman, 2015; Hiely-Rayner, 2015). When QAA 
conduct a review, reviewers will speak to staff and students about their ongoing experiences and 
review the processes in place at the time of their visit. Higher education data, however, is 
necessarily retrospective and often dated by the time it is available to QAA and others. As was 
noted by data experts discussing the challenges of using quantitative measures to assess 
excellence in higher education, data may be of limited use due to the time taken to gather and 
disseminate the data. Data relating to student qualifiers for example require exams to be 
completed, final grades awarded and students cleared for graduation. The data must then be 
gathered centrally and submitted to HESA in a prescribed format. HESA must then collate, quality 
assure and amend the data and only once this has been completed can the data be published 
according to certain standards. This process is necessary but slow.  
By the time the data is available to bodies such as the QAA to predict the outcome of reviews and 
take action, the next cohort of students may have already completed a significant proportion of 
their studies. It may also be the case that an institution has identified and resolved any issues 
identified when they first collated their data for HESA many months before it was available to the 
QAA. This will mean there is no longer an issue at the point they are flagged as a concern. 
Conversely, issues may have arisen at a provider where there was no problem the year before. 
This will not then be shown in the data until the following year; too late for the students affected. 
This issue is particularly severe for employment data gathered by providers six months after 
students graduate. The data is, arguably, influenced by all three or four years of undergraduate 
education meaning that by the time it is published it is at best several years out of date and likely 
unreflective of current performance. The problem is not limited to centralised higher education 
data; financial accounts for alternative providers do not need to be filed until nine months after 
the end of the provider’s financial year. This means a provider could be in dire financial straits, or 




In summary, there are a number of significant issues that limit the ability of the available data 
serve a proxy for quality, and hence possibly predict the outcome of QAA reviews. Interviewees, 
supported by a variety of secondary sources, said that metrics may be: gamed, unable to quantify 
specific aspects of quality provision, misused, outside of the control of providers, fail to account 
for diversity, too high-level, and or too narrowly focused. Furthermore, evidence from recent 
parliamentary hearings suggested that a significant proportion of higher education data may be 
too out-of-date by the time it is available to act as a proxy for quality. These issues have been 
discussed in higher education for over four decades, yet no solution has been found. 
 
8.4. QAA Review Outcomes as a Proxy for ‘Quality’ in Higher Education 
For a quasi-regulatory body, QAA is well regarded. The summarised responses to HEFCE’s initial 
quality assessment review noted:  
“The role of the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) as the single body for monitoring and 
advising on standards and quality in the HE sector was considered to be greatly beneficial, 
and many stakeholders considered its comprehensive nature to give UK a reputational 
advantage.”  
(MRUK Research, 2015, 100)  
Similar acclaim for the QAA has been repeatedly echoed by the sector in the media and 
parliamentary hearings (see for example Tynan, 2015; Scott, 2015; Cooper, 2016). 
Internationally, the QAA is held in equal esteem. A European Association for Quality Assurance in 
Higher Education (ENQA) review found QAA to be the first quality assurance agency to have met 
all of the Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education Area 
(ESG). ENQA’s report stated: 
“QAA’s overall performance against the standards of the ESG is uniformly high. It is a 
trustworthy, effective and highly credible agency and a leader in the field. QAA is well-led 
and well-managed at both Board and Executive levels, with a strong Board, which is both 
well-informed and constructively challenging. The Panel has been consistently impressed 
by the calibre and professionalism of all those contributing to the work of QAA in 
maintaining quality and standards across HE in the UK.” 
(ENQA, 2013, 95)  
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QAA’s experience and expertise has led to multiple, external quality assurance contracts including 
reviews of Mauritius’ tertiary education institutions and courses and providers under contract 
from the UK’s General Osteopathic Council (QAA, 2014a; QAA and GOsC, 2011).  
The respect and admiration for the QAA is, however, far from universal. Some feel the QAA is 
unnecessary in a market environment with one pro vice chancellor telling me that “if QAA ceased 
to exist we would still need to be excellent or we'd go out of business.” Others feel more strongly 
that QAA are actively harming higher education quality: 
“The QAA, for those of us who have suffered under its tawdry posturing, is a cancer that 
gnaws at the core of knowledge, value and freedom in education; its carcinogenic growth 
is now perhaps the greatest pervasive danger to the function of a university as a surviving 
institution,” 
(Docherty, 2008, p.112)  
Whilst few interviewees felt this strongly, the focus and robustness of QAA’s reviews was the most 
oft posited reason for the failure of available data to predict their outcomes. More broadly, this 
analysis identified four overarching factors which might be limiting the effectiveness of QAA 
reviews, and hence contributing to their inability to act as a proxy for ‘quality’ or align with 
available metrics. The inherent limitations of inspections, the over-reductionist nature of review 
findings, the ineffectiveness of assessing processes, and the decoupling of quality assurance from 
frontline practices, are each explored in turn below. 
8.4.1. The Limitations of Inspection 
“I don’t think an institution-wide QAA review is going to pick up on [quality], that's just looking at 
procedures, [at whether we’ve] got formal procedures across the whole university?” 
Interview with University Lecturer 
It was the fundamental inability of QAA to ‘get to the heart’ of ‘quality’ at a provider that was 
posited, alongside over-reductionist findings, as the main reason why data was unable to predict 
the outcome of QAA reviews. Reviews can achieve much that metrics cannot; no metric will detect 
the culture of a provider or the nuanced, specific concerns of a subset of students. Reviews are, 
however, constrained by the inspection frameworks, costs, and the normative limitations of 
inspectors.  
QAA reviews are all conducted in the same manner. Providers are made aware that they will be 
subject to review months in advance. The first stage is for the provider to provide a written 
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submission along with accompanying evidence, usually hundreds of documents, to QAA detailing 
how they meet each of the expectations detailed in the Quality Code (QAA, 2011b). This is 
accompanied by a student submission authored by student representatives at the provider. The 
review team will assess the submissions and accompanying evidence and request additional 
evidence they deem necessary. The team will then agree upon the length of the visit, whom they 
will speak to, and what topics they will cover. Once onsite, any additional discoveries can lead to 
further requests for evidence and / or meetings with relevant parties. Each reviewer is given lead 
responsibility for a subset of the 16 ‘expectations’ in the Quality Code that are assessed. The final 
day of the site visit involves no further discussions with staff or students but is dedicated to 
deliberating and agreeing upon the review judgements. 
The greatest concern amongst interviewees was simply that the limited interaction with staff and 
students provided a shallow impression of the provider and allowed for areas of concern to go 
undetected. As one PSRB which was recently abandoned a similar higher education review 
approach told me during an interview: 
“When we did visits and had the same issues that are occurring with QAA … it's very 
qualitative, essentially a lot of the time you are looking at what the uni provides and 
they're going to be selective and only provide you things they want you to see so it’s not a 
particularly effective way of quality assurance.” 
An academic from an alternative provider articulated widely stated criticisms of the reviews as 
‘tick-box’ exercises and dominated by paperwork: 
“When we prepare for QAA one of the main preparation tasks is making sure that the 
paperwork they are going to look at is ready and complete, and you know what they're 
going to look at really … It is very much a tick-box exercise: is all the paper there? Do the 
right people know the right answers? And I'm not sure they are really uncovering what the 
problems are as a consequence.” 
With the adoption of the Higher Education Review approach in 2013 reviews have had a greater 
focus on students, including interviewing student representatives and the requirement for a 
student submission, which have made it far harder for providers to hide areas of poor quality 
affecting students. Other parties, whilst welcoming the approach, were not convinced about the 
extent to which speaking to students could identify quality assurance issues. As one university 
lecturer stated “with the students they talk to … we know the sensible students and we could 
nominate these students”.   
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One student reviewer noted that such deliberate student selection was easily spotted and 
accounted for: 
“One review I did [the students] felt cherry-picked, that became obvious in the first five 
minutes. When they try to look perfect we can see through it. For the most part yes they 
are the keen beans but they represent students well. They are not backward in going 
forward if you know what I mean.” 
Reviewers themselves were not overly concerned with the efficacy of the review methods, but did 
suggest the uniformity of judgements they were able to reach as a reason why the review 
outcomes may not serve as a consistent proxy for quality. It was not a case of reviewers believing 
they were correct and others were wrong, rather that different reviewers had different areas of 
interest and would focus the review accordingly. As one reviewer succinctly stated during an 
interview: 
“Reviewers have different characteristics, they have different approaches to things, they 
have different things that are key and uppermost in their mind. Some people have a 
particular bee in their bonnet about particular things they want to look at. Others have a 
different approach … Each of those three or four reviewers will home in on particular 
elements when they come to do their review … they all take out those elements that are 
of interest to them as much as they possibly can and come to a conclusion based upon 
what they’re focused in on, so you end up with, it seems to me, and this is what has always 
worried me about QAA reviews, is I’ve often felt if you had a different set of reviewers 
going in they could come out with a different result … Even if you did have a review by a 
group of 4 reviewers that wrote a report up and gave 10 recommendations and 5 [features 
of good practice] for that, and then if you got a different team in to come and do exactly 
the same thing, they’d came up with a different set of recommendations and a different 
set of [features of good practice], and if you had another team they would come up with 
a different set yet again, and my point is this: they are all correct. None of them are 
incorrect, they’re all coming up with valid points of view.” 
The consistency of review judgements was raised by some interviewees that were not reviewers, 
but it was certainly not a consistent concern. One FEC Senior Manager expressed concerns over 
the reviewers’ failure to adapt to assessing different environments: 
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“I've found that when inspectors coming from universities would apply their university 
experience lock, stock and barrel to the college … the incredible focus on minute taking 
and record keeping I found some of that unrealistic in FE.” 
The academic literature suggests that, in part, this lack of consistency can be explained by human 
biases and is not specific to higher education reviews. A human’s ability to attribute a value to an 
item, output or process is constrained by ‘anchoring’ or ‘arbitrary coherence’ (Kahneman, 2011). 
When we first encounter details, say a university league table ranking or a previous reviewer’s 
rating of a provider, that ‘anchor’ is imprinted in our minds and serves as a point around which 
our judgements are made. Furthermore, repeated experiments have shown human judgement is 
affected by the surroundings in which they are made: coffee is perceived to taste better when 
served in nicer cups and company’s accounts are deemed to be in better health when audited in 
more lavish offices (Ariely, 2009). Arriving at an institution with impressive facilities and a good 
reputation, deserved or not, inspectors are already primed to judge it favourably. Conversely, a 
little-known but excellent provider in modest surroundings may be harshly judged. One former 
auditor with experience of the QAA reviews put forward an alternative suggestion: that the part-
time nature of QAA Reviewers meant their skills would not reach the necessary standard: 
“I'm not being critical of any of the individuals involved, they are all experienced and 
knowledgeable academics - I know they are - but an audit is a different skill and they are 
not auditors and I can tell they are not auditors cause I am … [Doing three reviews in two 
years] you're not going to get up to speed.” 
In their defence, QAA invest a lot of effort to minimise inconsistencies in judgements. Work is 
divided in such a way that a review team can easily pick up on a rogue reviewer, there are specific 
requirements for evidence that can be considered and how the judgements that come from it can 
be reported, the review findings must then go through a moderation panel with no prior 
knowledge of the review who are there to provide challenge and ensure consistency across 
reviews. These processes were strengthened following Southampton University’s ultimately 
successful appeal against an ‘unsatisfactory’ judgement for reasons which remain confidential 
(Grove, 2013). The same methods have been adopted by a similar quality regulator, the Care 
Quality Commission, in response to criticism that judgements were not consistent (Francis, 2013) 
yet in-depth evaluation showed they have failed to eliminate variation severe enough to 
undermine their regulatory approach (Boyd et al., 2014). It is doubtful that the steps taken by QAA 
are sufficient to ensure complete consistency across reviews carried out by numerous different 
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teams, with different backgrounds, different perceptions of quality and limited chance to hone 
their auditing skills whilst gainfully employed as full-time academics as their primary employment. 
Many parties suggested that the outcome of QAA reviews were not able to provide an accurate 
and consistent assessment of a provider’s quality assurance activity, and hence did not serve as a 
reasonable proxy for quality. It was suggested that some issues could be hidden from reviewers, 
that the reviews were too focused on paperwork, that reviewers did not review frequently enough 
to hone their craft, that different review teams would reach different conclusions about the same 
provider due to their perceptions of quality, and that numerous biases and heuristics could 
constrain reviewers’ ability to reach a valid judgement. In the face of such challenges, it will always 
be difficult for QAA reviews to serve as a consistent proxy for ‘quality’, and hence for the data to 
predict the outcome of QAA reviews.  
8.4.2. Over-Reductionist Findings 
“QAA is an institution-level review and there is going to be enormous variation within 
departments, never mind across departments” 
Interview with Russell Group Lecturer 
Interviewees were in universal agreement over the significant variation in quality and application 
of processes within higher education providers. Such variation poses a challenge for reviews that 
result in judgements of provider-level, not department-level or course-level, quality assurance. 
QAA are reluctant to provide decisions relating only to specific parts of a provider due to the 
precedent it may set. As one QAA Manager cautioned “before you know it every institution will 
want to plead for ‘ok we'll live with this negative judgement but can you make it clear it’s confined 
to this one programme’”. 
QAA do not aim to assess department-level performance, however it often becomes apparent 
during a review that that there are specific concerns with one or more departments. How then 
should a provider with nine excellent departments and one ‘unsatisfactory’ department be 
judged? While the QAA strive to ensure their judgements are pragmatic, accounting for the extent 
to which the problem is confined to particular areas, it remains a fact that a single judgement is 
required to summarise variable quality assurance practices across a provider. Realistically two 
options exist: acknowledge that central processes are not working if one department is 
‘unsatisfactory’ and therefore find the provider ‘unsatisfactory’, or acknowledge that 90% of 
departments are ‘satisfactory’ and therefore, on balance, the provider is too. Which occurs in 
practice is not clear. Just as the over-aggregation of data and the loss of information that results 
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presents a challenge for the use of data as a reliable proxy for quality, so too do the single, 
provider-level review judgements. 
It is not only reaching a judgement across multiple departments that poses a challenge. As one 
reviewer noted, it is difficult to aggregate a judgement across multiple assessment categories: 
“It always jarred how the categories assessed were so different. Learning resources was 
assessing libraries, physical resources. Quality enhancement, that is measuring something 
very different. How do you realistically measure them on the same scale? How do you 
combine them fairly?” 
The size and complexity of institutions, and the subsequent cost of reviewing each individual 
department, was one of the contributing factors to QAA’s adoption of a provider-level assessment 
focused on central processes. These centralised processes, it has been argued, should assure 
quality throughout a provider; however, the interviewees widely acknowledged variation within 
providers, indeed within departments, suggests this is not happening in practice.  
It is unlikely that the problems posed by the aggregation of data and review judgements cancel 
each other out and result in the same view of quality. Rather, the different explicit and implicit 
weightings present in metric construction and reviews will result in different views on quality 
meaning neither serve as a reliable proxy for quality. Hence, the data cannot predict the outcome 
of QAA reviews. 
8.4.3. Processes and Outcomes 
The specifics of QAA’s process-driven approach were not cited by many as a key issue that may 
result in QAA reviews being a poor proxy for quality. It was, however, a notable concern amongst 
the more policy-orientated interviewees. The QAA focus on processes for several reasons. First, 
to focus on outcomes instead would not be permitted by the sector they ‘co-regulate’. Higher 
education providers fiercely defend their academic freedom. Previous attempts to impose a more 
rigorous quality assessment system have been vociferously attacked with QAA reviewers having 
been denied access to LSE and ministers successfully lobbied to reduce burden (THE, 2001a, 
2001b). Second, as mentioned above, QAA simply could not afford to make an effective 
assessment of outcomes. As Roger Brown, former Chief Executive of HEQC, told me during an 
interview: 
“Although institutions bang on endlessly about the cost of quality assurance, in reality it’s 
much more cost effective to have a small group of people going in every few years to look 
at processes than it is to have people endlessly crawling over the outcomes” 
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Third, a belief in the effectiveness of assessing the providers’ processes rather than assessing their 
outcomes and the intractable challenges that accompany that. This is a view shared by many. In 
October 2015, 169 academics signed a letter to Madeleine Atkins, Chief Executive of HEFCE, and 
Professor Julia Goodfellow, President of Universities UK, expressing their concern over the 
planned use of outcomes measures to assess teaching quality (Jones et al., 2015). Concerns 
included the fact that student attainment is influenced by a host of factors external to higher 
education provision including student engagement, social class and prior attainment; the obvious 
incentives for grade inflation; and the narrow concept of quality which does not account for the 
promotion of lifelong attributes which are difficult if not impossible to capture.  
Not everyone agrees on the process-orientated approach however. For example, in 2009, the 
Innovation, Universities and Skills Select Committee disagreed with Peter Williams’ assertion that 
processes and outcomes “were very strongly linked” (IUSSC, 2009a, 212) and stated that “in not 
judging the standards themselves, the QAA is taking an unduly limited view of its potential role” 
(IUSSC, 2009a, 219). As one academic noted in response to the findings in this thesis: 
“The QAA assessments ignore entirely the quality of what's taught. They give top ratings 
to courses in pure quackery as long as the right bits of paper can be produced, while 
ignoring the fact that the unfortunate students are being taught pure nonsense. That fact 
alone makes QAA reports almost useless, and sometimes actually harmful to quality” 
(Colquhoun, 2015) 
Whether one has a preference for processes or outcomes however, it is true that the existence of 
processes assessed by the QAA does not necessarily result in quality provision. This is a fact that 
may clearly limit the ability of QAA reviews to serve as a proxy for quality, and hence be forecast 
by data also serving as a proxy for quality. If we consider the example of timely student feedback, 
a provider may have in place a policy which states all feedback should be provided within two 
weeks of a submission deadline. The first issue is that, unbeknownst to the central administration, 
the policy may not be followed. Providing the students presented for interview as part of the 
review process are selected correctly, and the student submission does not highlight the 
timeliness of feedback as a key issue, the provider can present the correct paperwork and will 
receive positive QAA review judgement. Second, even if the policy were followed the tight 
deadline might only be achieved by staff reducing the quality of their feedback, somewhat 
defeating the purpose of the policy in the first place. In this circumstance the provider could 
demonstrate the policy is in place, and being followed, and earn a positive QAA review judgement. 
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In neither case are the students experiencing quality outcomes, and this may be highlighted by 
the relevant NSS questions, but not by QAA reviews. 
One reviewer raised an alternative issue with the link between processes and outcomes. 
Outcomes data may highlight where there had been an issue, but if reviewers follow-up those 
poor outcomes and 
“if we find that the provider has noticed that the results are poor and they’ve actually 
acted upon that information and put measures in place to prevent that happening again, 
then we’d say that team was acting correctly and properly, they’ve got good processes, 
and therefore we would rate them highly. They are not rated highly on the fact that the 
data itself is good or bad, but that the processes are in place so that they can understand 
what the data is telling them, that they’re looking at the data and using that to guide 
whatever they do. And it’s what they do that is the important thing, not what the data tells 
you or not the outcome, it’s the process.” 
Poor outcomes therefore may be the result of a lack of processes, which should be judged 
negatively by QAA, but they can also guide QAA to good processes, which should be judged 
positively by QAA. One could argue that the fact poor outcomes were allowed to happen in the 
first place indicates that in the past processes have not been effective – they should not have 
allowed outcomes to fall to concerning levels – but by the time QAA conducts their review the 
provider has had the chance to transform this negative outcome into a positive.  
The disconnect between processes and outcomes works both ways, and can also be affected by 
the time and actions that elapse between when the two are assessed. The absence of process 
does not necessarily result in a poor outcome. Academics might not need to be told in writing to 
provide timely feedback, or to provide feedback in a certain way, for students to receive timely 
and effective feedback. The lack of such a central process may result in an unfavourable 
judgement from QAA, whilst students experience, and the data demonstrate, quality outcomes. If 
the presence, or otherwise, of processes does not necessarily lead to quality provision, the ability 
of QAA reviews to serve as a proxy for quality, and hence be predicted by the available data, will 
be constrained. 
8.4.4. The Decoupling of Quality Assurance Processes 
Multiple academics and regulators expressed concern during their interviews over the disconnect 
that has developed between quality assessment teams within providers and front-line staff 
interacting with students. Negative QAA reviews can have a significant impact on a provider; 
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further to inflicting reputational damage, the right for students to access government loans and 
for the provider to recruit international students can be curtailed. Accordingly, many providers 
establish quality assurance units to ensure all the necessary processes are in place and can be 
demonstrated. The result is that, to varying degrees, quality assurance has become decoupled 
from the provision of higher education (Power, 1997). This decoupling provides one reason why 
QAA’s review judgements may not serve as a reliable proxy for quality, and why the available data 
fails to predict them. 
During interviews, several references were made to course specification documentation compiled 
by teaching staff being sent to central quality assurance staff who would review the text and make 
the necessary changes to please QAA. These textual changes had no impact on what was taught 
or how it was taught, yet despite this disconnect, they could have a substantive impact on QAA’s 
judgements. This decoupling of quality assurance and frontline provision has not escaped the 
notice of QAA. As one former QAA Senior Manager acknowledged “QAA’s approach has reached 
maturity, people know how to play the game.” In an effort to combat this, QAA reviews have 
expanded to take representations from all stakeholders including student submissions, as one 
current QAA Senior Manager stated: 
“You’re trying to not just talk to representatives because mini-bureaucracies are created 
there … but you also want to try and talk to normal students about their experiences, get 
it from the horse’s mouth as it were, and speak to staff as well. Normally review teams will 
talk to particular kinds of staff about issues they are concerned about. If there's a particular 
issue about induction then, they'll want to talk to new staff. So the interactions are not all 
with the quality office or whoever the institutions put forward to represent themselves, 
you're trying to get behind that as well.” 
Interviews with academics revealed scepticism around the effectiveness of these developments. 
As one FEC Senior Manager stated: “When we've been subjected to QAA reviews, particularly the 
last two … was that there's an awful lot of paper moved around and I'm not sure they're getting 
to the bottom of quality”.  
A further limitation that may prevent QAA review judgements serving as a proxy for quality, and 
hence be predicted by the available data, is therefore that the QAA review process has become 
decoupled from higher education provision. QAA are simply conducting a ‘ritual of verification’ by 
reviewing centralised documentation entirely distinct from the activities, and quality, of providers 




In summary, there are significant issues with the validity of the outcome of QAA reviews as a proxy 
for quality. The inherent limitations of reviewers and reviews, reducing the quality assurance 
practices of often large and varied institutions down to a single judgement, the potential weak link 
between processes and outcomes, and the decoupling of those processes from provision, may 
each be limiting the robustness and consistency of review findings, and hence the ability of the 
available data to predict them. 
 
8.5. Differing Notions of ‘Quality’ in Higher Education 
“Quality in education’ is a subject extraordinarily difficult to come to grips with, and full of 
pitfalls. There is no single final answer to the quality question, and we should not look for it. But 
the issue cannot be avoided.” 
(Ball, 1985, p.97) 
“Quality: we know what it is, yet we don’t know what it is. But that is self-contradictory, for some 
things are better than others: that is, they have more quality. But when you try and say what the 
quality is, apart from the things that have it, it all goes ‘poof’. There’s nothing to talk about. But 
if you can’t say what quality is, how do you know what it is, or how do you know that it even 
exists? If no-one knows what it is, then for all practical purposes, it doesn’t exist at all. But for all 
practical purposes, it really does exist. What else are the grades based on? Why else would 
people pay fortunes for some things and throw others in the trash pile? Obviously some things 
are better than others. But what’s the betterness? So around you go, spinning mental wheels, 
and nowhere finding any place to get traction. What the hell is quality? What is it?” 
(Pirsig, 1974, p.184)  
The third possible reason why the available metrics cannot predict the outcome of QAA reviews 
is that, even if they aren’t significantly affected by the issues identified earlier and both serve as 
proxies for quality, they are measuring different conceptions of the incredibly hard to define 
notion of ‘quality’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, interviewees struggled to vocalise what they thought 
it was. A HEFCE senior manager, higher education policy analyst, a QAA reviewer, and former vice 
chancellor respectively defined quality as:  
“the [QAA] way of looking at quality is much more about quality management and it’s 
about the processes, but is that actually quality or is quality … what actually matters to 
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students in terms of the academic experience and probably most importantly student 
outcomes and those things for all intents and purposes the old QAA reviews weren’t really 
designed to measure?” 
“A good quality learning environment is one that provides challenge and stretch that 
enables you to develop as a whole person rather than just learning academic knowledge - 
are you learning skills and critical thought and how to engage in wider society and all those 
things. But also that a high-quality academic environment is an inclusive one … It's not high 
quality if only a certain type of person is able to succeed … Also important is the ability for 
individual - both learners and teachers and also institutions, across the spectrum - to take 
risks and innovate and get things wrong, and fail”  
“It’s extraordinarily difficult to define what quality is … it’s neither a subjective nor an 
objective phenomenon which could be easily pinned down, but you recognised it when 
you saw it.” 
“A good university is one that provides the best education it can for the students of whom 
it has charge, and extends, develops and matures those students as much as anyone could 
do given the resources and to an acceptable standard. So it’s not just about value added, 
the standards do have to come in there which is why you would have to have something 
like QAA reviews, peer-review to provide you both externally and internally with the 
evidence.” 
Quality, it seems, can concern inter alia outcomes (centred on retention and satisfaction in 
HEFCE’s new operating model), developing the students as a person, inclusivity and adaptability 
to students, risk taking, value-added, academic standards, and doing the best with resources 
available. These can, or cannot, be assessed by a QAA-like peer-review process. 
The challenge of defining and assessing the quality of public goods is a relatively new 
phenomenon. As Donabedian states in his landmark paper on the quality of healthcare: 
“There was a time, not too long ago, when … the quality of care was considered to be 
something of a mystery: real, capable of being perceived and appreciated, but not subject 
to measurement. The very attempt to define and measure quality seemed, then, to 
denature and belittle it. Now, we may have moved too far in the opposite direction.” 
(Donabedian, 1988, p.1743) 
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The perennial debate over ‘what is quality in higher education’ began in earnest in the 1980s when 
increasing participation, competition and pressure on resources led to concerns that quality – 
however it was defined – could suffer. The debate has yet to be resolved (Gibbs, 2010, 2012). 
Failure to agree on a definition for quality, let alone a measure of it, is perhaps unsurprising given 
the complexity of the task (Ball, 1985). 
Harvey and Green (1993) have identified five broad, distinctive definitions of quality in higher 
education, each with multiple variants. First, quality can be defined as being exceptional. The 
traditional notion of quality is something exclusive, distinctive and special (Pfeffer and Coote, 
1991). There are no defined criteria for this, as the Universities Funding Council (UFC) assumed in 
the 1989 Research Assessment Exercise “panels would recognise quality when they saw it” (UFC, 
1991, p.5). Alternatively, within the ‘quality as exceptional’ concept, quality can be perceived as 
excellence by exceeding high standards. More specifically, high standards of inputs and outputs 
such as bright students, Nobel prizewinning lecturers and modern laboratories will be perceived 
as high quality.  
Second, quality can be defined as perfection or consistency. This may take the form of ‘zero 
defects’: always conforming to specifications rather than attaining high standards. Such an 
approach focuses on quality at all stages of the higher education process ensuring ‘faults’ do not 
occur (Peters and Waterman, 1982). A high quality provider under this definition would be one in 
which every student receives their education as indicated and intended, regardless of how 
attainable the standards were. Alternatively, quality can be conceived of as the product of a 
‘quality culture’. Rather than an excessive focus on no single failure occurring, all staff are 
responsible for quality, identify when lapses occur and work together to prevent a reoccurrence 
in a constantly improving environment. 
Third, quality can be defined as fitness for purpose. Distinct from quality as something exclusive 
and exceptional, fitness for purpose conceives of quality as specific to individual criteria (Ball, 
1985; Reynolds, 1986). Fitness for purpose can be conceived as conforming to customer – or 
student – specifications. The obvious challenge to this approach is the variety of outcomes 
students on the same course, let alone at the same provider, seek and the fact that they may not 
be best placed to specify what education they should receive. An alternative is to define fitness 
for purpose in terms of a provider’s mission (Houston, 2007). A provider that focuses on poorly-
qualified students with little social capital and sees 50% through to graduation and in to related 
employment can be regarded as higher quality than a provider with the brightest students and 
best facilities but who does little to make them exceptional; a well-built Mini can be of higher 
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quality than a poorly built Rolls-Royce (Green, 1994). This approach was adopted in the 1991 
Higher Education White Paper which established the HEQC and quality assessment units to 
“safeguard the best of the distinctive missions of individual institutions” (DES, 1991, p.27) and 
continues, in part, to be adopted by the QAA (QAA, 2013c, p.6).  
Fourth, quality can be defined as value for money. In a theoretical perfect market the quality of 
higher education provision would, theoretically, be reflected by its price. The higher education 
market is, however, a long way from perfect with an upper price limit from which fees seldom 
deviate. Despite the lack of differentiation in fees, quality can still be conceived as the type and 
volume of provision students receive for their predominantly uniform fees. Mirroring the 
challenges of defining quality, defining value for money requires an agreement of what should be 
delivered and how that will be assessed. Several senior academics expressed the view during their 
interviews that it would be easy to increase contact time at little extra cost by mandating all 
students to attend unnecessary, high-volume seminars. 
Fifth, quality can be defined as transformative. One conception of transformation is the ‘value 
added’ to a student: how has a higher education provider enhanced the knowledge, skills and 
abilities of its students? The concept of quality as ‘value added’ has recently grown in saliency 
because, in the eyes of Gibbs (2012, p13), it is the only measure of quality that is effected by 
educational practices rather than inputs. A second conception of quality as transformation is the 
empowerment of students. A high quality provider enables students to affect their own 
transformation which may result in enhanced awareness, critical thinking and confidence.  
Further to Harvey and Green’s (1993) five broad definitions of quality, a sixth is apparent in the 
regulatory world: ‘quality as meeting minimum standards’. Foster care, insurance , and health and 
social care services, for example, are deemed to be of satisfactory quality if they can meet more 
attainable criteria designed to root out substandard providers (Department for Education, 2011; 
Lloyd's, 2015; CQC, 2015b). This minimum standards approach is also used by the QAA, in relation 
to the ‘threshold’ academic standards designed to ensure awards are set at the right level (QAA, 
2014f). 
Each conception of quality has its advantages and disadvantages which contributes to the lack of 
an agreed definition. Thinking of quality as exceptional would be common sense to many: those 
providers with the brightest students, most revered academics, and best facilities can easily be 
perceived as the highest quality. This definition however ignores what the provider does with all 
its advantages. Moreover, it means other providers doing incredible work with limited resources 
will not be regarded as high quality.  
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Ensuring every student receives what is promised is an alternative but narrow view of quality that, 
amongst other things, ignores the specifics of what is being delivered perfectly. Quality as fitness 
for purpose has been widely used in the UK over the past 25 years and acknowledges that different 
providers rightly have different missions; not all universities can be like, nor should they aim to be 
like, Oxbridge. The disadvantage of fitness for purpose as a measure of quality is that it holds 
different providers to different standards. A provider that has 99.9% retention but is not reaching 
the exacting target of 100% it has set itself, may be judged of lower quality than a provider with a 
retention rate of just 60%, albeit with more challenging students.  
Quality as value for money simply raises the secondary question of ‘how the value is measured?’ 
and helps little. Proponents argue that quality as ‘value added’ provides the only realistic way of 
measuring what a provider does; measuring outputs such as the number of first class degrees or 
future earnings is of little value as they are well predicted by inputs such as the prior attainment 
of students (Astin, 1985; Graham and Thompson, 2001). By measuring ‘value added’ however a 
decision must be made on where value must be added and may focus attention on these areas at 
the expense of course content. Moreover, providers with the brightest students are starting from 
a high point and will struggle to add as much value as a provider starting with less high-performing 
students. Minimum standards, when correctly enforced, provide a guaranteed baseline of what 
can be expected, but offer no further information than that. Such minimum standards approaches 
can disincentivise providers from exceeding expectations as their investment of resource may not 
be recognised. 
Even once a definition of quality has been decided upon, those seeking to measure and assess 
quality require specific standards against which judgements can be made. What is it that must be 
fit-for-purpose or exceptional? And how is that defined? What may be fit for the purposes of an 
18 year-old undergraduate, may not be fit for the purposes of a mature part-time postgraduate. 
What may be exceptional in a taught science course, may differ greatly from what is exceptional 
in an anthropology research environment (Gibbs, 2010). For the QAA, as discussed earlier, the 
specific standards are detailed as 19 ‘expectations’ concerning academic standards, teaching and 
learning, the provision of information, and enhancement. For HEFCE, quality can be defined by 
achieving good retention, student satisfaction and employability outcomes (HEFCE, 2016c). 
Gaining a fixed view on what quality is becomes yet more difficult when these defined standards 
are not fixed, but subject to ongoing review and revision (QAA, 2012b; RSS, 2016). 
Consistently assessing quality in a manner acceptable to all parties is therefore extremely 
challenging. Quality is neither tangible nor objective, it is not widgets to be counted or measured, 
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but a subjective and disputed characteristic of a service. It may be the case then that, despite all 
the potential issues highlighted in earlier sections, metrics and reviews serve as reliable proxies 
for quality, but different definitions of the contested notion of quality. Metrics will be interpreted 
by a model in absolute terms. They do not differentiate between a provider with a high standard 
of students and a worrying retention rate of 75%, and a provider seeking to widen participation 
to groups that traditionally forego higher education and doing well to retain 75% of them. The 
QAA reviews however adopt a combination of minimum standards and fitness-for-purpose views 
of quality. All providers must have effective systems in place to ensure certain outcomes – 
minimum standards – and the outcomes ensured should be appropriate for the mission of the 
provider – fitness for purpose. In the example above, whilst both providers may have a process 
with the aim of maximising continuation rates, and both providers have the same continuation 
rates, the provider with a high standard of students may be deemed ‘unsatisfactory’ by the QAA, 
but the provider seeking widen participation may be deemed ‘satisfactory’. 
It could therefore be argued that both QAA review outcomes and the available data serve as 
effective proxies for quality, but quality is multifaceted and in the ‘eye of the beholder’. Both 
proxies for quality may be correct, but they are proxies for different definitions of quality, and 
hence one cannot predict the other. It should be remembered however that benchmarking HEI 
metrics to focus on performance comparable with similar institutions – making their output more 
of an assessment of fitness for purpose rather than absolute – yielded no improvement in the 
predictive model. 
  
8.6. Summary and Discussion 
The intuitive reason for the failure of the data to predict the outcome of QAA reviews is that they 
are simply measuring different things. Whilst true, this is somewhat over reductionist. Had people 
believed they were measuring the same thing there would have been no need to establish and 
maintain HEQC and QAA; metrics would have sufficed. Rather, both QAA reviews and metrics are 
seen as proxies for quality. As both are proxies for quality, it was assumed one should be able to 
predict the other. 
This chapter has identified three assumptions that must hold true for the available metrics to 
predict the outcome of QAA reviews: the available metrics must be a reliable proxy for quality; 
QAA reviews must be a reliable proxy for quality; and the available metrics and QAA reviews must 
be proxies of the same conception of quality. There are, however, a number of factors which may 
render each assumption flawed.  
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The ability of metrics to act as a reliable proxy for quality may be limited by gaming, poor design, 
misuse, the extent to which performance is outside of the control of providers, sector diversity, a 
lack of granularity, and out-dated information. Whilst those metrics affected by gaming, poor 
design, misuse, and impact of external factors are a small fraction of the total, they are the metrics 
that all interviewees first mentioned when considering links between data and review outcomes. 
The remaining measures, such as applications, finance, staff and student characteristics, and 
research, were less affected by gaming, poor design, misuse, and factors outside of a provider’s 
control, but were believed to be less indicative of quality by virtue of what they measured. The 
timeliness of the data, although not mentioned by interviewees, is a factor that affects all 
measures. It is highly probable, therefore, that, even if one does not consider gaming of a subset 
of key metrics to be an issue, challenges inherent in the quantification of performance and 
resource data mean that the constrained ability of data to serve as a reliable proxy for quality is 
partly responsible for its inability to predict review outcomes.  
The ability of QAA review outcomes to serve as a reliable proxy for quality, and hence possibly be 
predicted by the data, may be limited by their summation of often large and varied institutions 
with a single judgement, the fact that having processes in place does not necessarily result in 
outcomes and vice versa, the decoupling of those processes from provision, and the inherent 
limitations of inspections and inspectors. All of these concerns are valid, but are neither unique to 
QAA nor easily overcome. Hospitals, prisons and schools can all be large, complex and loosely-
coupled organisations that are hard, if not impossible, to summarise in a small number of one-
word judgements necessary to communicate findings to lay audiences. Previous attempts to 
directly observe provision and overcome accusations of ‘focusing on paperwork’ have had to be 
abandoned in the face of fierce resistance as they were perceived as overly burdensome and 
impinging on academic freedom. Even if a comprehensive assessment and scoring approach could 
be agreed upon, QAA will only ever be able to minimise, not eliminate, inconsistencies in 
judgement between reviews. The widespread concern amongst interviewees over the challenges 
QAA face with the consistency and focus of their reviews suggests that it is also highly probable 
that the constrained ability of review outcomes to serve as a reliable proxy for quality is partly 
responsible for its inability to be predicted by the data. 
Finally, quality is contested. It can be conceived of as exceptional, consistent, fit for purpose, value 
for money, transformative, or meeting minimum standards. It is multifarious, subjective, and 
perceptions of quality may change over time. QAA’s traditional approach has been to focus on 
minimum academic standards and the fitness for purpose of providers’ activities. Metrics, 
however, tend to measure in absolute terms. Neither is necessarily wrong, but if they are different, 
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it is highly unlikely a proxy for one notion of quality will be able to predict a proxy for another 
notion of quality. 
It is not possible to say definitively the extent to which each these three overarching factors 
contribute to the inability of the data to predict the outcome of QAA reviews as part of a data-
driven, risk-based approach, although it seems highly probable that each factor does contribute 
to some extent. What can be said is that, following a comprehensive review of the available 
evidence and a wide-ranging set of interviews, there are multiple, compounding factors that 
provide what is likely to be an insurmountable barrier to the approach envisioned in Students at 




This final chapter discusses the findings of this thesis. Specifically, it revisits the conception of the 
research question, how it has been answered, and what the findings were. This is followed by a 
discussion of the limitations of the study and areas for further research, the implications of this 
thesis for the quality assurance of higher education, and the meaning of the findings in the wider 
context of risk-based regulation outside of higher education. 
 
9.1. Overview of the Study 
The origin of this thesis was the 2011 White Paper Students at the Heart of the System that called 
for the QAA to adopt a risk-based approach to prioritising their reviews. Such an approach was to 
“depend on an objective assessment of a basket of data, monitored continually but at arm’s 
length” (BIS, 2011, 3.19). There was, however, a comprehensive lack of empirical evidence to 
inform such an approach. It was not known how best, or indeed if it were at all possible, to 
succesfully schedule QAA’s reviews based on the risk of a provider failing their review. This thesis 
aimed to answer that question. 
There are, broadly speaking, three possible ways in which one could use data to prioritise 
regulatory activity. First, simple, rules-based methods place regulatees into prioritisation groups 
based on a small number of often contextual metrics selected a priori. Simple, rules-based 
approaches are cheap and simple to explain, however, they can be unfairly discriminatory, ignore 
important data, and fail to prioritise individual providers. Second, data-informed approaches 
present and aggregate numerous, wide-ranging metrics selected a priori to inform prioritisation 
decisions by one or more experts. Whilst data-informed approaches allow regulators to consider, 
and be seen to consider, a wide range of performance measures and incorporate their tacit 
knowledge, the advantages are outweighed by the significant epistemic challenges, issues with 
consistency, and the fact numerous studies have consistently demonstrated expert interpretation 
to be at best equal to simple models (see for example Dawes, 1979; Grove et al., 2000; Meehl, 
1986). Third, data-driven approaches use machine-learning techniques to determine the most 
accurate prioritisation model from the available data. Data-driven models are simpler and cheaper 
to run, can be continuously monitored, and produce an output free from human biases. It is this 
data-driven approach that best fit the stated goal of Students at the Heart of the System - namely 
to target QAA reviews via the “objective assessment of a basket of data, monitored continually 
but at arm’s length” – and offered the greatest chance of success (BIS, 2011, 3.19). A data-driven 
approach was therefore explored. 
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To determine how best QAA reviews could be prioritised using a data-driven, risk-based approach 
over 1,000 performance and resource measures were gathered. These data included confidential 
data sourced from QAA, a data set specifically constructed by HEFCE, and a data set painstakingly 
constructed by the author from 600 sets of financial accounts purchased from Companies House. 
Where appropriate, these data have had one and two-year absolute and percentage change-over-
time variants calculated, been imputed to account for missing values, standardised to remove in-
year variation, and benchmarked to account for performance relative to similar providers. The 
latest version of each item of data prior to each review was then combined with the results of 
each relevant QAA review, whether it was for an HEI, FEC, or alternative provider.  
To identify the optimal model for predicting the outcome of QAA reviews, and hence prioritsing 
them, various machine-learning approaches were available. The elastic net approach, a dynamic 
blending of ridge and lasso logistic regession was chosen as it best fulfilled the criteria for use by 
the QAA: models are accurate, easy to maintain and update, and simpler to interpret than other 
models meaning that they could be more easily understood by QAA and higher education 
providers alike. The elastic net approach was used to, in effect, try every possible combination of 
metrics and weightings to determine the best possible model.  
This analysis – the first to comprehensively assess the optimal approach to prioritising inspections 
of quality in any sector - has shown that no effective model exists that could allow QAA to 
successfully operate a data-driven, risk-based approach to prioritising individual providers for 
review. The continual monitoring of a basket of metrics, as envisioned in Students at the Heart of 
the System, will not be successful. The finding that a data-driven, risk-based approach cannot 
work, by extension means it is extremely unlikely any risk-based approach to prioritising individual 
providers for review will work; evidence from a host of other sectors and settings has shown the 
expert selection and interpretation of data will perform, at best, equal to data-driven approaches.  
It is certain that were the QAA to adopt a data-driven, risk-based approach, the stated benefits of 
such an approach will not be realised. A subset of ‘satisfactory’ providers will be unfairly burdened 
with additional reviews, distracting them from delivering their ‘satisfactory’ provision, and unfairly 
stigmatising them as ‘high risk’. At the same time, a subset of ‘unsatisfactory’ providers will go 
without a review for an extended period of time allowing poor-quality provision to continue to 
the detriment of students and the reputation of the UK higher education sector as a whole.  
Having established that a data-driven, risk-based approach to prioritising QAA reivews cannot 
work, a secondary, qualitative analysis was conducted to determine why this might be the case. 
Such an analysis cannot conclusively identify a single factor, or factors, with certainty, but can 
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highlight areas to be addressed. In-depth interviews with key stakeholders were combined with 
the analysis of policy documents and academic literature, written and oral evidence from select 
committee inquiries, and the author’s experience shadowing a QAA review. For a data-driven, risk-
based approach to work, the available metrics must be a robust proxy for quality; QAA reviews 
must be a robust proxy for quality; and the available metrics and QAA reviews must be proxies of 
the same conception of quality. However, a number of factors which may render each assumption 
flawed were identified including inter alia gaming, granularity, misuse of data, and timeliness 
issues; over-reductionist and inconsistent review findings; and the contested, subjective nature of 
quality in higher education.  
 
This thesis has therefore provided the first empirical analysis of data-driven, risk-based 
approaches for quality assurance in higher education and has shown that such an approach will 
not work. By extension, a data-informed approach selecting metrics a priori and making use of 
expert interpretation is also extremely unlikely to be successful. Whilst the findings from this 
thesis are not, and can never be, absolutely certain, they are extremely comprehensive and show 
that the changes required to make a data-driven, risk-based approach possible in the future are 
very unlikely to be realised. This is a significant contribution to the literature on risk-based 
regulation. Whilst there have been multiple qualitative studies of the political and operational 
challenges facing its implementation, this is the first quantitative study to analyse the most 
fundamental aspect of risk-based approaches: whether or not risk can be accurately determined. 
No effective model exists that could have allowed QAA to successfully prioritise individual 
providers for review. 
 
9.2. Limitations of the Study and Areas for Further Research 
As with nearly all analyses, this study has its limitations and raises further questions. The foremost 
limitation of this study is that, much like declaring there is no such thing as a black swan, stating 
that no risk-based approach can successfully predict the outcome of QAA reviews suffers from the 
problem of induction (Vickers, 2011). No matter how comprehensive the nature of the 
quantitative analysis, one cannot rule out the possibility that there is a model or approach that 
can predict the outcome of QAA reviews, but that it has not yet been found. Such a model could 
have been overlooked in the earlier analysis for two reasons.  
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First, it could be the case that there exists data that was not considered as part of this analysis 
that could predict, or contribute to the prediction of, QAA review outcomes. This is highly unlikely. 
The analysis considered included all metrics with the slightest feasible connection to quality or 
quality assurance from the HEIDI database in addition to other restricted or specially convened 
data sets, including financial information for alternative providers that is at present realistically 
too resource intensive to form part of a cost-effective, risk-based approach. New data collections 
could allow for the development of a succesful model in the future; however, none of the 
stakeholders interviewed for this study were able to identify a single, as-yet-to-be-collected data 
set that would aid the prediction of review outcomes.  
Second, a different modelling approach may be more succesful. It is possible a more complex but 
more powerful support vector machine or neural network – or indeed an as-yet-undiscovered 
machine learning approach – could identify an effective model. It is again unlikely however. There 
was a very clear lack of relationship between the available metrics and the outcome of QAA 
reviews demonstrated by the univariate analyses. No matter how advanced the analytical 
technique, it cannot identify a set of relationships that do not exist. Even if a more complex 
machine-learning approach were to be successful, the use of such an approach is questionable. 
Complex models are difficult to interpret – it would be difficult to explain to a provider why they 
are being prioritised for review – and more importantly, they are burdensome and expensive to 
develop and maintain. To quote Wagner on the imposition of the dual quality audit and 
assessment regime of the 1990s "there is a danger that the costs of the whole exercise to the 
system … will exceed the funds affected by the outcome” (Wagner, 1993, 281). 
There was also a limitation imposed on the study by the outcome of the reviews. HEIs and FECs, 
and to some extent alternative providers, are very compliant. The result is that the analyses in this 
thesis are attempting to predict an infrequent event, something which will always be more 
challenging than predicting a frequent event. As a nation, having few ‘unsatisfactory’ providers is 
a positive, but it will make an effective, data-driven, risk-based approach to quality assurance 
more challenging to successfully design and operate. Additional reviews have been conducted 
since the analyses in this study were performed and future analyses based on those additional 
reviews would complement the findings of this thesis. 
Finally, in the previous section I asserted that a data-driven approach, as envisioned in Students 
at the Heart of the System, could not work and that, by extension, given the literature reviewed 
in section 3.5.2, it is extremely unlikely that a data-informed approach would work either. This is 
true, but at present one cannot say for certain that a data-informed approach cannot work. One 
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can only say that it would be ‘ground breaking’ if it were to defy all previous studies on the 
performance of expert interpretation of judgement compared to simple statistical models. 
Even if one were to set aside the very considerable concerns over the cost of a data-informed 
approach, the periodic and subjective judgements being in direct opposition to the continuous 
and objective rationale detailed in Students at the Heart of the System, and the overwhelming 
body of diverse evidence that has assiduously demonstrated expert interpretation to be at best 
equal to simple models (see for example Meehl, 1954; Beaver, 1966; Libby, 1976; Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1978; Goldman et al., 1988; Ashenfelter, 2008; Montier, 2009), there are significant 
concerns over the a priori selection and interpretation of data. If one considers the most 
frequently touted a priori metric which experts would likely consider, the NSS results, this study 
has shown that there is a significant relationship between only one of the 22 questions and the 
outcome of QAA reviews, and that relationship shows the marginally better performing 
institutions are more likely to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ by QAA! It is doubtful that any amount of 
expert interpretation could turn a collection of measures with such a lack of relationship to the 
outcome into an effective, risk-based approach. As detailed in the following section however, such 
an approach has been adopted by HEFCE (HEFCE, 2016c), and the adoption of this approach poses 
an interesting opportunity for future research which could theoretically add significantly to the 
limited empirical study of data-informed approaches. 
Unfortunately, researching the effectiveness of a data-informed approach would not be 
straightforward. The only robust way to evaluate the approach would be to form two 
representative groups of providers. The first would be a control group with its reviews prioritised 
by performance on metrics alone. The second group would have their reviews prioritised by the 
expert panel. Reviewers would have to be ‘blind’, i.e. inspectors would not be able to know which 
group the provider they were reviewing belonged to, and by extension could not know their metric 
scores which would likely make their grouping apparent, lest they subconsciously bias the result. 
Given the low rate of non-compliance in the sector this experiment would need to be conducted 
over many years to obtain a statistically significant result, and the metrics and review method 
would have to remain consistent over that time. In both cases the feedback will be limited: false 
negatives may go undetected and the attribution of success to expert interpretation (or 
otherwise) may be challenging (Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Tetlock and Gardner, 2016). The 
robust evaluation of such an approach therefore is, for all intents and purposes, impossible and, 
arguably, by not allowing reviewers to know why they are at a provider and therefore enabling 




There are, therefore, a number of limitations to this study. The first limitation is that it is not 
possible to say with absolute certainty that no effective model exists, but has not been found by 
this study. Logically, this could be the case due to a lack of data or due to not using the correct 
modelling approach. Both are extremely unlikely however. Not only did this study include all 
available data that could feasibly form part of a cost-effective, risk-based approach, but no 
interviewees were able to identify additional, as yet to be collected data that may help. 
Furthermore, if a more complicated model does exist, which is unlikely given the robustness of 
the elastic net approach and the lack of relation between the individual metrics and the review 
outcomes, it would likely be too complex for regulatory use. The third limitation is that there were 
a limited number of reviews, and within those a limited number of ‘unsatisfactory’ reviews, with 
which to develop the predictive models. This study did however use all the available data, and in 
no instance was the lack of reviews, ‘unsatisfactory’ or otherwise, severe enough to call into 
question the findings. Finally, if one extrapolates from the findings to say that, if a data-driven 
approach cannot work, a data-informed approach cannot work either, this faces the same 
problem of induction that claiming no data-driven model can predict the outcome of QAA reviews. 
Despite the findings of this study, HEFCE have adopted a data-informed approach that in theory, 
although likely not in practice, allows for the important evaluation of a risk-based approach; 
something which is all too infrequent. This new approach, and other possibilities for the quality 
assurance of higher education, are discussed in the following section.  
 
9.3. The Future of Quality Assurance in Higher Education 
As noted in chapter two, higher education policy has been in unprecedented flux since the time 
this thesis was first conceived and, in 2016, HEFCE, HEFCW and DELNI published their revised 
operating model for quality assessment (HEFCE, 2016c). The operating model confirmed that 
future quality assurance work would be conducted by themselves and the winners of six 
competitive tenders. The largest contract, and the contract most relevant to this thesis, concerns 
conducting quality assurance reviews and has been awarded to QAA (QAA, 2016b).  
Established providers will no longer face cyclical reviews. Instead, the national funding councils 
will conduct a desk-based ‘Annual Provider Review’ exercise that will “build on established data 
analysis and assurance arrangements” to determine those providers in need of a quality assurance 
review (HEFCE, 2016c, 92). New providers are to enter a four-year probationary period that begins 
with an initial peer review. During the four year ‘development’ period, new providers will be 
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subject to the same desk-based ‘Annual Provider Review’ as ‘established’ providers. After four 
years, probationary providers will undergo a peer review and either be judged ‘established’, or 
remain in the probationary process until such time as they become ‘established’. 
 
Figure 9.1: Aspects of accountability arrangements in the Annual Provider Review (HEFCE, 2016c, p.24). 
HEFCE claim the ‘Annual Provider Review’ will utilise national funding councils’ “sophisticated 
understanding of its providers and the context in which they operate”. Intelligence will be 
supplemented by the funding bodies “establishing effective ways to capture the views of its 
students and any outcomes of PSRB activities”, and an expanded ‘Annual Accountability Return’ 
from governing bodies (HEFCE, 2016c, 94). The ‘Annual Accountability Return’, which currently 
requires governing bodies to provide details of their financial sustainability, management, 
governance, data quality and value for money, will be expanded to include new, unspecified 
“quality-related assurances” (HEFCE, 2016c, 94). HEFCE have also indicated that, where available, 
the data used to prioritise reviews will include: 
• over- and under-recruitment patterns 
• non-progression and non-completion rates 
• National Student Survey (NSS) outcomes 
• degree outcomes 
• employment outcomes 
• TEF outcomes 
(HEFCE, 2016c, 105). 
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Typical of risk-based approaches, the specific details of the ‘Annual Accountability Reviews’ have 
not been made public. However, HEFCE have noted that data will be “used as one source of 
information to inform a broader judgement supported where needed by suitably qualified and 
independent experts” (HEFCE, 2016c, 109). It will be a data-informed approach and a long way 
from the continual monitoring vision of the 2011 White Paper.  
The result of this thesis, and concerns over data-informed approaches, suggest the revised 
approach is unlikely to successfully differentiate between ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ 
providers. It will almost certainly unfairly burden some ‘satisfactory’ providers whilst allowing 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers to go unnoticed for extended periods. It is worth noting that nearly all 
the data to be considered as part of the new approach were included in this study. None were 
convincing metrics of the outcome of QAA reviews. 
There is one further option is available for a risk-based approach to quality assurance: a simple, 
rules-based approach. Analysis of all comparable QAA reviews gathered for this study shows that 
alternative providers are significantly more likely to be judged ‘unsatisfactory’ than HEIs (p=0.029) 
or FECs (p=0.018). These results were confirmed by QAA at the end of July 2016 when they 
published analysis of the last two years of reviews showing alternative providers were more likely 
to be found ‘unsatisfactory’. Adding support to the alternative provider analysis in chapter seven 
of this thesis, the report also confirmed that smaller, younger alternative providers were more 
likely to have shortcomings (QAA, 2016a). Prioritising alternative providers as a whole over HEIs 
and FECs may however still be regarded as unfair, will do little to detect ‘unsatisfactory’ 
performance in HEIs and FECs, and will generally target the smallest providers in the sector where 
‘unsatisfactory’ provision will arguably have the least impact.  
Whatever the reason, or reasons, for the available data not being able to effectively predict the 
outcome of QAA reviews, it cannot. Therefore, rather than trying and failing to prioritise reviews, 
an alternative, non-risk-based approach may be advisable. In 2013, recognising the limitations of 
a risk-based approach to quality assurance in higher education, Brown and Bekhradnia proposed 
a system of accreditation which must be renewed by all providers on a cyclical basis or 
immediately following changes of ownership (Brown and Bekhradnia, 2013). Another, non risk-
based alternative would be to randomly select providers for review with a guaranteed maximum 
time elapsing between reviews of each provider. Both non-selective approaches would avoid 
failed attempts to continually distinguish high-risk providers from others and the costs associated 
with it. Both approaches would also signal to the providers, and all other stakeholders, that every 
provider is important. Finally, both approaches would allow all providers to receive the benefits 
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of the review process; although frequently discussed as a burden, reviews do encourage 
introspection and enhancement, and allow for the sharing of best practice. Even though the 
overwhelming majority of reviews result in a ‘satisfactory’ judgement, all contain a list of 
recommendations to ensure continued good practice and improvement. Furthermore, with 
randomised reviews, providers would also need to be incentivised to maintain focus on quality 
assurance activities knowing that they could be reviewed at any time, rather than losing focus in 
between cyclical visits. Whatever approach is adopted, there is clear value in empirically 
evaluating its performance.  
A final possible future approach to quality assurance in higher education would be to abolish any 
form of external oversight. The University of Oxford has existed for over 900 years and nearly all 
universities predate HEQC and QAA; they managed to survive without external oversight so why 
should they need it now? As noted in chapter eight, some believe the market in higher education 
forces providers to maintain the quality of their provision. This argument, whilst it may hint at 
valid arguments concerning the effectiveness of review methods, overlooks the changed reality of 
the higher education sector. Immediately following the second world war, less than 2% of further 
education leavers went on to higher education. Higher education was training for an elite: only 
10% of solicitors had higher education and universities had 12 of their own MPs in parliament 
(Stevens, 2005). Today, nearly half the cohort partake in what is seen as a right for the many, a 
public service vital for economic health (HESA, 2014). The transformation in higher education 
attendance has been accompanied by a substantial investment of public funds. Moreover, even if 
public funds weren’t at stake, higher education is a post-experience, positional good. One cannot 
judge its quality until it is too late, and even if it is poor quality, it may still serve the non-stated 
purpose of elevating the purchaser’s social capital. With more providers, with new motives, in the 
sector there is more chance that this will be exploited. The market is far from perfect and will not 
guarantee quality. Whilst the quality assurance system can no doubt be improved, it cannot be 
done away with. 
 
The revised approach is therefore data-informed and unlikely to successfully identify 
‘unsatisfactory’ providers. Other options are available for a revised approach: simple, rules-based 





9.4. Data-Driven, Risk-Based Regulation and the Wider Context 
The final question to be addressed is that of how the findings of this thesis can be generalised 
beyond the quality assurance of higher education. Risk-based approaches to regulation are 
ubiquitous (Rothstein, 2013). What’s more, their use is spreading to all aspects of regulatory 
activity. As the Government noted in the 2016 higher education white paper: 
“This risk-based approach will not only be at the heart of how the OfS regulates entry to 
the higher education sector, but in the way it: allows providers access to financial support; 
assesses and assures ongoing quality; makes judgements on granting degree awarding 
powers and university title to providers; and ensures that providers have appropriate plans 
in place to protect students when a provider exits the market” 
(BIS, 2016, p.26). 
Likewise, CQC are proposing a risk-based approach to registration (CQC, 2015a). No longer are 
regulators ensuring all providers meet required standards before being allowed entry to a 
sector, and then inspecting only those providers that they feel are at risk of falling below the 
defined standards they had previously met. Instead, regulators are now checking only that the 
riskiest providers meet the required standards before being allowed entry to a sector, and 
then inspecting only those providers where the regulator feels there is sufficient risk. Given 
the results of this thesis, this trend is alarming. 
The extent to which these findings can be extended to other sectors is not known. The quality 
assurance of higher education is unique in some regards. The sensibilities around government 
interference with academic autonomy is unparalleled with the possible exception of the 
freedom of the press, the regulation of which has been a matter of much unresolved debate 
and great expense (Leveson, 2012; Greenslade, 2016). Furthermore, QAA is in the minority in 
not assessing quality itself, but rather that higher education providers have in place the 
processes to ensure their own quality.  
If it is the unique characteristics of QAA that prevents the successful operation of a data-
driven, risk-based approach, then such an approach should be able to work for other quality 
regulators like CQC or Ofsted. Whilst QAA face the challenge of assessing the risks posed by 
providers that set their own curriculum, exams and mark schemes, primary and secondary 
education, unlike higher education, has the benefit of a national curriculum and standardised 
testing allowing pupil performance and progression to be more objectively assessed. One 
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issue with CQC and Ofsted is that the outcome of their inspections, like QAA, is subjective. 
Studies have shown a lack of consistency in the judgements of both (Boyd et al., 2014; Fitz-
Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster, 2013). Perhaps then a determining factor of whether a risk-
based approach will be effective for other regulators is the objectivity of their findings. The 
Drinking Water Inspectorate is a quality regulator, but their decisions are for the most part 
objective; levels of hazardous chemicals are either low enough for the water to be safe enough 
to drink or they are not.  
An additional factor that may impact on the success of a data-driven, risk-based approach is 
the extent to which causal effects can be observed and obey rational, predictable patterns. 
The most remarkable success of statistical forecasting in the modern era is the accurate 
prediction of weather up to a week in advance (Silver, 2012). Weather forecasts are based on 
objective data – wind speeds, pressure, humidity, etc. – and Newtonian interactions of which 
predictions are readily verified and models updated constantly. The accuracy of a predictive 
model is clear. Whilst weather forecasting has improved dramatically with advances in 
computer power, the prediction of earthquakes believed to be caused by unobservable 
interactions 15km below the earth’s surface has not (Hough, 2009). Moreover, economic 
models continue to disappoint. A lot of economic data can be gathered; however, irrational 
human behaviour such as spending multiples of one’s annual salary on a tulip bulb cannot be 
predicted (Dash, 2011; Garber, 1990). 
In 1814, Simon LaPlace posited that scientific and technological advances may one day bring 
us to the point whereby all interactions and behaviours are understood, and hence man can 
foresee the future: 
“We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause 
of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set 
nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this 
intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in 
a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of 
the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just 




Despite the great advances in computer power – the kind that allows a single research student 
to consider every permutation of thousands of higher education metrics concerning hundreds 
of providers over a ten-year period – we have not reached this stage. Moreover, unless we 
inhabit a world of Calvinistic determinacy, then human irrationality, flawed data and 
unverifiable models, mean that no matter how much computational power is available, we’ll 
likely never have sufficient foresight to accurately prioritise some regulatory inspections.  
What then does this mean for risk-based regulation beyond higher education? The adoption 
of data-driven, risk-based approaches to regulation has its benefits: it is cheap, objective and 
empirically-based. However, none of these benefits will be achieved if the data has no relation 
to the regulatory findings. To implement such an approach regulators must address as best 
they can the robustness of the available data and regulatory judgements, and how verifiable 
predictive models will be. Then, any regulator can run a machine-learning exercise to 
determine if such an approach can be operated successfully. One suspects the chances of 
success will be higher in environments with meaningful, objective data, robust and verifiable 
dependent variables, and minimal opportunities for mass irrationality to undermine any 
model. Such approaches may be more likely to succeed in prioritising financial accounts to 
review or aeroplanes to safety check say, than which prisons to inspect for quality purposes. 
Whether or not a purely data-driven, or data-informed, approach is adopted by a regulator, 
this thesis has demonstrated the benefit of empirically evaluating such approaches. Without 
further empirical analysis assiduous platitudes concerning ‘making better use of data’ or 
unspecified ‘contextualised and nuanced’ solutions will simply continue the cycle of 
regulatory failings followed in quick order by revised ‘Intelligence Tools’, all whilst people are 
harmed by regulatory failings potentially more serious than a substandard education. If a 
regulator cannot demonstrate an effective model, then one must face the politically 
unpalatable decision of admitting the government, via regulators, cannot protect from all 
harms, or seek to minimise these potential harms by ceasing the expansion of regulatory 
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